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Abstract 
Accounts of the wartime experience in Britain's provinces remain few in 
number and, given the importance of the area to the war effort, a study of Tyneside 
during this period of national crisis is long overdue. Following a brief introduction 
which attempts to ground the thesis in a framework and to consider the historiography 
of this topic, the first chapter consists of a background study outlining the continuing 
importance of Tyneside to the national war effort. This focuses attention on the 
significance of the area's heavy industry, especially shipbuilding, armament 
production, engineering, and coal mining. Having established the vital nature of the 
area to the war effort chapter two considers the industries that were present on 
Tyneside. This is a wide ranging study which includes analysis of corruption, 
industrial disharmony, managerial structures, and the effects of wartime restrictions 
on industrial development. 
The central chapters in the thesis deal with the organisations that were created 
to provide protection from enemy aerial attack and from invasion. As such they 
include sections dealing with, amongst others, the Warden Service and the Home 
Guard. 
Chapters five and six are interlinked in that they deal with the reactions of the 
Tyneside public to the war. This includes, but is not limited to, sections dealing with 
evacuation, internment and alien policy, putatively bad behaviour (such as criminal 
activity), the upkeep and analysis of morale, and the impact of the air raids on 
Tyneside. A final conclusion follows chapter six and outlines areas in which further 
study would be beneficial, along with attempting to provide a description of the 
factors that faced the area at the conclusion of the war, including the impact of the 
1V 
war on local politics. This section also attempts to draw together previous arguments 
and to locate the study into a national framework. 
V 
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introduction 
For the British, the Second World War had been the `People's War', and the future 
peace was to be the `peoples' too. Many of the subsequent histories were 
unsurprisingly positive in their outlook. The end of the First World War had been 
characterised by a severe economic downturn contrasting with a sense of public 
optimism, one which was soon to be bitterly disappointed. Conversely, the cessation 
of the Second World War was met with no such economic slump. The greater social 
awareness engendered by many aspects of the conflict ensured that post-war 
governments were forced to devote a great deal of time, money, and energy in 
improving the social and working conditions of the masses. The war, through 
"Education in the forces and self-education in the air-raid shelters had assisted the 
developing consciousness of the inarticulate. "' A majority of Britons became more 
politically aware, or at least more willing to be politically involved. There were also 
more who new exactly what they "expected of a modern civilized industrial society: 
decent living standards, income and health security, a taste of the modest luxuries of 
life". 2 This new-found awareness permeated class barriers ranged from the working- 
class family huddled in their air raid shelter, to the likes of Wing Commander Guy 
Gibson, who reflected as early as 1943 that "We must learn about politics. We must 
vote for the right things, and not necessarily the traditional things. We want to see our 
country remain as great as it is to-day - forever. It all depends on the people". 
3 The 
very fact that people were increasingly becoming aware of these issues and their own 
1 Marwick, A, Britain in the Century of Total War. War, Peace & Social Change 1900-1967 (London: 
Bodley Head, 1968), p 322. 2 Ibid. 
3 Gibson, G, Enemy Coast Ahead (London: Goodall, 1990), p 286. 
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ability to shape the future was in itself an agent, and an example of, social change. 
This emotion permeated through to many of the historians who researched the period. 
The association of war with social change is far from original but most of the 
currently accepted theories on the subject stem from the works of historians who were 
working post-1945. The foremost post-war social researcher to secure acceptance of 
Over the thesis of war as a factor effecting social change was Richard Titmuss 4 
recent decades opposing views have been proposed to counter this thesis. According 
to Titmuss, the introduction of wartime welfare care and the Beveridge Report, in 
conjunction with the Labour General Election victory of 1945, showed that there was 
a radical change in public attitudes brought about as a result of wartime experiences. 
Titmuss' thesis focused on formal intervention at a central governmental level as 
being the most influential factor in the development of social policy and change. His 
central idea was that many wartime factors, especially the evacuation experience, 
acted as catalysts on social policy planning and created a wartime consensus of 
reformist fervour. 5 
Amongst the theses to be developed in an attempt to explain why social 
change should be associated with war is the military participation ratio, as espoused 
by the sociologist, Stanislaw Andreski. 6 The military participation ratio advocates 
that, in a Total War, hitherto powerless sections of society are empowered by wartime 
demands. In the case of twentieth century war this argument has been applied to the 
dependency on the working-class to provide necessary material and support for the 
war. Unfortunately there are several glaring weaknesses in this thesis: firstly, it 
assumes that the working-class is one united mass movement; secondly, the theory 
ignores the often strong conservatism and traditionalism that could be demonstrated 
4 See Titmuss, R M, Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950). s Ibid, p 506. 
6 Andreski, S, Military Organisation and Society (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1954). 
2 
by the British working"class; 7 thirdly, the military participation ratio ignores any 
safeguards that may have been put in place by the governing classes to avoid social 
destabilisation. The fact that throughout the war, and indeed during the First World 
War, British workers railed against workforce dilution would appear to show a 
working-class that was divided. The military participation ratio is overly simplistic 
and is of limited use when attempting to explain the social changes which emerged in 
Britain from the two world wars. As early as 1968 Arthur Marwick was providing 
accounts of why this thesis was of limited, if any use. 8 
Later historians disagreed with this emphasis on official bodies and instead 
looked for other reasons for change. For example, Arthur Marwick focused more on 
unguided forces resulting in alterations in the social structure. He theorised that there 
were four separate and distinct dimensions in which war effected social change. 
These four aspects were the disruption and dislocation of pre-war processes and 
relationships, the resultant testing of existing institutions and enforced changes caused 
by these tests, the active participation of previously under-represented social groups 
due to their necessary participation in the war effort and the psychological and 
emotional impact that war has upon both individuals and larger social groupings. 
Marwick argued that many of the changes that occur during wartime were spawned 
from reactionary and spontaneous social concerns and that the long-term 
consequences were unpredictable. 
The Second World War has been widely accepted as being a defining moment 
in the history of Britain and in the identity of the British people. The reasoning 
behind this characterisation has varied and, furthermore, been altered by historians 
7 DeGroot, G, Blighty. British Society in the Era of the Great War (London: Longman, 1996), pp xi- 
xiii. 
= Marwick, A, Britain in the Century of Total War, pp 14-17. 
lbid, pp 12-14. 
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and politicians since the end of the conflict, yet all agree that the war remains a 
seminal event in the British psyche. For many historians of the 1950s the war had 
been the moment when the British nation had rediscovered itself and the dismal 
shackles of the depression haunted inter-war years had been cast off. 1° For these 
observers the war was a catalyst that had shaken Britain from the semi-somnolent 
malaise which, they believed, had afflicted the country throughout the inter-war years. 
The war ensured that, once more, Britons were united, dynamic, and, above all, 
purposeful. Later historians, notably AJP Taylor, interpreted the war as being a 
defining event due to a perceived swelling of public awareness that occurred as a 
result of the conflict, for these historians "1945 was the critical, democratizing 
moment. "' 1 
The seminal work on Britain during the Second World War remains that of 
Angus Calder. 12 This work provides an admirably broad overview of the 
organisations, incidents, policies and attitudes of the time but deals largely with the 
nation as a single entity, with little emphasis on regional variations. Many of the 
views expressed in Calder's work have been challenged in recent years with 
arguments developing around the positive and negative examples of behaviour found 
amongst the general populace. During the past twenty years there have been several 
works that attempted to debunk the mythologized view of the British experience 
during the Second World War. This applies especially to the myths surrounding the 
blitz and the evacuation of Dunkirk. 13 It was, perhaps, inevitable that the country 
10 Mowat, C L, Britain Between the Wars, 1918-1940 (London: Methuen, 1955). pp 656-657. 
Baxendale, J, "You and I- All of Us Ordinary People': Renegotiating `Britishness' in Wartime', in 
Hayes, N, and Hill, J (eds), 'Millions Like Us'? British Culture in the Second World War (Liverpool: 
Liverpool University Press, 1999), p 297. 12 Calder, A, The People's War (London: Pimlico, 1969). 
" For example, see Calder, A, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), also Hylton, S, Their 
Darkest Hour. The Hidden History of the Home Front 1939-1945 (Stroud: Sutton, 2003), Ponting, C. 
1940. Myth and Reality (London: Cardinal, 1991), and Harman, N, Dunkirk The Necessary Myth 
(London: Coronet, 1981). 
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would become caught up in the propaganda attempts during the worst period of the 
war but there would appear to have been a deliberate attempt in subsequent years to 
propagate these myths. This can be partly explained by the need for a sense of 
national pride despite the diminishing importance of Britain on the post-war 
international stage. 14 
The myths and meanings of the war and, perhaps more importantly, their 
importance to the British public, have long been fought over, not only by historians 
but by politicians. The commonly expressed pre-war belief that the war had resulted 
in a victory for the left has been subsequently challenged in recent decades. It is 
inescapable that the end of the war did see the Labour landslide of 1945, the drive for 
the formation of the welfare state, and a shift in favour of a more protective and 
interventionist form of government. There was a perceptible drive, amongst 
politicians and people, for the ideals of creating a utopian New Jerusalem in post-war 
Britain's It has been argued that these changes were not as radical as was assumed 
by immediate post-war historians. The streak of conservatism that permeated much 
of British society, reflected in the widely held opinion that Britain would continue to 
be a dominant and influential world power, was an ever-present in post-war British 
society. Indeed the vision of a New Jerusalem was hardly radical. As the historian 
Correlli Barnett has argued, the liberal establishment, which he blames for the ideals 
of New Jerusalem policies, "had been a hundred years and more in the making". 16 In 
recent decades the Conservative Party has attempted, in some cases successfully, to 
associate itself with the values of wartime Britain. That right and left wings of British 
politics have both `claimed' the war is unsurprising. The importance of the Second 
14 Black, J, and MacRaild, D M, Studying History 2n° Edition (London: Macmillan, 2000), p 7. 's Barnett, C, The Audit of War. The Illusion & Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (London: Pan, 
1996), p 11. 
'61bid, p 12. For a detailed discussion of the educational and social developments behind the dream of 
New Jerusalem see: Barnett, C, The Collapse of British Power (London: Pan, 2002). 
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World War to developing national identities and the political process in Britain cannot 
be overstated. It is true that "the people's war of 1940 was a constant point of 
political reference" until very recently. '? Whilst memories of the war, and 1940 in 
particular, have always been a key factor in the myth of modern Britain, it is also true 
that differing political groups have emphasised different areas of the myths of the war, 
for example, emphasising the importance of the `people' over the military. The spirit 
of 1940 is a long-lasting legacy in Britain. It was evoked throughout the Falklands 
War, in subsequent election campaigns, and, as recently, as 1999 William Hague 
reacted to Labour Party attacks by invoking his, as leader of the Conservatives, almost 
spiritual link to Winston Churchill and the `People's War'. 18 The war resulted in a 
strange juxtaposition of identities: the majority wished for a New Jerusalem whilst 
wartime society continued to be dominated by traditional British culture and by a 
persistent national pride. 
The positive view of the impact of the Second World War is challenged by 
those who seek to demonstrate the damage which the war, and planning for post-war 
society, had 'wrought on the country. Corelli Barnett agrees with Marwick that many 
of the changes that occurred during the war arose from reactionary and spontaneous 
social concerns but claims that the long-term impact on the country, far from being 
unpredictable, was plainly obvious. The war had bankrupted Britain by April 1941 to 
such an extent that its continuance was only made possible by American aid, provided 
under the Lease-Lend Act. 19 Not only had the war bankrupted the country but it had 
also led to the collapse of the all-important export trade and had forced the country 
into selling off valuable overseas assets in order to raise funds. In 1944 the total 
amount borrowed from abroad or sold off in overseas assets came to £655 million, an 
" Smith, M, Britain and 1940. History, Myth and Popular Memory (London: Routledge, 2000), p 111. 
Ibid, pp 111-129. 
19 Barnett, C, The Audit of War, p 38. 
6 
increase of 935% on the figure from 193820 The penury of the country was widely 
publicised throughout the latter years of the war with a government white paper and 
extensive articles in journals and newspapers. Barnett argues that the policies of 
New Jerusalem that were being proposed, especially by the Labour Party, were 
ignorant of the harsh realities of the state of any post-war British economy. He 
further argues that politicians, including Liberals such as Beveridge, urged industrial 
and social reconstruction without considering hotiv such policies could be paid for. 21 
Despite these criticisms it is argued that those who were behind the New Jerusalem 
policies acted honestly but were fooling themselves due to their romantic outlook on 
life. 
Recent years have seen the balance of the historical argument swing back in 
favour of the more positive view of the `People's War'. Several recently published 
books have portrayed the negativity surrounding aspects of behaviour such as crime 
and profiteering as being overly emphasised. They reiterate the more traditional view 
that the vast majority of Britons were indeed steadfast, loyal, and committed to 
making personal sacrifices in the name of the war against Hitler. 22 
Tyneside's experience of war during the period 1939 to 1945 was as unique as 
it was important. As a major industrial area, specialising in shipbuilding and 
armaments production, the importance of the region to the national war effort cannot 
be overstated. Indeed, this significance was recognised by the German government as 
well as in this country. The area was mentioned in one of Hitler's war directives as a 
strategically vital target whilst the crucial nature of the area was stressed in German 
20 Ibid, p 39. 
21 lbid, pp 40-43. u See, for example, MacKay, R, Half the Battle: Civilian Morale an Britain during the Second World 
War (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002), and, by the same author, The Test of War: 
Inside Britain 1939-45 (London: University College London Press, 1999). 
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radio broadcasts 23 Whilst the saturation bombing that was expected did not develop, 
there was indeed heavy and in some cases sustained aerial attack on the area. For 
such a nationally important area for the war effort Tyneside, and indeed the people of 
Tyneside, received scant recognition for the contribution that they made to the war 
effort. Indeed there were complaints throughout the earlier years of the war that 
Tyneside was receiving less protection than other `less vital' areas of the country. 
The region played an increasingly large role in the replacement of vital war 
material, especially shipping and heavy weaponry, lost due to enemy action. The 
shipyards of north-eastern England replaced over half of the four million tons of 
British shipping lost during the course of the conflict. Without this contribution it is 
likely that the battle of the Atlantic would have been lost, or at least extended in 
duration, and much needed supplies would have failed to reach Britain. It is perhaps 
fitting that many of the ships that merchant seamen from the area lost their lives on 
were built in or near their own hometowns. Many of these merchant seamen lost their 
lives ferrying vital supplies, such as locally produced coal and steel, from Tyneside to 
London as can be seen in this quotation from comic Ernie Wise when considering his 
own wartime service. "Though the Merchant Navy didn't have the glamorous image 
of its Royal counterpart, it was suffering fantastic casualties performing its part in the 
war effort - ferrying essential supplies to the capital, it was the constant target of air 
and sea attack, and on my particular run an awful lot of people, especially Tynesiders, 
lost their lives., -)24 
Tyneside was also an important military base, especially for naval forces. The 
area off the North East coast came under the command of the Royal Navy's Tyne 
Sub-Command, itself a part of the larger Rosyth Command. By the summer of 1940 
u North East Diary 1939-1945 website [http: //www. bpears. org. uk/NE-Diary/], 2003. 24 Ibid. 
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there were twelve destroyers and a cruiser, the HMS Coventry, based in the Tyne. 
This was in addition to large coastal forces consisting of mine sweepers, armed 
trawlers, motor torpedo boats and so on. Whilst at Blyth, in Northumberland, there 
was a major Royal Navy submarine base. 
Tyneside had a peculiar, and important, role in British wartime society. Its 
economy was largely based upon armaments, shipbuilding and mineral production 
industries. All of which were vital to the success of the war effort. It was assumed 
that important industrial centres, especially Tyneside, would be vulnerable to air 
attack. Efforts to build up an emergent aircraft industry on Tyneside met with a lack 
of official support due to the area's vulnerability. Britain's wartime aircraft 
production facilities were instead centred on, although not restricted to, Coventry. It 
was envisaged that special measures would need to be put in place to provide 
protection from air attack. As early as 1938 the Chief Constable of Newcastle Police, 
Mr FJ Crawley, was concerned with the probable requirement of special provisions 
stating, "Owing to the accessibility of the River Tyne and the importance of this area 
as an arsenal, Tyneside can be regarded as an important military objective and special 
measures will be required to meet possible air attack. "25 
The industrial, military, and civilian contributions that Tyneside made to the 
national war effort make a study of the area during the period long overdue. In order 
to anchor the study into the national experience it is necessary to look at the area in 
relation to other parts of Britain. Comparative techniques allowed me to draw out the 
unique qualities that were present on Tyneside during the war and also enable us to 
evaluate how appropriate the national perspective of the war is when dealing with 
u TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes & reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP), May 131° 1938, p 61. 
9 
isolated, but strategically important, regions and Tyneside was, indeed, isolated both 
in a geographical and industrial sense, from the heart of British government. 
The majority of the previously completed studies of the Second World War 
have concentrated on the national experience as a whole and have as such been 
general interpretations of the period. Others have focused on tightly knit, yet isolated, 
topics within the period. For example, evacuation, 26 specific bombing incidents, 
27 or 
the home guard have all attracted significant research attention 28 Few studies have 
considered the variances that existed across different regions or even in different 
towns. 29 Where regional research has been performed it is largely restricted to the 
capital or to areas which experienced significant upheaval due to enemy bombing, 
such as Coventry. 30 Studies of the provinces during the war, and especially during the 
blitz period, remain "almost non-existent. "31 This is a problem that was highlighted 
by Calder during the 1960s but has yet to be resolved by sufficient research. 32 
Thus, this research is important in that it focuses on a tightly knit, yet diverse, 
area that was possessed of a strong regional identity. Whilst there have been studies 
of the social and economic effect of the war these have tended to concentrate solely 
on the national experience; there has been little research carried out on the 
consequences of the war in specific localities. Tyneside is an interesting area for such 
research as it was so dependent on the armaments manufacturing industry and had a 
26 For example, see Brown, M, Evacuees: Evacuation in Wartime Britain 1939-194S (Stroud: Sutton 
Publishing, 2000), and Crosby, T C, The Impact of Civilian Evacuation in WW2 (London: Croom 
Helm, 1986). 
27 For example, see Longmate, N, Air Raid (London: Hutchinson, 1976). 28 For example, see MacKenzie, S P, The Home Guard A Military and Political History (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000). 
29 For a study of the Midlands, see Thorns, D, War, Industry and Society (London: Routledge, 1989). 
The most recent regional study, although it considers both the First and Second World Wars, is 
probably Osborne, B D, and Armstrong, R, Glasgow. A City at War (Edinburgh: Birlinn, 2003). 
See Lancaster, B, and Mason, T, Life & Labour in a 20 4 Century City. The Experience of Coventry 
(Coventry: Cryfield Press, 1992). 
31 Calder, A, The People's War, p 630. 
321bid. 
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strong military tradition of service. This research considers the broader social and 
economic impact of the war on a locality and, as such, is vital to our understanding of 
how the effects and interpretations of war can vary, even within national boundaries. 
Much of this research deals with the events on wartime Tyneside from the 
perspective of the `ordinary' people who lived and worked in the region. As such it 
has much in common with the latter generations of the Annales School of History. 
The third generation demonstrated the importance of regional studies and strongly 
influenced the study of regional history in Britain. 33 The combined approach of 
studying microhistories with the openness to histories of mentalities is vital when 
considering the impact of a `Total War' on a complex 20th Century society. Such 
methodologies did not become popular in Britain until after the end of the Second 
World War. Together with the `New Social History' that penetrated British historical 
thought during the 1960s the field of historical study was widened to include people 
who had previously been sidelined as unimportant. The popular perspective of the 
war makes such a method very apt. The war became accepted as the `People's War' 
and has attained a special place in the defining of the nation's 20th Century character, 
and in interpretations of popular history. As a `Total War' the conflict involved every 
aspect of British society and, it has been claimed, acted to break down the traditional 
class barriers that had permeated British life. The people of Britain became every bit 
as important, if not more so, than the institutions that controlled policy decisions. For 
this reason Second World War Britain lends itself to a study from 'below'. 34 
Amongst the new branches of history that achieved popularity in Britain 
during the 1960s was the field of oral history. Accounts from eye-witnesses have 
33 See Marwick, A, The New Nature of History. Knowledge, Evidence, Language (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave, 2001), pp 88-96. 
See Sharpe, I, 'History from Below', in Burke, P (ed), New Perspectives on Historical Writing 2"d 
Edition (Cambridge: Polity, 2001), pp 25-42. 
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played a substantial part in my early research but the field is pitted with dangers. The 
accounts given must be, whenever possible, validated by other evidence. Oral sources 
cannot be entirely depended on and are often seen as being "second best" when 
compared to written, official, records. 5 Accurate recall of sometimes traumatic 
events can be problematic in the immediate aftermath, let alone after fifty or more 
years, whilst the experience of one witness may not be representative of the 
majority. 36 Memories are often also more involved with the relationship between 
memory, identity and national mythology. 37 Critics of oral history dismiss the field 
by criticising its usefulness, importance and accuracy. To these historians, oral 
history "tells us only trivia about important people and important things (by their own 
lights) about trivial people. "38 When looking at historical documents historians 
commonly look for three qualities: stability of form; chronological exactness; and 
supporting evidence. 39 Critics claim that oral history is of limited value because oral 
testimony is simply representative of one, often minor, individual. 
In the case of Second World War Britain, however, the involvement of every 
individual in the war effort to some extent means that every testimony can be viewed 
as important. Unfortunately, the myth of wartime Britain has served to colour a large 
proportion of oral testimony. The overall impact of these myths on British identity 
was readily identifiable in many of the interviews that I carried out and, whilst cliches 
become such because of a commonality of experience, some related events were 
contradicted by other, documentary, evidence. Whilst this could, and did, result in 
35 Prins, G, `Oral History', in Burke, P (ed), New Perspectives, p 121. 36 Perks, R, and Thomson, A (eds), The Oral History Reader (London: Routledge, 2000), pp 273-283 
and pp 320-332. Also see Thompson, P, The Voice of the Past. Oral History (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1978), or Prins, G, `Oral History' in Burke, P (ed), New Perspectives, pp 120-156. 37 For an example see Thomson, A. `Anzac Memories: Putting Popular Memory Theory into Practice in 
Australia', in Green, A, and Troup, K, The houses of history. A critical reader in twentieth-century 
history and theory (Manchester. Manchester University Press, 1999), pp 239-252. 38 Prins, G, `Oral History', in Burke, P (ed), New Perspectives, p 126. 39 Ibid, pp 125-126. 
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some interview accounts being less than correct in historical detail the method still 
proved useful when considering the question of how people had come to view the war 
and their part in it. It is true that many people had had indeed created a "usable past 
... through adjusting the sequence of events to fit an overall narrative", often resulting 
in a conflict with documentary sources. 40 Myth can indeed be a "pervasive influence" 
on oral evidence and it is studying the process of memory, from actual events to, in 
the case of Second World War Britain, national consensus that oral history is most 
important 41 
Throughout my research I carried out interviews with several people who had 
memories of wartime Tyneside. In addition to this I also received written accounts of 
memories in response to general appeals for information and information from a local 
library club. Fortuitously, a local newspaper was also preparing a supplement on the 
war and the local history reporter from that newspaper generously agreed to furnish 
me with the letters that he had received. 42 In total, combining both oral interviewees 
and correspondents, the accounts of some 70 people were gathered. These ranged 
from childhood memories to those of young adults. Unfortunately, it is very difficult 
to obtain accounts from those who were more mature during the war (someone who 
was 30 in 1940 would now be aged 95). This is another limiting factor that ensured 
that, whilst important, oral histories were not a major plank of my work. It rapidly 
became clear to me that many of the accounts that I was receiving, whilst given in 
good faith, were prejudiced by the myths that have taken root around our popular 
conceptions of the home front during the Second World War. Even recollections 
from the time can prove to be suspect due to the emotional state of the contributors or 
40 Green, A, and Troup, K, The houses of history, p 234. 41 Ibid, p 235. 
42 Details can be found in the Bibliography and, when used directly in the main text, in footnotes. I am 
indebted to Ray Marshall for permission to use letters sent to him in his capacity of local history 
reporter at the Evening Chronicle. 
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to the fact that many people often said what they thought they ought to. Many of 
these accounts were subsequently disproved by studies of the available archival 
material. Those that did prove useful in this research were carefully checked against 
all the known primary evidence of the event. 
The foundation of any research is the availability of relevant sources. 
Fortunately, there are a large number of archival materials available for this period of 
British history. The availability of sources becomes all the more important when 
undertaking research in local history. 43 As an area, Tyneside is rich in such source 
material. Local archives contain many of the papers produced by local authorities 
during the war and range from intelligence reports estimating the state of civilian 
morale to memoranda sent out to local ARP wardens. The papers of various trade 
organisations and private companies are also often to be found in local archives and 
these have presented me with the opportunity to consider the wartime situation on 
Tyneside from the point of view of a variety of professions, ranging from butchers to 
shipbuilding and armaments magnates. Despite the substantial regional autonomy 
that was gained by local authorities during the war the influence of central 
government remained important. For this reason specific papers contained within the 
National Archives at Kew have proven invaluable when looking to compare and 
contrast the opinions that existed on Tyneside and in Whitehall. General statistical 
evidence proved useful when considering the impact of the war upon Tyneside 
industry and, whilst newspaper articles and photographs also proved useful they were 
treated with considerable caution due to the problems that are involved in the 
interpretation of such sources. 
43 Black, J, and MacRaild, D M, Studying History, pp 93-95. 
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The definition of what exactly constitutes a `Total War' has vexed many 
historians. In this thesis, `Total War' denotes a conflict that necessitates the 
mobilisation of the vast majority of the population of a country to take part in either 
armed service or civilian work vital to the war effort. As well as this, a Total War can 
be said to involve the deliberate targeting of the civilian population by an enemy, thus 
placing them in the front line. An essential war aim of Total War, however, is to 
degrade morale and to reduce the ability of a country to prosecute the war 
successfully. Churchill believed the Second World War to be a `Total War' as every 
member of the population, regardless of gender or age, was a part of the unified 
national war effort. 44 The role of women, especially in the field of work, has been 
examined by several historians, most notably Penny Summerfield 45 These fail to 
analyse regional variations and are of limited use in a local study. Their best use is in 
contrasting what has come to be seen as the `national norm' with regional distinctions. 
Historians have argued that the Total Wars of the twentieth century both led to 
a corresponding shift in the social structures of Britain. The extent to which these 
conflicts instigated a restructuring of the political and social concerns of the populace 
has also been the subject of debate. The long-term effect of these changes, especially 
those brought about during the First World War, has been questioned in recent years 
with one historian, facetiously playing with Trotsky's locomotive of history theory, 46 
claiming that "If war is the locomotive of history, the rolling stock in this case was 
typically British: slow, outmoded and prone to delay and cancellation. "47 
0 
44 Calder, A, The People's War, pp 31-32. 45 See: Summerfield, P, Women Workers in the Second World War. Production and Patriarchy in 
Conflict (London: Croom Helm, 1984), also, Summerfield, P, Reconstructing Women's Wartime Lives 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1998). 
46 See Marwick, A, Britain in the Century of Total War, pp 12-14. 47 DeGroot, G, Blighty, p 311. 
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The greatest difference between the Second World War and those preceding it 
was in the level of commitment expected of the civilian population. The war required 
massive mobilisation of all forms of labour and increased levels of regulations to 
govern a greatly expanded, and unwieldy, labour force. The population of Tyneside 
was exposed to severe bombing, which led to higher civilian casualty figures than had 
ever been experienced before. It is worth noting that national casualties, more than 
60,000 killed and over 80,000 injured, 48 were not as severe as pre-war experts had 
predicted, though these figures do not include more than 45,000 merchant seamen and 
fishermen that were killed as a result of enemy action, 49 a point which impacted 
greatly on Tyneside. 
The authorities, as well as the populace, feared a mass bombing campaign and 
had begun to prepare for it well in advance of war being declared. Their plans 
included the evacuation of all children, parents with young children, and the infirm, 
from urban conurbations to rural areas where it was expected that bombing would be 
less severe. There was a great fear that an enemy would also utilise poison gas during 
future bombing raids. This led to several documented false alarms during or after 
raids had taken place. 50 The experience of being bombed was to characterise the 
British people's attitude towards the war. In order to prevent accurate bombing of the 
urban population greater powers were given to the police, and to the Warden's 
Service, to enforce blackout regulations, and there were occasional problems caused 
by over-rigorous application of these regulations: one Tyneside policeman cautioning 
48 Winter, J M, `The Demographic Consequences of the War', in Smith, H L, War and Social Change: British Society in the Second World War (Manchester University Press), 1986, p 163. 49 Thorpe, A, The Longman Companion to Britain in the Era of the Two World Wars 1914-45 
(London: Longman, 1994) p 50. 50 . WAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Reporting on an incident that occurred on September 17th 1940. 
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his own mother over a breach of blackout regulations 51 The preparedness of ARP 
measures varied nationally and the reactions of the populace to bombing also varied. 
The myth that everyone stoically `took it' is explored in this thesis by considering the 
population of Tyneside as a whole. 
Possibly the most visible, and, to those who were involved, the most 
memorable, result of early war air raid precautions policy was the evacuation scheme. 
"The early days of World War II will always be associated with the sight of British 
school children marching raggedly to train depots as they left the vulnerable cities ... 
in the face of threatened bombing raids by the Luftwaffe. "52 During the Munich 
Crisis of 1938 there was a rehearsal of the evacuation plan in some areas. 
Nevertheless, when the plan was implemented for real there were large-scale 
logistical problems. Despite the popularity of the plan on Tyneside, the scheme came 
in for much national criticism, and many of the local evacuees, an estimated 80% by 
1940,53 returned to their homes in the following weeks or months. The evacuation 
scheme also had an impact upon socio-political thought in Britain by revealing the 
levels of poverty that prevailed in many of the urban areas of Great Britain. This 
provided an added impetus to the demands for greater social service provision. Due 
to the popularity of the plan on Tyneside it is an eminently suitable area to choose for 
a case study of the evacuation system. 
To counteract the threat of heavy air raids it was recognised that large 
numbers of voluntary air raid precaution workers would need to be recruited and fully 
trained at the commencement of hostilities. This force was realised well in advance 
of 1939, for Stanley Baldwin's government issued the first Air Raid Precautions 
51 Newcastle Evening Chronicle, Remember When: On the Home Front, supplement 4, March 11th 2002, p 15. 
52 Crosby, T L, The Impact of Civilian Evacuation, p 1. 53 MacNicol, J, `The Effect of the Evacuation of Schoolchildren on Official Attitudes to State 
Intervention' in Smith, H L, War and Social Change, p 14. 
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Circular to the various local authorities in September 1935. The onus of providing 
ARP remained with the local authorities throughout the war. In April 1937 the Air 
Raid Wardens Service was formed and, a year later, this had recruited some 200,000 
men. Auxiliary Firemen were also being recruited during this period, although 
training remained rudimentary at best. Police officers, and some local government 
workers, were trained in the methods of anti-gas warfare as a precautionary measure. 
During January 1939 a pamphlet was issued to every household cataloguing various 
full and part time war jobs, whilst, by midsummer, there were 1.5 million volunteers 
for the Civil Defence Services. In addition, it was necessary for the local authorities 
to arrange for the entire populace to be fitted for, and issued with respirators, a 
complicated and time consuming task. 54 
The demands placed upon Tyneside industry during the period far outstripped 
anything that had been experienced before. Domestic production was seen as 
important at the outset of the war, but by 1940 it was viewed as vital-55 It was 
anticipated that the demand for workers would be much greater than during the First 
World War and that measures would have to be taken by central government to cope 
with this demand. There would be no repeat of the `business as usual' policy of the 
First World War. There was also concern regarding the threat of industrial action. A 
fine balance was required between introducing new measures and the risk of 
undermining morale amongst the workers who saw their right to strike as 
sacrosanct. 56 This was in turn recognised by the government, not least in the 
Emergency Powers (Defence) Bill of 1937, which was anxious not to provoke 
sa TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45), and MD/NC/127/1. Also, see Craven, P, `Passive Air Defence in 
Great Britain, 1936-1939, the Production and Distribution of Gas Masks', unpublished MPhil, East 
Anglia, 1999. 
ss Stammers, N Civil Liberties in Britain during the Second World War (London: Croom Helm, 1983), 
? 
6195* Ibid. pp 195-197. 
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avoidable industrial action. This bill stated that there should be no provision that 
would limit or curtail the right of civilians to strike. 
57 The upkeep of civilian and, 
more especially, the workers', morale became an issue of increasing importance 
throughout the war. This was not aided by the fact that football, which had long been 
a popular form of recreation on Tyneside, was severely curtailed by the war. 
Although some matches were staged crowds were limited, the wartime maximum was 
15,000 in Newcastle but this often fell to 2,000, and the football league had been 
postponed for the duration of the war. 58 
As in the previous war it was envisaged that volunteers would desert their 
employers in order to join the armed forces. To prevent this problem a schedule of 
reserved occupations was announced in September 1938. This ensured that 
employers could hang on to skilled workers when their jobs were adjudged to be vital 
for the prosecution of the war. As skilled workers were to be in higher demand than 
before the war it was likely that wage demands would increase and that there would 
also be incidents of headhunting of skilled workers. To discourage this practice, 
legislation was introduced to limit the rights of workers to move from one employer 
to another. 
All the adjustments necessary for the prosecution of a `Total War' would 
disturb the social fabric of Tyneside. The lack of research dealing with the area 
during the war is surprising. Tyneside is ideal for the study of the implications of war 
on a region that was, prior to the war, in a transitional stage with traditional industries 
failing and large amounts of unemployment. The area also has a history of extensive 
participation in the armed forces and, due to its industrial importance, was expected to 
play a significant role in Britain's war effort. 
57 Ibid, pp 195-196. 
s$ Joannou, P, United. The First 100 Years ... and More: The Official History of 
Newcastle United FC 
1882 to 1995 (2"°' Edition) (Leicester: Polar Print, 1995), pp 167-171. 
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Chapter 1 
The Arsenal Economy? 
Pre-War Industrial Tyneside 
By 1900, Tyneside had already established a world-wide renown as an area of heavy 
industry. This reputation was built around several key industries: coal mining, 
shipbuilding, heavy engineering, and armaments production. The trade was reliant 
upon overseas orders as well as home-based business. This was made possible by 
easy access to a major port. At the heart of this regional development was the River 
Tyne. The river provided access to overseas markets; its water was also a necessary 
material for many of the steel foundries and for the shipbuilding industry. Another 
driving factor helping to keep Tyneside industry at the forefront throughout this 
period was the bold and entrepreneurial spirit that had prevailed amongst the 
management community. The actions and abilities of local entrepreneurs were of 
great importance to the development of both Tyneside and Newcastle. A close-knit 
entrepreneurial elite controlled the types of development that succeeded in the area 
through their own creativity, business acumen, and monetary investment, and, whilst 
the debate over the decline in entrepreneurial ability continues to this day, it is clear 
that in this area the entrepreneurs were a key factor. 58 
The First World War had resulted in a huge increase in demand for additional 
shipping, both merchant and military, and the shipyards of the North East, with their 
skilled workers, made a massive contribution to the fulfilment of this demand. 
58 Lendrum, 0, 'An Integrated Elite. Newcastle's Economic Development 1840-1914', in Colls, R, and 
Lancaster, B, Newcastle upon Tyne, pp 27-28. 
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During this period the shipyards of the area were producing, on average, five ships 
every week. The total tonnage produced by North East yards during the war came to 
nearly 3,500,000 tons. All of this was achieved despite the severe drain of men 
leaving for service in the armed forces. At this time there were forty separate 
establishments repairing ships at forty-six dry docks. The importance of the ship 
repair yards, combined with new production, made the area's contribution one of the 
most strategically vital to the war effort. Over the course of the war almost 30,000 
ships were repaired in the area, these ranged from tankers and cargo ships to the 
largest battleships and cruisers in the Royal Navy. The increased importance of the 
region was demonstrated in the comments made by John Meade Faulkner, then 
Chairman of Armstrong-Whitworth, who declared Tyneside to be "a Government 
arsenal under Governmental control". 59 Workers and management were well aware 
that this situation was unlikely to outlast the conflict. The cyclical nature of the 
shipbuilding and armaments industries upon which Tyneside was so dependent was 
nothing new: such conditions had existed since the late 19`h century6° Indeed the 
government had become convinced that the major armaments manufacturers were so 
vital, as a national resource in times of war, that they were often persuaded to place 
orders when there was little demand and so fostered an often artificial level of 
profitability in the industry. 61 The sheer amount of industrial development on 
Tyneside can be seen on the two maps, dating from 1916, overleaf. 62 
59 Dougan, D, The History of North East Shipbuilding (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp 
135-136. Also Clarke, J F, Building Ships on the North East Coast, a Labour of Love, Risk and Pain 
Vol 2: c]914-1980 (1979) 
60 Arnold, A J, `Riches beyond the dreams of avarice'?: commercial returns on British warship 
construction, 1880-1914', Economic History Review, 104,2 (2001), pp 267-289. 61 Kaldor, M, The Baroque Arsenal (London: Abacus, 1983), p 24. 62 See Maps 1 and 2, overleaf. Both maps are taken from Clarke, J F, A Century of Service to 
Engineering and Shipbuildiing: a Centenary History of the North East Coast Institution of Engineers 
and Shipbuilders, 1884-1984 (Newcastle: The Institution, 1984). 
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War increased the profitability of these industries: Palmer's recovered from 
being £130,000 in debt in 1912 to registering a profit of £40,000 in 1915. However, 
such a turnaround served only to disguise the worsening overall situation. The war 
had resulted in a demand for a massive increase in capacity - an increase that would 
prove unsustainable in a more economically rational, peacetime, climate. The war 
had also served to hinder the advancement of production techniques and had disguised 
the faults that lay in the current processes. The need for both warships and merchant 
vessels resulted in a rush of construction where little energy was expended upon the 
development of new techniques or methods of managerial planning. Countries that 
were not directly involved in the war, especially Japan and Sweden, gradually became 
more advanced and more efficient than their British counterparts. 63 Whilst the late 
involvement of the USA allowed that country to invest substantial funds in its own 
shipyards and created technological advances that British manufacturers could not 
compete with. This was a factor that would prove costly to the shipbuilding industry 
in general and Tyneside in particular during the next twenty years. " 
Whilst Tyneside industries had contributed mightily to the national effort 
during the First World War, they had succeeded only in substituting short-term gain 
for long-term stagnation. Plans for the post-war period were sketchy or non-existent 
and the attitude amongst the major employers on Tyneside seemed to consist of an 
assumption that the pre-war status-quo would be maintained automatically. Post-war 
attempts to expand into other markets were ill-planned, under-funded, and, often, 
financially disastrous. 65 
63 See Vall, N, `Explorations in Comparative History. Economy and Society in Malmo and Newcastle 
since 1945', unpublished PhD thesis, University of Northumbria (2000). TM Ibid. 
6s Kaldor, M, The Baroque Arsenal, pp 32-33. 
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The inter-war years: Stagnation, Weakness, and Re-armament 
At the end of the First World War the heavy industries on Tyneside faced a 
stem test. The war had provided an artificial boost to the munitions industry and most 
especially the shipbuilding and ship repairing industry, but the short term financial 
benefits had come at a great cost. A combination of governmental controls, increased 
demand, managerial inertia, and workplace discontent had led to a shortage of 
research and development work. This had resulted in the majority of the industrial 
concerns on Tyneside no longer being as competitive in the world market as they had 
been four years previously. The area was more dependent than ever on a small 
number of key, specialised, industries. These concerns were experiencing increasing 
pressure from abroad where competitors were modernising at a significantly faster 
rate. 66 Despite government recognition that the area was overly dependent on a small 
number of industries, and incentives to open modern branch factories, there was a 
lack of newer industries locating such factories on Tyneside. During the period 1932 
to 1935 only one branch factory was opened in the North East Coast area, from a 
nation-wide total of 228.67 This is a stark indication of the dependency of Tyneside 
upon the declining traditional heavy industries. Developments that attempted to 
introduce newer industries to the area, such as at the Team Valley Estate, often found 
that they could not attract a sufficient workforce. The traditional heavy industries 
were viewed in a positive light by the general Tyneside workers but newer, lighter, 
66 Heim, C E, `Industrial Organisation and Regional Development in Interwar Britain', The Journal of 
Economic History, Vol. 43,4 (December 1983), pp 931-952. 
67 Ibid, p 938. 
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industries were looked on unfavourably and were often forced to rely on foreign 
labour or young women. 8 
Despite the managerial stagnation that permeated the majority of north-east 
industrial concerns of the time, the directors of several of the large Tyneside 
companies were aware of the tests that faced them. A warning given, for example, to 
the shareholders of Armstrong-Whitworth at the end of the war when they were told 
that "We have anxious times ahead of us"69 As a producer of guns and warships the 
firm realised that the demand that had made prior substantial profits possible was 
about to dry up. As a response to this the firm planned to diversify into new, up and 
coming, markets such as auto-vehicles. 70 Indeed prior to the war the company had 
produced small numbers of both cars and trucks at its site in Scotswood. In order to 
strengthen this side of their concern Armstrong-Whitworth purchased Siddeley-Deasy 
of Coventry a year after the end of the war but subsequent development was poorly 
planned and obsessed with the luxury market. 7' Hope was also placed in the 
prospects of the firm being able to successfully seize a sizeable portion of the 
locomotive industry and the Directors envisaged Scotswood becoming a major 
national site for the building of locomotive engines in the near future. 72 
The Tyneside firm failed in its bid to capture a substantial portion of the auto- 
vehicle trade but remained aware of the need for diversification. Although the 
company's leadership appeared to be showing the forward thinking that would be 
necessary to prosper in the future, a malaise common to British industry at the time 
68 See, for example, Loebl, H, Government Factories and the Origins of British Regional Policy 1934- 
1948 (Aldershot: Avesbury, 1988) 
69 Scott, J D, Vickers. A History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963), p152. 
70 For a history of the firm up until its merger with Vickers, see Warren, K, Armstrongs of Elswick: 
.. rowth in engineering and armaments to the merger with Vickers (London: Macmillan, 1989). 71 Kaldor, M, The Baroque Arsenal, p 32. 
72 Ibid, p 31. Also, see Smith, K, `From Ships to Shops', in Ayris, I, et al, Water Under the Bridges. 
Newcastle's Twentieth Century (Newcastle: Tyne Bridge, 1999), pp 32-33. 
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still persisted: outmoded forms of management. Armstrong's retained an autocratic 
and stifling approach to management and this weakness was exacerbated for much of 
the period by the appointment of Sir Gwyn West to the role of Chairman. 73 West was 
an opinionated, headstrong and domineering man who proved to be unwilling to take 
advice on issues where his knowledge was lacking; he was also uncommunicative. 
One historian of the firm compares his appointment to the inheritance of a medieval 
throne in that whilst it bestowed total power there was also a loneliness and 
vulnerability about the position. 74 
The collapse of an over ambitious plan to develop a large area of the 
Newfoundland coast had, by the early 1920s, left the company in dire financial 
trouble. By 1925 Armstrongs had a trade deficit of almost one million pounds and 
also owed over two million to the Bank of England. Uncertainty over the firm's 
future led to an alarming slump in the share price and the possibility of the largest 
employer on Tyneside entering into receivership became increasingly likely. The 
ramifications for the economy of Tyneside if this happened would have been 
disastrous, and worried speculation continued for several weeks. Concern over the 
situation also arose in Whitehall. The Admiralty was anxious about the effect that 
losing such a major industrial manufacturer would have in the event of a war and 
lobbied for a solution to be found urgently. It became apparent that a merger with 
Vickers was the only thing that would save the company. This course of action was 
favoured by the Bank of England. The Governor, engaged in hyperbole, describing 
the possibility of a deal as "desirable" in the case of Vickers, but absolutely 
"essential" for the sake, not only of Armstrongs, but also for the country as a whole. 7 
73 Both the names Armstrongs and Armstrong's are given in official reports but in the interests of 
standardisation the company is referred to as Armstrongs throughout this thesis. 74 Scott, J D, Vickers. A History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963), p 153. '5lbid, p 165. Also Kaldor, M, The Baroque Arsenal, pp 32-33. 
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After several false starts, including the refusal by the then Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Winston Churchill, to provide the sum of £1.5 million over five years, the 
merger finally proceeded on October 3 1St 1927. 
Notwithstanding this (attempted) consolidation, the armaments industry on 
Tyneside continued to experience lean times, as the government was determined on a 
course of disarmament. Naval shipbuilding was badly hit and the Walker Naval Yard 
suffered from a lack of orders, especially for large vessels such as battleships, 
resulting in the yard being temporarily closed during two separate periods, 1928-1930 
and November 1931-May 1934. Production of heavy guns kept the company going at 
Elswick; the only site in the country, apart from Barrow, where both guns and 
mountings could be produced. The reliance of the company on this product was such 
that a director was quoted, in 1932, as saying that heavy ordnance production was 
"still our most profitable industry. "76 
Despite a growing reputation for stagnation, some new development was 
undertaken at this time. The company branched out into the design and production of 
armoured vehicles and tanks, spearheaded by the development team of Sir John 
Carden and Mr VG Lloyd. This expansion was to prove an additional boon for 
Tyneside as work was moved from the company's Sheffield site to Elswick. This 
business was to prove profitable for a company which dominated this field. Orders, 
however, remained low; and without foreign contracts, the company no doubt would 
have been forced to abandon this side of its work. Overall, the profits created by the 
production of armoured vehicles helped the Tyneside economy when the broader 
economic outlook for the traditional heavy industries common to Tyneside was bleak. 
Orders in 1931 included not just contracts from the War Office but also from both 
76 Ibid, p187. 
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India and Poland. The importance of the tank industry, to the company in particular 
and to Tyneside as a whole, were reflected by the comments of one of the firms 
directors when he stated, in 1932, that without the production of armoured vehicles 
the machine shops at Elswick would have been closed. 
During this period the company, which was the sole British producer, had 
absolute control over the developing tank industry in Britain. The fact that there was 
little or no competition in this field was another result of the policy of disarmament. 
A factor which was criticised after the Second World War by official war historians 
when it was stated that, "The tank itself was a British invention, yet the supply and 
design of tanks were allowed to dwindle almost to vanishing point ... and but 
for the 
solitary and pioneering efforts of ... Vickers-Armstrongs the country would 
have 
possessed no facilities for the design and development of armoured vehicles. "77 This 
was another sad reflection of the apathy and torpor that dominated the majority of the 
political and managerial classes in Britain during this period but, again, reflects the 
importance role of at least one Tyneside industry in the defence of the country and, in 
times of war, to the national war effort. Indeed, this was an industry of worldwide 
importance: the sale of a tank named the English Workman to Russia in 1931 was to 
form the basis of Soviet tank design for several subsequent decades. 79 
Tyneside, and indeed the North East in general, had led the way in the 
formation of an efficient power transmission network, almost solely due to the 
innovation displayed by the Newcastle Electric Supply Company (NESCo). 79 By the 
1930's the electrical grid had spread across the country and this resulted in the loss of 
industry from Tyneside. Most notably affected was the motor industry which 
77 Postan, M M, British War Production (London: HMSO, 1952), p 188. 78 Kaldor, M, The Baroque Arsenal, p 32. 
7' See Vall, N, `The Emergence of the Post-Industrial Economy in Newcastle 1914-2000', in Coils, R, 
and Lancaster, B, Newcastle upon Tyne, pp 53-55. 
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coalesced around the Midlands area. The spread of electricity networks meant that it 
was more convenient for manufacturers to base themselves nearer to their primary 
markets, Tyneside was thus largely bypassed by the newer engineering industries. 
The Tyneside economy remained dependent upon either conflict or a firm 
peace-time commitment to the maintenance of large and modern armed forces. 
Whilst only 46% of Vickers-Armstrongs turnover came from armaments during the 
period, the proportion was much higher for Tyneside concerns. A fall in the 
profitability of the Tyneside sites led to a vastly exaggerated impact on the local 
engineering industry: a result of the fact that 50%-75% of Tyneside general 
engineering labour was employed by Vickers-Armstrongs, at both Elswick and 
Scotswood. 80 Thus the levels of unemployment in the industry were almost entirely 
dependent upon the prevailing economic and political climate which can be seen by 
the figures for the mid 1930s. Shortly before re-armament, the unemployment figure 
in general engineering on Tyneside was 48%, once re-armament was in full swing, in 
1937, this figure had dropped to just 8%. 81 
The industry for which the area was perhaps best known was shipbuilding. 
The myriad firms based on the river Tyne produced a substantial proportion of the 
world's shipping, both merchant and military. The industry employed a large number 
of Tynesiders although this employment was often sporadic in nature and 
unpredictable. A yard that employed 900 people one month could be employing 
nearly 2,000 a couple of months later; alternatively the workforce could have been cut 
due to a temporary lack of orders. This had a major impact on the local economy. At 
the turn of the century it was estimated that one in six of Tyneside men were 
80 NA: BT 64/3260 (Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, General Characteristics of the Area, 1943). 81 Ibid. 
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employed in the shipbuilding industry. 82 Ancillary trades, dependent on shipbuilding, 
were also major employers in the area. There were approximately 40,000 men 
employed in shipbuilding and related industries on Tyneside and, as a result, over 
£5,000,000 was paid into the local economy in wages over the course of the average 
year. As one historian commented, "Shipbuilding and ship repairing together 
constitute the greatest industry on Tyneside, its chief pride and the source of 
livelihood for a large part of its population. 943 
The slump in demand for tramp ships, as a result of the contracting coal export 
market, hit the area especially hard. Other countries, such as Belgium and Poland, 
expanded their own coal exports during this period and the resulting decline in 
demand for Tyneside coal, sales of British coal abroad declined by 42% between 1913 
and 1938, had a knock-on impact on the production of the small steamers that had 
been a market staple for many of the local shipbuilders. 84 Whilst Tyneside was hit by 
this, the main effect was on the other rivers of the region. Tyneside had always 
contained a number of yards that were capable of producing warships, liners, and the 
larger cargo vessels, especially tankers, for which there was still a demand. The 
industry on the Tyne was thus more comparable to the shipyards of Clydeside than it 
was to the yards of other North East coast towns. 
The crisis of the 1930's resulted in several factors that combined to make the 
situation within the industry even more serious. Lack of available funds meant that 
slipways and equipment could not be maintained and the subsequent deterioration of 
these sites led to the industry becoming less efficient and more expensive. Many 
skilled workers became unemployed for long periods of time and a large percentage 
92 Dougan, D, The History of North East Shipbuilding (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), pp 
128-129. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Dintenfass, M, Managing Industrial Decline. Entrepreneurship in the British Coal Industry between 
the Wars (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1992), pp 170-173. 
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left the industry to seek employment in other fields. This resulted in large numbers of 
workers migrating from the traditional shipbuilding areas to the areas that had 
developed light industries. Whilst this phenomenon undoubtedly occurred on 
Tyneside it would seem that it was of a significantly more limited extent than, for 
example, Clydeside or Merseyside. However Tyneside males still accounted for 4.3% 
of the total migrant population of Coventry in the period 1920-1939 (there were an 
estimated 260 Tyneside born men residing in Coventry during the period), whilst 
Tyneside females represented 3.7% of the total number of female migrants (an 
estimated 39 women in total). This phenomenon proved a cause for concern on 
Tyneside as these men who could find employment in the varied and modern light 
industries of places, such as Coventry, were frequently the more skilled, qualified or 
time-served engineers, of the local workforce. 85 In addition to this, the majority of 
those who moved away from Tyneside were from the Newcastle area whilst the 
mining areas saw relatively little movement despite being more badly effected by the 
economic conditions. 86 
The slump in shipbuilding orders had a devastating effect on the industry as a 
whole, but the effect was felt hardest on Tyneside where the local population was so 
dependant upon shipbuilding and its ancillary industries. Whilst the industry had 
been in decline for some time it was the drastic slump of the early 1930s that 
accelerated this feature. This downward trend manifested "itself in every region, was 
especially marked in the principle shipbuilding regions, and, within this group, in the 
Northern Region and in Scotland"87 At one point during the 1930s less than 3% of 
gs Shenfield, A& Sargant Florence, P, `Labour for the War Industries: The Experience of Coventry', 
The Review of Economic Studies, 12,1 (1944-1945), pp 43-45 and 48-49. 86 Also, see Lancaster, B, and Mason, T (eds), Life and Labour in a 200 Century City. The Experience 
o, f Coventry (Coventry: Cryfield Press, 1992), pp 57-80. $ Ross, N S, `Employment in Shipbuilding and Ship-Repairing in Great Britain', Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A, 115,4 (1952), p 526. 
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berths were in use on the river, whilst, in Jarrow, unemployment in the industry stood 
at 80%. The rot had started in the previous decade when launches dropped by a third 
year on year. By 1930 the depression of the industry was biting hard at the yards of 
Tyneside. The north-east yards had launched some 600,000 tons during the first year 
of the decade but a year later the total stood at only 68,000 tons, a fall of 88%; by 
1932 the Tyneside yards launched only 24,000 tons. This was largely due to an 
absolute lack of orders for oil tankers, a type of vessel that had been the staple of 
many of the larger Tyneside yards (North East yards had previously built two thirds of 
all British oil tankers and one third of the world total). The lack of orders hit the 
shipyards of the Tyne particularly hard and, by 1931, unemployment in the industry 
nation-wide stood at 60% whilst on Tyneside the figure was put at over 70%. In 
March 1931 the Newcastle Employment Committee had reported that there were 
78,452 people unemployed on Tyneside. Over 60% of those previously employed in 
the shipbuilding industry were registered as unemployed whilst the numbers of idle 
from the marine engineering field had practically trebled over the previous year. The 
slump in the shipbuilding industry, more than in any other single industry, was 
responsible for the heavy pre-war unemployment on Tyneside. In 1932 the 
unemployment index in this industry stood at 79% and, as late as 1938, the figure still 
stood at 25%. 88 This again exemplified the region's over-dependence upon a small 
number of key industries throughout the period and the results of a downturn in 
specific sectors highlighting the economic vulnerabilities of the area. The importance 
of shipbuilding and ship-repairing work to Tyneside can be seen by the fact that the 
North East Coast area (including Tyneside) contained 26% of all shipyard workers in 
68 NA: BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, General Characteristics of the Area, 1943. 
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Britain in 1930. This was greater than that of Clydeside, and twice the combined total 
of Merseyside and Barrow. 
In addition to rising levels of unemployment; employers understandably, 
attempted to cope with the Depression by decreasing wages and by restricting 
working hours. Both of these policies were very unpopular with both the Unions and 
the workforce, leading as they did to a reduction in take home pay. Restriction of 
working hours also led to a greater degree of inefficiency, lessening of training 
schedules, and a decline in standards of plant maintenance. 89 This was especially true 
of the engineering sector and on Tyneside the marine engineering industries. On 
Tyneside the average working for an engineering fitter, in 1931, was reduced by 
almost three hours when compared to average workloads just three years previously. 90 
Of all the types of engineering firms it was those engaged in marine work that 
suffered the second greatest losses of hours with only the textile industry being more 
badly affected. Some relief was gained by the transfer of some engineering workers 
to other fields but the lack of newer light engineering concerns on Tyneside continued 
to be a significant barrier. 
Available orders were far too few to sustain the massively increased capacity 
that had been a feature of the industry since 1914. In order to reduce this capacity a 
new body was set up by the government, named the National Shipbuilders Security 
Limited. The board of Directors was drawn from major yards on the Clyde, Tyne, 
Tees, Wear and Forth as well as from Belfast and Barrow. As Chairman, the 
government selected Sir James Lithgow of Clydeside. He was seen as one of the most 
able shipbuilders in the country, though he was still as prone as any when it came to 
failing to note technical and managerial deficiencies within the industry. Indeed, in 
89 Hart, R A, `Hours and Wages in the Depression: British Engineering, 1926-1938', Explorations in 
Economic History, 38 (July 2001), p 479. 
90Ibid, p 485. 
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1925 he had made a statement to the House of Commons Commercial Committee 
saying that shipbuilding was in a healthy position and was, "a strong, well-organised 
and virile industry, with pre-eminent technical skill. s91 
The result of the policy enacted by the NSSL was that, by March 1932, three 
Tyneside shipyards had been bought out and closed. The Northumberland 
Shipbuilding Company at Howdon, Charles Rennoldson and Company at South 
Shields, and Renwick and Dalgleish at Hebburn were the first to go. The next year 
brought a further three casualties: the Tyne Iron Shipyard at Willington Quay (in 
business since 1876), Palmers (which had launched its last ship, the HMS Duchess, on 
July 19th 1931) and Eltringhams, which had a capacity of 18,000 tons and was put up 
for sale as a going concern. 
Local shipbuilders, made anxious by these wholesale cuts, began appealing for 
government assistance. The President of the Shipbuilding Employers' Federation, Mr 
AL Ayre, called on the government to place Admiralty orders, as was happening in 
other countries (including France, Italy, and the USA), in order to maintain "a skilful 
and efficient shipbuilding industry". 92 Mr Ayre reiterated the importance of the 
industry to the country by declaring it to have been "of first importance, not only to its 
[the country] essential maritime trade outlook but also to its defence. "93 Tyneside, as 
one of the foremost shipbuilding areas, building both naval and merchant vessels, was 
clearly to be regarded as a vital location for the production of materials vital to 
Britain's trade empire as well as its defence in times of war. 
Calls for direct government subsidy increased as the situation worsened. On 
Tyneside, however, there was not complete backing. Dr GB Hunter, Chairman of 
91 Barnett, C, The Audit of War: The Illusion & Reality of Britain as a Great Nation (London: Pan, 
1996), p 111. 
92 Scott, J D, Vickers. A History (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1963), p163. 93 Ibid. 
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Swan Hunter & Wigham Richardson, stated his opposition to subsidies, saying, "I do 
not advocate subsidies for British industries: I am not aware that British shipowners 
or shipbuilders desire them. But they do ask for fair play. Should we allow 
subsidized foreign products and ships into our ports? "94 This may have been the case 
with large concerns such as Swan Hunter & Wigharn Richardson, often the Blue 
Riband holder for being the forest shipbuilder in the world (even though the company 
had only 6 orders in the year 1931-1932). Yet it is certain that some of the smaller 
yards on the Tyne would have welcomed such government intervention. At least one 
of the larger yards would certainly have been desirous of financial assistance. The 
closure of Palmers in 1933 was a shock to the area; but it should not have been. 
Despite vociferous criticism of NSSL Chairman, Sir James Lithgow, for his part in 
the closure the facts were that the yard had no orders, no sign of a future reversal of 
the downturn, and huge outstanding debt repayments that it could not keep up with. 
This, when combined with the lack of entrepreneurial spirit during the post-war 
decade, ensured that the yard was beyond salvation. Jarrow MP, Ellen Wilkinson, 
was quick to criticise the directors of the company for taking care of their own 
interests ahead of those of the workforce and the town. Her criticism would appear to 
have some merit when we look at the accounts of the last profitable year the company 
experienced. In 1929 the company turned in profits of £25,000 but over a quarter of 
this figure was paid out in directors fees 95 Selfish and weak leadership in the 
industry was heavily criticised by the unions and by later historians 96 
94 lbid, p 166. 
93 Dougan, D, The History of North East Shipbuilding (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1968), p 
163. 
96 For examples of this see, Lorenz, E H, `An Evolutionary Explanation for Competitive Decline: The 
British Shipbuilding Industry, 1890-1970', The Journal of Economic History, 51,4 (December 1991), 
pp 911-935. Also, Broadbent', SN and Crafts NFR, `Britain's Productivity Gap in the 1930's: Some 
Neglected Factors', The Journal of Economic History, 52,3 (September 1992), pp 531-558. 
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The year 1933 was viewed with ambivalence by those involved in the 
industry. It was the worst year of the crisis but also the year when there were the first 
signs of an improvement in the situation. During the year orders continued to be 
abnormally low and the Tyne yards produced only 11,000 tons during the year, 
caused largely by the dearth in naval contracts 97 However, orders for merchant 
vessels were showing signs of a dramatic increase and confidence in the industry 
itself, whilst still shaky, was beginning to improve. The next year showed a marked 
improvement: north-east yards doubled their production compared to the previous 
year. Recovery on Tyneside, however, was to proceed at a slower pace than the 
recovery of the industry nation-wide. This was largely a result of the types of vessels 
that the Tyne yards produced. Orders for tramp steamers and oil tankers picked up at 
a slower rate than for other types of vessels. Indeed it was to be several years into the 
period of rearmament before the Tyne yards started to catch up with the rest of the 
industry. The marine engineering field also improved. Progress in this industry was 
somewhat quicker as it was less affected by the vagaries of the types of vessels being 
built 98 
Tyneside, which includes the mouth of a navigable river, had traditionally 
experienced great importance as a merchant port, though this significance was now in 
decline. Newcastle experienced a steadily increasing export trade from the 1830s 
onwards and, by 1883, the city was the second most important port in the country, at 
least in terms of tonnage exported. 99 The area was most important in the export trade, 
most notably coal, whilst imports, mainly consisting of consumer goods, were 
significant to the economy of Newcastle. The ports of the North East coast, of which 
the Tyne was by far the busiest, were responsible for just over 2% of the total import 
97 TWAS: DSNA. Vickers-Armstrongs, board minutes, 1930-1934. 98 TWAS: DS/HL. Hawthorn Leslie & Co Ltd, balance sheets, 1930-1945. 99 Lendrum, 0, `An Integrated Elite', pp 28-29. 
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and export trade in Britain but this amounted to £30 million per annum. Once again, 
the entrepreneurial elite of the region played a large role in this industry with a large 
number of shipowners living in Newcastle and several of the coal magnates owning 
and running their own fleets. '°° 
The relative decline of the Tyne as a commercial river can be partially 
explained by the events that followed on from the First World War. Once more it was 
the area's dependence on the carboniferous economy that was to prove the greatest 
weakness. The contraction of the coal export business led to a substantial fall in 
revenue for those areas that were reliant on the trade, not least Tyneside. Exports 
from the Tyne had fallen by the value of £6 million in the period from 1913 to 1936. 
Almost all of this shortfall being represented by the coal trade, whilst imports had 
remained relatively steady. 101 Exports to Scandinavia, Egypt, and London increased 
during the period but this was more than balanced by a substantial fall in the key 
markets of France, Italy, Germany, and the Low Countries. '02 
Major weaknesses were clearly present beneath the outwardly healthy surface 
of Tyneside's industrial strength. It would appear that the area was overly reliant on 
the heavy industries for which it had earned fame during the previous century. The 
area was especially susceptible to global conditions due to the preponderance of 
industries that depended upon conflict for their trade. 103 The demand for coal, the 
area's traditional chief export, had been in steady decline for some years with the 
local industry being increasingly unable to compete with cheaper rivals from both 
home and abroad. The situation grew more severe as the decade before the war 
10° Ibid, p 29. 
101 Leak, H, `The Carrying Trade of British Shipping', Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, 102,2 (1939), p 220. 
102 NA: BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, General Characteristics of the Area, 1943. 103 Mess, H A, `The Social Survey of Tyneside: An English Regional Social Survey', American 
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passed, resulting in a significant slowing of the valuable export trade. During 1935 
thirteen million tons of coal was dispatched from the Tyne compared to 21 million 
tons just ten years previously. 104 
The continued reliance of the area on the carboniferous economy is 
highlighted by the performance of the area's coal mining industry during the inter-war 
period. Much of the coal produced in the large Northumberland coalfield was 
exported, either to the south of England or abroad. The collapse of this market 
brought about by the war resulted in the contraction of the industry. Small collieries, 
however, still existed on Tyneside itself, many of which supplied coal to the local 
market. The largest of these Tyneside concerns was at Throckley, just to the West of 
Newcastle. Unlike the majority of the Northumberland collieries, "Throckley sold 
two-thirds of its coals in Northumberland. Seventy percent of the sales went to 
manufacturing and other industries. "' 05 According with this unique reliance on the 
domestic market, one would have expected the company to have coped more 
effectively with the post-war downturn but we find that by 1938 the amount of coal 
produced was only 71% of the pre-First World War figure. This is compared to the 
neighbouring Ashington colliery where production had increased by 37%"106 
Ashington was an exception to the general decline, this was largely due to an inspired 
and efficient managerial structure. This surprising decline was the result of poor 
inward investment, worsening industrial relations, and technological obsolescence. 
Before the policy of re-armament in the mid to late 1930s the economic 
viability of the traditional heavy Tyneside industries was worsened by several 
additional factors. Increasing wage demands caused increasing overheads and was a 
104 Vall, N, `The Emergence of the Post-Industrial Economy in Newcastle 1914-2000' in Colls, R& 
Lancaster, B (eds), Newcastle upon Tyne: A Modern History (Chichester: Phillimore, 2001) pp 47-48. 105 Dintenfass, M, Managing Industrial Decline, p38. 106 Ibid, p 82. 
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factor in the growing inability to compete demonstrated by Tyneside industries during 
the period. Managerial lethargy and a failure to appreciate the need for new 
development resulted in a lack of investment in research and in new technologies. 
This stagnation was a further factor that reduced the competitiveness of the area's 
heavy industries. Many working practices remained unchanged since the Victorian 
era and the complicated system of individual craftsmen's unions led to a large number 
of demarcation disputed that further disrupted productivity and eroded the relationship 
between workers, union, and management. It was a lack of vision on the part of the 
unions, combined with the aforementioned managerial lethargy, which had resisted 
the numerous attempts to modernise working practices. 107 The dilution of the 
workforce with semi-skilled workers, male or female, 108 during the war, had served to 
increase both resentment and the determination of skilled workers to defend their 
exalted position. To meet this end the unions resisted any attempt to curb their power, 
especially within the shipbuilding industry. 
The period of relative peace, combined with government reluctance to spend 
money on military equipment, had hit the traditional industries of Tyneside during the 
inter-war period. The prevailing mood of lax self-satisfaction had meant that much 
expertise had been lost and that much needed improvements to the foundations of 
British heavy industry had been neglected. Thus, when the need for re-armament 
became urgent, many of the companies involved on Tyneside suffered from 
insufficient labour, a lack of facilities and the attitudes of management. Much of the 
equipment and techniques being used in the shipbuilding industry had not changed for 
30 years or more. The entrepreneurial flair that had made Tyneside an industrial force 
107 Lovell, J, `Employers and Craft Unionism: A Programme of Action for British Shipbuilding, 1902- 5', Business History, Vol. 34,4 (October 1992), pp 3-7. '°8 Abbott, E, `The War and Women's Work in England', The Journal of Political Economy Vol. 25,7 (July 1917), pp 641-678. 
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had ebbed and been replaced with the complacency and worsening industrial relations 
between management and workforce, typified by example of Throckley. 109 Tyneside 
was not alone in experiencing this malaise but the effects were magnified in this area 
by the importance of heavy industry, whilst other areas could point to the growth of 
light engineering and other modern manufacturing industry Tyneside had no such 
positive model. 
Despite the general sense of gloom in the manufacturing sector, Tyneside did 
have some industries that were in a process of expansion, or were at least coping with 
the economic conditions, during the decade before the war. These were largely in the 
service sector industries and, on Tyneside, were largely confined to Newcastle upon 
Tyne and the coastal resorts of Tynemouth and Whitley Bay. Newcastle upon Tyne 
had always been the most prosperous area of Tyneside and, as the regional centre, had 
always enjoyed economic development separate from the rest of the region due to its 
importance as the centre for regional government and trade. In the words of Oliver 
Lendrum "It is easy to assume that Newcastle's economic development followed the 
same path as that of Tyneside generally during the years 1840-1914", "° this 
continued after the First World War. It was the main distribution point for the North 
East of England. The initial development of this retail sector took place between 
1841 and 1911. Retail, too, was dominated by a small number of entrepreneurs. The 
first was Emerson Bainbridge who opened a drapery store in 1838 and managed to 
bring his products to the substantial numbers of lower-middle-class residents of the 
city. He was followed, in 1882, by JJ Fenwick who demonstrated a sound head for 
marketing by utilising window displays and press advertising to publicise his store. 
Once again, these entrepreneurs were an integrated part of the elite of the city: 
'09 Dintenfass, M, Managing Industrial Decline, p 114-121. 1 1° Lendrum, 0, `An Integrated Elite', p 27. 
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Bainbridge had sat on the boards of several major industrial firms, including both 
Wailsend Slipway Company and Swan Hunter. " These concerns employed large 
numbers of workers, Fenwick's alone employed 400 at the start of the First World 
War, 112 and are rarely mentioned in studies of the area, although the official survey 
into Tyneside did mention the numbers involved in this sector. The food, drink and 
tobacco production industry combined with catering, clothing, and the various 
distributive trades employed some 77,500 people on Tyneside in July 1939, of whom 
55.5% were female. The various distributive trades alone employed some 51,400 
persons and were the greatest single employer amongst the listed categories, being 
larger than the engineering industry total by some 3,800 workers. 113 
After the dominance of the pacifist belief in armaments cuts the government 
was finally persuaded by the developing world situation that it could no longer 
palliate the cutting of funds to the armed forces. The abnegation of previous policy 
resulted in a wide-ranging plan for the upgrading of the armed forces and a 
programme of modern re-armament was prepared and launched in 1934. Several 
forward thinking company directors had correctly anticipated this development and 
had begun putting in place schemes to capitalise on a prospective boom period. One 
such company was Vickers-Armstrongs. In the years leading up to the re-armament 
period the company had been independently developing several new weapons 
systems, including revolutionary anti-aircraft guns. The stated aim of the board 
during this period was to develop every weapon that a newly modernised British 
Army would require. This intention had sprung from a realisation of the level of 
foreign competition and was very much a locally-based initiative that received little or 
no official backing from central government. This can be seen by a report from a 
111 Ibid, pp 37-39. 1 12 Ibid. 
113 NA: BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, Pre-War Position, 1943. 
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member of the board which stated "We shall never be on equal terms with either 
Schneider, Bofors or Skoda in the competition for land armaments until we have a 
complete range of models, and I consider the time has now arrived to take further 
steps towards completing this range. "114 
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Figure 1. A 3.7" (90mm) AA Gun produced by Vickers-Armstrongs in the mid-1930's»5 
Unfortunately, despite the government policy, there was still a residual lack of 
commitment to the process of re-armament. This was largely a result of opposition 
from a number of civil servants and politicians who were confident that there would 
he a further prolonged period of peace, or that the policy of appeasing Germany 
would yet prove successful. The Labour Party was also strongly anti-rearmament 
throughout this period. A lingering lack of commitment can be seen in the 
government attitude towards Vickers-Armstrongs' new anti-aircraft weaponry. 
Despite substantial orders from overseas governments and faced with armed forces 
enthusiasm for the weapon, arising from its superiority over the weapons then in use, 
the British War Office remained lukewarm in its attitude towards the new weapons. ' 16 
1 14 Scott, J D, Vickers, p 235. 
115 Photograph © of the Military Vehicle Museum, Newcastle upon Tyne, 2004. 
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Much of the activity at Vickers-Armstrongs gave a false impression of a busy 
and prosperous production. The majority of the work, however, was not immediately 
profitable and there was a greater degree of development work in progress than there 
was production. At Elswick, the Gun Department remained at less than half capacity 
at the start of the re-armament period and the majority of its production was naval. 
The next year was only a little better. Indeed, the only War Office contract obtained 
by the Elswick site in that year was for a pair of 3.7-inch guns. ' 17 
Over the next couple of years orders improved drastically and, by 1937, the 
Gun Department was operating at full capacity. This healthy situation was to 
continue throughout the remaining years of re-armament, although foreign orders 
continued to play an important role as late as 1939.118 Although this foreign work 
brought in much needed capital it also meant a reduction in the amount of capacity for 
production of British orders. There were however local benefits to the foreign orders 
as they enabled firms such as Vickers-Armstrongs to maintain a pool of skilled 
workers and to train new apprentices, something which was to prove problematic in 
the naval side of the firms' business. 
Throughout the re-armament period orders did improve, but, Vickers- 
Armstrongs remained largely what it had always primarily been, a supplier of naval 
armaments. The only maximum effort that was required of the firm was in the 
production of the Valentine tank, built largely at the firm's Scotswood site, and this 
occurred only in the year immediately prior to the war. As Scott commented in his 
official history of the firm, "In preparing for the Second World War, Vickers- 
Armstrongs had remained, to a surprising extent, what Vickers-Armstrongs had been 
when preparing for the First [World War], preponderantly suppliers of naval 
1 17 Ibid. 
118 Ibid, 236. 
44 
armaments. "119 As one of the major employers on Tyneside this represents a huge 
over-dependency on a specialised form of work, one which depended on several 
economic and political factors. However, the extent of the upturn in the fortunes of 
the firm can be seen by the fact that the numbers of insured workers in general 
engineering on Tyneside rose by 25% over the period, many of them working at 
Vickers-Armstrongs factories and yards. 120 
The period of re-armament led to an upturn in the naval work of Vickers- 
Armstrongs. The rapid recovery was adumbrated by the recognition during the 1930s 
that the "Royal Navy [was] dangerously short of modem ships" and that there were 
few remaining yards capable of building such large naval vessels. 121 1934 saw the re- 
opening of the Naval Yard at Walker and the laying down of the keel of the cruiser 
HMS Newcastle. 122 Additional orders were forthcoming but overall the growth of 
business continued at a relatively slow rate. By 1936 the restrictive requirements of 
the Washington and London naval treaties had been revoked and the government 
ordered a large-scale programme of naval rebuilding. The backbone of this rebuilding 
programme laid out in a defence white paper was the five battleships of the King 
George V class supported by five additional cruisers and, "an unspecified number of 
destroyers and submarines in a steady replacement programme. " The first of these 
ships, HMS King George V, was built at the Naval Yard. The new building 
programme meant there was a concomitant requirement for gun mountings. As the 
Tyneside site was one of the few in the country that was capable of producing heavy 
gun mountings capacity was quickly taken up, a crisis that was to continue throughout 
the war. As a response to this increase in orders the firm began an investment 
191bid, p 237. 
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programme, sinking £2 million into developing greater capacity, £250,000 was 
invested in order to improve the Elswick facility. This campaign of investment and 
expansion was made possible solely by the upturn in orders as a result of naval re- 
armament. 123 
The Vickers-Armstrongs yards were busier during this period than any of their 
chief competitors with orders for one battleship, two aircraft carriers, two cruisers, 
four destroyers and six submarines in 1937. This rapid increase in orders was not 
without difficulties. Whilst Tyneside was not as badly affected as many other areas 
by the lack of skilled labour there was an alternative problem in that, owing to 
professional pride, many of these men wanted to work on the longer term and more 
prestigious heavier ships. It proved quite problematic to encourage them to work on 
the smaller, but vital, destroyers and corvettes. This was compounded by the favour 
that was shown by the yards towards large-scale building contracts as opposed to the 
smaller escort vessels. The major armaments producers of Tyneside, in common with 
others, had a scale of preference when it came to orders. All preferred large naval 
units as opposed to new infantry weapons or even armoured vehicles. 124 
The manpower shortages that existed throughout the armaments industry was 
most acute in relation to work on gun mountings. At the start of 1938 Craven (the 
managing director of Vickers-Armstrongs) wrote to Sir Thomas Inskip complaining 
that, "Quite frankly, the position is that Vickers-Armstrongs are getting behind-hand 
in most of their armament products and I believe that the only real reason for this, 
where plant had already been installed, is because of the difficulty of manpower. " 25 
This was the official line but there were also other reasons for the late completion of 
orders; foremost amongst them was a lack of central control and guidance combined 
123 Ibid, pp 221-222. 
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with unrealistic goals. As these items could only be produced at Elswick and Barrow 
it was inevitable that a bottleneck would develop when orders increased as radically 
as they did in the late 1930's. Several times the company complained that, `Both the 
Admiralty and the War Office are asking for earlier dates than it is possible to 
achieve. A programme of priority would be of great advantage to us. -)126 Once again 
the weaknesses caused by the previous depression were overshadowing the 
armaments industry on which so many Tynesider's depended. 
Major naval work continued to be the most profitable area for the company 
and by 1939 many Tyneside shipyard workers were again employed at full capacity in 
building new naval vessels. By 1939 the Naval Yard alone was involved in building 
the aircraft carrier, HMS Victorious, as well as the 8,000 ton cruiser, HMS Nigeria. 
Alongside these vessels berths were prepared for the construction of the battleship, 
HMS Lion, and two escort vessels. The economic and political conditions once again 
were favourable for the heavy industries that dominated Tyneside. The encroachment 
of war led to a boom for the armaments and shipbuilding industries and subsequently 
meant that the faults of the previous decade were papered over and forgotten in the 
crisis of immediate re-armament. The faults, however, were still present: facilities 
were still obsolete when compared to many foreign competitors, relations between 
employers and employees were still problematic, and techniques were still archaic. 
Moreover, Tyneside was still heavily dependent on several specialised industries and 
there was the same lack of diversification that had blighted the depression years. 
Indeed, if anything, the re-armament period had served to magnify the polarisation of 
the area's heavy industries. 
126 Ibid. 
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For the more general shipbuilders of the Tyne the re-armaments programme 
also led to an increase in orders but at a substantially slower rate than that experienced 
by Vickers-Armstrongs. Many of the smaller yards were dependent upon the 
merchant trade and so the increase in building of naval vessels would have little or no 
effect on their businesses. In 1934, the year that Palmers was finally sold to the 
NSSL, the capacity of British shipyards had been successfully reduced by some one 
million tons, even though the remaining yards still had capacity for over three times 
the available work. The number of shipbuilding employees nationally had dropped 
from 358,000 in 1923 to 157,000 by 1935 whilst on Tyneside the number of insured 
workers in the industry fell by 20% over the years 1929 to 1938.127 The industry still 
suffered from 40% unemployment in some areas although regional factors played a 
large part in these figures. 
By 1935 it was clear that the government was required to intervene in the 
industry. It did so by introducing the British Shipping (Assistance) Act. This enabled 
the Treasury to advance a total sum of up to £10 million in loans that were repayable 
in 12 years at an interest rate of 3%. There were conditions on these loans that meant 
the recipient firms would have to scrap two tons for every one ton of construction. 
Most of the ships to be built at this time were general cargo vessels of the types that 
many Tyneside yards specialised in so that, in theory, the hard-hit yards of Tyneside 
should have seen the greatest benefit. Unfortunately, the act fell short of expectations. 
The rate of orders was still too slow and the act failed to abate the crippling effects of 
foreign, subsidised, competition. The industry did not recover completely until 1939 
when then introduction of a system of low interest loans led to a rash of orders 
127 NA: BT 64/3260 Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, General Characteristics of the Area, 1943. 
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totalling over 700,000 tons, which, when combined with naval building programmes, 
led to the biggest boom in a decade. 
Despite the many problems, the general trend in the industry at the time was 
upwards. By 1936, orders for merchant ships had gone up by almost five times the 
figure for 1932-1933 and, in the words of Sir Maurice Denny, the President of the 
Employers' Federation, "At long last, the dark clouds have rolled away. "128 Whilst 
the general sentiment of Sir Maurice was correct, on Tyneside the situation was still 
poor when compared to the years before the depression of the 1930s. North East 
shipyards had been responsible for a third of world output before 1930 but, by 1936, 
this total had fallen to just 12%. Figures for cargo ships built in Britain at the time 
intimate a continuing importance of the area to global shipbuilding. It was estimated 
by The Economist in 1939 that, "of a total of 507,000 gross tons, 464,000, or 92 per 
cent of the total, were being built in Scotland and on the North East Coast. " 129 In 
addition to the increasing orders the companies were also benefiting from the 
increasing value of these contracts. During the six year period to 1937 the cost of a 
7,000 ton merchant vessel increased by approximately 60%. 130 
The diverse nature of Tyneside shipbuilding, including merchant, naval, and 
repair work, meant that several of the larger yards were able to exploit the naval re- 
armament scheme. By September 1936 there were seventeen warships under 
construction in the yards of Tyneside. The majority of the larger, fleet, units were 
contracted to the Naval Yard but independent shipbuilders also capitalised. Swan's 
had procured contracts for a cruiser and four destroyers, including HMS Hunter, 
whilst Hawthorn Leslie was constructing the Sheffield Class cruiser, HMS 
12& Dougan, D, The History of North East Shipbuilding (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1968), p 
170. 
129 Ross, N S, `Employment in Shipbuilding and Ship-Repairing in Great Britain', Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Series A, 115,4 (1952), p 528. 130 Ibid. 
49 
Manchester, and two destroyers. In the following March Swan's received an order 
for a 35,000 ton battleship, HMS Jellicoe, but this was later cancelled due to the more 
pressing demand for escort vessels rather than large capital ships. 131 
By 1937 the Tyneside yards were operating at full capacity and the problems 
of manpower caused by the previous years of neglect began to manifest themselves. 
Labour shortages were a constant problem as many of the skilled workers who had 
found themselves redundant during the early 1930s had left the area or were now 
working in other industries. The pressure continued to mount on the shipyards of the 
Tyne and when the Naval Yard launched the HMS King George V on February 21St 
1939 an order for another battleship followed a day later. This was in addition to the 
aircraft carrier, five cruisers and eight destroyers that were in various stages of 
construction on the river at this time. Once again the oncoming war had created an 
artificial boom for one of the industries on which Tyneside was dependent and little 
thought was given to the situation that would affect the industry after the war had 
ended. Whilst the depression clearly demonstrated that over-specialisation in the 
traditional heavy industries had caused the regional economy to become vulnerable to 
the fickle movements of global events, the re-armament period showed that "The 
North East had returned in full measure to its traditional role of making weapons of 
destruction with all the skill and energy at its command. In doing so, it underlined yet 
again the old axiom that it is busiest and most prosperous in times of war. 102 
Unfortunately there was a resulting lack of planning for a continuation of success in 
peacetime or an analysis of the problems that would have to be faced. 
For all his reputation on the world-wide market the Tyneside industrial worker 
remained, in the approach to war, an exponent of obsolete techniques. He lacked 
131 Dougan, D, The History of North East Shipbuilding, pp 187-195. 1321bid, p 175. 
50 
many of the skills necessary for the increasingly technologically-reliant market. For 
example, at the turn of the century Armstrong-Whitworth employed almost 20,000 
men, 2.5% of the total population of Tyneside, in armaments production, yet 
production techniques had changed little in the last two decades. Unfortunately these 
industries were in decline by the 1930s, especially when compared to the rising 
prosperity of the newer industries that were becoming a characteristic of the south of 
the country. It has been estimated that the new industries saw a rise in the number of 
people they employed of almost three million people whilst the traditional heavy 
industries had lost over 700,000 employees between 1923 and 1937.133 In order to 
prosper the workers in the region would be required to face these challenges and 
develop newer skills for use in the developing industries. There were, however, no 
organised structures to facilitate the change in the skills base that would be required if 
Tyneside was to take advantage of the changing industrial situation. This was 
recognised by some in local government and a plan of action was prepared. A 
meeting of Newcastle City and County Council on 20th April 1938 was of the opinion 
that, "given that it was necessary to look beyond to future opportunities: `They had 
lost the motor trade, but now there was the manufacture of aircraft, and they should be 
looking after that. "'134 
It would appear that the opportunity to develop these newer industries was 
being denied to the people of Tyneside by the very government that should have been 
giving encouragement. Just prior to the war Swan Hunter's, in conjunction with 
Anthony Fokker and D. W. Douglas of the United States of America proposed the 
creation of a modem aircraft factory on Tyneside. The innovative plan to develop this 
133 Heim, C E, `Structural Transormation and the Demand for New Labour in Advanced Economies: 
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extensive factory and testing field, to be called British Fokker Douglas Aircraft 
Ltd, 
was rejected out of hand by the Secretary of State for Air. It was felt that the area was 
too vulnerable to aerial attack. 135 Despite this fear, much of the British aircraft 
industry developed around Coventry and other areas that were as easily identified 
from the air as Tyneside and were nearer to Luftwaffe bases with the result that many 
of these areas suffered significantly heavier bombing. Short-sighted decisions such as 
this served to stifle the skills base of the workers in the region and were to prove 
costly after the initial post-war reconstruction period. 
Second World War, Industrial Tyneside 
Official wartime reports defined Tyneside as "a compact industrial community of 
over 800,000 persons. °'136 This figure fluctuated a great deal and, during the war, it 
was considerably higher. The area included thirteen towns extending along the River 
Tyne for some sixteen miles from the mouth of the river and including the towns of 
Whitley Bay and Monkseaton on the coast to the north of Tynemouth. Out of the 
total population 37.5% lived in the metropolitan city of Newcastle upon Tyne whilst 
only six percent lived in the residential towns of Gosforth, Whitley Bay, and 
Monkseaton. The bulk of the remaining 66.5% of the population lived in the 
remaining ten towns and consisted of "almost exclusively working-class folk engaged 
in a small number of large heavy industries. 9437 Board of Trade officials concluded 
that the area could be seen as one whole unit industrially, commercially, and to a large 
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Lancaster, B (eds), Newcastle upon Tyne: A Modern History (Chichester: Phillimore, 2001) pp 5 7-58. 
136 NA: BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: report on Tyneside, general characteristics of the area, 1943. 
137 Ibid. 
52 
extent socially, and cautioned that the populations of the various areas of Tyneside 
often had strong regional identities. 
As the Board of Trade had identified, the Tyneside workforce was hugely 
reliant upon a select few key industries, almost all of them within the heavy 
engineering field. Engineering industries, during 1939, accounted for 27.4% of the 
total number of insured workers in Newcastle County Borough. A total of 36,220 
people were employed in these trades throughout Newcastle (other areas of Tyneside 
had even higher proportions working in these industries). When we add the number 
that were involved in the coal mining and chemical industries this number increases to 
41,995, or 31.7% of the total number of insured workers. 138 
Other major industrial employers on Tyneside included representatives of the 
food, drink, and tobacco trades. Between them these industries employed more than 
30,000 people by 1939.139 On Tyneside, brewing was traditionally an important 
employer. The building and catering trades were also large-scale employers in the 
region although much of the employment they provided was seasonal. The vast 
majority of the catering trade was centred on the chief holiday resorts of the area: 
Whitley Bay, Cullercoats, and Monkseaton being the foremost. Despite this, the area 
remained one which was overly dependent upon the traditional heavy industries of the 
carboniferous economy. 
The geographical location of Tyneside with its large port and proximity to the 
sea led to an extensive export industry. As a major port Tyneside was responsible for 
a majority of the export business on the north-east coast of England as well as the vast 
majority of imports into the area. The main exports consisted of coal and engineering 
products with dairy produce and grain being imported through Tyneside. The reasons 
138 Ibid, report on Region I (Northern), Newcastle upon Tyne County Borough, 1943. 139 NA: BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: report on Tyneside, general characteristics of the area, 1943. 
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for Tyneside being a major import centre was that Newcastle as the regional capital 
had the majority of the area's distributive trades and service sector industries. Indeed, 
by 1939 more than 51,000 persons were employed in the transport and distributive 
trades on Tyneside. The port also served a subsidiary purpose as a base for a 
substantial deep-sea fishing fleet, based mainly at North Shields. 140 This provided 
work for a large number of local men, both crewing the boats and in onshore support 
work. Though this industry was important only in a very confined geographical area 
it was, nevertheless, severely curtailed by the war as many of the crewmen were 
members of the Royal Naval Reserve and were immediately called up to active 
service, whilst many boats were requisitioned for admiralty use, usually as patrol 
vessels or minesweepers. 
The war came at a time of crisis for traditional, heavy, Tyneside industrial 
concerns. Whilst there had been a recovery in the later part of the decade the levels of 
production and employment had not reached the proportions of the years immediately 
following the First World War. With the necessity of increased production in steel, 
coal, shipbuilding and in armaments production the war brought an artificial boom 
time to the Tyneside economy. Artificial, in the sense that this expansion was at odds 
with the preceding economic situation and by the artificially high levels of demand 
for industrial products due to the removal of various import markets combined with 
the higher demand at home replacing lost exports. The numbers employed within the 
fields of engineering and metal working on Tyneside increased by more than 20,000 
persons during the first two years of the war. 141 Vickers Aimstrongs were responsible 
for the majority of these extra jobs but other firms such as Reyrolles, Parsons and a 
number of small firms on the newly established Team Valley Industrial Estate also 
'40 TWAS: EX/NS. Register of fishing boats, 1937-1946. 
141 NA: BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, Effect of the War, 1943. 
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substantially increased their workforce, a large percentage of the Team Valley 
workers being women. 142 Expansion of engineering concerns on the borders of 
Tyneside, not least at the Royal Ordnance factory at Birtley, also led to increased 
work for the people of the area. 
Awareness of the artificiality of the situation was widespread and generally 
acknowledged both at a local and national level. Despite this, many of the leading 
local industrialists were, regrettably, guided by false and unrealistic optimism. A 
governmental report on Tyneside industry stated that "The engineering industry is 
dominated by Vickers Armstrong which has more than doubled its labour force during 
the war. The other large engineering firm is C. A. Parsons which has also 
considerably increased its war-time output.. . In view of the enormous expansion in the 
labour force during the war... we must, however, expect some drop after the war. i143 
The report then goes on to acknowledge the bleak prospects for much of the Tyneside 
industry at the end of the war in the very first sentence of its summing up of the 
prospects of post-war Tyneside. "It would seem inevitable that after reconstruction 
demands have been met, a heavy slump will occur in the engineering and shipbuilding 
industries which have suffered abnormal expansion. " 
A minority of industrialists counselled caution. They warned that the boom 
was unsustainable and would end abruptly when the conflict was resolved. Their 
admonishments were unheeded by the much greater majority of people within the 
senior management level who were content to maintain a determined but unfocussed 
optimism because of the large profits that were being made at the start of the war. 
Tyneside benefited a great deal from war work and North East shipyards were 
142 ]bid, also, see Loebl, H, Government Factories. 
143 NA: BT 64/3260. Written report for Mr BC Engholm, Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries, 22nd September 1944. 
'44 NA : BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, Post-War Prospects, 1943. 
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responsible for the replacement of over half of the 4 million tons of shipping lost by 
Britain during the war. Tyneside was responsible for only 535,800 tons of this 
merchant shipping but the Tyneside yards were predominantly working on naval 
contracts throughout the war. This can by seen by the preponderance of naval 
contracts, mainly for destroyers, contained within the reports from firms such as the 
Wallsend Slipway and Engineering Company, a subsidiary of Swan's. This yard was 
described as working "solely on Admiralty contracts". '45 During the course of the 
Second World War the Tyne yards launched 74 merchant ships whilst Swan's alone 
launched a total of 83 warships, totalling more than 250,000 tons. 
Employment in the Tyneside shipyards increased rapidly but never quite 
attained the levels of employment during the previous war. By 1940 Hawthorn Leslie 
had increased its workforce by over 2,000 men to a total of 6,600. Due to the 
massively increased demand for tonnage, of merchant and naval shipping, there were 
calls for several of the yards that had been casualties of the Depression but not 
dismantled to be re-opened. On Tyneside there were demands for the re-opening of 
Northumberland Shipbuilding Company at Howdon and the Tyne Iron Shipbuilding 
Company at neighbouring Willington Quay. High level deputations from both of 
these areas presented their cases to the Admiralty and continued to press their points 
throughout the war. This resulted in competition and rivalry between the two 
respective councils and eventually an Admiralty enquiry into the alleged misuse of 
labour in the Tyneside shipyards. 146 Both of these yards remained closed but the old 
Low Walker Yard of Armstrong-Mitchell was successfully re-opened. The problem 
that the Admiralty stated was not one of capacity, of which there was an ample 
amount, but a lack of available skilled labour. This opinion was in turn disputed by 
'45 TWAS: DS/SWH/l/7. Minutes from Board meeting, July 10th 1941, p 20. 146 NA: ADM 1/15260. Correspondence between County Borough of Tynemouth, Borough of Jarrow 
and the Admiralty, May - June 1943. 
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the Ministry of Labour, in a bad tempered exchange of memos, which claimed that the 
unskilled labour for the re-opening of the shipyards as yards building smaller vessels 
or assembling pre-fabricated ships could indeed be found in the local area. 
147 
However, reports from the board of Swan Hunters would seem to reinforce the 
Admiralty's case by stating that work at Wallsend Slipway was being delayed due to 
a, "lack of men. i148 It would also seem that the Repair Department was forced to hire 
as many men as possible due to the increased amount of available work. 149 The 
Repair Department was described during the period as working "to the fullest capacity 
and efforts being made to increase production still further. " 5° 
Some problems remained in the field of shipbuilding: largely a result of the 
unnatural boom that the war created. Foremost amongst the problems was the simple 
fact that the almost constant demand did not lend itself to the upkeep of delicate or old 
equipment nor did it aid in the replacement of obsolescent items of machinery. This 
was the greatest problem faced by shipbuilders as they attempted to cope with 
wartime production demands. Tyneside yards, in common with the industry in 
general, had "entered the Second World War ... with a shipbuilding industry that was 
a rusting, partially dismantled and partly unmanned hulk of essentially Victorian 
technology, and, on the whole, no less rusting were its management and workforce 
and their operational methods"151 A technological survey of all yards in 1942 by the 
Controller of Machine Tools described how "the technical history of the industry 
since the 1870s had bequeathed yards and layouts unsuitable to modern methods". 152 
Cecil Bentham, the head of the survey team, reported that the cranes that were in use 
147Ibid, memo from Mr EA Hitchman, Ministry of Labour, to Mr JG Lang, Admiralty, June 11`h 1943. 148 TWAS: DS/SWH/1/7. Minutes from Board meeting, September 2d 1941, Report on Wallsend 
Slipway, p 28. 
'49 Ibid, minutes from Board meeting, September 2"d 1941, p 27. 150Ibid, Swan Hunters & Wigham Richardson, minutes from board meeting, May 6th 1941, p 16. 151 Barnett, C, The Audit of War, p 112. 
152 Ibid, p 116. 
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in the majority of yards were outdated and inadequate, whilst the majority of machine 
tools exceeded 20 years in age. The field of marine engineering fared little better with 
Bentham stating that "only 25 per cent of the plant in the North-east was modem". 
153 
This harsh criticism of the state of British shipbuilding led to changes. The 
Shipyard Development Committee funded an ambitious spending programme 
designed to rehabilitate the shipyards. From 1942-1944, at a cost of £6 million, new 
machinery, cranes, and tools were purchased and fitted in many yards. This was 
indeed "a remarkable feat of re-equipment in the middle of a world war. " 54 
Although the Tyneside yards did continue to spend substantial amounts of 
money on renewing items of vital equipment whenever possible it would seem that 
the greatest obstruction was finding time to fit the equipment. The increased demand 
led to several yards attempting to open up new facilities, including new dry-docks, 
berths and, in the case of Swan Hunters' Neptune Yard, new plating sheds costing 
over £2,000.155 These expenditures of course came at a time of increased 
profitability, for example, Wallsend Slipway made profits of £143,504 during 1944. 
This total was an increase of almost £100,000 on the previous year but, as recently as 
1941, the company had been forced to sell off £100,000 in investments due solely to 
delays in receiving payment for completed contracts. These debts were outstanding 
not only on government contracts but on overseas private contracts such as the work 
performed for the Canadian Sarmia Steamships Ltd who owed over £175,000 to the 
company in 1941.156 
Due to the importance of the industry during wartime the workers were 
imbued with greater power. Amongst the ways in which this power was experienced 
133 Ibid, pp 116-117. 
'54 ]bid, p 119. 
Iss TWAS: DS/SWHJ1/7. Swan Hunters & Wigham Richardson, minutes from board meeting, July 
10`h 1941, p 20. 
156 Ibid, May 60` 1941, pp 14-18. 
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was in the demand for better working conditions, despite the pressures of war. As 
workers were expected to endure longer hours it became a prime concern that they 
should have greater access to canteen and rest facilities at their places of work. 
Despite opposition the majority of shipbuilding firms on Tyneside were coerced by 
the government, which was afraid of unnecessary and crippling strikes, into accepting 
the demands of the workforce. At Swan's, for example, the company was forced, 
after complaints from the workforce and advice from the local Factories Inspector, to 
spend at least £15,000 on a new 600 capacity canteen at Wallsend Slipway. '57 
The war also brought changes to the products being constructed by the 
Tyneside engineering firms. As the war progressed it became obvious that there 
would be more demand for smaller naval vessels than there would be for the huge 
battleships of previous years. The result of this was the cancellation of the Lion Class 
battleships that had been ordered and their replacement with a greater number of 
orders for escort vessels and auxiliary shipping. The U-boat war created a demand for 
a large number of escorts and the Admiralty estimated in 1940 that the Royal Navy 
would require at least 100 more of this type of vessel. Whilst the Naval Yard was 
more experienced in the construction of larger ships the records of Vickers- 
Armstrongs show that the company did adapt to the building of the smaller ships once 
it became clear that there was little demand for larger vessels. The company was to 
remain fully employed due to the fact that the guns and mountings for all shipping 
had to be produced by the company, at either Barrow or Elswick. This can be seen in 
the variety of products that Elswick worked on during the war. These ranged from the 
16-inch mountings for the Lion Class battleships through to the 5.25-inch mountings 
that represented the secondary armament on the King George V Class ships. Orders 
137 Ibid, report to the board, July 1941, p 19. 
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for Tyneside gun mountings during the period totalled £30 million. The Naval Yard 
had orders for £13 million of naval work; Elswick had over £12 million and 
Scotswood £5 million. This was from a total amount of work worth £44 million. 
These figures highlight the Tyneside firm's dependency upon naval work -a 
proportion running at 68% in 1940. 
One of the greatest problems faced by heavy industry on Tyneside was the 
securing of adequate coal supplies. Despite the existence of the extensive 
Northumberland and Durham coalfields, and a number of smaller Tyneside collieries, 
much of the production was exported by sea to the south of the country. In the first 
months of the war a dearth of coastal shipping forced a crisis and led to the temporary 
closure of several Northumberland and Durham pits. 158 The wartime demands placed 
upon the coal production trade, at a time when output had been steadily declining for 
several years, stretched an already overextended industry and were a factor in the 
heightening tensions between the workforce and the management. '59 
The heavy industries of Tyneside, as elsewhere, depended, either directly or 
indirectly, upon coal for their continued production needs. Unfortunately the 
productivity of both the individual collieries and the workers themselves continued to 
drop steadily throughout the period. This was the result of a number of factors 
including an ageing workforce, resentment towards both colliery owners and central 
government, as well as the lack of modem equipment and methods. Although at least 
one governmental report claimed that mechanisation of the Tyneside and 
Northumberland coalfields had, "proceeded rapidly", it was also acknowledged that 
this modernising process had, "now nearly reached its limit. "160 Meanwhile, at least 
15$ Supple, B, The history of the British Coal Industry Volume 4.1913-1946 The Political Economy of 
Decline (Oxford: Clarendon, 1987), p 500. 
'59 Ibid, pp 497-590. 
160 NA: BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, Subsection: Coal, 1943. 
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one expert witness from the area, Dr HS Houldsworth (The Fuel and Power 
Controller for the North East Region), stressed the effect of the ageing workforce on 
productivity to the official Committee charged with investigating the decline of the 
British coal industry. 161 The industrial strife that blighted the industry during the war 
will be discussed in a later chapter but it is plain from the existing records that the 
coal industry more than any other was affected by the perceived shortcomings of both 
its workforce and its managers. 
The necessity of regulating wartime production resulted in many factories 
switching production to essential war materials in order to obtain orders from various 
government ministries, several factories were also requisitioned directly by the 
government. Increased demands for war materials also led to the opening, or in some 
cases re-opening, of new factories and industrial concerns. A wartime report on 
Tyneside included a list of some sixteen firms that had either switched their 
production or had been newly opened. These firms ranged from the re-opening of the 
Armstrong-Whitworth shipyard at Walker, working on Admiralty contracts and 
employing 1,200 workers, to the Bushboard Company Ltd which had switched 
production from veneered plywood to making unspecified aircraft components, the 
company employed just 27 people. The Metal Box Company Ltd, which opened new 
premises in Foundry Lane, Newcastle, in order to manufacture Jerricans, was in many 
ways typical of the newly opened factories on wartime Tyneside. Of average size, the 
factory employed 333 people in 1943, the majority of the workforce were female. 162 
A complete list contained within a Board of Trade report names more than 30 separate 
companies that had either switched production or had newly opened in order to 
produce important war materials. This list extends to naming the main engineering 
161 NA: CAB 87/92. Papers of the Committee on the Coal Mining Industry, May 14`h 1942. 162 NA: BT 64/3260. Report by Mr Weber, Control of Factory & Storage Premises, Board of Trade, Newcastle, to Mr Fairweather, Board of Trade, July 21' 1943. 
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companies on Tyneside and gives the products that they manufactured. This list 
shows the overall importance of Tyneside industry to the war effort not only in the 
traditional fields of armaments and shipping but also in terms of the many lesser items 
of necessary equipment such as webbing, uniforms, medical supplies, and the 
aforementioned jerricans. 
163 
One very noticeable feature of the wartime expansion of Tyneside industry 
was the opportunities that were presented to the women of the area. Traditionally, 
Tyneside had a much smaller percentage of female workers than other areas of Britain 
in part due to its dependence upon heavy engineering work. The wartime creation of 
jobs in the clothing industry and the light engineering sector, combined with the loss 
of an estimated 50,000 Tyneside men from industry to the services, 164 meant that 
there was a greater willingness to employ women in work for which it was previously 
thought they would not be suitable. Many of the newer firms opening on Tyneside 
immediately before the war or during the conflict would continue to employ 
substantial numbers of women after the end of the conflict. The greatest expansion in 
female employment on Tyneside was in the fields of clothing and the manufacturing 
of foodstuffs: industries not traditionally associated with the area, but necessary all 
the same if Tyneside was to diversify and survive the industrial slump that would 
almost inevitably follow the war. The increased profitability of several of the 
Tyneside heavy industrial concerns also led them to branch out into fields that 
employed more women than had hitherto been the case. Swan's, for example, had a 
controlling share in the Tyne Plywood Works Ltd. This factory employed a 
substantial number of female employees, working on various products for the 
1631bid, Post War Report on Tyneside, attached documents, 1943. 164 NA: BT 64/3260. Board of Trade: Report on Tyneside, 1943. 
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Ministry of Aircraft Production. 165 The factory was to prove a major success and 
continued to earn large annual profits despite the initial teething problems centred on 
the training of new workers and retention of the workforce, once trained. 166 The 
company was eventually sold, at a profit, to Great Universal Stores in 1945.167 
As we shall see later, the bombing attacks on Tyneside had a relatively limited 
effect on industrial output. Many of the local shipyards suffered damage as a result of 
air raids, but none of the yards were ever prevented from operating, whilst the 
Luftwaffe failed to substantially damage any of the important armaments 
manufacturers in the area. The main damage was in areas such as North Shields, 
which had several minor factories producing war material but was important largely 
due to its docks facilities and shipyards. Reasons for the failure of the Luftwaffe 
campaign are perplexingly diverse but foremost amongst them was the mistaken 
importance that was paid to bombing residential areas of London in the hope of 
destroying morale. The effectiveness of Luftwaffe bombing on Tyneside was further 
degraded by the task of having to bomb at night. Such raids were often poorly co- 
ordinated and inaccurate. The losses suffered in an early attempt to bomb the area 
during daylight had shaken the commanders of Luftflotte Five, based in Scandinavia, 
and this, when combined with the piecemeal nature of attacks in the north of Britain, 
served to protect the heavy industries of Tyneside. The failure of the German High 
Command to effectively target Tyneside is surprising. For there is no doubt that the 
concentration of heavy engineering, armaments production, port facilities, shipyards, 
and goods transfer yards made the area an important production facility but also a key 
supply node. A crippling attack on the area would have represented a severe blow for 
'65 TWAS: DS/SWHJI/7. Swan Hunters & Wigham Richardson, minutes of board meeting, May 6t' 1941, p 18. 
'66 Ibid, July 10`h 1941- March 17`h 1942, pp 28-47. 167Ibid, April 5`h 1945, p 167. 
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the national war effort. The sheer number of Tyneside firms that were deemed to be 
important enough to be placed on the Special Action List (Air Raid Warnings) 
emphasises the significance of the area to the nation during time of war. These firms 
all received advance warning of any possible air attack and were continually updated 
by the local ARP authorities on the progress of any raid. The list for Newcastle alone 
includes 22 separate sites. These range from the Post Office Sorting Station on Forth 
Road, the colliery at Benwell, Vickers-Armstrongs factories, to R Sinclairs Tobacco 
Works on Westgate Road. 169 
It is clear that Tyneside was indeed an arsenal in the nation's overall war 
effort. The area was strategically vital, largely due to the collection of vital industries 
that were based in the region. That the authorities considered Tyneside an area of 
special danger implies that they believed that, due to its nature, the area would be one 
of the first to be singled out for sustained attack. The contribution made by the 
shipbuilders, marine engineers, and repair yards, of Tyneside were significant in 
keeping the vital supply lines open, across the Atlantic, to Russia, and further afield. 
Vickers-Armstrongs remained one of the very few plants that were capable of 
designing and manufacturing large artillery pieces and naval guns, whilst the 
company also led the field, at least at the outbreak of war, in the area of armoured 
vehicle design. Without the coal that was shipped from the Tyne it is equally clear 
that the manufacturing plants in other parts of the country, especially South East 
England, would have struggled to maintain peak levels of production and the 
importance of the Tyne as a port facility is reflected in the efforts that were made by 
Royal Navy minesweepers to ensure that the river and coast was kept clear of enemy 
mines. During the period 1" June 1940 to 31St July 1940, of the fifteen ships sunk 
168 TWAS: PA/NC/5/17. Newcastle City Police files re: Air Raid Warnings. Categories of premises 
receiving special warnings, 1940. 
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sailing to or from Tyneside eight, or 53%, were transporting coal. Several more of 
those sunk were returning north after delivering coal cargoes. 
169 The traditional 
manufacturing skills of the Tyneside workforce also aided in the transition from 
peacetime production to wartime standards, both in increasing working effort and in 
ensuring the smooth conversion to wartime material production that occurred in many 
factories. 




The War in the Workplace 
Development and the Same Problems 
The Tyneside area's war effort was dominated by heavy industry, such as 
shipbuilding, engineering, armaments and coal production. 170 Most of these 
industries had been hit very hard during the recession of the 1930's and it was hoped 
that wartime conditions would promulgate a recovery. Despite the malaise that had 
affected most of the decade before the war there had been some efforts by both central 
and local government to improve the situation. The North East Coast was designated 
as one of the Special Areas requiring inward investment and companies were given 
financial incentives to open new branch factories in these areas or, in some cases, to 
relocate completely. Large cities, including Newcastle upon Tyne, in the Special 
Areas were usually exempt from the proposal. Statistics show that this scheme had 
attracted significant numbers of firms to the area. In total, 89 new branch factories 
were opened in the North East area. The majority of these, 64 altogether, or 72% of 
the total, were opened during the period from 1936-1938. Of the branch factories 
opened nationwide in the years from 1932-1938 over 15% were opened in the North 
East area. However, the major area of the North East to benefit from this scheme was 
Yorkshire. Redevelopment in the North East Coast area, which included both 
Tyneside and other severely depressed industrial locations, was limited, with only 17 
new branch factories, just 19% of the North East total and only 3% nationally, being 
170 See Chapter 1. 
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created in this area. 171 This compares with the figures for Greater London, which 
accounted for a quarter of the total, and the Midlands, which made up 20% of the 
national total. 
The build up to war had begun with the re-armament process in the late 1930's 
and this period had been marked by a large increase in the number of government 
contracts that were placed in the hands of Tyneside industries. The actual outbreak of 
war saw an initial quickening of this process with larger orders for shipping, 
armaments, and armoured vehicles being placed in the first months of the conflict. 
Now, the traditional heavy industries of Tyneside would once again prove crucial in 
the national war effort and the importance of maintaining and, if possible, improving 
levels of productivity became an essential wartime objective. This would of course 
result in serious levels of overspecialisation on Tyneside and would instigate an 
artificial boom in industries that had been failing in peacetime. One of the keys to the 
maintenance of the wartime levels of production on Tyneside would be the morale of 
the local workforce. It was realised that, although Tyneside did not have as poor a 
reputation for industrial disharmony as Clydeside, some necessary wartime measures 
would prove unpopular with the workers and that it was essential to maintain 
industrial harmony if the government's production plans were not to be severely, if 
not irreparably, damaged by strikes and industrial unrest. 
171 For more details see Heim, C E, `Industrial Organization and Regional Development in Interwar 
Britain', The Journal of Economic History, 43,4 (December 1983), pp 937-939. 
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The Industrial Situation: The Workers 
During the First World War the industries of Tyneside, in common with the national 
experience, had been badly affected in 1914 by the rush of men volunteering for the 
armed forces. 172 Given the importance of the Tyneside industries to the national war 
effort, it was thought vital that plans should be put into place before the outbreak of 
war to prevent such a crisis occurring again. This was why a group of trades, 
including those involving armaments, shipbuilding, mining and engineering, as well 
as farming, were declared to be reserved occupations. 173 Combined with the later 
classification of `protected establishments' this ensured that workers in these 
industries could not leave to join the armed forces, or indeed, to find other work that 
was deemed not to be vital to the war effort. 174 These regulations, whilst impinging 
on the workers' rights to seek employment of their own choosing, were widely seen 
as necessary for the war effort and were welcomed by the major Tyneside employers 
as they ensured that they would have a core workforce sufficient to cope with 
expected demand and would not lose skilled workers. 
The population of Newcastle upon Tyne was reduced as a result of the war, 
although the official figures do not include military personnel stationed in the city. If 
these were included then the population figures would show an overall increase. As it 
was, the four years between the outbreak of war and 1943 saw the population fall by 
34,587 from a 1939 peak of 293,400 to 258,813, a decrease of approximately 11%. '" 
This was largely a result of many men joining the armed forces, whilst others, both 
men and women, moved out of the area, relocating to areas as widespread as 
'n Clarke, J, Building Ships on the North East Coast, a Labour of Love, Risk and Pain Vol. 2: c1914- 
1980 (Whitley Bay: Bewick Press, 1979), p 153. "' Calder, A, The People's War, p 51. X741bid, p 235. 
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Scotland, Cheshire, the Midlands, and London, in order to perform work valuable to 
the war effort. It would appear that most of the people who left the area were either 
first time workers or that the shortfall was made up for by an influx of workers into 
the area. In 1939 the insured working population consisted of 132,163 persons (some 
45% of the population of the city) whilst four years later this had fallen to 130,956 
people (although, due to declining overall population figures, this represented an 
increase in the insured percentage of total population to some 50%). It would appear 
therefore that although the number of insured persons decreased it still represented an 
overall increase in the ratio of insured persons to total population. This would 
presumably be a result of the development of new jobs and the increased availability 
of government orders in the heavy industries. There was a readily available source of 
labour from those who were still unemployed at the start of the war. On Tyneside, 
even as late as 1939, the unemployment rate was still 2% higher than the national 
average, of 10.8%. 176 
Tyneside continued to be dominated by the heavy industries, such as 
engineering and shipbuilding although the mainly service sector industries of 
commerce and distribution employed a substantial portion of Tyneside residents. 177 
Despite the importance of the service sector, which was largely restricted to the city 
of Newcastle upon Tyne, the traditional industries of engineering, shipbuilding and 
coal mining accounted for nearly one third of the insured male population. 178 The 
local engineering industry, as discussed in the previous chapter, was dominated by 
eight firms who all employed more than 300 persons ranging from Donkin and 
Company with 350 workers to Vickers which employed 23,000 employees at the 
height of the war (the other firms were CA Parsons Ltd, R&W Hawthorne Lesley, 
176 Ibid. 
177 Ibid. 
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Robert Stevenson & Hawthorne Ltd, Northern Coach Builders Ltd, Metal Box 
Company Ltd, and Mitchell Bearings). Engineering on Tyneside, including the 
smaller employers, was pre-occupied with governmental contracts, mainly for the 
Admiralty, the Ministry of Aircraft Production, and the Ministry of Supply. 
Throughout the immediate pre-war period the Tyne ports had been responsible 
for approximately 50% of the North East's exports. These exports were largely 
dominated by coal and engineering products, whilst the most commonly imported 
goods were dairy produce, meat, and grain. 179 The importance of the River Tyne as a 
port was only increased by the war as important materiel was both exported from and 
imported into the area in even greater amounts. Key to the successful operation of the 
port was the efficiency of the dock workers. Responsible for unloading and loading 
ships, they were under increasing pressure to work faster and more effectively than 
ever before so that the turn-around time of shipping in ports could be reduced. Whilst 
this led to increasing levels of fatigue and stress it also granted the dockers a degree of 
power that they had seldom experienced before, despite the poor labour relations that 
traditionally existed in the industry; they had suddenly become vital to the national 
and local war effort. 
As it became necessary to divert imports to the western ports of Britain and to 
the north, away from London, the importance of the dockers, nationally, had been 
recognised early in the war. This enforced policy led to subsequent transport 
difficulties and had forced Bevin to formulate a registration scheme in June 1940 for 
all dockers so that they could, if it became necessary, be transferred to the west coast 
ports. This was yet another factor that eroded the ability of a worker to sell his labour 
in a free market. The measure was defended by the government claiming that the turn 
179 Ibid. 
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around rate of ships was too slow and that this resulted in the amount of imported 
goods being needlessly, and dangerously, reduced. The dockers of the west coast 
were to benefit from governmental policy as regional port directors were appointed 
and dock labourers were registered as a permanent labour force, thus ending the 
pernicious vagaries of the casual system that had, up until then, applied-180 
Unfortunately, this scheme at first applied only to the west coast ports of Merseyside 
and Clydeside, those dock labourers who were still needed in huge numbers on 
Tyneside gained little or no benefit from the scheme and continued to work, in most 
respects, as they had before the war, albeit at a much greater pace. 
Simmering resentment amongst the Tyneside stevedores finally reached 
boiling point on May 14th, 1942. Since the start of the war there had been several 
minor strikes involving dock workers: eleven at Newcastle Quay and three at the 
Albert Edward Dock in North Shields. '8' These had been small in scale and short- 
lasting in nature, despite the disruption they caused. Lack of faith in the local 
agreements, the national union, and the national arbitration methods combined with 
the fact that recent illegal strikes, such as that at Betteshanger Colliery in Kent where 
over 1,000 miners had been summonsed for striking illegally but where prosecution 
had proven problematic, had gone relatively unpunished had emboldened the attitudes 
of a majority of the dockers. 182 The resentment between the dockers, nationally, and 
their employees was both long standing and bitter. 183 On Tyneside, distrust had been 
steadily increasing for sometime and the point had been reached where neither side 
trusted the other as can be seen reflected in the comment of one docker to the 
180 For a more detailed discussion of this subject see Calder, A, The People's War, pp 232-233. 'g' NA: LAB 10/208. Official Report to the Right Honourable Ernest Bevin MP, Minister of Labour, into the problems surrounding dock workers on the Tyne, June 1942, p 1. 182 See Calder, A, The People's War, p 396. Also Croucher, R, Engineers at War 1939-1945 (London: Merlin, 1982), p 217. 
183 For example, see Phillips, J, `British Dock Workers and the Second World War: the limits of social 
change, Scottish Labour History Society Journal, 30, pp 87-103. 
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committee established to officially report into the problems in the area. When asked 
why the dockers had frequently taken action without even beginning negotiations he 
admitted that, whilst the question was a common sense one, the men "were not 
dealing with common sense employers. " 194 Such strong distrust augured poorly for 
the future efficiency of the Tyne docks. 
The first major strike, when it came, was sparked by the actions of one firm 
and revolved around the unloading of a single ship. An American cargo ship, the SS 
Winona, damaged whilst carrying a cargo of munitions to Russia, had put in to the 
Tyne, docked at 22 Shed on the Quayside, for unloading and repairs. The dockers of 
Messrs Tait and Son of Newcastle were engaged to unload the cargo. The standard 
rate of pay for day work on a cargo such as this was 23/- per day (approximately £46 
today). 185 Due, however, to the urgency of the cargo it was proposed that the men 
should work a two shift pattern beginning at 6 a. m. until 2 p. m. and then 2 p. m. until 
10p. m. In the words of the official submitted report, "The afternoon shift had 
received some payment in the way of an advance and immediately raised objection to 
the method of computing the amount and refused to continue discharging the ship 
until more favourable terms were conceded. "' 96 Rather than allow the national or 
local arbitration process to take place the 172 men immediately ceased work at 2 p. m. 
The men involved in the action knew that the strike was illegal but stated 
when asked that they would not be prosecuted because others had taken similar 
action. 187 The local Conciliation Officer, the Port Manager, and the Deputy Regional 
184 184 NA: LAB 10/208. Official Report to the Right Honourable Ernest Bevin, MP, Minister of 
Labour, into the problems surrounding dock workers on the Tyne, June 1942, p 4. 
'$s Figures given for present-day values are arrived at using the method in, Thomas, D, An 
Underground at War. Spivs, Deserters, Racketeers and Civilians in the Second World War (London: 
John Murray, 2003), p xiv. 
186 NA: LAB 10208. Report of the Ministry of Labour (Industrial Relations Department), No 1 
Region, Newcastle upon Tyne to the Ministry of Labour, May 14th 1942. '87Ibid, May 160' 1942. 
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Controller all agreed, after Mr Tarbit of the National Union of General and Municipal 
Workers (NUGMW) had reported that his efforts to persuade the strikers to return to 
work had met with a "point blank refusal", ' 88 that the strikers should immediately be 
prosecuted and that the military should be brought in to unload the cargo. Using the 
military to take over from striking dockers appears to have been a relatively common 
wartime tactic on the Tyne. 189 
By this time the dangers of a single strike could be seen by the spread of the 
action to other workers employed on the docks in the form of sympathy strikes. 90 
men of James Kirkley and Company who had been employed unloading cargo from 
the SS Guinan refused to continue work whilst 10 dock employees of the London and 
North Eastern Railway withdrew their labour and the employees of the Co-operative 
Wholesale Society's Grain Warehouse followed suit. These sympathetic actions 
resulted in severe delays to the unloading and loading of vessels, including the SS 
Tahsinia and the SS Cortachy. 190 
Undoubtedly, both local and national authorities were worried by this trend 
amongst the Tyneside dockyard workers to put their own interests and those of their 
fellow workers above the national war effort, or the importance of their role in 
supplying the nation and its allies. The men themselves admitted to an official 
inquiry that they had disregarded established negotiation procedure and that they had 
frequently taken illegal industrial action. 191 Government fears were expressed that the 
strike action could, if wrongly handled, spread to other ports. 192 It was thought that 
this was especially likely given that the local branch of the union involved, the 
188 Ibid, May 19th 1942. 
189 See The Times, October 3`d 1944, p 4. Also October 5`h 1944, p 2. 190 NA: LAB 10/208. Report of the Ministry of Labour (Industrial Relations Department), No 1 
Region, Newcastle upon Tyne to the Ministry of Labour, May 19"1942. 19'Ibid, official report to the Right Honourable Ernest Bevin MP, Minister of Labour, into the problems 
surrounding dock workers on the Tyne, June 1942, p 3. 192 Ibid, report of the Northern Regional Officer, May 19'h 1942. 
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NUGMW, had 3,422 members involved in the docks, and a total of 70,489 members 
locally. 193 Indeed it was being rumoured that the strike would spread quickly to the 
Tyne Dock workers who were said to be in sympathy with the workers from Tait and 
Son although this feeling seems to have passed by May 20th. The subsequent lack of 
support from the workers of Tyne Dock is possibly attributable to the strong 
disciplinary action taken against several Tyne Dock workers who had refused to 
relocate to Glasgow earlier in the week. 194 Despite the concerns the authorities were 
willing to hazard using the threat of prosecution to force the dockers to return to work 
in this instance, at least initially. 
Permission was immediately sought by the regional authorities to secure 
permission to both prosecute the strikers and to use the military to unload the 
munitions. This was a repeat of First World War action when the Army had often 
been utilised as make-shift dock workers. Relevant permissions were quickly given 
by the Ministry of Labour and the army began unloading the SS Winona the next 
morning at 6 a. m. 195 Meanwhile a "very special approach" was made to the 
Magistrate's Clerk to arrange a speedy hearing for the 172 strikers from Tait and Son 
but not the other workers, despite the protests of Mr J Atkinson, the Port Manager, 
that all 500 men involved should be prosecuted. 196 This hearing was subsequently 
arranged for only three days time on May 22nd at 11 a. m. at Newcastle City Police 
Court. 197 The Docks Corporation wanted to summarily dismiss the workers who had 
come out on strike. This would have resulted in those of military age being eligible 
for call up to military service. However, the Ministry of Labour discouraged this 
131bid, official report to the Right Honourable Ernest Bevin MP, Minister of Labour, into the 
problems surrounding dock workers on the Tyne, June 1942,1. 94 Ibid, report of the Chief Industrial Commissioner, May 20` 1942. 
'951bid, telegram from Ministry of Labour at 1.41 p. m. May 16th 1942. 1% Ibid, report of Northern Regional Officer, May 19`h 1942. 
19 Ibid, telegram from Northern Regional Officer of the Ministry of Labour at 12.45 p. m. May 19th 
1942. 
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action as it could complicate the issues of the strike and evoke sympathy for the 
strikers concerned. Both the Ministry of Labour and the Home Office agreed that an 
official inquiry should be appointed after the strike had ended so that ways of 
improving both the discipline and management of the Tyne docks. 198 
The strikers union, the NUGMW, "entirely dissociated itself' from the men 
and assured the government that no support would be forthcoming from the national 
organisation. 199 Disagreement between the national leadership of the union and the 
local branch (number 9) was highlighted by the fact that, despite this promise, the 
men's solicitor was paid for by their local branch. This distrust that existed between 
the national union organisation and the local branches on the one hand and the 
membership on the other was said to have been a major motivational factor behind the 
persistent industrial disruption that affected the Tyne docks? °° This was a reflection 
of the regional attitudes that pervaded the industry and was to remain a key factor in 
disputes throughout the war. 
158 of the men from Tait and Son were prosecuted on May 22 °d 1942. The 
remaining fourteen men were said to be "officials and checkers" who were not 
directly involved in the strike. 201 All of the accused men agreed that they would abide 
by the judgement imposed upon one of their number as a representative of all of the 
men involved. The case of Mr James Gilmour was heard and, despite protestations 
from the solicitor employed by the Union, Fred Lambert, of Messrs Stanford and 
Lambert of Newcastle upon Tyne, that the case had been brought too quickly (a 
charge ignored because the speedy resolution of the case was said to be in the national 
198 Ibid, Ministry of Labour reply to request from Newcastle upon Tyne Docks Corporation, 19th May 
1942. 
'99 Ibid, report of the Chief Industrial Commissioner, May 200' 1942. 
200 Ibid, official report to the Right Honourable Ernest Bevin MP, Minister of Labour, into the 
problems surrounding dock workers on the Tyne, June 1942, p 3. 01 Ibid, report of Northern Regional Officer, May 26th 1942. 
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interest), the Magistrate found in favour of the government and imposed a fine of £5 
per man (approximately £200 today) plus 2/- costs (or approximately £4 today). The 
men were given just 28 days in which to pay or face a term of 30 days imprisonment. 
The main thrust of the prosecution argument had been that the strike was clearly 
illegal, the men knew this, that their actions had an adverse effect on the attempts to 
assist Russia (an argument clearly designed to erode any public support for the 
strikers), and that by taking strike action the men were nullifying the bravery of the 
sailors, many of whom came from this region, who endeavoured to supply cargo in 
dangerous wartime circumstances. 202 
Despite the imposition of this substantial fine and the subsequent threat of 
imprisonment, the strike continued unabated. The strikers organised daily meetings to 
ensure that they could keep up to date with latest developments and to express their 
feelings. At these meetings they remained resolute, resentful, and defiant of the 
authorities. Official intelligence reports stated that the striking men had "come to 
regard a strike not only as profitable but safe. s203 The continuation of the action was 
a growing cause for concern amongst several government departments including the 
Department of War Transport who expressed their anxiety in several official 
memorandums. 04 
Behind the scenes increasingly efficacious, from the government and 
employers point of view, negotiations were ongoing. By the 1" of June a peace deal 
had been brokered, largely thanks to the efforts of the National Industry Officer, 
Captain Mark Hewitson. Captain Hewitson claimed that whilst the men had 
"suspected an attempt to evade an old agreement! 'by their employers and thus had a 
202 Ibid. 
203 Ibid, excerpt from Weekly Intelligence Reports, May 30th 1942. 
204 Ibid, memo from Mr SS Wilson of the Ministry of War Transport to the Ministry of Labour, May 
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strong case for arbitration they had placed themselves in a vulnerable position by 
knowingly embarking on an illegal strike. 205 After accepting the peace deal the men 
held a meeting early the next morning and voted by a large majority to return 
immediately and unconditionally to work. Ironically, many of them were employed 
the next day in loading the original cargo of the SS Winona aboard the two 
replacement vessels. 06 
After the return of the men to work there were requests, from several quarters, 
for the fines to remain un-enforced by the local authorities. These requests would 
appear to have been unofficially granted as correspondence indicates that although the 
Home Secretary could not officially petition for the fines to be left in abeyance, he 
could hint that this may be the best solution as further action against the men could 
only lead to a greater level of anger and may have caused more problems than it 
solved in the local area. 207 
The crux of the persistent problems in the industry on Tyneside was said to be 
the lack of trust that existed between the men and both their employers and their 
national union officials. The men fervently believed that the national union was 
incapable of representing local issues in the manner that was required and, instead of 
following their union's instructions, workers on Tyneside increasingly viewed the 
words of their union representatives as simply advice, to be ignored as required. 208 In 
many cases of industrial action the union's local leadership was forced to admit that 
not only was it powerless to convince the men to return to work but that in several 
cases it had not even been notified of a strike in advance. 209 When combined these 
205 Ibid, report of Northern Regional Officer, June 3rd 1942. 
206 Ibid, June 2"d 1942. 
207 Ibid, correspondence between Home Office, Ministry of Labour, and NUGMW, June 12'h-16`s 1942. 208 Ibid, official report to the Right Honourable Ernest Bevin MP, Minister of Labour, into the 
problems surrounding dock workers on the Tyne, June 1942, p 5. 209 Ibid. 
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factors led to significant damage to the reputation of the union, both at a local and 
national level. 
The evidence that representatives of the workers gave to the official 
committee investigating Tyneside indicated that the majority of problems with the 
national union stemmed from local resentments. The men wanted local problems to 
be solved at a purely local level and when any national body became involved the 
levels of trust subsequently faltered as it had become widely accepted that outsiders 
would not understand the position of the industry on Tyneside. Much of this distrust 
stemmed from the problem of the lieu rate issue. The lieu rate was the grade of pay 
that had been agreed upon in the 1920's for the handling of certain cargoes, including 
munitions, and had been established at 23/- as opposed to the national norm which 
was significantly lower. This meant that, through extensive use of the lieu rate, the 
dockers on Tyneside had secured a "privileged position for themselves" when 
compared to other areas of the country. 210 From examples such as this, it has become 
increasingly clear that, far from always pulling together, there were some industries 
on Tyneside where the workers saw themselves in a purely local context and refused 
to submit to procedures that would have meant a reduction in wages, despite 
reassurances that this would be in the national interest. 
The industrial unrest within the dock industry proved to be a continual 
problem on Tyneside with another strike breaking out in the late summer of 1944 over 
the removal of ship hatch covers. Again, this involved approximately 600 dockyard 
workers. The military was again used for the loading and unloading of ships whilst 
the Chief Industrial Officer of the National Union of General and Municipal Workers, 
Captain Mark Hewitson, alleged that the strike was a deliberate sabotage of the war 
210 Ibid, p 7. 
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effort and that Newcastle had been a particularly troublesome spot in the dock 
industry throughout the war, with a number of strikes, all of which were illegal, and 
that the dockers in this area were now completely "out of hand". 211 The Minister of 
War Transport, Ernest Bevin, agreed and, in combative mood, stated that "the services 
at the docks will be maintained. "212 As a result of this strike, and further allegations 
that union officials could no longer control their members, the local branch of the 
NUGMW was closed down on October 4th 1944. A new branch was opened but 
members had to firstly swear to abide by the rules of the Union's national 
leadership. 213 
Strikes on Tyneside continued to be a prime concern for both the local 
authorities and the national government as they grew more common towards the end 
of the war. Although there were a limited number of strikes during the first year and a 
half of the war this period, when the country was in its most vulnerable position, 
appears to have been one of relative accord on Tyneside. Despite the lack of strike 
action, however, it is clear that much resentment was still bubbling under the surface 
with pre-war tensions between workers and employers having been temporarily 
subsumed, to a large extent, by the national situation. These issues were still under 
the surface and could be brought bubbling through by seemingly minor incidents and, 
later in the war, when the national situation did not appear so desperate the workers 
were more likely to exercise their newly gained importance and express their feelings 
in the form of illegal strikes and stoppages. 
One way of analysing the mood of the workers on Tyneside is to study the 
changes in their political attitudes, especially the levels of support for the parties to 
the far left of the political spectrum. It has long been argued, by historians such as 
211 The Times, October 3'd 1944, p 4. 212 Ibid. 
213 The Times, October 5`" 1944, p 2. 
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Calder, 214 that the `People's War' resulted in an increase in the levels of political 
awareness (in actual fact a term for relaying the fact that the electorate had become 
more left wing) amongst the working classes. The British Communist Party, which 
until the invasion of the USSR had been opposed to the war, made committed 
attempts to garner support amongst the workers of Tyneside throughout the war, 
especially those involved in the traditional heavy industries. In the first year of the 
war, however, it would appear that their attempts did not meet with much success on 
Tyneside, or indeed nationally. 215 Intelligence reports continually recount instances 
of poorly attended meetings. Indeed, by May 1940 there was an alleged "consensus" 
that meetings held by the party should have been banned. 216 This may have been 
Newcastle City Police placing an agreeable emphasis on the situation in order to stifle 
the activities of party members, who were largely seen by the authorities as rabble 
rousers and malcontents. 
As the war progressed the BCP began to gather more popular support on 
Tyneside. This was largely due to the changing wartime situation, increased 
bombing, shortages, and the policy of advocating greater ARP measures and shelter 
facilities adopted by the BCP during 1940. The initial increase in popularity can be 
seen in the steadily rising numbers who attended meetings and by the sums of money 
raised at such assemblies. At one such gathering, in November 1940, more than 600 
people had attended and £75 (£3,000 today) was raised by means of a collection. 217 
When a meeting was addressed by Harry Pollitt over 700 people attended, and again a 
Zia See Calder, A, The People's War, pp 569-586. 
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substantial sum was raised. However, Pollitt's speech was hardly radical 218 The 
Party continued its policy of representing the working man and his family by 
organising voluntary pressure groups, such as the Newcastle Housewives Guild, to 
campaign for greater food supplies or better air raid shelters and by opening advice 
centres in the aftermath of heavy air raids 219 
The entry of the USSR into the war on the allied side caused the Party to 
radically change tack, and the focus of subsequent meetings became the need for 
greater productivity to beat Hitler and to provide aid to the Russian people. This need 
for unity between the people of Tyneside and those of Russia was expressed 
forcefully by Willie Gallagher, MP, the only BCP Member of Parliament through the 
war, when he addressed a meeting of more than 1,200 people at the City Hall in 
Newcastle 220 Throughout 1941 the BCP continued to hold meetings which were well 
attended and by November of that year the Party was being described in intelligence 
reports as "very active". 221 Local support for the Party had increased to such an 
extent that the Party was able to book large halls and to pay for speakers to travel 
from other parts of the country. 222 formation of Anglo-Soviet Committees with 
the purposes of securing aid for the Russian front enabled some of the middle and 
upper classes to join in with the Party activities, those attending the Anglo-Soviet 
Committee meetings were described by the Police as being "people of a better type", 
and led to a significant increase in local membership 223 Throughout 1942 the BCP 
continued to gather support on Tyneside, thanks largely to a determined recruitment 
drive, and there were concerns that the Party was attempting to secure a hold over 
218 Ibid, January 0 1941. 
219Ibid, March 14th 1941, and September 120' 1941. 2,20 ]bid, July 18th 1941. 
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both the Shop Stewards Movement and the local shipyard apprentices. Despite these 
concerns the Party line was still to increase production and to aid the war effort in 
every way possible 224 
The local branch of the BCP demonstrated how faithful it was to the war effort 
at the time when a shipyard strike led to the Party advising its members not to strike 
and to remain at their duties, the Shop Stewards Movement was in agreement with the 
BCP line and the strike was short lived finding little public support. 225 The lack of 
support given to the Total Time strike by engineering workers in October 1942 was 
significant. The action was the first serious industrial dispute since the ban on the 
Daily Worker had been lifted and the party made it absolutely clear that it not only did 
not support the strike but actively opposed the action, describing the strike as being "a 
disgrace to all concerned" 226 The BCP, despite (or perhaps because of) its strong 
links with the engineering unions, continued to oppose the strike and did everything in 
its power to halt it. The Party leader, Harry Pollitt, himself an ex-boilermaker, again 
travelled to Tyneside, this time to contact local shop stewards in an attempt to 
persuade them to do everything possible to bring an end to the stoppage. 227 
Throughout the remainder of the war the BCP continued to receive support but this 
appears to have been fading by mid 1944. It would appear that some of the workers 
on Tyneside did support the BCP as a means of protecting their rights but many more 
appear to have been attracted to the party out of an initial feeling of solidarity with 
Russia. This was a feeling that lasted for a couple of years but was not enough, in the 
long term, to provide a lasting political foundation of substantial support. From this 
evidence it would seem that the workers of Tyneside were not willing to back BCP 
2241bid, May 26th 1942. 225 Aid, October 9th 1942. 
226 Croucher, R, Engineers, p 183. 227 Ibid. 
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policies short of an initial feeling of comradeship with an allied country. Those who 
supported the Party in order to secure their working rights and to fight the employers 
were dismayed by the shift in party line after Russia was attacked and this ensured a 
loss of many of the Party's more committed supporters. 
Perhaps the most notorious strike to occur on Tyneside during the war was 
that of the shipyard apprentices at the end of March 1944. Once again a Communist 
subversive element was suspected of involvement. This strike was seen as so 
significant that it has been described by some socialists as marking "the high point of 
industrial militancy during the war" 228 The strike began as a result of dissatisfaction 
in the coal mining industry. The severe strikes that had affected this industry were 
viewed with a great deal of alarm by the government and with output steadily 
dropping whilst wartime demand steadily increased the issue of nationalisation of the 
industry in order to give the government more direct control became more important. 
One result of this was that the Bevin ballot scheme was given greater emphasis. This 
scheme was designed to summarily direct roughly 10% of all apprentices to the mines 
in order to boost production. This measure was hugely unpopular with the 
apprentices in the shipyards of Tyneside. The apprentices felt that they were being 
asked unfairly to give up their rights and to leave behind the hope of becoming a 
skilled worker to go down the mines with no guarantee of being given their old jobs 
back at the end of hostilities. Whilst apprentices had previously been seen as a 
conservative element in the industrial spectrum, they were not allowed to strike or to 
join a union in many cases, the war had seen this group emerge as a newly militant 
group, prepared to fight for their rights. 
228 Dabb, T, `Official Secrets', Socialist Review, 185 (April 1995), p 3. 
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The apprentices organised themselves into an unofficial union called the 
Tyneside Apprentices' Guild under the leadership of one of their number, James 
William Davy, an ex-member of a communist organisation. 
229 This organisation was 
described by one member as being "the government of the apprentices, by the 
apprentices, for the apprentices"0 Despite this claim it is clear that the TAG was, 
from its inception, heavily influenced by political parties. Although the apprentices 
themselves were described as being apolitical, the local branch of the Independent 
Labour Party (including Dan Smith and Ken Skethaway) along with members of the 
Workers International League lent much support and advice from the very start231 
The apprentices appeared to have allowed time for negotiation of their grievances, 
which were aired well in advance, but when there was no official reply they declared 
their intention to strike, allegedly with the backing of their families and workmates. 
The unions, however, did not support the action and throughout negotiations 
refused to recognise the Apprentices' Guild as an official body. At the beginning of 
the strike an open air meeting between the unions and some 5,000 apprentices at 
Wallsend resulted in an impasse when the unions made it abundantly clear that they 
would not back the strikers and that they would not negotiate with the representatives 
of the Apprentices' Guild 232 Despite this lack of support the Tyneside apprentices 
were described in the national press as being in an "aggressive mood" 233 Although 
the strike, supported in other parts of the country to varying degrees, lasted only a 
fortnight, by April 11th the Tyne Shipbuilders Association was stating that 70% of 
229 Bornstein, S, and Richardson, A, War and the International. A History of the Trotskyist Movement 
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apprentices had returned to work, 234 and officially did not achieve the demands of the 
apprentices it is also true that no Tyneside apprentice was sent to the coal mines. 
The government responded to the strike by quickly investigating for 
subversive elements that possibly lay behind it. Whilst indicating that the apprentices 
had been duped into striking by these subversive elements the government attempted 
to distract attention from the real issue: that of dissatisfaction at the erosion of rights 
and the fact that the apprentices were more concerned with their future economic 
security than in assisting an industry essential to the national war effort. The paranoia 
surrounding Trotskyist manipulation was reflected in the experiences of Swan 
Hunter's in 1941 when a short, only a few hours, stoppage of work by apprentices 
after one of their number was sacked for breaking yard rules was blamed on 
"Communist elements" and their attempts to organise the apprentices for the purpose 
of taking industrial actions The short stoppage was ended when the guilty 
apprentice agreed to pay a fine and was reinstated in his position. These were minor 
incidents that, in peacetime, would have been seen as insignificant but in the spirit of 
wartime paranoia were blown out of all proportion. The Trotskyists, and especially 
the Revolutionary Communist Party, were the main focus of this paranoia: Ernest 
Bevin thought that these agitators were the central motivators of illegal strikes 236 In 
Newcastle, both the Trotskyists and the striking apprentices were aided by members 
of the ILP. One member of this party who later went on to achieve notoriety was T 
Dan Smith (1915-1993). Smith, who was also a member of the PPU, had helped with 
the initial meetings of the apprentices and made speeches in their support. He later 
went on to become leader, in 1960, of Newcastle City Council as a member of the 
234 TWAS: 895/10. Tyne Shipbuilders Association minute book, special general meeting, April 11th 
1944, p 217. 
235 TWAS: 978/8. North East Coast Shiprepairers Association, minute book, meeting of the Executive Committee, March 24th 1941, pp 200-201. 236 Bullock, A, The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin, Volume 2 (London: Heinemann, 1967), p 269. 
85 
regular Labour Party. In this capacity he oversaw extensive changes to the structure 
of the city, at great architectural expense, but was jailed for corruption in the 1970s237 
By the summer of 1944 several Trotskyists had been charged with conspiring 
to incite the apprentices to strike and acting in furtherance of an illegal strike. The 
accused, Lambert Heaton Lee, Rawling Tearse, James Ritchie Haston and Angel 
Rosalie Keen, were tried at Newcastle assizes and sentences were passed on June 19`h. 
The three men were all found guilty of acting in furtherance of an illegal strike but 
cleared of conspiracy and of incitement, whilst Mrs Keen was cleared of all 
charges. 38 Mr Lee, a South African national, and the organiser of the Revolutionary 
Communist Party, was jailed for a year. He was joined in the same sentence by Mr 
Tearse, who was the secretary of the Militant Workers' Federation and described as a 
"political agitator" by the police. Mr Haston, the national secretary and organiser of 
the Revolutionary Communist Party, was sent to prison for six months. Mrs Keen 
was given a nominal sentence and released immediately. 239 The trial only served to 
increase the "R. C. P. 's self-importance" and the convictions were subsequently 
quashed at appeal just three months later. 240 It is clear that the rights of these accused 
were violated. In an effort to obtain evidence the Newcastle Police had questioned 
Bill Davy, the leader of the TAG, for a period of 24 hours and had "threatened and 
cajoled" him into making a statement 241 Furthermore, the authorities had failed to 
inform Mr Davy of his rights and were holding him without having cautioned him. In 
addition, thinly veiled threats to blacklist, arrest and imprison Mr Davy were made by 
the police during the interview process. 242 
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The trial judge made it clear in his summing up of the case that the striking 
apprentices knew that the Bevin Ballot would not even affect the vast majority of their 
number. 243 That they were striking on behalf of the rights of all apprentices, and so 
this strike was simply being made on a point of principle: that being that the freedom 
of the apprentice to continue in his chosen profession overrode the national need. The 
fact that the government was seemingly willing to ride roughshod over the rights of 
the apprentices due to wartime conditions did not mean that the apprentices would 
accept such measures. Wartime necessities, especially this late in the war, would 
appear to be taking second place to the established work-place rights of the 
apprentices. 244 
The last two years of the war seem to have been characterised by a renewed 
willingness on the part of Tyneside workers to take strike action. This is in concert 
with the national trend, with the number of strikes in both 1944 and 1945 being more 
than double that of 1940. There were a greater number of strikes in the five years 
from 1941 than there had been in the fifteen years from 1926 to 1940. In total some 
6,549,000 working days were lost due to strike action in the final two years of the 
war, whilst the total for the whole war, excluding 1939, was 10,963,940 days. 1944 
was the single worst year, in terms of working days lost, since the depression haunted 
days of 1932 . 
245 The pattern of industrial action on Tyneside follows this model, 
characterised by few strikes in the crisis year of 1940 but a greater number in every 
year following. Such figures do not corroborate the traditional view of working 
people united behind the national war effort at any cost. 
243 The Times, June 20`h 1944, p 2. 244 For a fuller discussion of the impact that the Tyneside Apprentice's Strike had had on labour laws in 
Britain, and for the credibility which it lent the RCP, see Bornstein, S, and Richardson, A, War and the 
International, pp 115-141. 
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Whilst mining remained, throughout the war, the greatest source of strikes and 
industrial unrest it is clear that the shipbuilding and repair industry on Tyneside, along 
with the associated engineering trades, was far from untroubled during the period. 
The earliest stoppage in the local industry that is deemed serious enough to be 
mentioned in official intelligence reports occurred in the summer of 1941 and 
involved the stoppage of work by riveters in various yards concerned over their rates 
of pay in comparison to other shipyard workers. 46 The pacification of the riveters 
appears to have been an ongoing problem with strikes occurring throughout the war. 
As late as April 1944 an emergency Joint Committee representing the Tyne and Wear 
Shipbuilders' Associations respectively was convened to discuss the concerns of the 
riveters. 47 Once again, pay seems to have been the motivation behind the action 
taken by the riveters. Demands for a minimum lieu rate of 30/- per day (£60 today) 
were made by the men despite a national agreement for a lesser sum having been 
reached on March 7t' 1944. Once again showing the importance placed by some 
workers on purely regional bargaining as opposed to a national structure of pay and 
conditions. A compromise was eventually reached whereby the men would be paid a 
bonus of between five percent and ten percent depending on the work that they were 
involved in on that day. 248 The riveters seem to have become a target for allegations 
from local authorities as it was claimed to an official inquiry that some firms were 
keeping riveters employed under the Essential Workers Order despite the fact that 
they had no employment for them for substantial periods of time. 249 
246 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle City Police, September 12th 1941. 247 TWAS: 895/10. Tyne Shipbuilders association, minute book, Emergency Joint Committee, April 
250' 1944, pp 228-229. 
248 Ibid. 
249 NA: ADMI/15260. Summary of Statements made to the Financial Secretary of the Admiralty about 
Misuse of Shipyard Labour on Tyneside, July 1943, p 2. 
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Throughout 1942 there were reports of "unrest" within the industry250 Then a 
dispute occurred involving the drillers in the Fitting Out Department of Parsons 
Marine Steam turbine Company Ltd, at Wallsend, an incident compounded when 
drillers at William Doxford & Sons Ltd in Sunderland also came out in sympathy. 
Once again the key issue was rates of pay and after a lack of progress in discussions 
the matter was referred to the local Conciliation Officer of the Ministry of Labour and 
National Service. Despite further discussions an agreement could still not be met. To 
increase the difficulties of the industry the dispute spread top Swan Hunters' Neptune 
Works251 The year 1942 would appear to have been marked by poor relations in the 
engineering industry on the Tyne, including the Total Time strike. Relations were 
strained with several unions and worker's organisations including the National Union 
of Heating and Domestic and General Metal Workers; the National Society of 
Painters; the Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers (Tyne District); the Plumbers, 
Glaziers and Domestic Engineering Union; and the Amalgamated Slaters and Tilers 
Provident Society. Locally, the members of all of these organisations had been 
involved in confrontations with their employers during the year. 252 
These last workers did not come under the umbrella of shipbuilding but under 
the more widespread definition of engineering. On Tyneside however the majority of 
engineering work was concerned with the shipbuilding industry or armaments 
production. The engineering trades were commonly talked of in the same sentence as 
the shipbuilding workers and it would appear that they `enjoyed' a reputation for even 
greater levels of industrial discontent. Indeed the first, "watershed", 253 area-wide 
250 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle City Police, September 11th 1942-November 
7`h 1942. 
u` TWAS: EM/EN 1/1/3. North East Coast Engineering Trades Employers Association, minute book, Standing Committee, September 15th 1942. 
252 Ibid. 
u' Croucher, R, Engineers, p 180. 
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strike of the war occurred in the Tyneside engineering trade in late 1942. The dispute, 
which became known as the Total Time or Lying-On strike, occurred over what at 
first appeared to be a relatively minor issue: when the changing of how the working 
week was calculated due to demands of office staff. This change, which was 
supported by the engineering unions, would mean that the engineers would have been 
forced to accept a short week when the system initially changed over. Union 
negotiations came to a settlement whereby the workers would be paid a weekly 
average for this short week and would pay this sum back over the course of five 
weekly instalments. The new policy was met with a "flood of protests from the 
members"2sa 
Within days at least eight local union branches had written to complain, with 
South Shields being especially indignant at the manner in which its members had not 
been consulted. Ironically, many of the workers actually understood the reasoning 
behind the employers' decision, but their main qualm was that the District Committee 
had taken a decision affecting them without consultation. The employers attempted to 
placate the engineering workers by extending the period over which the money would 
be paid back to twelve weeks. The workers refused to be mollified and, on October 
5t', a number of yards came out on strike. 255 The strike was markedly different in that 
it was one of the first anti-official strikes of the war. Meaning that the majority of the 
strikers were not particularly vehement in opposition to their employers but felt 
considerable ire towards the union officials who, they felt, had betrayed their trust and 
responsibilities to grass roots members. Within a week there were estimated to be up 
to 18,000 men on strike in the area and a proposal put forward at a meeting in North 
Shields for a return to work pending and independent inquiry had been rejected. The 
254 Ibid, p 182. 255 Ibid. 
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opposition to the strikers from both union leadership and the BCP remained strong. 
Faced with such determined opposition from every official body that could have been 
expected to support the strike the action was inevitably short-lived and a meeting of 
the Central Strike Committee at Wallsend Town Hall on October 12th decided by 75 
votes to 22 to back a return to work. Two days later the strikers had all returned to 
work. 256 The strike, whilst officially achieving little, was significant in that it 
demonstrated the abilities of Tyneside workers once again to organise themselves 
unofficially. Furthermore, it showed that there was sufficient militancy and unity 
amongst the Tyneside workforce to fly in the face of criticism from official 
representative bodies when they believed that their views were not being considered. 
As the war continued the unrest in the local shipbuilding industry continued to 
grow. In common with the national experience 1944 proved to be the worst year with 
stoppages amongst the boilermakers at Vickers-Armstrongs Naval Yard at Walker, 
amongst others, capturing headlines both locally and nationally. This stoppage, in 
September, concerned the manning of newly installed gas cutting machines and 
resulted in an official inquiry chaired by Sir John Forster. 257 This inquiry reported 
that there was no defensible reason for the strike action and the men's refusal to return 
to work was delaying vital production. 258 As a result, 125 of the men were found 
guilty of taking part in an illegal strike and were fined £10 each with an additional l Os 
in costs (a total, per man, of approximately £420 today). 259 The men insisted, through 
their solicitor, that their actions were correct and that they would refuse to pay any 
fine levied by the court. The Chairman of the bench took a very dim view of this 
256 Croucher, R, Engineers, pp 184-187. 
s' TWAS: 895/10. Tyne Shipbuilders Association, minute book, December 21" 1944, p 320. 258 The Times, December 21' 1944, p 4. 259 The Times, January 8th 1945, p 2. 
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strike and stated that it would be "impossible to exaggerate the seriousness of the 
offence. " No mitigating factors could be found for the men's actions. 260 
The shipbuilding industry, combined with the engineers and steel producers, 
formed the most actively militant section of British society throughout the war. This 
increase in militancy is notable during the war and "in both the proportion of disputes 
and workers involved, the Metal, Engineering, and Shipbuilding industries 
experienced the greatest percentage increase' . 261 This field of industry was the only 
one to experience a greater average number of disputes during the first three years of 
war than it had in the previous eleven years of peace. Between the years 1927 and 
1938 the shipbuilding, engineering, and steel production industries had been 
responsible for 17.1% of all industrial disputes but during the first three years of the 
war this total had increased to 30.9%. In terms of the percentage of the total working 
days lost the figure had more than quadrupled from 7% to 32.2%262 The only 
category of industry responsible for a greater percentage of days lost was mining. 
Throughout the war there were continual and vociferous complaints that the 
shipyard workers on Tyneside were not working to their utmost capacity and that 
slackness was commonplace in the industry. Allegations made against shipyard 
workers included the case of six workers who had been found fishing in the river from 
a partially completed vessel whilst they were meant to be working. It was also said to 
be common practice amongst the woodworkers in the yards to make toys at 
Christmas. The manufacturing of petrol lighters was also commonplace. 263 There 
were also largely unsubstantiated allegations that woodworkers, who had been 
M Ibid. 
261 Gromberg, E L, `Strikes and Lock-Outs of Great Britain', The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 59, 
1 (November 1944), p 100. 
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employed by Swan Hunter's after working at Wallsend Dock, had stated that they had 
done no work for several weeks. No evidence was produced to the inquiry to support 
this accusation. 264 These claims were of course part of an attempt by local councils to 
encourage the Admiralty to approve the re-opening of several local yards that had 
been closed in the previous decades and the inquiry had been appointed to investigate 
allegations that labour was being wasted in the industry. 
The shipyard workers, however, were still capable of showing a high level of 
dedication to the war effort and were most strongly influenced by events at sea. There 
was, for example, a noticeable increase in productivity in the yards after the loss of 
the battleships HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales was made public. 265 The loss 
was met with consternation, "especially as the residents of Tyneside recognised the 
value of such ships. s266 The increased determination of the shipyard workers was put 
down to their realisation of how important their work actually was to the national 
effort. There is also evidence that large numbers of workers believed that overly 
controlling bureaucracy was responsible for stalling their ability to contribute more 
fully to the war effort. This opinion crystallised around the issue of the re-opening of 
yards closed during the previous decade, including Jarrow, and a commonly 
expressed opinion by former and current shipyard workers was that the government 
should "let them get on with the job. )s267 This would seem to imply that the workers 
were often unified behind the wartime requirements of the country but that they grew 
anxious and irritated by what they saw as governmental interference in an industry in 
which they knew best. 
2" Ibid. 
265 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle City Police, December 190' 1941. 266 Ibid. 
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Due to the preponderance of heavy industry on Tyneside, along with the 
traditionally masculine views of such a society, the working opportunities for women 
have often been viewed as extremely limited. A report inquiring into the social and 
industrial culture of Tyneside would seem to have found some justification for this 
viewpoint as it pinpointed the "scarcity of industrial employment for women. "268 
Despite this, the report goes on to state that the proportion of women employed in the 
area was greater than that in other parts of the North of England. Most of these 
women were employed in distributive trades, along with summer employment of 
women in the catering trades and hotels found in the area's seaside resorts. 
Despite this rather gloomy view it is obvious that the situation had been 
changing in the decade before the declaration of war and that the resurgence of the 
heavy industries caused by the wartime situation had merely drawn the focus of 
attention away from these developments. This is reflected in the fact that whilst the 
numbers employed in coal mining and shipbuilding fell by between 20% and 30% the 
numbers involved in the consumption goods and service sector "increased rapidly in 
the twenties but remained fairly stationary after 1935.1,9269 This slowdown coincided 
with the process of re-armament and the subsequent resurgence of the heavy 
industries. New and existing industries had created an estimated 10,000 new jobs in 
the pre-war decade, with over half of the positions being filled by women. Much of 
this progress was due to the developments on the Team Valley Industrial Estate in 
Gateshead where more than 100 firms had been tempted to establish themselves by 
financial inducements from the Commissioner of the Special Areas. Together these 
new developments, largely in the clothing and food industries, employed 
2" NA: BT64/3260. Report on Tyneside by Professor Allen, 1944, p 1. 269 Ibid, p 3. 
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approximately 5,000 people, over 60% of them young women. 270 Increased demand 
for the products of the traditional heavy industries of Tyneside also led to new 
opportunities for women. The numbers of those employed in industries such as 
shipbuilding and engineering increased throughout the war although, they remained a 
very small percentage of the total workforce in these fields. The situation was 
improving with, for example, a total of 268 women being employed by nine separate 
North East shipbuilding companies by late 1942.71 Thus, it can be seen that the 
creation of work that came with the war resulted in an increase in workplace 
opportunities for women, often in areas for which they had long been considered 
unsuitable. By the spring of 1941 local intelligence reports were able to make the 
comment that the rising levels of female employment in local industries were 
"significant" and this trend continued so that, by later that summer, local sources were 
proclaiming that "large numbers of women are now employed in industry. s272 
Despite the view of Tyneside as an area dominated by traditional heavy 
industries such as coal mining, shipbuilding, engineering, and munitions work, the 
city of Newcastle upon Tyne presented a different role. As a regional capital and hub 
of trade, the city had always possessed a significant service sector based largely 
around the distributive and commercial sector. It was these industries that, together 
with domestic service, employed the majority of the female working population of the 
area. Indeed, by 1931, the retail sector was estimated to employ approximately 9,000 
women in Newcastle. 273 Whilst the heavy industries had been in decline during the 
1930's the service sector had maintained its capacity and in many cases had expanded 
270 ibid. 271 TWAS: 978/8. North East Coast Shiprepairers Association minutes, October 6t' 1942, p 364. 272 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports - Newcastle upon Tyne City Police, March 29th 1941 
and July 4i' 1941. 
273 Vall, N, `The Emergence of the Post-Industrial Economy in Newcastle 1914-2000' in Colls, R& 
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significantly. The war led to the stalling of this process at the expense of a temporary 
and disproportionate boom in the heavy industries. 
Given the levels of employment in thirsty trades, such as the heavy 
manufacturing industry, on Tyneside, combined with the number of local breweries, it 
is no wonder that the licensed trade played a significant role in the Tyneside service 
economy. Whilst Tyneside also contained an important brewing industry the role of 
landlords and publicans was somewhat different given their close contact with the 
local communities that they served. Indeed, it has been argued that if "the breweries 
were the prime suppliers of liquid morale during the war, the front-line troops in 
keeping everyone's chins up were the men and women running the pubs of 
Britain. '-274 Roles changed for publicans during the war. Not only were they still 
expected to play the part of the convivial host, often when faced with shortages and 
staff problems, but they were also expected to act as lookouts for signs of poor 
morale, to provide encouragement, to aid the war effort through the running of charity 
funds, and to build close relationships with the armed forces in their area. 275 The 
public houses of Tyneside also formed key nodes in their local communities. This 
was especially important in the working-class areas that sustained the majority of the 
heavy industries. Fluctuating shift patterns, combined with increased wages and the 
general austerity of wartime Tyneside, resulted in the public house being seen as an 
ever more important entertainment venue. There was an upsurge in the customer base 
of most pubs as younger people began to earn more money during the war and 
servicemen were increasingly based in the region. There were, however, problems 
that went hand-in-hand with the growing popularity of the public house. 
274 Glover, B, Brewing for Victory. Brewers, Beer and Pubs in World War 11 (Cambridge: Lutterworth 
Press, 1995), p 67. 
275 See Ibid, pp 67-84. 
96 
Drunkenness had decreased nationally throughout the inter-war years, yet 
Newcastle and Tyneside remained one of the areas where the rate was significantly 
higher than the national average. Indeed, Newcastle continued to be in the "top five 
of the drunkenness table and comparatively its problem was getting worse"276 It has 
been stated that the rate of drunkenness, measured by the simple expedient of the 
number of arrests per head of population, for Newcastle throughout the 1930's and up 
to the outbreak of war was 40 per 10,000 head of population, and a claim has been 
made that this represented two and a half times the national rate. 277 In fact, the rate 
could have been even higher as the figures available from the Licensing Statistics 
(England and Wales), indicate that, in 1938, the national average was just 11.33 per 
10,000 278 If this is the case then Newcastle's figures were in fact more than three and 
a half times greater than the national average. 
It was argued that the wartime situation on Tyneside had led to a "more 
responsible attitude" towards alcohol consumption, with prosecutions per annum 
decreasing from over 1,000 during the late 1930's to just 257 in 1946279 This, 
however, does not tell the whole story. Police intelligence reports for the period 
suggest that the consumption of alcohol on Tyneside was prone to peaks and troughs. 
The subject is first mentioned in a report on January 4th 1941 when it is stated that 
drunkenness, although showing an overall "substantial decrease", was still "rather 
prevalent". Eighteen people were charged with this offence in Newcastle over the 
New Year period . 
280 The drinking habits of the Tyneside public continued to be 
affected by seasonal changes with the long nights of spring and summer seeing the 
heaviest consumption rates and a subsequent increase in arrests for drunkenness. In 
276 Bennison, B, `Drink in Newcastle', in Colls, R& Lancaster, B (eds), Newcastle upon Tyne, p 185. 277 Ibid. 
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1941 the arrest rate for the six months up until the end of June showed an increase of 
12% from the six months previous. 281 This is explainable as a reaction to the wartime 
conditions. During the winter nights the earlier blackout created problems for people 
travelling even short distances whilst public transport was also more unreliable at this 
time of the year. 
Later police reports on the subject appear confused, stating that although 
consumption had increased there had been little discernible rise in incidences of 
drunkenness but also that prosecutions for the offence had increased by 28% on 1940 
figures and 11% on those from 1939282 From this it would appear that the first full 
year of war, which was also the period when the country was at most risk from 
invasion and bombing, saw a significant fall in drunkenness but that as the situation 
became less threatening the figures began to slowly creep up again although the 
comparative weakness of wartime beer and the shortages that particularly afflicted 
Tyneside meant that levels never reached the levels of the mid-1930's. The lack of 
reports where drink is mentioned later in the war would seem to suggest that the 
problem was easily controlled and that people had settled into a wartime rhythm. 
Although the public houses continued to receive extensive patronage it would appear 
that drunkenness continued to decline during the latter period of the war with even the 
VE Day celebrations in Newcastle being described as "comparatively quiet'? ß3 A 
common official response to increasing levels of alcohol consumption was to increase 
the price of beverages and this was done several times during the war to subsequent 
good effect. 
As a corollary of increased sobriety the problems affecting the owners of 
public houses and inns quickly became clear at the onset of war. If people were 
22' Ibid, report dated July 18'h 1941. 
282 Ibid, report dated January 30t' 1942. 
283 Ibid, report dated May 15`h 1945. 
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consuming less alcohol immediately after the outbreak of war then this would be felt 
economically by the pub owners and breweries, as the immediate impact of the 
declaration of war began to wear off, however, the customers began to return and 
increasing prices resulted in greater profits. Many of the pub owners had expected to 
come under attack once more from the tee-totaller's party and temperance movement. 
They were not, in the first year of the war, disappointed. Concerted attempts were 
made to bring back the draconian legislation that had been in place during the First 
World War and concerns were raised in the national press by high placed supporters 
of the temperance movement regarding the threat to the war effort that alcohol 
consumption supposedly represented. The government however took the view that 
beer consumption was good for public morale and realised that restrictions on 
consumption and availability may have led to subsequent industrial unrest. 284 
The Licensed Trade Employer's Association appeared to be late in preparing 
for the war with a circular regarding ARP measures being distributed to members 
only on March 22°d of 1939. Despite these precautions it would seem that the main 
concern voiced in the- circular concerned the possible disruption to supplies that could 
result from air raids and the possibility of greater regulation of dray deliveries in the 
Tyneside area. 285 Complacent attitudes towards ARP resulted in several pub owners 
falling foul of blackout regulations early in the war. 
The more general wartime problems, as represented by the blackout, instigated 
significant problems in the licensed trade. The conditions of the blackout forced 
many local authorities to curtail late night tram and bus services and this had a knock- 
on effect on the licensed trade. In December 1939 both Newcastle City Council and 
284 For a fuller description of the battle between the temperance movement and the breweries and 
licensed trade during the period see Glover, B, Brewing for Victory (Cambridge: Lutterworth Press, 
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Tynemouth Borough Council wrote to the Association stating that services would 
cease at 10 pm due to the restrictions on street lighting. This resulted in a succession 
of meetings to discuss the possible responses to this predicament. Proposals included 
the early opening and closing of pubs but this was impractical because in order to 
open early would require the permission of the Brewery Sessions whilst early closing 
was disagreeable because it would mean that public houses would lose custom to 
clubs who did not close early. 286 Despite these concerns, most breweries decided to 
have their pubs stop serving at 9.30 pm so that both customers and staff could avail 
themselves of transport home. 
Some breweries, including Calders in Newcastle, refused to close their pubs 
early; whilst others, such as the representatives of Messrs Rowells, voiced the 
suspicion that an official curfew would be put into place in any regard ensuring the 
early closing of all businesses. 87 Some of the other suggestions by members of the 
Association showed a distinct lack of understanding of their workforces needs and 
included a scheme whereby staff would be redistributed so that they could work 
closer to their homes and a plan to force 50% of staff to stay overnight at their place 
of employment on alternating nights. Obviously these schemes were dismissed by the 
majority as unworkable. Some recognition, however, of the increased dangers faced 
by their staff during wartime was evident in the early wartime increase in wages. 
From January 1" 1940 all employees working in industrial areas alongside the Tyne 
were to receive a pay rise of not less than 2/6 per week (approximately £5 today) 
whilst others would receive a more limited rise of at least 2/- per week (or 
approximately £4 today). In addition to this a minimum wage was set at 45/- (or 
approximately £90 today), plus the increase, for barmen and 30/- (or approximately 
286 Ibid, minutes of general meeting on September 23rd 1940. 
197 Ibid. 
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£60 today), plus increase, for barmaids. 88 In this manner the licensed trade hoped to 
stop the flow of workers that it had suffered leaving to join the armed forces and ARP 
organisations. 
Perhaps the greatest problem to face the licensed trade on wartime Tyneside 
was the shortage of beer that occurred persistently from the summer of 1941 onwards. 
As previously mentioned the matter was discussed by representatives of the local 
authorities, the Licensing Justices, the local Police, the Northumberland and Durham 
Brewers Association and the Licensed Trade Employer's Association. The earliest 
recorded meeting of the latter two organisations to discuss this problem happened in 
early August 1941. At this conference the causes of the problem were discussed and 
it was agreed that the two key areas were transportation problems that were placing 
greater demand on local breweries and the "heavily increased" public demand for 
beer. 289 The two associations agreed that their foremost duty was to the members of 
the public and "particularly to working men whose hours for leaving work must be 
specially considered s290 Again this was a reflection of the government's fear that 
shortages of beer could lead to an increase in incidences of industrial unrest. The 
shortages had led to some pubs closing their doors early or, in some cases, not 
opening at all for several consecutive days. This not only deprived workers and 
regular customers but could also lead to congestion at licensed premises that did have 
a supply of beer. 
The continuing crisis led to a later meeting between the Licensing Justice, the 
Police and representatives of the Board of Trade in May 1942. Several complaints 
had been received from workmen who claimed that they could not obtain refreshment 
2S8 Annual meeting on December 1S'h 1939, in ibid. 
289 TWAS: EM/LT/1/l. Licensed Trade Employer's Association minute book, joint meeting of the 
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after their shifts had finished due to pub closures and early closures. They went on 
further to claim that they were being forced to visit several premises before being able 
to get served and that this was a cause of great irritation. It would seem that some 
publicans, and indeed their staff, were taking advantage of the situation by selling 
what limited stocks they had quickly and then closing to take the rest of the day off. 
The police voiced their disapproval of this practice and petitioned the owning 
breweries to take stern measures against any publican caught doing this 291 Whilst the 
breweries largely accepted these accusations they put the blame on individual 
managers and on new wartime staff who were inexperienced in their duties. Little 
headway was made at the meeting and it was expressed that hopefully the upcoming 
budget might help to reduce the demand for beer, especially in the coal mining areas 
of the district. 292 
The problem of publicans closing their premises early after selling all their 
stock continued to be a major problem on Tyneside and it would seem that brewers 
and licensed trade workers were becoming increasingly resentful of accusations 
against them. This can be seen in the response to a letter from the Newcastle Trades 
Council submitted in 1944. This letter stated, "That this Council takes a serious view 
of the loss of rights suffered by the public by the premature closing of licensed 
premises, in that it appears that these premises are cleared at the will of the tenants 
and occupiers, who ignore the terms of their license. s293 The response once again was 
to blame this on inexperienced staff and to hostilely state that the situation of 
Newcastle was no worse than that in neighbouring towns where "no fuss" was being 
made. The local press were also blamed for inciting the public feelings on the issue. 
191 ]bid, details of a conference between the Licensing Justices, the Police and the Board of Trade on 
May 15th 1942. 
292 Ibid. 
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An attempt was even made to blame the situation on the general public and it was 
claimed that, if there was a shortage, it was largely "due to the greed of certain 
customers who drank far more than their share, also more people were drinking 
today". 294 It was in attitudes such as these that some of the management community 
of Tyneside unwittingly aided in maintaining traditional class and regional disputes, 
despite the supposedly unifying influence of the war. 
Food rationing enforced by the government impacted, not only on the food 
retail sector and the customer, but also, on the butchery trade. Shortages of meat and 
the implementation of coupons meant that those in this trade faced several new 
challenges brought about by the war. The centralisation of slaughter houses, just 
three such establishments were meant to cater for the majority of the North East, 
resulted in supplies of meat on Tyneside running short. The members of the 
Newcastle, Gateshead and district Butchers' Association vehemently criticised this 
measure and claimed that the scheme would be unworkable. A deputation was sent to 
protest to the Ministry of Food and the policy was decried as a recipe for disaster that 
would "make no end of confusion. "295 
Early in the war however the main complaint seems to not have been 
regarding quantity but quality of meat provided by butchers as there were several 
complaints that meat supplied was of a poor grade 296 One of the most common 
complaints concerned the profiteering of butchers around the Christmas period when 
the prices of turkeys and other fowl tended to increase. , There were several 
complaints about this matter from members of the general public and the Association 
promised to hold a full internal inquiry with punishment for any member who was 
294 Reply from Mr James Deuchar to letter from Newcastle Trades Council, August 306' 1944, in ibid. 
295 TWAS: TUBA/1/1. Newcastle, Gateshead and District Butchers' Association, minute book, 
secial committee, September 110' 1939, pp 371-372. 
2z Ibid, May 27'' 1940, p 399. 
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found to be profiteering 297 During the Christmas of 1940 the level of complaints 
regarding this matter reached such a level that they were included in the police 
intelligence reports, it was said that people believed the prices to be "exorbitant". 298 
The problem, despite the promises of the Association, was obviously not completely 
solved as there were once more complaints in December 1943 that poultry was both 
scarce and expensively priced. 299 
Although it can be argued, as indeed Churchill did, that during a Total War all 
workers are on the front lines, the merchant seamen of Tyneside appear to have 
suffered more from enemy action than most. Although figures are difficult to 
calculate, the Merchant Navy lost in total some 45,313 casualties. It is probable that 
these men suffered some of the greatest numbers of casualties in comparison to their 
numbers. The Tyne-based Moor Line Company , for example, lost 257 men killed (a 
further 27 were interned in Sweden) from its thirteen ships sunk during the war. 30° 
From the very beginning of the war the heavy and sustained enemy attacks on east 
coast shipping resulted in the merchant crews, many of whom were Tyneside 
residents, experiencing great difficulties in the performance of their, already arduous, 
duties 301 There are no exact figures that provide an accurate breakdown of the ratio 
of Tyneside men manning these ships but the anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
numbers were substantial. For example, many of the crews manning the vessels of 
convoy CW9, during July 1940, were described as being "Geordies from the 
Tyne',,. 302 The area experienced greater casualties lost in merchant vessels during the 
war than any other comparative area. Concerns over the "losses among local crews" 
2971bid, November 6d' 1940, p 412. 
298 TWAS: MD/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle City Police, January 4`h 1941. 
299 Ibid, December 30`h 1943. 
soo TWAS: DX1054/1. Moor Line, Book of Remembrance, 1939-1945. See Appendix C for details of 
vessels lost by this company. 
301 TWAS: 1070/21. North of England Shipowners' Association, annual reports, 1939, p 11. 302 Slader, J, The Fourth Service. Merchantmen at War 1939-45 (London: New Guild, 1995), p 32. 
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were being expressed by large numbers of the Tyneside public throughout 1942 
303 
The amount, and frequency, of losses of local men was also "a matter of great 
concern" to the North of England Shipowners' Association. 304 
Merchant seamen, at home on leave, represented over 1% of all losses during 
air raids on Tyneside suggesting that there were substantial numbers of men in this 
service. Even an unscientific calculation, using the proportion of Merchant Navy 
sailors killed in air raids as a basis, for the total numbers in the service would indicate 
that there were at least 10,000 men from Tyneside in the Merchant Service (and this is 
a conservative estimate). It would appear, from this evidence, that the men of 
Tyneside made up a larger than average proportion of the merchant crews aboard 
British vessels. The importance of this industry on Tyneside cannot be overstated. 
Indeed, so important was merchant service to the area that the national union of 
seamen was centred on South Shields. The topic would certainly benefit from 
dedicated study. The Seaman's Union's primary founder, Havelock Wilson, was the 
former MP for Middlesbrough. In an effort to partially alleviate the plight of the 
seamen a policy known as the Seafarers' War Risk Money scheme was introduced 
that would give an additional £5 (£200) for officers and ratings alongside £2.10s. Od 
for boys (£100). 
The dangers applied to all mariners of course, not only those who ventured out 
to sea, including those who manned the tug boats on the river. The response of the 
tug boatmen to the increasing levels of danger was to demand increases in fees. The 
first such increase, of between 16%-20%, was agreed in November 1939 and there 
were further increases throughout the war. 305 
3°3 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, July 17th 1942. 
304 TWAS: 1070/22. North of England Shipowners' Association, annual report, 1941, p 6. 
305 TWAS: 1070/21. North of England Shipowners' Association, annual reports, 1939, p 15. 
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During the invasion scares of 1940 and 1941 some workers would have found 
themselves on the frontlines with a quasi-military role to play in the defence of 
Tyneside. It was thought that the enemy may have attempted to land troops on the 
Tyne by seaplane and it would have fallen to the Tug-boatmen of Tyneside 
companies, Francis Fenwick, Lawson Batey, and Redheads, to have used their, largely 
unarmed, vessels to ram and sink the seaplanes as they landed. In addition to this they 
were expected to use their vessels to impede river traffic and to render possible 
berthing points unusable. 306 
Managing the War Effort 
The persistent strike action that affected the dockyards of Tyneside provided a stern 
test of local management bodies and eventually attracted the attention of the national 
government. Despite the best efforts of the regional bodies that were set up to 
arbitrate disputes in this sector it had become obvious by the spring of 1942 that the 
men themselves distrusted these organisations and preferred to take unilateral strike 
action without reference to official bodies or indeed their own union. After the 1942 
strike of more than 100 dockers at Tait and Son in Newcastle the Minister of Labour, 
Ernest Bevin, commissioned an official inquiry into the frequent stoppages that had 
affected the port. The remit of the inquiry was made clear in that it was to focus on 
wider issues, and officially "To inquire into the causes and circumstances of 
306 Information kindly provided by Mr David Waller, host of the Auxiliary Units website, 
[http: //www. btinternet. com/-david. waller/index. html], originally quoted from Newcastle Evening 
Chronicle, 23rd April 1968, page number unknown. 
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successive stoppages of work of port transport workers on the river Tyne, and to make 
recommendations for the avoidance of such interruptions of work in the future. "307 
The inquiry was held in the Regional Headquarters of the Ministry of Labour 
at 28 Great North Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, from June 22°d 1942-June 24th. A 
wide range of representatives was heard from including those who spoke for the port 
authorities, relevant businesses, the union concerned, and the workers. 308 The 
employers and the port authorities seem to have presented a relatively united front by 
claiming that the main causes of the strike were distrust between the men and their 
union and also that there was difficulty in interpreting the various pay rates especially 
with regard to the `Lieu Rate'. The National Joint Council for Dock Labour claimed 
that a major problem was that the Tyneside workers had drifted away from the 
National Agreement of May 1920 309 The employers attempted to portray themselves 
as being concerned only for the war effort with Mr B Elliott Common, the Regional 
Port Controller, stressing the necessity of maintaining a quick turn-around of vessels 
in the port. 310 Mr Elliott Common was an interested party in more than his official 
role as he was also a director of Common Bros Steamship Company and as such, 
surely, had a vested interest in the matter. 
As has been referred to previously the official report cited one of the main 
causes of stoppages to be the lack of trust that the men had in the established 
negotiating procedures. The report did not fail to implicate the employers as being 
partially responsible for this breakdown in confidence stating that the employers in 
307 NA: LAB 10/208. Official Report to the Right Honourable Ernest Bevin MP, Minister of Labour, into the problems surrounding dock workers on the Tyne, June 1942, p 1. 308 Ibid. 
309 Ibid, p 2. 
3101bid, p 1. 
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the industry could have displayed "a greater sense of their collective responsibility" 
and by blaming them for the sometimes lax application of previous agreements. 311 
The North East Council of Port Labour however, placed the blame for the 
deteriorating situation firmly at the feet of the local union leadership. It claimed that 
weak leadership was the second largest cause of stoppages and that the failures of the 
local branch leaders had contributed to the worsening relationship between employers 
and employees. To reinforce these claims, the Council gave the example of the `green 
book' agreement of 1923 in which it was stated that no strike action would be taken 
pending negotiations. This agreement was also backed-up by clause eight of the War 
Emergency Agreement of June 24th 1940. Faced with this barrage of blame the union 
could do little but admit that the claims were true and reiterate that, as a national 
body, it condemned the strikes that had occurred in the region. 312 
The employers' claim that the lieu rate of 23/- (£46 today) was unofficial was 
not as readily accepted by either the union or the committee itself. This argument was 
contradicted by past experience on the Tyne and by the results of previous legal 
consultations 313 There was no doubt that the lieu rate was legal, but it was too widely 
utilised by the employers. The employers no doubt wished to utilise the national `fall 
back rate', which was just over 14/- (approximately £28 today), but this was rejected 
and a compromise eventually reached when an acceptable piece rate was offered for 
all general cargo, including munitions 314 
Local management, both at governmental and industrial levels, remained 
concerned that new industry should be stimulated by the increased demand caused by 
the wartime conditions. In Jarrow a deputation was sent to the Admiralty in order to 
311 Ibid, p 3. 
3 12 Ibid, p 5. 
313 Ibid. 
314 Ibid, pp 7-8. 
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attempt to persuade the government to re-open the Palmers shipyard that had closed, 
with devastating consequences for the town, in the 1930's. It is clear from the 
proposal put forward by the Mayor of Jarrow that the local council was aware that, 
even in time of national need, regional competition remained strong. To attempt to 
subvert expected protests from other local shipbuilders it was put forward that the 
yard should be re-opened by the Admiralty directly and run as a naval yard. 315 
Indeed, once it had become public knowledge that a deputation from Jarrow had been 
seen by the Admiralty, the Town Clerk of Tynemouth County Borough Council, Mr F 
G Egner, contacted the Admiralty stating that if there was an inquiry it was hoped that 
it would also consider the possibility of re-opening the Northumberland Yard at 
Howdon, this request was supported by the neighbouring authority of Wallsend. 316 
The main problem surrounding the re-opening of Palmers, and indeed other yards in 
the North East, remained the shortage of available manpower, the Admiralty 
estimated that "On the Tyne we could use at least a thousand more men. "317 The 
claim that labour shortages were a problem on the Tyne is reinforced by the report in 
1941 that Wallsend Slipway was suffering from a lack of available labour and that 
this had led to delays in production. 318 
When questioned by the Financial Secretary of the Admiralty the deputation 
from Jarrow could do little but give vague re-assurances that through informal 
conversations they had come to the opinion that labour was available in the area, a 
view supported by the local MP, Ellen Wilkinson. They then contradict their own 
argument by suggesting that "all local firms [could be] made to give up a percentage 
315 NA: ADM1/152260. Minutes of a Meeting between the Financial Secretary and a Deputation from 
Jarrow, May 18`h 1943. 
36 Letter from Town Clerk of Tynemouth CBC, 26`h May 1943, in ibid. 
317 NA: ADM1/152260. Minutes of a Meeting between the Financial Secretary and a Deputation from 
Jarrow, May 18`h 1943. 
318 TWAS: DS/SWH/1/7. Swan Hunters minute book, Board meeting, September rd 1941, p 27. 
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of their men [to the newly re-opened yard]", it is claimed that this would not 
adversely affect the donating firms capacity to carry out their existing work. 
319 The 
questions posed regarding availability of labour at the meeting led to the Jarrow 
deputation making serious allegations that in many local shipyards "it was quite clear 
that Labour was being wasted v)320 Despite the seriousness of the allegations being 
made little or no direct evidence beyond hearsay was given to the Secretary yet it was 
agreed that there should be an official inquiry into the matter. The local authorities in 
Tynemouth and Wallsend pounced upon the allegation that labour was available in 
Jarrow to make the suggestion that, considering a recently re-opened shipyard on the 
north bank of the Tyne was still 50% below strength, this labour should be 
transferred. 321 The Ministry of Labour declared that whilst there was no shortage of 
unskilled labour the shortages of skilled shipyard labour would prevent the re-opening 
of the Palmers Yard. However, a small yard producing pre-fabricated modules or 
landing craft would probably be viable in Jarrow. 322 
The Regional Officer of the Ministry of Labour and National Service, Mr St. 
John Wilson, wrote to inform his Minister that there were many reasons for workers 
in the yards appearing, to the uninformed observer, to be idle, when in fact they were 
prevented from activity by necessity of work. 323 Despite these assurance the inquiry, 
which was to be on an informal and private basis, led by Mr Hall, the Financial 
Secretary of the Admiralty, into the availability and use of shipyard labour on 
Tyneside went ahead between the 6t' and the 8th of July. The report heard 
representations from local authorities, shipyard owners' organisations and from 
319 NA: ADM1/152260. Minutes of a Meeting between the Financial Secretary and a Deputation from 
Jarrow, May 18th 1943. 
X20 Quote from Councillor Richardson in ibid. 
321 Letter from Tynemouth CBC, June 12`' 1943, in ibid. 
322 Letter from Ministry of Labour and National Service to the Admiralty, June 22nd 1943, in ibid. 
" Report of the Regional Officer of the Ministry of Labour and National Service, May 29`1% 1943, in 
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representative union officials. It becomes clear that many of the complaints from the 
local authorities were unsubstantiated or could be explained by the shifting patterns of 
work within the industry and by the restrictions placed upon work by the dilution of 
yards with an increasing proportion of unskilled labour. 324 Indeed a statement made 
to the inquiry that Smith's Dock could afford to spare 200 men was proven to be false 
by the fact that, just months earlier, two docks had been temporarily unused because 
of labour shortages. 325 
The shipyard employers came in for criticism. It was claimed that it was 
wholly the attitude of the employers which prevented the release of enough labour to 
open a new yard. There were also vague allegations of management using labour on 
private contracts. One yard manager was accused of using joiners to erect trellises at 
his home whilst in another case skilled men were employed putting railings around 
shelters, work which could have been done by labourers. 326 Employers were also 
using the Essential Workers Order to hold on to men even when they were not 
immediately required. This was seen as good business practice as shortages could be 
hard to replace and would lead to a lack of profitability if large orders were 
forthcoming. Employer - trade union relations were also criticised in the report and it 
was said that the employers did not consult with the unions on a regular basis with 
regard to how the available labour should be deployed in local yards although the 
employers protested that this was not the case and that consultations were frequent. 327 
Once again this highlights the ideological differences between employers and local 
Trade Union officials, ironically this was at a time when most management 
consultative exercises with the unions were frowned upon by many of the rank-and- 
324 NA: ADM 11152260. Summary of Statements made to the Financial Secretary of the Admiralty 
about Misuse of Shipyard Labour on Tyneside, July 1943, p 1. 
325 Ibid, p 2. 
3261bid, p 5. 
327 Ibid, p 4. 
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file union membership, who categorised such attempts at consultation as the "Gaffer's 
Committee", 328 because of the unions' perceived complicity in ensuring the smooth 
running of the wartime industries. 
The problems faced by local industrial managers did not wholly revolve 
around the prickly issues of wartime employee relations. The war introduced new 
problems and further complicated peacetime inconveniences. Many of the local 
shipbuilding companies could rely on naval contracts to an extent but most also had 
yards working on vitally needed merchant shipping. Unfortunately the situations 
brought about by wartime risks often meant that it was difficult to obtain payment for 
vessels built during the period, especially when the vessels concerned were built for 
foreign fleets. At Swan Hunter's significant problems were experienced in securing 
the full payment for a vessel built for Sarwia Steamships Ltd of Canada, which seems 
to have been the worst country for this, and the total debt owed on this contract stood, 
in May 1941, at £175,523 (£7,020,920 today) 329 The money, if it was ever paid in 
full, was most often paid back in small and infrequent amounts. 
Damage caused by enemy bombing, whilst not as bad as had been anticipated, 
continued to concern the management of Swan Hunter's, and led to further financial 
complications for the firm. Even minor damage to key locations within a yard could 
result in a slowing, or even temporary halting, of work on important contracts. Such 
as when several building were damaged, and a platers' shed destroyed on the night of 
9th/10`h April 1941. Sometime such damage could lead to a modest restructuring of 
the infrastructure within a yard and in the above case it was decided to double the size 
of the machine shop when it was rebuilt, at a significant cost of £32,380 (£1,295,200 
today). The management quickly developed a greater degree of adaptability than had 
328 Croucher, R, Engineers, p 155. 
329 TWAS: DS/SWH/1/7. Swan Hunter's & Wigham Richardson, minute book, Board meeting, May 
6`h 1941, pp 14-18. 
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been required in the peacetime running of the company. In many cases this was 
necessary because larger companies subsumed control of smaller concerns which, in 
peacetime, had their own management structures. In the case of Swan Hunter's the 
company was running, in addition to its shipyard, a cement works and a plywood 
factory. 
The necessity of providing facilities to wartime staff was also of prime 
concern to the management and in many cases local companies were ordered to 
provide better recreational facilities for their enlarged workforces. This was often 
borne at a significant cost to the parent company such as the estimated £21,000 
(£880,000) paid by Swan Hunter's management to provide two canteens, with a 
combined capacity of over 600 persons in the summer of 1941330 Even recruiting 
enough staff to fulfil contract demand was problematic for local managers and 
throughout 1941 it would appear that the managers at Swan Hunter's were attempting 
to recruit as many men as possible with both the repair Department and Wallsend 
Slipway being short of essential workers during this period 331 
Local managers had to deal with increasing levels of external and internal 
security. This was a direct result of the sensitive and important nature of much of the 
work undertaken by Tyneside engineering concerns. Several of the major companies 
on Tyneside were designated as `protected places' by the government and were prone 
to spot inspections from members of the Intelligence Service, in addition to attempted 
infiltration attempts to test local security. 332 Added to these factors those factories 
designated as `protected places' were ordered against giving out information over the 
phone and had to take unspecified security measures against attack, not only from 
330 Ibid, report to the Board, July 1941, p 19. 331 Ibid, minutes of board meeting, July 10th 1941, p 20. 
332 TWAS: DS/REY/35. Reyrolles Ltd, minute book and correspondence file. Letter from the War 
Office, September 10"1939. 
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German saboteurs, but from IRA elements, 333 and from internal sabotage by members 
of their staff. One local factory manufacturing gyroscopic gun-sights, propeller hubs 
and other equipment for the Ministry of Aircraft Production experienced a fire which 
was later described by the Intelligence Service as being "most certainly deliberate 
arson" and further security measures concerning the storage and disposal of 
inflammable materials were instituted 334 
Mr Oliver Stanley, MP, stated that "the importance [of the merchant shipping 
industry] rested not only on their contributions to the economic resources of the 
country and the volume of skilled employment that they gave, but also to the essential 
part these services played in our national defences" 335 This vital industry was badly 
disrupted by the war, not least in the very severe losses inflicted by enemy action. 
The British shipping fleet operated under a system of government licensing but upon 
the outbreak of war many ships were requisitioned for government use. At first these 
vessels were mainly passenger liners required for transportation purposes but late in 
1939 was extended to include many deep sea tramp vessels. The official body that 
represented the ship owners of Tyneside, the North of England Shipowners' 
Association, disapproved of this measure as it would severely curtail their businesses. 
A statement of 2 °d February 1940 declared that: 
"The members of the North of England Shipowners' Association have carefully considered 
the policy of His Majesty's government... and view with grave misgivings the intention of 
extending the requisitioning of Deep Sea Tramp tonnage ... They [the members] nevertheless feel that the policy of total requisitioning and subsequent delegation of management will 
inevitably lead to confusion... The Association is convinced that a much greater degree of 
efficiency would be achieved if the effective management and chartering of vessels remained 
in the hands of experienced shipowners... "336 
333 Secret memo from Major Brock of the Intelligence Service to Reyrolles detailing possible IRA 
attacks on Orange Day, July 7`h 1940, in ibid. 
334 Secret memo from Major Brock, 7`b May 1940, in ibid. 
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336 Ibid, pp 5-6. 
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The loss of requisitioned vessels imposed a burden on the parent company as, 
whilst compensation was paid at pre-war values, the costs of ordering new ships had 
risen steadily since the war had begun and would continue to do so, almost doubling 
by 1941; a problem described as "probably the major one confronting the 
Industry. "337 Increased levels of governmental control on the merchant fleet also 
proved to be a hindrance for most Tyneside ship owners as the government was 
permitted, under the Emergency Powers Defence Act, Defence Regulations (Statutory 
Rules and Orders, Number 927,1939), at first through the Admiralty and Board of 
Trade and then, from October 1939, the Ministry of Shipping to control pilotage and 
navigation, license ships, control ships in port and to stop vessels in port. 338 In an 
effort to attract more men to the merchant fleet, and to provide necessary training to 
counter the dearth of engine room and catering ratings, the South Shield's Marine 
School was founded early in 1940. 
The wartime conditions forced on to the merchant fleets resulted in a large 
number of losses to the Tyneside companies' fleets. The President of the Association, 
Lord Walter Runciman, stated that "before the war the Association represented 
roughly 260 ships. That number has been reduced ... We have been carrying the 
burden of this war more emphatically and more dramatically than any other branch of 
industry. "339 The government policy regarding the merchant ship owners was 
criticised and there appears to have been a great deal of suspicion regarding the 
motives behind the policy of requisitioning in particular. The Chairman of the 
Association stating that: 
337 Ibid, p 10. 
3381bid, p 7. 
339 Notes from annual meeting, in ibid, p 21. 
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"at the present moment the Ministry of Shipping is busy requisitioning as fast as it can all our 
ships with the alleged object of furthering the national interest by so doing. Those outside 
shipping take that to mean that requisitioning is necessary to ensure that this country obtains 
essential supplies... that, as we know, is not the case. The true reason.. . 
is to enable the 
Government to make spot cash out of British shipping... Again and again, Gentlemen, we are 
being reminded that great Britain wants nothing out of this war - well, that is just what 
shipowners are going to get X34° 
This was a harsh criticism of policy towards the industry and would appear to 
have reflected the views of most members of the Association, although it is possibly 
influenced by the pro-appeasement leanings of the President. Lord Runciman had 
been appointed by the British government as an unofficial mediator tasked with 
finding a peaceful solution to the Sudetenland crisis. 41 As such he had been in 
Czechoslovakia, prior to the beginning of the war, attempting to prevent hostilities, 
and later claimed that "if he had the time over he would do the same again. , 342 This 
reflects the level of support for appeasement that was prevalent in the country before 
the war and perhaps also indicates the reluctance of shipowners to see their businesses 
put at risk by war. 
As the war intensified, the 80 companies in the Association lost 79 vessels 
from 1939-1940 totalling 271,949 tonnes, the mercantile shipping fleets became a 
frontline concern and the annual report of the Association declared "The year just 
ended has demonstrated beyond doubt... and had brought about a fuller realisation of 
the vital service which the shipping industry renders to the British people. This 
should augur well for the well-being of the industry after the war. "343 By VE Day the 
Association had suffered the loss of 387,845 tonnes of shipping. Early wartime 
events, submarine attacks were "particularly intense on the East Coast", 344 had 
340 Ibid. 
341 Gilbert, M, and Gott, R, The Appeasers (London: Phoenix Press, 2000), pp 129-131, and pp 372- 373. 
3421bid, pp 21-23. 
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resulted in the collapse of the North East Coast coal trade and had severely restricted 
the overseas trade. Despite these problems the industry enjoyed good relations with 
its workers and had experienced no serious industrial dispute for over 28 years. 345 It 
was reported that at no point through the war had any time been lost in the shipping 
industry due to industrial unrest 346 
Throughout the war the management community on Tyneside had to learn to 
deal with an increasing number of regulations, situations that would never have 
presented themselves in peacetime and the problems of establishing successful ARP 
procedures and managing the local workforce effectively. Despite the problems that 
did occur in the area it would seem that most managers remained committed and 
professional in their approach to the wartime situation. This can be seen reflected in 
the relatively smooth functioning of the majority of firms and organisations despite 
the severe conditions experienced due to enemy action and general wartime problems. 
A Cause for Concern? 
The strikes that occurred on wartime Tyneside are important on many levels. They 
include the first wartime strike, the Total Time or Lying-On Time strike of October 
1942, to spread over an entire area instead of being limited to an individual company 
or to a very small geographical location and also serve to demonstrate the regional 
characterisation of many of the strikers, especially in the engineering and shipbuilding 
industries, where it would appear that when national union support is unforthcoming 
the workers on Tyneside were once again capable of organising themselves into 
unofficial bodies in order to run disputes effectively and without outside support when 
345 TWAS: 1070/21. North of England Shipowners' Association, annual reports, 1942, p 6. 3461bid, 1943, p 2. 
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necessary. This organisational flexibility is a common factor in the history of 
Tyneside industrial action with examples in each generation of the workforce from the 
Nine Hours strike of 1871 to the wartime strikes of 1942 and 1944.47 Does the 
existence of these, undoubtedly historically important, strikes on Tyneside, however, 
allow us to draw the conclusion that the Tyneside industrial worker was more 
concerned with his own well being, in defending his peacetime working rights and 
enlarging his wage, than in contributing to what has now become the established view 
of wartime Britain with every member of the community pulling together to fashion a 
new national solidarity in the face of Nazism? 
Of course union membership expanded: 7,803,000 members by 1945, an 
increase of 1,750,000.348 It would be hard to imagine any other occurrence given the 
increased number of people in work during the period. However, the majority of 
national unions at the time were fully supportive of both the war effort and as an 
extension of this the government, even though this was often at the expense of 
workers' rights and therefore a direct contradiction of their memberships interests and 
the functions for which the unions' leaderships were elected. 349 Likewise, after the 
invasion of Russia, the BCP followed a line supportive of greater production and 
government industrial policy at the expense of failing to represent the interests of 
many of its members who were employed in the traditional heavy industries that 
thrived in the wartime conditions on Tyneside. - This meant that the BCP was 
compelled to enforce the same line as the unions at a time when it could have 
exploited the workers' antipathy towards the union structure. 350 
347 Croucher, R, Engineers, p 181. 
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So, if we cannot use greater union activity or an expansion of political 
awareness to explain the growth of workplace dissatisfaction, what was responsible? 
Rather, it can be better explained by the awareness of their workplace environment 
that existed within the majority of British workers. Many of these men, it is important 
to emphasise that, despite employing numbers of women, the majority of strikes 
occurred in male dominated industries, had extensive experience of the industrial 
system at action in the workplace and had also heard the accounts of their father's 
and, possibly grandfathers', experiences in the same, or similar, industries. Such an 
inherited memory left a sharp awareness of the balance of power within industry and 
the men were well aware that their power increased when there was a drastic need for 
greater productivity. The men therefore were merely using an increase in their levels 
of workplace power in order to further their own interests. However, we must also 
take into account that fact that there were few or no strikes of any importance in the 
first two years of the war. This surely allows us to make the assumption that the 
workforce was, at this period, dedicated to the national war effort and were `pulling 
together' with their traditional enemies, the employers. Despite this, such bonhomie, 
that was experienced in the crisis years of the war soon abated and was replaced by 
the steady grind of the years 1942-1945. This resulted in a number of attempts by 
employers to bring in schemes that would degrade the peacetime rights of the 
workforce and the subsequent increase in industrial militancy amongst the workers. 
On Tyneside the workforce showed their independence and strength of unity by 
following industrial action even when opposed by their unions, their employers and 
by the government. Their ability to organise themselves into an efficient body in 
order to run a strike action reflects greatly on their determination and intelligence. 
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The very existence, and number, of strikes that took place on Tyneside 
throughout the war would seem to contradict the view of some that "[The British] 
were fighting a war with their sense of humour intact; they were `good tempered' and 
modest. s351 Though the strikers may have maintained their `sense of humour' it is 
clear that they felt that, whilst they may have been part of a national effort, they had 
every right to take disruptive industrial action, regardless of the national effort, if their 
working rights were perceived to have been threatened. 
The local authorities on Tyneside were faced with grave problems at the 
beginning of the war. They were forced to assemble an ARP network with little time, 
manpower, or monetary resources due to the lax attitude shown by both central and 
local government in the run up to war. The catastrophe that occurred to the ARP 
structure at Newcastle upon Tyne resulting in the government inquiry showed that 
corruption in local government managerial circles could run very deep. Whilst the 
scandal of a Newcastle City Councillor with too much influence would re-occur after 
the war the fact that this happened during the worst crisis in the country's history 
makes the lesson all the more harsh. It would appear that there were many, on both 
the sides of the workers and the managerial sector, who were quite prepared to use 
wartime conditions to further their own selfish ends, whether by using their influence 
to pröfiteer or by taking illegal strike action as a means of exploiting the national 
situation. Certainly this was the `People's War' and as such we should remain aware 
that the people of Tyneside, whilst on the whole being brave and steadfast, were as 
susceptible as anyone to self-interest, especially in the context of a larger conflict. 
351 Rose, S 0, Which People's War. National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 
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Chanter 3 
Preparedness for Total War from the Air 
Overview of ARP 
The possibility of a sustained and effective air attack on Tyneside was one which 
continually caused concern to both the local and national authorities as the European 
situation worsened. The area had witnessed limited raiding during the First World 
War but the experience of nearby coastal towns such as Hartlepool, which had 
suffered bombardment by the German fleet, had wrought a deep impression. 
Tyneside was seen as an active "danger spot" 352 This was due largely to the nature of 
its industrial concerns and its easily identified location near the mouth of a major 
river. As a major armaments centre with a deep sea port, the area was expected to be 
a target, even though it was initially beyond the range of the Luftwaffe. Indeed the 
concerns raised by a council report into the vulnerability of the area led to a further 
suggestion from Councillor Armstrong that the authority should petition central 
government in order to secure Newcastle and Tyneside special protection. This 
suggestion was passed on to the Air Raid Precautions Officer, Chief Constable 
Crawley of Newcastle City Police. 
The overwhelming fear that had dominated military and government thinking 
throughout the Thirties, in Britain, throughout the whole of Europe, and beyond, was 
that of the prospect of the mass bombing of the civilian population. This fear was not 
352 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes & reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee: Air Raid Precautions. Report by Chief Constable Crawley of Newcastle City Police 
regarding the evacuation of the populace and the trench and bomb proof shelter system, April 290' 
1938, p 57. 
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only present in official thinking but also in popular culture from novels such as `The 
Gas War of 1940' to Alexander Korda's cinematic version of HG Wells' opinions in 
the film `Things to Come, '353 which begins with the destruction of London by 
successive air raids 354 Even sober military tacticians, such as Major General J. F. C. 
Fuller, predicted that even one air raid on London would result in mass panic, 
pandemonium and the collapse of lawful government. It was believed that "the 
bomber will always get through"355 to its target and that the aerial bombardment of 
civilian populations would be the decisive form of warfare in the future. 
The fear of aerial bombing obsessed the British throughout the inter-war 
period. Certainly, the RAF was aware of the effectiveness of this form of warfare 
having used it effectively at the end of the First World War. Indeed if the war had 
gone on until 1919 a plan was in place for an extensive strategic bombing campaign 
of the German mainland in order to destroy military capability and to erode the 
morale of the German people. The theory has been advanced that, in Britain, the fear 
of aerial attack was deliberately encouraged by senior officers within the RAF. The 
main proponent of this thesis, the historian Correlli Barnett, has attempted to place the 
blame for the overwhelming fear of air attack on the scaremongering of the RAF 
which, he claims, were attempting to "make the politicians' flesh creep by claiming 
that air-power could bomb a nation's industry into rubble and reduce its life to 
anarchy. "356 In a time of severely limited spending, such as the 1930s, it is possible 
that the RAF were utilising these scare tactics in order to secure greater levels of 
funding, although Barnett alleges that the motivation on the part of the RAF, and the 
353 Miles, The Gas War of 1940 (London: Scolaris, 1931). Things to Come, dir. Menzies, WC (United 
Kingdom: London Films, 1936). 
3M For a detailed consideration of attitudes towards possible bombing raids see, Smith, M, Britain and 
1940. History, Myth and Popular Culture (London: Routledge, 2000), pp 14-28. 
355 This famous quote came from a speech by Stanley Baldwin, given in the House of Commons on the 
10th of November 1932. 
356 Barnett, C, The Collapse of British Power (London: Pan, 2002), p 436. 
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Chief of Air Staff in particular, was simply to increase the standing of the service in 
relation to the Army and Navy. 357 The forecasts of bombing induced anarchy were in 
direct contrast with the early campaigns of RAF Bomber Command during the war, 
when a concerted attempt was made to hit only military targets with the dropping of 
bombs on the German mainland expressly forbidden. Barnett uses the official history 
of the air campaign to underpin his thesis. 58 A possible flaw in this argument is that 
many of the opinions expressed by the official, though controversial, historians of the 
bomber offensive, Webster and Frankland, have been subsequently disputed by 
several members of Bomber Command 359 Throughout the 1930s a glut of 
commentators mused on the apocalypse that would result from aerial bombing attacks 
but the opinions formed were based substantially upon fallacious evidence 
extrapolated from the limited experiences of the country during the First World War. 
Taking examples from Britain's experiences of bombing raids from 1916- 
1918, and the effectiveness of this type of warfare in other, more recent, conflicts, 
most notably the Spanish Civil War, the British government grossly overestimated the 
effectiveness of bombing. Both in terms of the social dislocation caused by bombing 
and in the number of casualties that would be the result of bombing raids, almost from 
the outset of hostilities, the estimates were to be proven by later experiences to have 
been vastly over exaggerated 360 This fear of the consequences of air raids was not 
solely confined to the upper echelons of government. Mass Observation surveys 
showed that many people, influenced by popular culture, believed that in the event of 
another war there would be an aerial holocaust from which few of them could expect 
357 Ibid. 
359 Webster, Sir C, & Frankland, N, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany] 939-1945 (London: 
HMSO, 1961). 
359 For one such critique see, Goulding, A G, Uncommon Valour. The Story of RAF Bomber 
Command, 1939-45 (Manchester: Goodall, 1996). 
360 Calder, A, The People's War, pp 221-22. 
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to escape untouched. This expectation was even reflected in the attitudes of the ARP 
workers one of whom stated that "No-one knew just exactly what would be needed of 
them at the commencement of hostilities and it was fully expected that the whole 
country could be raided to a very great extent. "361 Government attitudes towards the 
prospect of mass air raids also trickled downwards into the concerns of the regional 
authorities who would be ultimately made responsible for the organisation of Air Raid 
Precautions in their area. Indeed, the over-estimation of the effectiveness of an air 
raid was something which persisted in some areas until well into the war, as can be 
seen when considering some of the paper exercises that Air Raid Precautions 
organisations undertook throughout the war. 362 These local organisers, as did the 
national forecasters, often exaggerated the effectiveness of prospective air raids and 
tended to over-estimate the amount of damage that would result. 
The British government was quick to recognise that precautions would have to 
be taken in order to maintain control over the country in the event of air raids. As a 
result, the Baldwin government had issued a circular to the local authorities entitled 
`Air Raid Precautions' as early as 1935. The motivation behind the early air raid 
precautions, such as the distribution of 38 million gas masks and the digging of 
trenches in London, has been questioned. The measures are said to have increased the 
anxiety of the general public at the time of the Munich conference and were possibly 
used as a means of persuading public opinion to accept further appeasement because 
"Apprehension took the place of resolution' ; 363 
The most immediately visible arm of the various ARP services, the Warden 
Service, was formed two years later. By mid-1938 the organisation had recruited 
361 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135145). Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee) minutes, 
1939. 
362 TWAS: PA/NC/5/51. Newcastle City Police Wartime Files Re: ARP. 
363 Taylor, AJP, English History 1914-1945, pp 427-431. 
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almost a quarter of a million personnel nationwide. Preparing this new force took 
time and money. In Newcastle the spending on air raid precautionary measures 
increased by an average of 68% in 1937-1939 compared to the preceding two years. 
In 1937 only £55 7s 9d (approximately £2,214 today) was spent compared to £522 
19s 6d (£20,918 today) in the next financial year, an increase of over 900%. The 
majority of the money, apart from that assigned to Police and Fire Brigade pay 
allowances, went on secretarial costs, furnishings and training courses and 
demonstrations. 64 The full breakdown of expenditure for the years 1936 to 1939 can 
be found in appendix A. 365 The two tables highlight the drain on the resources of 
local authorities caused by the necessity of purchasing even small everyday items of 
equipment that were needed to ensure the smooth functioning of the ARP services, for 
example, typewriters. This was despite the official government policy that promised 
to pay at least 60% of the costs to local authorities 366 In reality the compensation 
from central government was slow in coming and was often delayed by red tape. 
As a reflection of the level of forethought that had been given to the 
vulnerability and importance of the area, several additional schemes had been 
suggested by the city council. The first was a plan to create a zigzag trench system 
covering all of the available space in the city. This was to be a co-operative scheme 
whereby each member of the population would be allocated a section of trench and 
would be responsible for digging out and maintaining this section in the event of a 
war. The need for a variety of shelters was also envisioned in this report. These were 
to include shelters in places of work, at home and in areas widely frequented by the 
general public. As such the local police and fire service were to locate premises that 
3" TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes & Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee: Air Raid Precautions. Records of preparations to be put into place with regard to ARP 
measures in the event of war being declared, p61, May 13th 1938. 
365 Appendix B, tables i and ii. 
3" Thorpe, A, The Longman Companion to Britain, pp 114-115. 
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could be converted into use as shelters and list these for the attention of the City 
Engineer, Captain Youll. 367 
Under the Civil Defence Act of 1939 and ARP Department circular 91/1939 
the local authority was duty bound to provide "domestic shelter (freely) to those who 
could not be expected to provide for themselves. " Although this was limited to areas 
that were expected to come under sustained attack, including Tyneside. As part of 
this responsibility the authority had the power to designate any building or part of a 
building as suitable for either a shelter or an aid post. The property remained in the 
hands of the previous owner who could appeal against the authority but only on the 
grounds that the building was required for purposes of public importance or that the 
building was already in use as a private shelter. 68 Unsurprisingly, very few people 
did decide to appeal against the local authorities. 
It falls here to explain a little about the complicated structure of local 
government on Tyneside during this period. The City of Newcastle upon Tyne, along 
with the County Boroughs of Tynemouth, South Shields, and Gateshead, had councils 
which enjoyed far greater powers than the rest of the area, including their own police 
forces (which also supervised the other emergency services). Other parts of Tyneside 
came under the aegis of either Northumberland or Durham County Council and had 
town councils with strictly limited powers. A Royal Commission had reported shortly 
before the war on the complicated and muddled nature of local government on 
Tyneside, making recommendations for changes to boundaries and powers of 
367 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes & Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee: Air Raid Precautions. Report by Chief Constable Crawley of Newcastle City Police 
regarding the evacuation of the populace and the trench and bomb proof shelter system, April 29`h 
1938, p57. 
368 TWAS: PA/NC/4. Newcastle City Police Files: Wartime Arrangements, 1939-1945. Statutory 
Rules & Regulations as lain down in Home Office memo of August 3`d 1939. 
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authorities. 39 This was to include the absorption of ten local authorities into one 
municipal borough based on Newcastle upon Tyne. The primary criticism of the 
report was that the confusion of local authorities was resulting in inefficiency and 
that, not only should the Borough Councils be abolished, but that unification of the 
authorities was urgently required. 
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Map 3: Map of Tyneside Authorities in 1938. Shaded area is proposed new Municipal Borough 
of Newcastle upon Tyne. '7D 
In Newcastle a search for suitable buildings to use as air raid shelters was 
underway, overseen by the City Engineer, well before these instructions were relayed 
from central government. Several locations that could be readily bomb-proofed were 
noted as suitable for use as deep shelters. The specified locations were the Ouse Burn 
culvert, the Victoria Tunnel and the Benwell Colliery Tunnel. It was envisaged that 
'69 See NA: HLG 11. Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside Area (Rowlatt and 
Scott Commission): minutes and papers, 1935-1937. Also, Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government, Local Government in the Tvneside Area, cmd. 5402 (1937). 
'70 Goodfellow. D. Tyneside: The Social Facts (London: HMSO, 1940), p 94. 
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after some work these three locations could shelter approximately 10,000 people 371 
Problems occurred when the Home Office refused to sanction the use of the Ouse 
Burn culvert due to the possibility of overcrowding causing panic during an air raid. 
A new design was later submitted by the City Engineer and eventually approved, but 
only after much delay had ensued. 72 The provision of private air raid shelters was 
somewhat slower. By March 1939 some 1,800 Anderson shelters had been erected in 
the Newcastle area, over 2,000 had been delivered but the authority was still awaiting 
delivery of more than 9,000 373 As preparations for war continued, sandbags were 
issued to local ARP services by the Home Office. By late October 1938, Newcastle 
had been issued some 800,000 of these and had placed an order with the Home Office 
for a further 900,000 for the use of public and private air raid shelters. Air raid sirens 
were also appearing in larger numbers at this time: Newcastle had ten working sirens 
by October 21 t, and was awaiting delivery of a further two 37' 
The British government feared several outcomes of heavy and sustained 
raiding. The primary fear was an erosion of public morale caused by losses and 
damage to homes and families. There was the anxiety about the spread of disease 
caused by the rupturing of sewer systems, the lack of available health facilities, and 
the lack of burial facilities for the numerous corpses left in the wake of each raid. The 
policy regarding the burial of air raid victims posed difficulties for the authorities. 
The expectation of large numbers of fatalities meant that central, and indeed local, 
government was forced to "subsume individual burial preferences within wider 
371 TWAS: MD/NCI276/1. Minutes & reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Report of the City Engineer, June 10th 1938. 
372 Ibid. Report on the development of ARP works, April 3rd 1939. 33 Ibid. ARP report, March 3 1939. 
374 Ibid. Report on ARP preparations, October 2 1't 1938, p 136. 
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communal imperatives". 375 This was partially offset by an attempt to give civilian 
deaths "a `heroic' military rhetoric ... to compensate 
for a loss of familial control over 
the destination of the corpse. "376 At Whitley Bay the mortuary services received early 
practice when the four bodies, two seamen and two Luftwaffe airmen, had been 
washed onto the shore early in 1940 377 It was also expected that bombing would 
result in a large-scale exodus from the major cities and urban areas into the 
countryside. This expectation continued long into the war in some local authorities. 
Their beliefs enforced by the experiences of large numbers of the population 
`trekking' in towns that had already experienced heavy bombing, from Southampton 
to Glasgow, as well as in the immediate aftermath of the blitz on Coventry. 378 
The overall structural organisation of the ARP services was laid down largely 
by Whitehall 379 There were limited regional variations, despite the fact that there 
were a number of ad-hoc local arrangements in place just prior to the commencement 
of hostilities. Directions to local authorities came via a series of memos and advisory 
letters from the Home Office. These were intended to instruct local authorities on the 
administration of the national Civil Defence Act of 1939. The act largely dealt with 
the organisation of services, along with the adequate provision of air raid shelters and 
gas precautions. 380 Recruitment was a continual problem in some areas; several of the 
other ARP services for South Shields showed a worrying shortage of manpower. The 
als Rugg, J, `Managing `Civilian Deaths due to War Operations': Yorkshire Experiences During World 
War II', Twentieth Century British History, 15,2, (2004), p 154. 
376 ibid. 
377 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee), report of 
August 28th 1940. 
378 Harrisson, T, Living through the Blitz (London: Penguin Books, 1990), pp 165-166. 37' NA: HO 186/660. Modification of the basis of organisation and discipline of the ARP Services, 
1938-1942, and also, HO 192/1263. ARP Organisation 1941-1942. 
380 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes & reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Report on ARP preparations, October 21" 1938, p 136. 
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area had only 27% of its Auxiliary Fireman contingent and 31% of the estimated 
number of required messengers in 1938.381 
Each authority was advised to appoint an ARP Controller who would be 
responsible for making a wide range of executive decisions in the event of a local or 
national emergency. 382 A Regional Commissioner was also appointed who would 
assume overall civil control of the area if it was ever completely cut off from 
London. 383 In the event, most local authorities gave the duty of ARP Controller to 
either the mayor of the borough or the chief constable of the local police force, in 
Newcastle's case Chief Constable Crawley filled this role. The Chief Constable of 
South Shields was also given the position of ARP Officer by South Shields County 
Borough Counci1384 However, this centralisation of power was viewed as unhealthy 
by South Shields County Borough Council and a later meeting decreed that the Chief 
Constable should only be in charge of police and fire brigade services whilst the other 
ARP services were transferred to the position of ARP Controller. The Borough 
Engineer, a MR Reid, was appointed ARP Controller in May 1939.385 An Emergency 
Committee, wielding wide-ranging powers over civil defence in the event of an 
emergency, was also regarded as necessary. 386 In Newcastle this committee consisted 
of two notable locals from the city council, Alderman Thompson and Councillor 
Calderwood. 387 Due to the power that could be wielded by these people during an 
381 TWAS: T179/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes book), April 4t' 1938 - May 5m 1939, meeting of April 4`h 1938, p 1. 382 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minute & reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch Committee (ARP). Letter from Lord Privy Seal to the Local Authorities. March 31" 1939. 383 NA: HO 186/2228. Regional Commissioners: powers under Regulation 29A of Defences (General) 
Regulations, 1939 to control operations of the ARP Services 1940-1945. 
384 TWAS: T179/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes book), April 4`h 1938 - May 5m 1939, meeting of April 4"' 1938, p 5. 185 1bid, meeting of November 21" 1938, p 17. 386 NA: HO 186/1520-1521. Emergency Committees and ARP Controllers: legal status and powers 1939-1944. 
387 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes & reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch Committee (ARP). Response to Lord Privy Seal's letter of March 31" 1939. 
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emergency it was necessary for the local authorities to submit their names to the 
Ministry of Home Security for security vetting and clearance. 388 Both the ARP 
Controller and the members of the Emergency Committee were given training in the 
roles that they would be expected to fulfil as well as in the limitations of their 
powers 389 Both the positions of ARP Controller and that of the members of the 
Emergency Committee were for the duration of hostilities only. 90 The local 
authority was also responsible for the production of regular written reports for 
Whitehall giving the details of any incidents and the levels of preparedness of its ARP 
Services in the area. 391 
Despite government awareness of the issues, the effects of raiding were 
underestimated in some important aspects. The disruption to power and water 
supplies that could be caused by even a minor air raid was widely misunderstood by 
both central government and by the majority of local authorities, including those on 
Tyneside. Transport was also more prone to disruption than had been forecast in the 
build up to the war. Least attention of all was given to the problem of homelessness 
that arose from bombing raids. Whilst the projected number of casualties of bombing 
had been greatly exaggerated, it came as a shock that, whilst large numbers of 
properties were either destroyed or damaged to the extent that they were rendered 
uninhabitable, the occupants of these properties often survived relatively unhurt but 
with no place of shelter. By late 1944 more than 3,000 people from South Shields had 
been made permanently homeless due to bomb damage whilst many more residents of 
Tyneside had experienced temporary homelessness due to their evacuation from bomb 
388 NA: HO 186/2848. Suitability of ARP Controllers: recommendations for appointments of deputies. 389 NA: HO 186/2873. Instructions to ARP Controllers: duties of ARP Controllers 1940-1943, and 
also, HO 186/163 (ARP Schools: Controllers' training courses at Falfield. 1940). 
390 NA: HO 186/2129. Emergency Committees and ARP Controllers' disbandment, 1945. 
391 NA: HO 199/400. Survey of state of ARP preparedness in all Regions, 1939. 
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damaged homes. 92 Throughout the early years of the war this was to prove a 
problem for the local authorities and led to the creation of a variety of ad-hoc systems 
designed to cope with these unfortunates. This included the expansion and refinement 
of the system of rest centres that were already overstretched during raids. 
One of the most telling preparations that both central and local authorities put 
into operation during the period was that of evacuation. The experiences of some 
evacuees are considered in chapter five. For now, a brief overview of the state of 
preparation on Tyneside with regard to local evacuation schemes is offered. By April 
1938, the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch Committee (ARP) had 
developed plans to evacuate all school children, invalids, and the elderly to rural 
areas. During the first year of the war 70% of Tyneside children were evacuated, 
although many quickly returned home. 93 It was recognised that there would be 
problems in arranging the necessary transportation, accommodation and feeding 
facilities to ensure the success of the evacuations 394 There were a total of 75 schools 
in the Newcastle area and over 43,000 children attending those schools. 395 The 
evacuation plan was to 'be in two distinct stages, evacuate all of those who were 
vulnerable, children, invalids and elderly, immediately when a warning was received 
by the city ARP authorities and to evacuate those left homeless by a raid. 396 The 
evacuees were to be moved by local bus companies working in co-operation with the 
Council Transport Manager. It was recognised that pre-planned routes would have to 
be arranged if the scheme was not to degenerate into absolute chaos. 97 It was also 
392 The Shields Evening News, October 13th, 1944, p 5. 
393 Harrisson, T, Living through the Blitz, p 263. 
394 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Letter from Chief Constable Crawley regarding Evacuation of Populace, April 29th 
1938. 
395A figure that has been disputed. See chapter five. 
396TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Report on the evacuation scheme, June 10 1938. 
397 Ibid. 
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envisaged that a warden would be in charge of each group of evacuees. The 
immediate priority at this time was to locate suitable billets and log them. There were 
obvious difficulties inherent in this local plan: wardens had insufficient experience to 
cope with large groups of evacuees, billets would have to be inspected before being 
recommended as suitable, and the transportation plans were sketchy at best. This 
shows us the level of confusion that resulted from local authorities not knowing 
exactly what was required from them. It is peculiar that South Shields was originally 
not included in the evacuation plan. This was an oversight that led to calls from the 
local Head Teacher's Association for either mass evacuation or the building of deep 
air raid shelters. 398 The area was not classified as an evacuation area until May 18th 
1939.399 
It was recognised at an early stage that the voluntary ARP services would be 
expected to liaise closely with the regular civil authorities. Well in advance of the 
commencement of hostilities thousands of regular police officers were being trained 
in anti-gas warfare and being informed of their expected increase in duties in the 
event of a war. Police officers were forbidden from retiring for the duration of the 
conflict, but there was initially little change in their day to day duties. Indeed the 
morale of many police officers increased during the first months of the war as many 
criminals and dubious characters were conscripted, leading to an initial, and 
temporary, downturn in the national crime rate. However, many police forces were 
unprepared, or simply too small: 41 of the 181 forces in England and Wales in 1932 
had fewer than 50 officers, to cope with the extra duties which rapidly became 
necessary in wartime. A report by His Majesty's Inspectorate in 1938-1939 stated 
398 TWAS: TI 79/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes book), April 4`" 1938 -May 50' 1939, meeting of February 21"1939, p 23. 399 TWAS: T179/338. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes book), May 5`h 1939 -November 25th 1941, meeting of May 18`h 1939, p 7. 
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that there was a lamentable and complete failure to understand the extent of the extra 
burden placed upon them by the majority of the police forces in the country. 
400 This 
was due, in part, to the cost-cutting which marked the police forces' experience in the 
1930s. When the forces were expected to expand their manpower and their duties, it 
led to an impossible situation. Further problems arose when regular police officers 
were seconded to ARP departments within local authorities and the forces were 
ordered to undertake the majority of the training of ARP wardens. All of these 
demands placed an unbearable stress on some of the local police forces. 
On August 22 "d 1939 the revised police war instructions were sent out to all 
county and borough police forces. They also went to the River Tyne Police due to the 
"strategic importance of that force. "401 These instructions ordered the police to mount 
armed guards at all vulnerable points within their area. To help the police forces to 
cope with the extra duties the revised instructions also ordered the expansion of all 
police forces by 50%. Regional Commissioners were also appointed at this time. In 
the North East this role was undertaken by Lord Harlech. These Regional 
Commissioners were given operational responsibility for civil defence services and 
charged with co-ordinating the work of local authorities with central government. 
Most Chief Constables viewed this measure with disdain; looking on it as an 
impingement on their operational independence. 
The steady loss of men to the armed forces throughout the early months of the 
war, alongside the lack of volunteer reserve police officers and pre-war secrecy in an 
attempt not to alarm the public, meant that there was no effective appeal for 
volunteers. This contributed to a steady decrease in both the effectiveness and the 
morale of the police forces. In an effort to combat this Regulation 29B of the Defence 
400 Donaldson, K, `Policing the War', Unpublished PhD, University of Huddersfield, 1998, pp 72-73. 
401 Jbid, p 68. 
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Regulations Act ensured that police service was a reserved occupation from June 
1940 and that participation in the Police War Reserve counted as ARP duty. There 
was also an increasing demand for special constables to bolster the regular police 
force. Special constables undertook all the duties of a regular officer, including the 
mounting of armed guard on vulnerable points, and so took pressure off regular forces 
for the purposes of combating the rising levels of crime during the war. Retention of 
special constables remained a problem throughout the war, however, as other services 
seem to have been more appealing. In Newcastle City Police Force there were 470 
special constables in June 1938 and by September the number had risen to 540; but by 
April 1939 the number had dropped to 509.402 
Much the same applied to the regular fire brigades of the time, many of which 
were under the supervision of local police forces. They were small, often badly 
equipped forces, which had no hope of being able to handle a major air raid on their 
own. The firemen of the time were also trained ambulance men and the two services 
that we recognise today were often combined during the period. Once again, men 
were lost in the early months of the war to conscription but by June 1940 the 
profession was regarded as a reserved occupation under section 29B. 
Many of the duties that would be performed in the event of an air raid were of 
a specialised nature, and an entirely separate and largely volunteer force was 
envisaged to perform these tasks. This decision led to the pre-war creation and 
training of an air raid Warden Service. 
402 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch Committee (ARP). Personnel figures, June 30`' 1938 - April 21°' 1939. 
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The Warden Service 
What was the Warden Service? The Warden Service was designed to enable the 
country to cope with large-scale raiding and still be able to function in a military and 
an industrial capacity. This was the reason for the services being recruited from the 
civilian population, and in many cases being part-time and voluntary in nature. The 
primary concerns of the government were that, in the event of sustained raids, the 
general populace remained capable of performing their necessary war work and to 
bolster morale. This was clearly recognised in the formation of the Warden Service. 
On Tyneside the structure of the warden service in the various areas was 
similar. As a result, the levels of co-operation were not affected by differences in 
organisation to any large degree. The initial development of ARP measures, and the 
formation of the necessary groups, would seem to have been ponderously slow. 
Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee) recorded at its first meeting in 
October 1935 that it could make no decisions as to what steps should be taken as it 
lacked sufficient information to base any decisions upon 403 Over the course of the 
next two years there were very few meetings held and. so little or no action was taken 
to provide adequate ARP measures. Until the Munich Crisis there were reportedly 
only seventeen or eighteen fully trained wardens to cover the whole area and this 
resulted in a subsequent problem with the provision of further training. The year 
1938 saw several recruitment meetings, and, though attendance was reportedly very 
good, there was a very little interest in the enrolment forms that were distributed: only 
five percent were completed and returned. 404 This may not have been the case 
everywhere, however. In Newcastle, for example, there were over 2,000 registered 
403 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee). 
`4 Ibid. 
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wardens in service by May 1938.405 By September this number had increased to 
almost 2,500. 
Other areas were slower to organise their forces. In April 1938 South Shields 
County Borough Council reported that it had only 59% of the required number of 
Wardens that it envisaged as being necessary in an emergency. 406 Worries over the 
shortages in the ARP scheme on Tyneside resulted in a publicity campaign involving 
posters, announcements at cinema showings, and a speech given at greyhound 
meetings in South Shields. It would appear that the campaign, alongside the 
worsening situation, had the desired effect. By February of 1939 South Shields had 
some 79% of its required quota of Wardens, the majority of them being women. 
The training of wardens was vital to the smooth functioning of the service. 
The warden's role was complicated by the fact that no one in authority really knew 
what to expect. In Whitley Bay and Newcastle this resulted in the first classes 
concentrating largely on anti gas warfare measures and methods to help the 
enforcement of the widely-resented blackout. The ability of both central and local 
authority to provide adequate training of wardens proved to be a severe problem prior 
to the war and during the early months of the conflict. To take the example of the 
2,500 Newcastle wardens given above; of this number approximately half had been 
fully trained whilst another 200 were still reportedly undergoing training. 07 The 
difficulties of providing adequate training in a short time frame were to prove a 
consistent and long-standing problem for the local authorities throughout the war. 
405 TWAS: MD/NC/276/l. Minutes & Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee: Air Raid Precautions. Records of preparations to be put into place with regard to ARP 
measures in the event of war being declared, May 136' 1938. 
406TWAS: T179/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes 
book), April 4th 1938 - May 5`h 1939, p 2, meeting of April 0b 1939. The wartime required strength of 
the Warden Service was put at 1,600 but only 946 were enrolled at this time. There is no mention of 
how many of these were trained. 
407 TWAS: MDINC/276/1. Minutes of the Committee, September 16th 1938, p 122. 
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Several methods were used to attempt to solve the problem, ranging from 
weekend training camps and schools run by the military and/or civil authorities, to 
night classes run by senior officials from within the ARP services to the simple, 
though often problematic, solution of on the job training. 08 Many wardens received 
the very basic training that was required and were then posted to learn at the hands of 
their more experienced colleagues. Practice raids and extensive drills were utilised 
both prior to and throughout the war to sharpen the skills of the warden service. 
These drills were carried out on a regular basis and often in conditions of blackout in 
order to attempt to simulate wartime conditions 409 An admirable trait of the warden 
service throughout the conflict was its willingness to train so enthusiastically in an 
effort to improve the service efficiency. Exercises and simulations were seen as the 
most effective means of training members by most of the local authorities: "Local 
exercises including all personnel attached to the ARP Services and Control Centre 
were constantly being held and this had the effect of greatly increasing the efficiency 
of the services. MO 
These exercises highlight the ability of the warden service to experiment with 
different systems and to adapt its methods in order to provide greater efficiency as a 
result of lessons learned. A good example of this is shown by the difficulties 
experienced by Whitley Bay area with its messaging system. As a result of this an 
exercise was held in May 1940 and from the results it was determined that there were 
several forms of messages that were unnecessary and caused confusion. These were 
discontinued and the service improved as a result. 41' 
408 NA: HO 186/1571. Regional Training Schools for ARP Officers 1941-1944. 
409 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes & Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee: Air Raid Precautions. Training report, p 233, April 21't 1939. 
410 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Whitley Bay Urban District Civil Defence Report 1939-1945. 
411 Ibid, Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee). Notes on the exercise of May 28th 
1940. 
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Figure 2. A mock-up of a typical warden post. Note the switchboard and uniforms. 412 
The instructional lecture was also used as a training method by the warden 
service throughout the war years. These were primarily intended to increase 
understanding of the duties of a warden and to give some insight into the working of 
the overall ARP system as a whole. These lectures were usually given by guest 
speakers from within the local ARP organisation and were intended as refresher 
courses and to give updates in new organisational systems. An example of this type 
of training was the series of meetings chaired by Assistant Chief Constable Bell of 
Newcastle City Police throughout August 1943 that dealt with the functions of the 
report centre and the nature of warden reports at incidents. 411 
The relatively advanced training methods undertaken by the warden service 
were reflected by the service's willingness to learn lessons from other areas that had 
been raided more heavily than Tyneside. Reports were presented to the relevant 
committee and a list of possible training requirements was drawn up after analysis. 
412 From the author's own collection. Original display in the Military Vehicle Museum, Newcastle 
upon Tyne. 
"' TWAS: PA/NC- 5,, 51. Newcastle City Police Wartime Files re: Air Raid Precautions. Talk given by 
Mr BH Clapperton, sub-controller of "C" Division, August 3"d 1943. 
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These requirements were then filtered down to a more local level so that the local 
wardens could begin to put more advanced methods into practice. An example of this 
is the recommendations by Newcastle's Regional Training Officer that greater efforts 
must be allocated dealing with incidents over a wide area, dealing with warden 
casualties, co-ordinating action, and collating data. 414 
Training would appear to have been well organised and planned on a local 
level. The abilities of the warden service in the Tyneside area show a consistent and 
steady improvement throughout the war despite problems with an ageing workforce 
and a shortage of manpower during some periods. The organisation of the training 
regime for wardens is most impressive. By early 1941 all Newcastle area wardens 
had received a copy of the booklet `What everyone should know After an Air 
Raid' als This pamphlet earned wide-spread praise from the region's Civil Defence 
Commissioner. 416 Rigorous training appears to have taken place on an exceptionally 
regular basis up until the closing stages of the war. 417 The results were not only 
analysed, but, where prudent, action was taken as a result of the training findings. 
The upper levels of the warden service showed a willingness to learn not only from 
their own mistakes but also from those of other areas of the country and the 
neighbouring authorities. 
18 
The usual method of organisation for ARP services was for the local authority 
to divide its area into several districts. In the case of Northumberland County Council 
there were seven districts, although it is unclear whether this was across the whole 
414 Ibid. Analysis of Lesson Learned from recent raids, presented by Mr JA Hanlon, March 31" 1944. 
415 TWAS: 359/794 (50). Memo from FJ Crawley (Chief Constable) re: ARP matters, January 2a 
1941. 
416Ibid, letter from Civil Defence Commissioner (Northern Region), Sir A Lambert, January 8th 1941. 
417 TWAS: PA/NC/5/51. Newcastle City Police Wartime Files re: Air Raid Precautions. Details of 
forthcoming exercises, August 9`h 1944. 
419 TWAS: 359/794 (5). Emergency Shelters/Feeding Centres. Report to the Public Assistance Officer 
of Newcastle upon Tyne re: Lessons learned from the raid on South Shields on April 9`h/10`h, 1941, 
April 161h 1941. 
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county or applied just to south-east Northumberland. These districts were then 
separated into various sectors each with its own warden post that was responsible for 
the reporting of events within its sector. Warden Services varied somewhat from area 
to area but the Whitley Bay area, which was estimated to contain a population of just 
over 50,000,419 represents a fairly standard example of the Warden Service on 
Tyneside. The first warden systems were cumbersome and unnecessarily 
complicated. The Whitley Bay Area was at first divided into 52 sectors each with its 
own warden post envisaged. As the system became more organised and lessons were 
absorbed from other areas the number of sectors, and thus warden posts, to continue 
with the example of Whitley Bay area, was scaled down to a more manageable 
fifteen. 420 
Several wardens staffed each of these warden stations and one of them was 
designated as the post's head warden. The warden posts were expected to respond to 
any incident in their area and to report back to the area control room so that any 
required aid could be dispatched and in order that the overall situation could be 
monitored. The control room personnel, under the direction of the Area Controller, 
interpreted the reports of the local wardens and decided upon and initiated any actions 
that were believed to be necessary. This included the calling of other required 
services and, if necessary, the summoning of mutual aid from a neighbouring area to 
help out 421 
The local wardens were also responsible for the initial reaction to an incident. 
They were usually expected to be the first service to arrive at the scene of an incident 
and so they had a crucial role to play. Wardens were usually local to their area and 
often had, or established, relationships with many of the local residents. This was 
419 NA: BT 64/3260. Post War Survey of Tyneside, p 1. 420 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1(T135/45). Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee). 
421 Ibid, pp 6-9. 
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often a positive development, but, where a warden was unpopular it could lead to 
increased difficulties. The local community saw a popular warden as the leader of all 
air raid precaution policy within his area of influence. The wardens did indeed have a 
great deal of influence, in some aspects this went far beyond their actual purview, and 
were often prepared to promote their own schemes if they thought that it would 
benefit the area. In the Kenton area of Newcastle this resulted in a joint appeal for 
female volunteers who would be trained in the use of stirrup pumps as well as asking 
for small contributions in order to purchase necessary fire fighting equipment for the 
area. 422 This was a local and purely voluntary attempt to increase the efficiency of the 
warden service as is shown by the concluding paragraph of the letter: "This is a 
private enterprise on the part of the wardens in your area, and nobody is impelled in 
any way to participate. " As the war progressed the wardens were also responsible for 
the organisation of the Fire Guard system. On duty, wardens required the assistance 
of a sizeable reinforcement from several voluntary services in order for them to 
complete their duties effectively and efficiently. Many of these units will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
This warden system was prone to some problems during a heavy raid; most 
essentially this was because the system of reporting was heavily reliant upon the 
telephone system. This was often disrupted during bombing raids and was even 
susceptible during periods of bad weather. The Whitley Bay Area Control Room was 
left completely isolated for a short time during the severe winter weather of February 
1941, when snow brought down priority telephone lines in the area. 423 As a result of 
these problems there was an increased reliance on, and demand for, volunteer 
messengers. These messengers were usually boys aged between sixteen and eighteen, 
422 TWAS: DX385/1/1. Home Guard and Civil Defence files. Letter from local wardens. Not dated 
but most likely pre-1939, or very early in the war. 
423 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee). 
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but it was commonly believed that they could not be relied upon to turn out for drills 
due to the voluntary nature of their service. 
Whitley Bay seems to have suffered particularly acute problems from 
recalcitrant volunteer messengers. As was pointed out in a report to the ARP 
Committee, "only a very few were really interested in the Service unless there had 
been an alert ... 
but certain of the neighbouring areas seemed to have a very efficient 
Messenger Service and interest was very keen. , 424 The reliance on young lads and 
youths could result in high finks and larking about. During one alert, early in the war, 
a group of fifteen messengers, having grown bored with the lack of employment, were 
discovered by local police officers marching along the promenade wearing full anti- 
gas clothing and steel helmets, much to the concern of several local residents 
425 
Whilst some areas did seem to have a more organised messenger service it 
was still an area of the warden service that was beset by difficulties. Newcastle City 
voluntary messengers were required to attend two nights every week and one 
weekend every month because there were many training exercises in order to acquaint 
the messengers with the conditions of the blackout. The job was very dangerous as 
the boys were expected to be out in the open with no protection in the midst of an air 
raid. Not only this, but there were the attendant dangers of riding around in the 
blackout whilst attempting to avoid roadblocks and air raid trenches. Unfortunately, 
because of the ages of the messengers they were often lost due to call up to the 
military services, whilst others, with full time jobs in important industries, were 
required to work overtime. One of the youngsters who served in this capacity 
remembers that as a result of these problems: "After a few weeks the bicycle 
messengers were replaced by full time motor cyclists... so the whole system of 
au Ibi4 p 26. 
425 ]bid, p 10. 
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volunteers was not a success in this case"426 There were also legal problems 
concerning the use of children as members of the ARP services. It was announced at 
a meeting of the local ARP Controllers in early 1940 that the Ministry of Pensions 
scheme of compensation did not cover messengers under the age of sixteen and so it 
was decided that boys under this age were not to be used for outdoor duty. 427 
The Rescue Services 
At the outset of the war most people, including those in the British government, 
expected Germany to utilise every weapon at its disposal to drive Britain to its knees. 
Foremost amongst the fears of the populace, many of whom had experienced the 
weapon in the First World War, was the spectre of gas attacks. In order to counter 
this threat several measures were undertaken: the issuing of gas masks, the application 
of gas detecting paint onto post boxes, and the formulation of Gas Detection and 
Identification Squads. The men of these squads were often trained chemists or 
pharmacists who had volunteered for such duties within the ARP services. 
Fortunately the expected gas attacks did not take place and the men of these squads 
were quickly absorbed by the other ARP services or re-entered their profession on a 
full time basis. As the war progressed, it quickly became evident that, whilst 
casualties were not as high as predicted, there was a need for greater storage of items 
belonging to those who had been bombed out. This led to the addition of Salvage and 
Storage Squads, once again a mix of volunteers and council workers, to the ARP 
organisational umbrella. 
426 Correspondence from Mr J Amrstrong, 2001. 
427 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Memo from local ARP Controller regarding meeting of February 12`h 1940. 
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Whilst the Warden Service was designed to cope with most incidents the 
government also recognised the requirement for more specialised ARP organisations. 
These groups would primarily be responsible for the rescue of trapped persons, their 
evacuation and medical treatment, fire fighting and the clean up in the aftermath of an 
incident. As such groups made up mainly of council workers were designated by 
local authorities as Rescue Squads, whilst street cleaners were organised into 
Decontamination Squads. The duties of first aid, evacuation and fire fighting were 
handled by the recruitment of volunteers into the Ambulance Service and First Aid 
Squads. the stretcher parties and the Auxiliary Fire Service. 
Figure 3. Example of a typical Heavy rescue Squad uniform. '' 
The prospective job of the Decontamination Squads was to be hazardous and 
poorly rewarded. Not only were they expected to assist in the general clear up 
operations after an incident but they would also be expected to deal with the release, 
whether deliberately by the enemy or accidentally by bomb damage, of any dangerous 
chemical agents. For the squads to effectively fulfil their duties a large sum of money 
428 From the author's own collection. Original in the Military Vehicle Museum, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
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was required to provide adequate equipment and facilities. In Newcastle this need 
was recognised before the outbreak of hostilities as a decontamination station was 
prepared at Nevington Road as early as May 1938, at a total cost of £2,500.429 Whilst 
they, like the entire population, had gas masks, most of these men had only overalls 
and heavy gloves to protect themselves from chemical spillage. In the event of enemy 
chemical attack they did have access to anti-gas suits and a limited number of the 
protective asbestos suits that were used by some fire fighters. 
Figure 4. A Decontamination Squad in anti-gas warfare gear. """ 
Many local authorities placed an early level of priority on the formation of 
Decontamination Squads, showing how serious they considered the threat of chemical 
attack before the war and during its early stages. Again this was symptomatic of 
popular opinion and was reflected by the novels and films of the period. Newcastle 
ARP Committee received a report dated 28"' July 1938 that stated the scale of the 
decontamination squads in unequivocal terms. By this date there were nearly 250 
men that were employed in decontamination duties, the service was divided into four 
429 TWAS: MD/NCr'276, 'l. Minutes and reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). ARP Committee minutes, May 13`h 1938, p61. 
ý'Ö Photograph CO Newcastle upon Tyne City Libraries & Arts. 
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divisions (A through D) and had at its disposal 50 vehicles, including reserves. Most 
of the men in this role were from the Council's Cleansing Department and their 
service, unlike the majority of ARP workers, was viewed as compulsory431 This had 
already caused some concerns and a complaint had been lodged by the Union of 
General and Municipal Workers objecting to the service in decontamination squads 
being compulsory. 432 
Whilst the decontamination squads and their colleagues in the gas 
identification squads did not have to perform their primary duties they were still an 
active portion of the ARP services. Decontamination squads were expected, as the 
war progressed, to perform debris clearance and other, more mundane, ARP duties 433 
During the early stages of the war, however, people were still anxious about the 
possibility of gas attacks and this led to the squads being called out on several 
occasions. These false alarms were largely due to panicked mistakes. For example, 
Whitley Bay decontamination squad and gas identification squad were both called out 
in September 1940 after a report of someone smelling phosgene gas. Geraniums in a 
neighbouring garden's flower-bed were later established to be the source of the 
alert434 
The early establishment and strength of the decontamination squads, as well as 
the unrest that must arise from making service compulsory, shows us how seriously 
the threat of gas attack was taken by the local authorities of the period. The fact that 
they were maintained until the end of the war demonstrates that the continuing risk of 
a last ditch chemical retaliatory attack by Germany was taken seriously in the local 
431 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Report by Captain Youll and WJ Steele (City Engineer's Department) on 
Demolition and Rescue Services, July 28th 1938, p 114. 
432 Ibid. 
433 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee). 
434 Ibid. 
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ARP community. The decontamination squads represent an example of how both 
central and local government was unable accurately to predict the likely events of an 
air attack and also how efficiently some local authorities were preparing for all 
eventualities, no matter the cost. 
In order to cope with the large numbers of expected casualties most authorities 
created a network of fully manned first aid posts and stretcher parties. These were to 
act as triage centres where the casualties could be assessed and the lightly injured treat 
whilst the more serious cases could be dispatched by ambulance to the nearest local 
hospital. Professional doctors and nurses staffed some first aid posts but a larger 
number relied almost entirely on part-time volunteer staff, 435 often Women's 
Volunteer Service members. In addition to the necessary first aid supplies many were 
also equipped with at least one ambulance, often a commandeered van, private car or 
even a bus. Some areas experienced a great degree of difficulty in recruiting 
sufficient numbers of first aid workers. At South Shields, for example, the numbers 
of trained ambulance crews remained critical; only 8% of the required 420 had been 
enrolled by February 1939 436 Despite further publicity campaigns, the numbers in 
the medical services remained low. Only 17% of ambulance crews had been 
recruited, whilst only 19% of vacancies in first aid parties had been filled 437 Despite 
these shortfalls the Regional ARP Inspector had expressed his satisfaction as early as 
October 1938 438 Possibly the shortfall in ambulance crews was partially balanced by 
aas NA: LAB 6/166. Recruitment for Police War Reserve, Auxiliary Fire Service and First Aid 
Services. 1940-1941. 
436 TWAS: T1791337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes book), April 4t' 1938 - May 5" 1939, meeting of February 21" 1939, p 24. 437 TWAS: T179/338. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes book), May 5`h 1939 - November 256' 1941, meeting of May 18th 1939, p 7. 438 TWAS: T179/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes book), April 4t' 1938 - May 5t' 1939, meeting of October 20`h 1938, p 8. 
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the numbers of those who had volunteered to act as car drivers for the purpose of 
removing slightly injured victims. 
In Newcastle, female volunteers largely dominated the workforce of the first 
aid posts. The problem of securing male first aid workers was pinpointed as early as 
1938 by the city's Chief Medical Officer of Health in a report to the ARP Committee 
in which he stated that the recruitment levels of male first aid workers was wholly 
inadequate and that strenuous efforts would be required to remedy the situation. 439 
The overall level of medical training within the city was criticised in the above report; 
it was estimated that on average less than twenty percent of the staff in the city's 
municipal hospitals could be regarded as fully trained. Two instructional first aid 
posts were also set up in the city (Jesmond Dene House and at Lough Model House) 
in order to encourage volunteers to come forward and to aid in their initial training. 
The first aid posts also served as the bases of the first aid parties who would 
respond to the scene of an incident at the request of the local control centre. The 
demand for drivers in the ARP services as a whole was high and this was especially 
true of the first aid parties who required ambulance drivers if they were to be able to 
respond promptly. In the Whitley Bay area there were two first aid posts: at the 
Garden Cafe and at West Monkseaton High School, which housed nine first aid 
parties. Eleven ambulances were stationed either at these locations or in nearby 
premises. The aid posts and the ambulances were fully manned for twenty-four hours 
a day, seven days a week placing great strain upon the volunteers. As well as the long 
hours the staff had to quickly adjust to witnessing sights that few could have 
witnessed before the commencement of hostilities. As they responded to incidents 
immediately they also placed themselves at great risk as they were expected to be 
439 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minute & Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Report of the Medical Officer of Health, May 13'h 1938. 
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available even during the heaviest raid, inevitably this led to some casualties. On the 
whole the first aid organisation on Tyneside was not seriously tested, raids did 
produce a number of casualties but there was never a sufficient number as to flood the 
aid posts and hospitals. This is perhaps fortunate as questions can be raised as to 
whether the first aid organisations on Tyneside could have coped with sustained 
raiding. In Newcastle especially there was a problem with the retention of first aid 
workers and withdrawals were said to be "substantial" 44° Where there were serious 
incidents the authorities appear to have coped well with the need to supply sufficient 
medical attention. The schemes of mutual aid that existed between the different ARP 
areas on Tyneside allowed help to reach any one area if it had suffered a large number 
of casualties in a single incident. 
In the event of incendiary raids it was realised that the regular Fire Brigades 
would be quickly overwhelmed and would thus require extensive voluntary support. 
The governmental answer was to institute a large and purely voluntary fire fighting 
force, the AFS. 441 The members of the AFS were paid at a roughly commensurate 
rate to the members of the regular Brigades, a fact that caused a degree of resentment 
towards the `amateurs'. Conditions in some of the assigned quarters were appalling; 
buildings from private houses to filthy basements were utilised by the AFS 442 The 
accommodation of AFS men was said to be poor in London but even worse in many 
provincial towns and cities. The men of the AFS had never attended the scene of a 
fire; their duties in the early part of the war largely consisted of pumping out flooded 
shelters. They were completely inexperienced and for many their first engagement 
would be on an actual incident involving very real risk to life. The AFS men were 
440 NA: HO 199/400. Report of the Lord Privy Seal into Preparedness of ARP. Number 1 Region, July 
10`l 193 
441 NA: HO 187/1775. Auxiliary Fire Service: mobilisation, 1939. 442 Calder, A, The People's War, pp 68-69. 
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required to work a fireman's hours of forty-eight hours on duty, twenty-four 
hours off 
as well as receiving limited sick pay and being eligible for dismissal if they were not 
fit 43 The force was split between full timers and part time volunteers; the part timers 
made up roughly sixty percent of the total AFS manpower. 
444 
The equipping of the AFS was a notoriously haphazard and slow affair. The 
order of one hundred and fifty uniforms for the Newcastle AFS, placed with the 
lowest bidder, was not expected until late June of 1938.5 This was despite the fact 
that by September of that year there were almost 800 members of the AFS in 
Newcastle, 300 of who were considered fully trained at this time: 
46 By September it 
had been established that the uniforms were of vastly inferior quality, they were 
described as being too thin and prone to wearing out, and a compromise was 
eventually reached between Newcastle Council and the manufacturer to pay a 
discounted price. 7 South Shields County Borough Council claimed that it cost 
£3.16s. 10 and a 1/2d (just under £160) just to clothe anauxiliary fireman. 
448 Even the 
most basic fire-fighting equipment was in perilously short supply and by spring of 
1939 there was only one stirrup pump per 1,000 of the population in the city of 
Newcastle upon Tyne. 9 
44' NA: HO 187/33. Auxiliary Fire Service: conditions of service, disciplinary control, machinery for 
representation etc. 1936-1941. 
NA: HO 187/50. Auxiliary Fire Service: war organisation. 1939-1942. 
445 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). ARP Committee minutes, May 13`h 1938. 
446Ibid, September 16`h 1938, p 122. 
47 Ibid. 
448 . WAS: T179/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes 
book), April 4th 1938 - May 5`" 1939, meeting of October 20th 1938, p 11. 
449 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). ARP Committee minutes April 21" 1939, pp 233-236. 
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Figure 5. The ubiquitous stirrup pump, as used by Fire Guards in Newcastle upon Tyne. 
450 
The build-up to the war saw the expansion of fire coverage in most cities, 
Newcastle was not an exception and the Home Office ordered an increase in the 
number of trailer pumps. There would be an extra large trailer, ten extra medium 
capacity trailers and 40 small trailers supplied for the Newcastle area. 451 In addition 
to these vehicles the AFS used a number of commandeered cars, vans and trucks. 
Orders were placed for regular fire fighting engines but these were slow in arriving 
and were largely confined to the regular Brigades. In the Whitley Bay area in 1940 
there were only two purpose-built fire engines, compared to eighteen trailer pumps of 
varying capacities. 42 Recruitment to the AFS also underwent something of a boom in 
the period immediately before the war. By April 1939 the Newcastle AFS numbered 
some 1,375 volunteers. just short (91%) of the proposed necessary wartime strength 
45" From author's own collection. Original in the Military Vehicle Museum, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
45' TWAS: MD/NC/276, '1. Minute to the ARP Committee, September 16th 1938, p 122. 
452 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Northumberland County Council booklet: ARP, 1940. 
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of 1,500.4'3 By comparison, South Shields had a compliment of 299 auxiliaries from 
a wartime requirement of 500 (60%) at this time. 44 
Figure 6. A Sigmund fire pump trailer. This one was used in Newcastle and was manufactured 
locally. 45 
Examples of heavy raiding in other parts of the country, most especially 
London and Coventry. led to an increase in the pace of equipping the AFS on 
Tyneside. These raids had showed that the number of fires was much higher than had 
been expected and that the AFS and the regular fire services were often rapidly 
overwhelmed .4 
An exercise, held in January 1941, intended to simulate a heavy 
blitz type attack on Tyneside. estimated that the fire services would be required at the 
scene of in excess of seventy major fires and would need some two hundred and fifty- 
seven pumps in order to even hope to cope with such an incident. Even this was 
45' 'TWAS: MD/NC/276/ 1. Minutes and reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Report on ARP measures, April 21S' 1939, p233-236. 
454 TWAS: T179/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes 
book), April 40' 1938 - May 5`h 1939, meeting of May 5"1939, p 33. 
ass From the author's own collection. Original in the Military Vehicle Museum, Newcastle upon Tyne. 456 Lancaster, B& Mason, T (eds), Life & Labour in a 20"' Century City: The Experience of Coventry 
(Cryfield Press, 1992). 
153 
slightly optimistic as it was estimated that the general public, in the guise of 
firewatchers, would be able to cope with many small fires. The experiences of other 
cities around Britain had also showed that air raids badly affected the abilities of the 
fire services by blocking roads, disrupting water mains and so on. 57 A further result 
of lessons learned from previous raids was that the priority for the fire services was 
not to extinguish the blaze but to ensure it was contained so that the search for 
survivors could proceed quickly and in reasonable safety. 4459 
The realisation that an incendiary raid would quickly overwhelm the AFS and 
regular fire brigades led to the formation of another organisation. Service in this 
organisation, variously known as the Fire Guard or the Fire Watch, became 
compulsory for men up to 65 and women up to 45 years of age. Rotas were set up 
and training with stirrup pumps organised so that the organisation could hope to deal 
with small fires and incendiary bombs. Untenanted buildings could not be left 
without a guard and street watches became commonplace with neighbours taking 
turns to work in shifts from dusk until dawn, the organisation again gave free reign to 
those with organisational skills and a variety of levels of competence were achieved. 
In Newcastle, the Osbaldeston Gardens fire watch leader ensured that each member 
was familiar with the equipment, shelters and ARP arrangements of at least three 
neighbouring houses so as to, "facilitate speedy action in emergency. "459 The fire- 
watching organisation was of most importance in the suburbs of major cities and in 
semi-urban areas. The Newcastle ARP authorities conceded, in a letter to fire watch 
street leaders, "that in the event of a severe attack upon Newcastle-upon-Tyne, the 
457 Longmate, N, Air Raid: The Bombing of Coventry, 1940 (Hutchinson, 1976). Also Lancaster, B& 
Mason, T (eds), Life and Labour in a 2dß' Century City. The Experience of Coventry (Cryfield Press, 
1992). 
458 TWAS: PA/NC/5/51. Newcastle City Police Wartime Files re: ARP, Memo from J Atkinson, Town 
Clerk, regarding lessons learned from raids that have occurred recently, April 3d 1944. 
459 TWAS: DX385/1/2. Newcastle upon Tyne Home Guard & Civil Defence files. List of fire watch 
duties compiled by street leader, Mr H Dove, January 25th 1941. 
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Fire-fighting personnel and equipment from the suburbs would in all probability be 
drawn into the centre of the city, so that each residential area would have to deal with 
local fires on its own account. "460 This was a revealing admission on the part of the 
local authority suggesting that it would be unable to cope with the demands of a major 
raid without help from outside the area. 
AFS men, like most of the ARP services, were expected to work throughout 
air raids and had one of the most dangerous jobs in the ARP organisation. During the 
course of the war more than 800 fire personnel lost their lives and in excess of 7,000 
were seriously injured 461 On Tyneside the AFS and the regular Fire Service suffered 
ten fatalities during the war. This was a lighter figure than one would have expected 
given the severity of raiding experienced, especially during 1941, the worst year. 
The fire services in Britain prior to the commencement of war were chaotic 
and uncoordinated. Over 1,600 separate brigades existed in Britain in 1938, most of 
which had fewer than twenty men. The majority of brigades were run by, or in co- 
operation with, the local police force. There was no standardisation of equipment, a 
factor that could lead to frustration and even disaster when a neighbouring brigade 
attempted to lend assistance during a crisis. Some commanders would not allow 
neighbouring brigades into their own areas for fear that they would be criticised by 
the local authority for incurring unnecessary expenses. It was realised by central 
government that action must be taken to co-ordinate the fire services and to ensure co- 
operation and adequate training. On 130' May 1941 the announcement was made of 
the founding of the NFS, the many small brigades were to broken down into less than 
50 and all were to fall under a central control. A central training school was 
established and supported by five regional schools had trained some 6,000 men by the 
460 TWAS: DX385/1/4. Newcastle upon Tyne Home Guard & Civil Defence files. List of fire watch 
duties compiled by street leader, Mr H Dove, January 25th 1941. 
461 Calder, A, The People's War, pp 208-209. 
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end of 1943. In the event many of the AFS men were given full time command posts 
in preference to their pre-war professional colleagues. Such a wide-ranging change 
would have been unthinkable before the war and serves as a good example of what 
can be achieved during the stresses, and due to the demands, of a total war. 
Increasingly, as lessons were learned from the effects of air raids, the 
importance of the rescue squads increased as the war progressed. Although these 
squads had been a recognised part of the Tyneside ARP plans from pre-war years the 
vital role that they would come to play had not been recognised due to the belief that 
there would be a more significant proportion of fatalities compared to those who 
would be survive a raid but be trapped in the resultant debris. The rescue parties were 
separated into two distinct groups, heavy and light squads. Heavy rescue squads 
consisted of seven men and a foreman whilst their light counterparts had only five 
men and a foreman. 462 Most of the men who made up the rescue squads (often 
referred to as demolition squads) were members of the peacetime building trades. As 
such, many of the men who worked in rescue parties were civilian volunteers whilst 
the remainder came from the local authorities Engineering Department. In Newcastle 
there were 200 men formed into rescue squads by 1939, split equally between civilian 
volunteers and members of the City Engineers Department 463 The rescue 
organisation in the city consisted of ten heavy squads and twenty light squads. These 
official rescue squads were assisted by ad-hoc road repair and debris clearance squads 
formed from over 100 men from the City Engineer Department 464 This meant that by 
the commencement of hostilities there were some 308 men serving, either officially or 
otherwise, in the rescue services in Newcastle alone. 
462 JAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minute & Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Report by Captain Youll and WJ Steele (City Engineer) on Demolition and Rescue 
Services, October 21" 1938. 
; 63 Ibid. 
464 Ibid. 
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As raiding caused more damage in other parts of the country builders were 
increasingly in demand in order to make properties habitable again and so take 
pressure off the support services such as rest centres. This in turn led to an increase in 
the average wage for members of the building trades. In areas that were 
comparatively lightly raided, such as some areas of Tyneside, this caused problems 
with the retention of rescue workers for the local authorities. Volunteers would often 
secure more profitable employment in a different part of the country and were prone 
to leaving without first informing the authorities that they would no longer be 
available for their ARP duties 465 
The rescue squads received extensive training in their duties, including the use 
of specialised listening equipment to locate trapped persons. Constant training and 
evaluation of past experiences led to a steady improvement in the abilities of the 
rescue squads throughout the course of the war. This was despite the fact that as the 
war went on the volunteers became more aged and slightly less physically capable, 466 
due to call up for armed service and so on. As greater experience was gained by the 
members of the rescue squads they quickly developed their own guidelines on how to 
deal with specific incidents. For example, it was quickly discovered that it was safer 
to dig trapped people out from the side rather than the top of a pile of debris and that 
heavy lifting cranes were useful only at major incidents and became a hindrance at 
smaller incidents. 67 There was also a strong criticism that there was a tendency 
amongst the majority of ARP workers to assume that buried casualties were already 
465 TWAS: MB/WB127/1 (T135145). Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee). 
466 TWAS: PA/NC/5/5 1. Newcastle City Police Wartime Files re: Air Raid Precautions. Report of the 
Town Clerk, J Atkinson, on lessons learned form recent raids, April 3T(I 1944. 
467 Ibid. 
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dead and that this tendency had to be "very strongly discouraged" if the rescue parties 
were to be successful 468 
By its very nature the work of the rescue squads was very physically 
demanding but it could also be mentally fatiguing. The recovery of shattered bodies 
was a task that most of the rescue workers had not experienced prior to their first call- 
out. As a result of the demands of this role it was decided that rescue workers should 
work in very short shifts so as to allow frequent rest and recovery time, something 
that was not common throughout the ARP services in general. In Newcastle rescue 
squads worked on a four-hour shift pattern but there were calls that this should be 
shortened to three hours, following the example of some other local authorities. 
469 
Due to the nature of their work and the frequent breaks that the rescue squads 
enjoyed it would seem that they became the leading rumour mongers amongst the 
ARP services in some areas. Discussion of incidents during breaks at ARP canteens 
was commonplace and could on some occasion lead to unfortunate consequences. 
This was especially true of a raid on Whitley Bay when a human head was found at 
the scene of a recent incident and the relatives of the deceased found out about this 
discovery "on the grapevine" due to the gossiping of local rescue workers at a local 
canteen. 470 After this occurrence all rescue workers were forcibly reminded that their 
work was to be considered confidential and that discussion of incidents outside of 
work was forbidden. 
The rescue squads were also expected to attend to more mundane ARP duties 
when there were no incidents in their areas. One of these duties was the use of their 
transport for the purpose of transferring goods to and from storage. As such the 
468 Ibid. 
469 Ibid. 
470 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP Committee). Report 
on the raid of December 8t` 1941. 
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rescue squads co-operated heavily with the salvage and storage squads who were 
responsible for removing personal property from damaged buildings and ensuring its 
safe storage until its owner could be relocated. This service became more necessary 
as the war went on, as it quickly became obvious that there had been little or no 
provision for this necessity made before 1940. Whilst it was primarily the owners 
responsibility the local authority was encouraged to give as much assistance as 
possible and in the event of an owner not being traced the storage of goods was the 
responsibility of the authority. Most of the personnel of the salvage and storage 
squads were council workers or members of the removal trade. The salvaged 
furniture was placed in storage in warehouses or empty houses that had been 
commandeered by the local authority. In Newcastle the salvage and storage squads 
were largely manned by the men of the Association of Warehousemen and Removers 
with the agreement of the local authority 471 
Local ARP efficiency relied on co-operation and this was especially true of the 
rescue squads. As each squad was equipped with a vehicle and a driver they could 
quickly be asked to render assistance to a neighbouring area. The organisation behind 
this seems to have functioned smoothly and effectively on Tyneside with many 
examples of co-operation between neighbouring areas. 
The Support & Voluntary Services 
The widespread assumption that in the event of heavy raiding there would be large 
numbers of fatalities led to mistakes being made in the formulation of plans for ARP 
471 TWAS: 359/794 (90). Town Clerks report on ARP procedures. 
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measures on both a national and a local scale. One of the foremost dangers of this 
assumption was that it resulted in a lack of preparation for huge numbers of minor 
casualties and those who were uninjured but had been rendered homeless due to the 
destruction or damaging of their property. 
Early experiences of air raids during the war quickly proved that some more 
organised method of providing shelter for the needy was required. During the blitz on 
London one of the most commonly voiced complaints was that people who had been 
made homeless had nowhere to go. Officialdom seemed uncaring and seemed to treat 
these unfortunates as casualties as if they had or at least should have been killed. 
There are stories of local dignitaries taking matters into their own hands and breaking 
into schools and other public buildings in order to open them up to the homeless. The 
situation tended to be the same in the provinces, although some such as Newcastle 
were marginally better prepared, as the official attitude to the results of air raiding had 
percolated down to the local authorities. Due to the fact that there was little or no 
official organisation in place to deal with this vital ARP duty most of the 
organisations that took it upon themselves to care for the needy were of an entirely 
voluntary nature. 
Even when the official scheme of rest centres came into being the centres 
continued to be organised and staffed by both volunteers and members of various 
charitable organisations throughout the war. The large numbers of schools that had 
been closed for the duration were quickly commandeered and designated as either rest 
or feeding centres, often both were combined. In Wallsend, for example, out of the 
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total number of ten centres, four were combined rest and feeding centres whilst the 
other six were rest centres only. 472 
During the early months of the war, and especially the phoney war period, 
many of the locations approached for use as voluntary accommodation or feeding 
centres were uncooperative and looked to their own business interests first. Many of 
these concerns were not only unwilling to give up business but also refused to provide 
services for the local ARP effort in general. 73 This shows us that when the war 
seemed far away the blitz spirit could be replaced by a more pragmatic, profit-driven, 
outlook. 
Newcastle Corporation appears to have been satisfied with its scheme for the 
shelter and feeding of the homeless. Indeed, an official list compiled by the Town 
Clerk in May 1940 suggests that officially recognised rest and/or feeding centres 
would be able to accommodate over 14,000 people and could adequately cater for 
over 6,000 in one sitting 474 However, the report does not differentiate between the 
capacity of air raid shelters and rest centres and it is therefore extremely likely that the 
two figures have been added together giving an overly-optimistic view of the 
situation. This is further evidenced by the fact that an earlier report in the series, 
unfortunately undated, gives the total number of people that could be catered for as 
just over 2,000. Whilst it is likely that there was a significant improvement in the 
efficiency of the organisation of centres, I find it unlikely that the limited number of 
rest centres in Newcastle could have coped with as many as 14,000 people in an 
emergency situation at this stage of the war. 
472 TWAS: 359/794 (18). Emergency Shelters / Feeding Centres. See also, After the Raid- Wallsend 
(Wallsend Council, official pamphlet, 1940). 
473 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Whitley Bay Municipal Borough Council ARP Committee. 
Memo from local ARP Controller, February 12`h 1940. 
474 TWAS: 359/794 (5). Emergency Shelters / Feeding Centres. Report by Town Clerk, Mr J 
Atkinson, May 17th 1940. 
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Each centre in Newcastle had a shadow centre, that is, a different location that 
would be opened in the event of the regular centre being overwhelmed, anyone 
requiring a rest or feeding centre would thus be directed by a warden to the shadow 
centre. By November 1940 there were nineteen schools being utilised as rest centres 
in the city of Newcastle upon Tyne, the popularity of school buildings can be 
explained by three reasons. Schools had facilities that could be used for both sexes at 
the same time, there were adequate washing and sanitary facilities available in schools 
and every school had the bonus of an adjacent air raid shelter so that the population of 
the rest centre could be easily catered for in the event of further raiding 475 
The centres were organised into three categories: first line centres that could 
provide food and shelter and were fully equipped; additional centres that provided 
sleeping accommodation only and were opened only if the first line centres were 
overwhelmed; and shadow scheme centres that were opened only in the most serious 
circumstances, for example, during a heavy and sustained period of raiding. 76 At 
Tynemouth, the Public Assistance Officer was in charge of the centres from his 
central location in Northumberland Square, North Shields. Each of the eight shelters 
in this area had an officer in charge and a group of voluntary helpers to run the centre. 
Local authority policy was to provide at least one hot meal per day and to ensure that 
there were games and toys organised in order to keep children fully occupied. 
Bathing was also arranged at nearby cleansing stations and a notice board and 
common room developed in each centre to engender a community spirit and to keep 
homeless persons informed of events. 77 
475 TWAS: 359/794 (18). Emergency Shelters / Feeding Centres. Report on rest centres, feeding 
arrangements, November 1940. 
476 TWAS: 359/794 (93). County Borough of Tynemouth - Emergency feeding and shelter scheme. 
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477 Ibid. 
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Obviously, such a complex organisation demanded the extensive use of a 
variety of premises. The quest to secure locations for use as centres continued 
throughout the war and was sometimes met with a mixed response that was not 
typical of the myth of the blitz spirit representing a community pulling together as a 
whole. Local cinemas in particular could prove unwilling to grant the use of their 
premises, even as third line rest centres that would be used only in the event of a dire 
emergency. As late as December 1940 the manager of the Bamborough Cinema, in 
Newcastle, would only give his permission if he could be guaranteed the freedom to 
open for the evening showing, a request that was plainly impossible to grant 478 It 
would seem from the evidence that cinemas were the favourite type of location for 
emergency rest centres, after the schools had been exhausted, despite their obvious 
deficiencies. Many did not have sufficient air raid shelters, cooking facilities, space 
for adequate bedding and the fact that balconies would have to be used rendered them 
of dubious value at best. Possibly the answer lies in the community spirit and 
togetherness that they fostered in people, much like Londoners gathering in church 
halls during raids 479 Indeed after schools and cinemas church buildings were the next 
most popular premises on the lists of the local authorities. In South Shields four out 
of the nine first aid and rest centres were church buildings. 480 
Locations with canteen facilities were also sought out and requests were made 
as to whether they would be able to provide emergency feeding facilities. 
Unfortunately many of the best canteens were located within major industrial 
concerns and were fully occupied keeping workers fed throughout the day and night. 
Their locations also made them targets for any prospective bombing raid on their 
47$ TWAS: 359/794 (110). Additional premises for use as 3'd line rest centres. Correspondence from 
Mr R Potts, the Relieving Officer, and the manager of the Bamborough Cinema, December 9`h 1940. 
47' TWAS: 359/794 (111). Official list of Emergency Rest Centres and Canteens. 
4SO TWAS: T179/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes 
book), April 4 `h 1938 - May St' 1939, meeting of December 16th 1938, p 19. 
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locality and so most of these concerns responded negatively. In Newcastle, however, 
several major department stores, notably Mark & Spencer's, Fenwick's and C&A 
Modes, responded to these requests in a very positive manner and were utilised as 
emergency feeding stations throughout the war, both for the homeless and for ARP 
workers. Newcastle Brewery was also approached and whilst receptive, despite the 
constraints of coping for its own workers, there is no evidence to suggest that the 
location was ever used. 481 This was undoubtedly because of the combustible nature of 
the chemicals stored at the brewery. 
Those who were unfortunate enough to be rendered homeless (Not necessarily 
bombed out, as an unexploded bomb could render thousands homeless just as 
efficiently as severe bomb damage could) were immediately directed to their nearest 
open centre by a warden and were given a free meal while details were taken down. 
In response to concerns raised by Lord Woolton, the Minister of Food, regarding the , 
physical deterioration of the populace due to poor nutrition communal feeding 
centres, British Restaurants, were also created. These centres, six in Newcastle, could 
purchase food more cheaply and provided a nourishing, if basic, menu, usually 
consisting of potatoes and vegetable pie. 
Once again the only way lessons could be learned was from shared 
experience. Local authorities co-operated well on Tyneside furnishing each other 
with information after each raid in order that all lessons could be passed on. The 
efficiency of this procedure is shown by the series of reports drawn up in response to 
raids on other areas. As an example a raid on South Shields on the night of the 9th of 
April 1941 led to a report being issued by the Public Assistance Officer of Newcastle 
just six days later. This report is critical of some aspects of the efficiency of the South 
481 TWAS: 359/794 (111). Official list of Emergency Rest Centres and Canteens. 
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Shields centres, at one centre no details were taken of the people who were sent there, 
no attempt was made to get those persons who were shocked to bed and lavatories and 
sanitary conditions were also criticised 482 This shows that whilst there were 
problems with the running of the centres steps were being taken to correct any faults 
and lessons were being observed in order to improve the standards of care for those 
left homeless. As a result of the report into the South Shields raid it was decided that 
it would be helpful if one of the staff at all centres was designated a children's nurse 
as it had been observed that children rapidly grew bored in the confines of a rest 
centre. 
It became the job of the local authority's Public Assistance Committee's to 
locate and secure accommodation for those who had been rendered homeless. The 
properties that were used were varied in nature ranging from sports pavilions to scouts 
huts and convents. 83 These locations along with the rest and feeding centres were 
furnished and equipped by the local authorities at substantial cost, the cost of 
outfitting ten centres in 1939 came to £2574.19s. 0d. (£102,99,8 today) As ever it was 
the ephemera that presented the most difficulties. Cups, utensils and other crockery 
were in very short supply and there was a great deal of difficulty in securing adequate 
supplies of these vital items, to the extent that public appeals were made, in order to 
equip the centres. 484 Another constant fault in the system was the fact that most of the 
rest / feeding centres depended upon gas or electricity for cooking and lighting. In the 
event of a major raid, or even just one lucky bomb on a mains supply pipe, these 
supplies would quickly become unavailable and the one of the centres' main functions 
would be rendered ineffective. 
482 TWAS: 359/794 (18). Emergency Shelter / Feeding centres. Report by J Robinson, Public 
Assistance Officer, re: Lessons learned from the raid on South Shields, April 16`h 1941. 
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In Newcastle the Director of Education became responsible for the running of 
the feeding centres, probably because most were located in school buildings, and it 
was his intention to be able to provide emergency catering for five percent of the total 
population of Newcastle upon Tyne, almost 15,000 people. To accomplish even 
adequate coverage the local authority believed that it would be necessary to establish 
fifteen centres, the government at first gave permission for only five but a 
compromise was reached at the total of eleven. This shows how central government 
was unwilling, or unable, to adjust its attitudes to a local situation. Also this gives us 
some measure of the central government priority towards rest and feeding centres as 
opposed to the local authority in Newcastle. Central government inefficiency 
continued to plague the feeding centres, it was standard procedure to serve cold, 
tinned food when a feeding centre was opened. This food would then have to be paid 
for and replaced. An incident in September 1940, that left 30 Newcastle residents 
homeless, led to the discovery that it was cheaper to obtain a hot meal from a local 
Central Kitchen than it was to replace the tinned foods that were in storage. This 
became standard procedure where feasible in Newcastle, but was not officially 
recognised by the central government. 
Over 800 volunteers were involved in the running of the rest centres in 
Newcastle during 1940, in addition to the staff responsible for the eleven dedicated 
feeding centres that were also operating at the time. Many of these volunteers were 
members of the WVS, as were a huge number of the volunteers who were responsible 
for the driving of ambulances, mobile canteens and so on. Formed in 1938, the 
brainchild of the Home Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, under the overall leadership of 
Lady Stella Reading the WVS came to be a most valued part of the ARP services, 
even though officially not a part of those services. By the end of 1941 the WVS had a 
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membership of over 1,000,000 women. 485 The level of participation and commitment 
of the WVS can be seen by the organisational chart of their Air Raids Welfare 
Committee. 486 In South Shields the WVS, led by a Mrs Chapman, took over the 
recruitment of women into the ARP services, perhaps explaining the local success in 
recruiting women into duties as Wardens and at first aid posts and rest centres. 487 
At first, there was considerable opposition to another female voluntary 
organisation, as it was thought that the organisation would too often seek to act on its 
own initiative. This sense of initiative became the WVS' greatest trait and indeed its 
hallmark quality. The service quickly developed a reputation for solving any 
problems that were thrown its way and for filling in important gaps in both national 
and local ARP schemes. Despite the work carried out staffing rest and feeding 
centres the WVS personnel also played an active role in caring for evacuees, staffing 
the British Restaurants, organising welfare clinics, operating an information bureau, 
the warden service (staffing telephones and acting as messengers), the Civil Nursing 
Reserve, the LDV / Home Guard and in the Women's Land Army. The members of 
the WVS also actively participated in first aid and fire fighting courses where they 
could. The members of the WVS were also responsible for the running of the 
information centres where, after a raid, relatives could go to find details of their 
family and loved ones. This was an often melancholy yet immeasurably important 
task and one that the central government had little prepared for. 
Although often seen as a force that dispensed aid and comfort the WVS was in 
no way a pacifist organisation. The service also produced camouflage netting and 
designed and created sniper suits for use by the Army, despite criticism from some 
485 Westwood, L, `More than Tea and Sympathy', History Today, 48,6 (June 1998), pp 3-4. 496 Appendix B, table iii. 
487 TWAS: T179/337. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes book), April 4`h 1938 - May 5'h 1939, meeting of November 21' 1938, p 16. 
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quarters that this was beyond its official remit. The truth was that the WVS had no 
official remit and so was free to operate where and how it saw fit. The work 
undertaken by these volunteers was often dangerous and unpleasant: nationally, over 
200 WVS members were killed while on war duty. 88 The service crossed class 
barriers, despite the myth that the WVS was populated by middle class women who 
had no other function. In fact, the WVS enabled old and young women, working 
class and upper class, to work together for a cause that they had voluntarily given up 
their free time for, a further example of total war breaking down the barriers that had 
existed in Britain for centuries. The effectiveness of the WVS can be measured by the 
fact that the service is still in existence to this day performing charitable community 
spirited works whilst most other voluntary organisations formed in the crucible of the 
war have long ceased to exist. 
A Whole Greater than its Parts? 
The ARP services on Tyneside did not have to cope with the expected heavy and 
sustained raiding that occurred in other, strategically less important, parts of the 
country, as can be seen by the gradual slackening of the services that took place by 
October 1944. The Whitley Bay control centre ceased to be manned on a full time 
basis on November 15th 1944 and even became the venue for local social events, 
dances and concerts every Thursday night, though it was reported that these were not 
well attended 489 Even so there were some incidences of heavy individual raids and 
occasions when casualties were high, most notably the Wilkinson's shelter incident in 
`88 Westwood, L, `More than Tea', p 5. 
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North Shields, and the ARP services seem to have dealt with most of the problems 
that were presented. Often the large incidents resulted in areas such as Tynemouth 
County borough calling on mutual aid from nearby areas such as Whitley Bay and 
Newcastle. 
It appears that the system of mutual aid was especially strong on Tyneside 
with many recorded examples of aid being sent from various locations without it even 
being requested. A North Tyneside Co-ordination Committee made up from 
representatives of the various local authorities and ARP departments undoubtedly 
helped in the forming of this bond of co-operation. This committee was set up 
formally on March 25th 1942 but had existed in an informal manner for some time 
previously. 490 The role of the committee was to deal with problems that it was 
perceived would have an effect on the area in general rather than one specific location 
within the area. A conference held in Newcastle in June 1941, for example, had 
discussed the arrangements that would be necessary in case of a large exodus from 
local towns in the event of heavy raiding. This resulted in the building of temporary 
hutted accommodation for nearly 3,000 people who had been bombed out but whose 
work was of national importance. Cooking depots were also organised as a direct 
result of this conference showing the high levels of co-ordinated planning that the 
areas officials could reach. 
The spirit of co-operation is the overwhelming aspect from the ARP 
documents of the North Tyneside authorities (Wallsend Municipal Borough, 
Tynemouth County Borough, and Whitley and Monkseaton Unitary District); this 
even ran to the voluntary organisations. The WVS formed several Mobile (Mutual 
Assistance) teams consisting of members skilled in cooking, first aid, gathering and 
490 TWAS: 359/809 (2). Correspondence File: North Tyneside Co-ordination Committee, minutes of 
meeting reporting on matters dealt with in the last year. 
169 
disseminating information and organising and providing clothing. These teams, of 
which there were fort\ -one in 1942. were provided with transport and could 
locate 
from area to area as they ,, ý ere required. 
Whilst many of the ARP services suffered from either lack of equipment or 
expertise they seem to have made up for this, at least on Tyneside, by organising their 
own systems of training and through fostering a spirit of healthy co-operation with 
each other. Whilst there is evidence to suggest that in the early months of the war, 
when the expected heavy air raids did not appear, a large number of volunteers began 
to lose enthusiasm and drift away from the services. Again this is not conducive to 
the opinion of every citizen pulling together. Indeed the attitude of the general public 
on Tyneside towards ARP workers and the organisations as a whole continued to be 
one of apathy well into the war. '`' However, once raiding did commence and the 
national situation became grim the overall enthusiasm would appear to have returned 
and the public attitude improved towards those volunteer ARP workers. 
Figure '. Plaque erected in Whitley Bay to the ARP Services. 4' 
491 NA: HO 199/400. Report of the Lord Privy Seal into ARP Preparedness. Number I Region, July 
10'h 1939, p 5. 
492 From the author's own collection. 
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The running of ARP services was a difficult task and could place some people 
in positions of immense power and influence. As has been seen, the pressures of 
organising and controlling the area were largely borne by the local councils. Not only 
did they have to ensure the smooth functioning of civil services and mediate between 
the major employers of the area but they also had to organise and run an efficient air 
raid precautions service. In many cases there had been little pre-war preparation for 
this mammoth task and a range of differing solutions to the problems emerged. The 
effectiveness of the management of ARP organisations ran the gamut from the 
efficient to the woefully inadequate. Organisations were created overnight and many 
of the techniques used to run these services were ad-hoc in nature. In Newcastle it 
emerged that one of the problems inherent in the ARP organisation was the fact that it 
had been formed too quickly; a witness, Mrs E Paterson, formerly director of the ARP 
canteens, testifying before the official inquiry into the city's ARP service stated that 
the organisation had been "created in a night and built up at a very fast rate. "493 
Ironically the ARP Canteens Service in Newcastle was one of the few areas that were 
praised in the Home Office report, it being said "that the Canteens were very well run, 
and, having regard to experience elsewhere, it could not be said that the Service in 
Newcastle suffered from anything but the inevitable defects of an improvised 
system. "494 This praise however still reflects the general awareness that the ARP 
Services of Newcastle, in common with most other areas' experiences, were hastily 
formed and that their efficiency suffered due to this. 
The scandal that enveloped the ARP organisation overseen by Newcastle City 
Council concerned allegations of corruption at the very highest levels of the Council. 
The concern over the matter led to questions being asked in the House of Commons 
493 The Times, March 25th 1944, p 2. 494 TWAS: MD/NC/274/5. Newcastle Council Emergency Committee (Civil Defence) minutes, May 
12'h 1944, p 168. 
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on February 3 `d 1944 and an official delineation of the scope of the Home Office 
inquiry was given to the house and subsequently reported by Newcastle Council. The 
inquiry remit was to investigate: 
"the administration by the Council of Newcastle upon Tyne and its Committees and Officers 
of their functions in relation to the Fire, Police and Civil Defence Services with particular 
reference to the disposal of fire engine B13.999, the acquisition and use as a fire float of the 
East Coast Scottish fishing vessel called `The Premier' and the use of personnel, food, stores 
and equipment intended for the aforesaid Services. "495 
The subsequent Home Office appointed inquiry, which cost Newcastle city 
Council approximately £4,018 (£160,720 today), 496 led to the resignations of the ARP 
Controller, Chief Constable Crawley, and his deputy, Councillor Embleton. The 
allegations of corruption remained unsubstantiated but the report makes it clear that 
there had been favouritism and incompetence within the Council and, from the 
number and nature of the allegations against Councillor Embleton in particular, 
certainly allegations of corruption were implied. The primary allegations against 
Councillor Embleton, which were spearheaded by Councillor McKeag, concerned the 
disposal of ARP equipment involving a business he was directly involved in. One fire 
engine, BB. 999, was disposed of by the Premier Electric Welding Company, the 
company that Councillor Embleton was closely involved in running 497 Bought by 
Councillor Embleton for the sum of £15 (£600 today) it was claimed that the engine 
was to be replaced with a more modern appliance but the shed that the engine had 
been stored in remained empty long after its sale. Councillor Embleton claimed that 
the pump was out of date and unusable but this was contradicted by the evidence. He 
also claimed that the acquiring company were scrap merchants, a claim that was 
495 Ibid, February 7`h 1944, pp 117-118. 
496 The Times, May 25th 1944, p 2. 
497 Todd, N, `Ambition and Harsh Reality', in Ayris, 1, et al, Water under the Bridges, p 98. 
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proven to be untrue and it was the opinion of the chairman of the investigative 
committee that Councillor Embleton's answers, both to the committee and to his 
fellow councillors, "were deliberately misleading and were intended to stave off or 
stop any further inquiry. "498 
Not only had Councillor Embleton been behind the removal of an important 
piece of ARP equipment but workers from the Premier Electric Welding Company 
had also removed a fire pump from the Fire Brigade Headquarters when they were 
meant to be simply removing rubbish. Councillor Embleton later ordered the men to 
cut the pump up for scrap. When questioned he claimed that the pump had been taken 
by accident. The committee refused to accept his defence, as the removal of the pump 
would have required specialist lifting equipment. This meant, in the words of the 
committee, that "the property of the corporation was taken without authority and 
without payment, and the city was deprived of yet another pump, which makes two 
taken from its resources. The transaction is indefensible. A99 
Yet another allegation concerning fire fighting equipment was levelled 
regarding Councillor Embleton's role in locating a suitable vessel for use as a fire 
float on the Tyne. He ensured that his company purchased the vessel and then hired it 
out to the corporation. It would appear that, in this matter, Councillor Embleton and 
the ex-Fire Brigade Superintendent, a Mr Chadwick, were in collusion and the inquiry 
asserted that Councillor Embleton had used knowledge attained through his 
chairmanship of the Watch Committee to profit his own company. Under cross 
examination by the inquiry team Councillor Embleton had merely claimed that such 
allegations were "cruel and unwarrantable". The chairman of the inquiry thought 
498 The Times, March 25`h 1944, p 2. 
499 Ibid. 
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otherwise. SO° However, even before he had been called to testify before the inquiry, 
Councillor Embleton, together with the Town Clerk of the City and others, had 
protested about the lack of information provided to those who had been subpoenaed 
about the nature of their questioning and claimed that this had placed themselves and 
the Corporation in a difficult position. 50' 
This was not the full extent of the corruption of Councillor Embleton. A 
further allegation concerned an arrangement for the stabling of horses that he had 
reached with Newcastle City Police. Whilst the corporation was renting out stables 
for £104 per annum (approximately £4,160 today) it appears that Councillor 
Embleton, in addition to his family and a few select friends, was allowed to stable his 
horses at the Police Stables, thus they were effectively being kept "for his own use at 
the public expense. s502 Chief Constable Crawley would appear to not only have 
known of this arrangement but had failed to regularise the agreement, despite having 
powers to do so from the Watch Committee. 
Concerns had been raised by the Home Secretary that Councillor Embleton 
should not have been serving as Deputy ARP Controller due to his position as 
chairman of the Emergency Committee. However, a ballot by the Emergency 
Committee, in which Councillor Embleton was permitted to vote, resulted in the 
decision being taken, by five votes to four, that there should be no change. Further to 
this the decision was also taken that the Home Secreatary should not be informed of 
the decision to retain Councillor Embleton as both ARP Deputy Controller and 
chairman of the Emergency Committee. The investigating committee drew the only 
possible conclusion under the circumstances. That Councillor Embleton was 
S0° Ibid. 
501 TWAS: MD/NC/274/5. Newcastle Council Emergency Committee (Civil Defence) minutes, 
February 14th 1944, pp 119-120. 
502 The Times, March 25th 1944, p 2. 
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intolerant of any criticisms of his actions and that he was in a position of almost 
absolute control with regard to ARP matters in Newcastle. The members of the 
Emergency Committee who voted in favour of councillor Embleton were also blamed 
for attempting to conceal their decision from the Home Secretary. 503 
It appears obvious that Councillor Embleton, despite his work in initially 
setting up the ARP organisation for Newcastle and his "gallant service during air raids 
on the city", 504 had not behaved in the manner expected of a man in an influential 
position during a time of national crisis. Some of the gallant behaviour referred to in 
the inquiry report was even questioned by members of the local Rescue Service. The 
Home Office report claimed that Councillor Embleton, in his role as Deputy 
Controller, "took charge of Rescue and other urgent works" during air raids on the 
City. This was disputed by rescue workers who claimed that "The Deputy Controller 
has never in fact during the whole life of the Rescue Service organised or been in 
charge of Rescue Work at any incident within the City. "505 
Councillor Embleton's behaviour, despite the findings of the official inquiry, 
would appear to have been at least self-serving, if not corrupt. It is certainly not 
commensurate with the romantic notion of everyone pulling together for the greater 
good, during the war. From this example we can see that even during the crisis of 
war, and the pump removed from Fire Brigade Headquarters was taken in July or 
August of 1940, the very height of the national crisis, there were some in positions of 
managerial power who were more than prepared to place their own narrow interests 




soy TWAS: MD/NC1274/5. Newcastle Council Emergency Committee (Civil Defence) minutes, May 
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The response of the Council to the official Home Office report was to accept 
the resignations of Mr Crawley as ARP Controller, Chief Air Raid Warden and Chief 
Fire Guard Officer on March 28th, and Councillor Embleton as both Deputy 
Controller, and from his position as a Councillor, on May 10th506 This did not, 
however, happen without significant discussion and argument within the Emergency 
Committee. At a special meeting, chaired by the Lord Mayor, Alderman Thompson 
argued that the positions of both men had become untenable and that they should be 
removed from their positions immediately, at least pending the publication of the 
report, when further action could be discussed. 507 This measure was opposed by 
Councillor Russell, an ex-Lord Mayor of Newcastle who had been found guilty of 
selling goods at his auction house without the necessary Board of Trade licence; he 
was fined a sum of £2,000 (£80,000 by today's standards). 508 A vote was taken on 
Alderman Thompson's motion and this was passed by five votes to three votes. 
Councillor Russell, whom appears to have been speaking on behalf of Councillor 
Embleton (he had been asked to leave the committee room whilst the matter was 
under discussion), subsequently stated that he understood that Councillor Embleton 
"was now willing to allow himself to be removed. "509 At a meeting held the next day 
Councillor Russell complained that he had not used the word `now' in his statement 
of the previous day and this was removed from the records. Surely this was an 
attempt to paint Councillor Embleton in a more magnanimous light? In fact 
Councillor Embleton, who was still sitting on the Committee and was indeed 
officially still Chairman, did not go quietly. He asked for his "strong protest against 
306 The Times, May 114' 1944, p 2. 
S07 TWAS: MD/NC/274/5. Newcastle Council Emergency Committee (Civil Defence) minutes, March 
27th 1944, pp 128-129. 
508 The Times, May 4'" 1943, p 2. 
509 TWAS: MD/NC/274/5. Newcastle Council Emergency Committee (Civil Defence) minutes, March 
27th 1944, pp 128-129. 
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the action which the Committee had taken at this time before the report of the 
Commissioner was available" to be noted in the official minutes of the meeting. 51° 
This meeting also heard that the Chief Constable had resigned from his ARP offices 
permanently and appointed the Town Clerk as temporary ARP Controllers 11 
A letter from the Home Office was read to a special meeting of the council 
held on May 10`h 1944 in which the Home Secretary requested that the Watch 
Committee consider whether Mr Crawley could continue to serve as Chief Constable. 
Mr Crawley, who throughout this time had been ill with a very severe jaw abscess, 
was apparently aware that his position was untenable and subsequently declared his 
retirement, by letter and by contacting the Lord Mayor, the next day. 512 The former 
Chief Constable, Mr Crawley was retiring with his full police pension and was 
thanked by the members of the Watch Committee for his nineteen years of service as 
Chief Constable of Newcastle City Police. His resignation and retirement resulted in 
some disquiet amongst Police officers who had been seconded to ARP duties and four 
men, an Inspector and three Sergeants, who had been working as Assistant Fire Guard 
Officers requested that they be returned to their Police duties immediately. This 
request was turned down as it was claimed that they would be impossible to replace at 
such short notice. 513 The local Labour Movement was, however, delighted by the 
resignation of the Chief Constable. Mr Crawley had been a larger than life figure who 
had often rode through the city streets atop a police horse, "in the style of a cavalry 
510 Ibid, March 280' 1944, pp 130-131. 
511 Ibid. 
512 TWAS: MD/NC/274/20. Newcastle Council Watch Committee special meeting minutes, May 11`h 
1944, p 396. 
513 TWAS: MD/NC/274/5. Newcastle Council Emergency Committee (Civil Defence) minutes, April 
11`h 1944, pp 13 7-140. 
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commander", and had ordered baton charges against strikers during the General Strike 
of 1926.514 
The Council, after a meeting lasting some three hours, agreed to the formation 
of a special committee to consider the report and to make recommendations to 
strengthen the administration of ARP matters. 515 The subsequent recommendations of 
this special committee were radical and disquieting. They advised that both the 
Watch Committee and the Civil Defence Emergency Committee should be disbanded 
forthwith. These committees had very senior members of the Council sitting on them, 
including four ex-Lord Mayors and the ex-Sheriff of the county. The special 
committee further advised that the members of those committees should be asked to 
tender their resignations immediately and that the posts of ARP officer and fireguard 
officer should be filled as a matter of urgency. The Council, however, when called to 
vote on these recommendations, rejected them by 30 votes to fourteen votes. 516 
It was agreed that the appointment of both a full time Fire Guard Officer and 
an ARP Officer, both of whom would be separate from the office of Controller, was 
essential. 517 By July of 1944 some changes had been made to the methods of 
overseeing the ARP organisation of Newcastle. A letter from the Town Clerk to the 
Home Secretary stated that no members of the Emergency Committee now held 
executive positions in the ARP organisation -and that a paid ARP officer and a Fire 
Guard Officer had both been appointed, at pay rates between £600 and £750 per 
annum (£24,000-£30,000 today). In addition to this, new methods of keeping track of 
petrol used by Civil Defence and ARP forces had been introduced, through the 
514 Todd, N, `Ambition and Harsh Reality', in Ayris, I, et al, Water under the Bridges, p 98. 515 The Times, May 11l 1944, p 2. 
sib The Times, May 25th 1944, p 2. 
s" TWAS: MD/NC/274/5. Newcastle Council Emergency Committee (Civil Defence) minutes, April 
l 1t° 1944, pp 137-140. 
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appointment of a single officer to oversee this, 518 alongside more thorough 
accountancy methods concerning the use of stores and equipment. 519 It would appear 
that, although the Council did take some action, there was only a limited amount of 
accountability amongst the Councillors. An undercurrent of resentment at the 
criticism directed towards them permeates the meetings discussing the crisis. Several 
Councillors wanted the press to be excluded from Council meetings but were outvoted 
whilst the lack of enthusiasm for the recommendations of the special committee show 
a reluctance to accept responsibility for the corruption that had been uncovered. The 
failure to disband either the Watch Committee or the Emergency Committee and to 
discipline, or force the resignation of, those Councillors who were members of those 
committees is another example of how some members of the management community 
could place their own position above that of national requirements and standards of 
accountability. 
The outcome of the inquiry into the Council Committees responsible for ARP 
in Newcastle showed that not only was their incompetence at high levels of the civic 
managerial structure but also that there were considerable grounds for suspecting that 
several highly placed members of the council were guilty of both favouritism and, in 
some cases, possibly corruption. This is at odds with the accepted view that the 
wartime situation led to a pulling together of all sections of society and that selfish 
attitudes were subsumed by the national need. It would appear from the evidence of 
the Home Office inquiry that there were at least some who wished to continue to 
profit from there influential positions even at the expense of risking the safety of the 
City, and indeed the people, they were meant to protect. 
511Ibid, April 24th 1944, pp 149-154. 
519 The Times, July 110' 1944, p 2. 
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However, the attitude of some of the Councillors of Newcastle was by no 
means unique and Newcastle was not the only place where allegations of misconduct 
by senior councillors were made. At South Shields an inquiry was held into the 
behaviour, during an air raid, of a councillor. It was alleged that Councillor Gompertz 
had continually pestered the ARP and police services during the air raid on April 25'' 
1941. He had made repeated phone-calls requesting updates on the Tyne Dock area, 
despite the fact that the ARP services were at this time stretched to their limit in 
coping with the raid. It was further alleged that councillor had made use of an ARP 
vehicle, without permission, to journey down to Tyne Dock. Councillor Gompertz 
defended himself by claiming that he had not requested the use of the vehicle but had 
been offered it by a police inspector. 520 An inquiry was launched but no further action 
appears to have been taken. 
Despite these allegations of corruption in the local ARP command structure 
and the fact that, in some places, individual areas of ARP coverage may have 
continued to be weak, the ARP services cannot be considered as separate entities, they 
were by and large an amalgam, a mass of individuals struggling to cope and to 
develop an efficient form of service in the event that they were required. Indeed the 
extent of the overall system of air raid precautions on Tyneside can be seen by 
studying the "75 point plan" of organisation of Newcastle upon Tyne's services. This 
plan divided the city into three divisions (A, B and C), fifteen depots and 60 sub- 
depots. 521 Yes there were rivalries and resentments between regular services and the 
volunteers but it would appear that these existed to a lesser extent than those that 
developed in other areas of the country, possibly a result of the fact that Tyneside was 
$20 TWAS: T179/338. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes 
book), May 5`h 1939 - November 25`s 1941, ARP Emergency Committee meeting of April 26th 1941, 
177-182. 
52I The North-East Diary 1939-1945 website, [http: //www. swinhope. myby. co. uk/NE- 
Diary/index. html], 2004. 
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not seriously tested by sustained bombing. Overall the ARP services on Tyneside 
coped with what was thrown at them, they could do no more; they had fulfilled their 
purpose and performed their duties. 
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Chapter 4 
Preparedness for Total War: Civil Defence 
The Local Defence Volunteers & Home Guard 
Amongst the many myths that have sprung up since the end of the Second World War 
the image of the Home Guard as inept and doddering old men struggling against the 
local authorities, as much as the threat of invasion, has proven to be one of the most 
long lasting. Perpetuated especially by the cult television comedy, `Dad's Army', this 
myth has become the accepted account of the organisation in the popular memory. It 
is certainly true that some aspects of the popular myth were present in the historical 
reality. In the words of George MacDonald Fraser, himself an infantryman in Burma 
during the war, "anyone who supposes that Captain Mainwaring of Dad's Army is a 
latter-day caricature can rest assured that Mainwaring was there". 522 
The common historical view of the Local Defence Volunteers and Home 
Guard was that of a disorganised, under-equipped, -badly-led group that was 
incompetent in the execution of its duties. Very few academic accounts have been 
written about the organisation. Most accounts of the group are concerned solely with 
regional units and appeared shortly after the war. One recent book on British wartime 
society dedicates only four pages to the subject, whilst Angus Calder covers the 
organisation in fewer than 30 pages. 523 In recent years, however, some historians 
have attempted to refute the accepted view of incompetent and irrelevant 
522 Macdonald Fraser, G, The Hollywood History of the World (London: Joseph, 1988), p232. 523 Calder, A, The People's War, pp 121-128,151-152,156,200,215,268-269,322,340-345, and 563- 
564. 
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marginalisation. 524 These historians have looked at the positive elements of the force 
such as the contribution they made to relieving regular forces from tedious and time- 
consuming duties. The social benefits of service in the Home Guard have been cited 
in recent works, with the sense of belonging and the absorption of procedural and 
management skills being a benefit to many men in post-war life. 525 As well as this, 
there have been attempts to analyse the force as a social microcosm of British 
(masculine and civilian) society of the wartime period. 526 Undoubtedly the social and 
cultural aspects of the Home Guard would benefit from further in-depth study. 
It would appear that, at least on Tyneside, the force was quickly and 
efficiently organised and that it went from strength-to-strength. As the war continued, 
the accepted roles of the Home Guard changed in response to the altering situation 
and the force not only appears to have improved its levels of expertise but also to have 
shown a large degree of adaptability in its approach to training for, and performing, 
duties as diverse as anti-aircraft rocket operation and traffic management. The 
usefulness of the organisation in relieving other, regular, forces cannot be 
underestimated as it allowed the regular troops to concentrate on training and re- 
arming, whilst the volunteers took over duties such as guarding vulnerable areas and 
manning roadblocks. 
Whilst some historians have attempted to refute the popular interpretation of 
the Home Guard others have attempted to explain away the force as a propaganda 
device: a "vehicle by which the [British] government could promote the myth of a 
524 See, MacKenzie, S P, The Home Guard: A Military and Political History (Oxford University Press, 
1995) and, Carroll, D, Dad's Army: the Home Guard 1939-1945 (London: Sutton, 2002). 
su Mackay, R, Half the Battle. Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), pp 259-260. 
526 Rose, S 0, Which People's War? National Identity and Citizenship in Wartime Britain 1939-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp 151-197. 
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unified Britain standing firm against Nazi aggression". 527 Such supposed 
mythologizing was primarily for the benefit of the American government as a means 
of showing that Britain was willing to continue the fight despite the fall of Europe. 
528 
Others have seen the failings of the Home Guard as being the fault of government 
failure to back the force in a meaningful way by providing sufficient equipment, 
weaponry and training. 529 Many of the tributes paid to Tyneside Home Guard units at 
the end of the war seem to refute this belief. In the documentary sources now 
available, the force is portrayed largely as an effective and reasonably well-organised 
body of men. 
David Yelton has raised some interesting points regarding the weaknesses of 
the `propaganda tool' argument. 530 He points out that the force was retained until late 
in 1944 as a militarily useful organisation that provided indispensable aid to the 
Regular Army and to the ARP services. Ironically, the contribution of the Home 
Guard increased as the war went on and as the danger of invasion, for the resistance 
of which the force was originally assembled, shrank. The size of the force remained 
significant and despite the introduction of mandatory service later in the war the 
efficiency of the force seems to have increased as training became more refined and 
equipment more readily available. 
Undoubtedly, the formation of the LDV, which was later renamed the Home 
Guard during the summer of 1940 on the instructions of Churchill (who sought to give 
the force a more dynamic title), in 1940 was heavily influenced by the belief that the 
existence of such a force would serve to calm public fears of a German invasion and 
527 Yelton, D K, `British Public Opinion, the Home Guard, and the Defense of Great Britain, 1940- 
1944', The Journal of Military History, 58,3 (July 1994), pp 461-480. 
528 For an example of this argument see Collier, B, The Defence of the United Kingdom (London, 
HMSO, 1957). 
529 See Longmate, N, The Real Dad's Army: The Story of the Home Guard (London: Hutchison, 1974). 
s30 Yelton, D K, `British Public Opinion', p 462. 
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the threat from Fifth Columnists. It is equally obvious that some prominent members 
of the government, most notably Winston Churchill, believed that the force should be 
capable of acting in a military sense and that its creation was seen as more than 
simply a publicity sop to allay the fears of the general public over the invasion 
531 threat. Churchill remained a most fervent supporter of the force, playing, as it did, 
to his sense of patriotic history. 
A further accusation commonly levelled at the LDV/Home Guard concerned 
its somewhat erratic relationship with the general public. There are many easily 
available and familiar examples of members of the public being stopped and 
questioned by overly officious Home Guardsmen. There are also the often quoted 
examples of Home Guardsmen killing or injuring innocents by opening fire when 
their challenges were not heeded, or else by accident. The harassing of motorists, 
ARP workers, officers of the local constabulary and even the Regular Armed Forces 
was a commonplace complaint during the early months of the force's existence. 532 
Mistakes were bound to occur in the culture of suspicion and fear that was 
prevalent during the invasion scare of 1940. Rumours ran rife about the capabilities 
and numbers of German paratroopers and the scale of threat from the suspected Fifth 
Column. These prevailing conditions, when combined with the inadequate training 
and guidance that was offered to the LDV, were bound to result in some tragic 
incidents occurring. Unfortunately, the nature and scale of these incidents was prone 
to be exaggerated on both a local and national scale. The very fact that by the end of 
the war the Home Guard had become a highly regarded organisation is evidence that 
the criticisms that have been made were putatively not wholly shared by the general 
public, the government or indeed the regular army. On Tyneside, the stand down 
531 NA: WO 193/20. Suggestions for formation of irregular units and Home Guard, 1939-1942. 
532 Calder, A, The People's War, p 127. Also, see MacKenzie, S P, The Home Guard, pp 57-61. 
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parades of the Home Guard units were well-attended and attracted considerable 
positive newspaper coverage showing the regard in which the force was held 
despite, 
the disgruntlement of some guardsmen who believed that the force was being 
disbanded prematurely. 533 
The Formation of the LDV/Home Guard 
After the initial expectation of a devastating blow from the massed ranks of 
the Luftwaffe failed to materialise upon the declaration of war in 1939 some thought 
went on in official circles, as well as much more public debate, as to how Germany 
intended to defeat Britain. Intelligence reports from a very early stage in the war 
seemed to speculate that Germany was planning a combined seaborne and airborne 
assault on Britain. 534 From the beginning, Churchill, then First Lord of the Admiralty, 
was enthusiastic about the forming of a volunteer home defence force in order to 
oppose any invasion alongside the regular forces 
535 On October 8th 1939 he wrote to 
the Lord Privy Seal asking "Why do we not form a Home Guard of half-a-million 
men over forty (if they like to volunteer) and put all our elder stars at the head and in 
the structure of these new formations... and I am assured there are plenty of rifles at 
any rate. "536 
The rapid fall in 1940 of Norway followed by France and the Low Countries 
led to a situation of increasing desperation and hysteria within Britain. More 
worryingly the part played by parachute troops and enemy agents, the so-called threat 
533 The Shields Evening News, December 4t' 1944. 
534 NA: WO 190/879 appendix A (MI3 minute), November 1" 1939. 
535 NA: WO 193/20. Suggestions for formation of irregular units and Home Guard, 1939-1942. 
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of the Fifth Column, in the German successes was highlighted and given perhaps 
undue attention by all sections of the media. The situation led the Ministry of 
Information to report in May 1940 that there were extensive public fears over the 
existence in Britain of a Fifth Column. 537 The higher circles of central government 
were also concerned about the risk represented by these Fifth Columnists; the Chiefs 
of Staff presented a paper to the cabinet in May 1940 urging stem action against 
anyone suspected of being a traitor. It was during this period that some of the more 
well known myths of the war started to gain credence with the general public, that 
German paratroopers in Holland had descended disguised as nuns or priests and so on. 
Newspaper columns became clogged with demands for the formation of a 
voluntary force to oppose both the threat of paratroops and the more invidious threat 
from within the country. Some of the clamour for the formation of a force was 
bordering on the hysterical. In one such article, the author inquired whether plans 
would be made, to train golfers in rifle shooting so that they could deal with stray 
parachutists. Some members of the public began to take matters into their own hands 
and formed unofficial units armed with shotguns and other makeshift weaponry. The 
British Legion even formulated its own plans for the creation of Local Defence Rifle 
Units to oppose any attempted enemy landing. All of this was of course in addition to 
the bringing up to strength of the Territorial Army units and in this respect, Tyneside 
proved to be enthusiastic. Newcastle upon Tyne was the first city in Great Britain to 
bring every Territorial unit within its boundaries to double, wartime, strength. 538 In 
addition, Northumberland became the first county in England to attain this 
537 NA: INF 1/264, Public Opinion on the Present Crisis, May 30`" 1940, 
538 The Times, May 22nd 1939, p 20. 
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distinction. 539 This was not surprising given the area's long and proud military 
tradition. 
On May 14th 1940 the British government gave in to these demands and 
Anthony Eden addressed the nation to ask for volunteers to form the Local Defence 
Volunteers force. When Anthony Eden, on May 14th 1940, during his first speech to 
the nation as Secretary of State for War, called for "large numbers of such men in 
Great Britain who are British subjects, between the ages of seventeen and 65, to come 
forward now and offer their services", 540 he was following a grand English tradition 
for establishing voluntary military forces. Throughout the nation's history, 
characterised by small standing armies, these militias have often proven to be 
militarily important. This tradition can be traced back to the voluntary militia units 
formed after the defeat of the British fleet by the French off Beachy Head in 1690 and 
continued over the centuries and throughout the First World War. 541 
539 Ibid. 
54° Eden, A, Freedom and Order: Selected Speeches 1939-1946 2"d. ed (New York, 1971), pp 71-73. 
"' A century after this the Home Secretary of the time, Henry Dundas, found himself bombarded with 
applications from ordinary subjects, mostly on the South coast, demanding the right to form local 
defence forces to protect against any attempted French landing. The volunteers also stated concerns 
about any Jacobin-inspired subversion from within the country as a principle motive for the formation 
of the volunteer forces. During the early years of the Napoleonic conflict volunteers were raised 
officially and with high levels of enthusiasm, by early 1804 the number of volunteers stood at around 
three hundred and fifty thousand men. The official enthusiasm for these volunteer units faded after the 
initial concerns about French invasion had waned. Public and official confidence in such forces was 
further eroded due to the part played by the Manchester and Salford Yeomanry during the Peterloo 
massacre of 1819. This lack of confidence is reflected by the fact that during the Chartist protests of 
the 1840's demands, from certain wealthy sections of society, for the re-formation of volunteer bands 
were ignored by the Home Office as it concluded that the associated risks were by far greater than any 
benefits that could be gained from such a move. 
During World War One public anxiety regarding a possible attempt by German forces to land 
on the East coast of England, exploiting the absence in France of the British Expeditionary Force, led 
to demands for a voluntary military force to be raised. This call was quickly taken up by various 
national and local figures, including the authors HG Wells and Arthur Conan Doyle. Letters appeared 
in various national papers in support of this argument as early as two days into the war. Despite 
official opposition from the War Office, and Lord Kitchener in particular, the Volunteer Training 
Corps was acknowledged in November 1914. Any male who was ineligible for enrolment in either the 
Regular or Territorial Army could enrol in the VTC. There was no provision of clothing, arms or 
equipment and service was entirely voluntary at this stage. 1916 saw more official recognition of the 
contribution of the VTC, uniforms were doled out and an Act put through parliament ensured that 
service in the VTC was for the duration of the war. Despite this, by 1918 public enthusiasm had waned 
considerably and the end of the war saw the beginning of the end for the VTC although official 
disbandment of the organisation did not come into effect until 1920. 
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Any men who were willing to serve in this force were asked to give their name 
and address to their local police station and await further contact. It was inevitable in 
the atmosphere of fear and suspicion that some would take matters a step further. 
Indeed some volunteers were organising their own patrols from the very night after 
Eden's announcement 542 The overall reaction to the call for volunteers was 
astounding, and completely unexpected by the government, in its scale. Within 24 
hours of the initial broadcast there were over 250,000 men who had put their names 
down. 543 
This was especially true of the men of Tyneside: large queues had formed at 
local police stations within "a remarkable short space of time". 544 Newcastle City 
Police reported that the first volunteer "walked in four minutes after the broadcast" 
and that he was the "first of a steady stream". 545 By midnight after the call for 
volunteers had been heard there were 464 names taken by the police at North Shields' 
Central police station. By the following day the number had increased to over seven 
hundred and by the 18th of May the number had risen to nine hundred and seventy 
nine. For an area the size of North Shields and Tynemouth this would represent a 
substantial proportion of the eligible population. Indeed, it was said that it was 
"extremely doubtful whether any town of similar size can equal it. "sah The men were 
from all walks of life and counted amongst their number retired ex-servicemen, 
professionals, businessmen, shipyard workers, and labourers. 
The extremely large numbers of those who wished to volunteer for the new 
force caused problems for employers, especially those who were engaged upon work 
sae MacKenzie, S P, The Home Guard, p 34. S43 NA: HO 45/18523. Formation of Local Defence Volunteers: applications, relations with police and 
defence against parachutists, 1940. 
344 The Shields Evenin News, November 15t° 1944, p 3. 54s The Times, May 15 1940, p 6. 
546 The Shields Evening News, November 15th 1944, p 3. 
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of importance to the war effort. In mid-May 1940 the Deputy Divisional Food 
Officer, Mr WT Rainbow, was compelled to write to the Chief Constable, in his 
capacity as ARP Controller for Newcastle upon Tyne, seeking clarification over 
Ministry of Food employees who wished to undertake duties in the LDV. A number 
of employees who had served in the First World War wished to volunteer but there 
were concerns over the interference that this might cause to the operations of the 
Ministry of Food. The Chief Constable replied saying that, of course, all employees 
should consult with their superiors before commencing their new duties as part of the 
LDV. 547 
One way of getting around the problem of losing workers to Home Guard 
duties was to form units that were based at the workplace. - This proved to be a 
popular measure and many such units quickly formed. In Newcastle alone workplace 
units were formed at some 28 locations. These ranged from a squad formed from 
workers at the BBC to a larger unit formed to guard the LNER Forth Goods Yard and 
units at each of the three major Vickers Armstrong sites at Elswick, Scotswood and 
the Naval Yard. A company was also raised from workers at Redheads Shipyard at 
South Shields. 548 The Newcastle Corporation Fire Brigade formed an LDV section 
armed with six rifles or shotguns in August 1940 to protect their own premises whilst 
a separate company comprised of workers at the city's brewery mounted a machine 
gun on the water tower at the brewery site. 549 The forming of Home Guard units was 
0 
547 TWAS: PA/NC/5/35, Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files re: Home Guard 1940-1942. 
Letter from Mr WT Rainbow (Deputy Divisional Food Officer) to FJ Crawley (Chief Constable and 
ARP Controller), May 15th 1940. 
548 TWAS: 1061/1470-1472. LDV, Redheads Shipyard. Enrolment forms, name lists, ID cards, etc. 549 TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files: re Home Guard 1940-1945, 
letter from the Lieutenant Colonel (Secretary), August 6th 1940. 
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not restricted to the major industrial concerns of the area with units also performing 
their duties at the Co-Op in Newgate Street and Mitchell Bearings in Benwell. 
55° 
Whilst this method of organisation was more convenient for the employers 
concerned (indeed, it provided a free night-watchman service) it did represent several 
problems for both the overall Home Guard command structure and the local police 
force. Many of the workplace units operated outside of the main command structure 
and it was not until 1941 that they were re-organised so that they fell within the 
overall command structure of the Home Guard. In North Shields, for example, the 
company formed by Smiths Dock Ltd and the Tyne Improvement Commissioners was 
not amalgamated with the Tynemouth Battalion until September 1941 at which time it 
formed a new company (D) in that organisation and was tasked with guarding the 
riverside area from North Shields Fish Quay to Howdon. 
55' The patrolling of 
workplaces by independent units also led to incidents with the police and as early as 
1940 a warning was given to local police officers to exercise the utmost caution when 
they were carrying out inspections of premises which had self contained Home Guard 
units, especially after dark. 552 Presumably this was due to the possibility of the Home 
Guard unit believing that police officers were in fact infiltrators or members of the 
suspected Fifth Column. 
The early members of the LDV had many varying reasons for volunteering 
their services to the organisation. For some there was the obvious fear of a German 
invasion and the impact that this would have upon their loved ones. For these 
volunteers the reason was simple: they wished to do everything in their power to 
safeguard their families. It is clear from the literature that has built up around the 
sso TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files re: Home Guard 1940-1942. 
Official list of works with established Home Guard units, September 6th 1940. 
s51 The Shields Evening News, December 12th 1944, p 3. 
552 TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files re: Home Guard 1940-1942. 
Memo from Chief Constable, September 6`' 1940. 
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LDV and Home Guard that patriotism played a substantial part in convincing many of 
the men to volunteer. Feelings of vulnerability also played a role and also partially 
explained the allure of the LDV when compared to the ARP Services. Whilst the man 
in the street felt powerless to stop a German bomber from attacking his country and 
threatening his family, he realised that he could fight back against an invasion. 
Indeed, when combined with feelings of patriotism, it became his masculine duty to 
do so. 
There were a number of other, sometimes less laudable, reasons for some men 
volunteering for service. Wartime British society placed a great deal of store in 
traditional masculine roles and this pressure could explain the urgency of some of the 
volunteers to be taken seriously. The war led to a change in the perception of what it 
meant to be a British male. Recently, some historians have described the process as a 
slide into "hyper-masculinity". 553 The hegemonic male caricature was physically 
powerful, handsome and young. Of course this left out a great number of men who, 
for various reasons, did not fit into this stereotype but who wished to be seen to be 
doing their duty to their country in its time of need. 
Of course it was not only preconceived notions of masculinity that were 
challenged by the formation of the Home Guard and other civil defence organisations. 
Many women throughout the country wished to play a more active role in opposition 
to any invading force. Despite the desperation of the prevailing situation in the first 
three years of the war, when invasion seemed most likely, the official governmental 
attitude towards female volunteers in the Home Guard remained obstinately hostile. 
The general attitude of the government was based on assumptions about gender which 
had applied to women during previous conflicts. However, the totality of the Second 
sss Rose, S 0, Which People's War, p 181-182. 
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World War, and the threat presented to all sections of British society, resulted in a 
disruption of the traditional distinctions that separated combatants from non- 
combatants with a subsequent blurring of the boundaries that had traditionally 
separated the "gendering of conflict". 554 
Summerfield and Peniston-Bird argue that the Home Guard was unique in that 
it "resisted the recruitment of women, in respect of both its structure and its symbolic 
status" 555 They do, however, go on to outline various exceptions to this rule. In this 
respect the 7th Tynemouth Battalion of the Northumberland Home Guard would seem 
to be a very definite case to the contrary as, from the unit's inception, a woman was 
enrolled as an unofficial auxiliary member. Miss Muriel Venus was the borough's 
only female Home Guard and had offered support services to the battalion from the 
first. Although it was only in 1942 that she was officially appointed as an auxiliary 
member and was granted permission to wear an arm badge bearing the letters H. G. 
This would appear to have been an officially recognised position but if so it 
contradicts the assertion that "from 1940 to 1943 (the period of greatest invasion 
danger), it [The Home Guard] mäde no official arrangements to enlist the help of 
female auxiliaries. "556 Although Miss Venus was a member of the organisation she 
played no part in any combat activity or training and instead aided in passing 
messages and preparing meals for the battalion's officers, "" both being traditionally 
acceptable feminine roles during wartime. Despite this, she was viewed as a part of 
the unit and was not merely a tea-lady. The lack of a combat role is in keeping with 
the service of females in the regular armed forces of the period. The only arm where 
554 Summerfield, P& Peniston-Bird, C, `Women in the Firing Line: the Home Guard and the defence 
of gender boundaries in Britain in the Second World War', Women's History Review, 9,2, (2000), p 
231. 
555 Ibid, p 232. 
556 ibid. 
5" The Shields Evening News, December 21" 1944, p 3. 
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women were allowed in a combat role was in the mixed anti-aircraft units, and, even 
here, they were not permitted to actually fire weapons. Of course women did play an 
active, and dangerous, role in various espionage organisations. 
The reluctance of the Home Guard in accepting female recruits resulted in 
questions being asked by female Members of Parliament and the issue rapidly 
assumed national proportions. Surely, it was argued, if women were on the front line 
in this war, as they unarguably were, then it was only fair that they should be entitled, 
alongside the men of the country, to join an organisation designed as a last-ditch 
defence? 558 Indeed Churchill was in favour of letting women play an active role in 
combat and supported the principle of women in the Home Guard. He also pushed for 
more women to be involved in anti-aircraft batteries. Despite this, the call for women 
to be allowed to become combat trained members of the Home Guard was ridiculed 
by leading politicians and the masculine hegemony of the defence of the realm 
continued. By April 1943 women were being allowed to join the Home Guard but 
only as Women Home Guard Auxiliaries with non-combatant roles such as clerical 
duties. 559 On no account were they to be given weapons training or to participate in 
combat exercises, their function was solely "to perform non-combatant duties such as 
clerical work, cooking and driving". 560 The truth, however, is probably that the 
numbers of women who wished to join the Home Guard were small. Unmarried 
women became subject to conscription whilst it is unlikely that many married women 
would have wished to join a combat arm. 
On Tyneside, an area already synonymous with high levels of military service, 
there was a large body of ex-servicemen who were now past the age when they would 
55e For the political debate on the subject see, Summerfield, P& Peniston-Bird, C, 'Women in the 
Firing Line', pp 233-238. 
559 Ibid, p 238. 
560 Hansard, v 338, col 1532, oral answers, PJ Grigg, April 20`h 1943, quoted in ibid. 
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be accepted for active military service. These men formed the basis of the more 
experienced cadre of the local Home Guard units. The area also included a great 
number of industries vital to the national war effort and, because of this, a large 
number of men who were employed in reserved occupations. A large proportion of 
these men were willing to volunteer their services and they quickly became a 
mainstay of the service. Their reasons for volunteering to take on sometimes arduous 
duties on top of their extended working day can be found in common feelings of 
patriotism as well as fellowship with their colleagues. As the wartime situation 
became more desperate, however, another reason became increasingly common. A 
substantial aspect of the wartime masculine dominion involved uniformed service and 
whilst the campaign of ostracism of those who were not in uniform never reached the 
pitch that it had in the First World War it remained a looming ever-present aspect of 
British society. As such, many of those men who were young enough to be accepted 
for active service but who occupied reserved positions found themselves, if not 
shunned then, being looked on askance by some sections of society, especially by 
some women. This does seem to have been more of an issue in the Midlands, 561 with 
letters to the press castigating young reserved workers as cowards and shirkers, 562than 
it was on Tyneside. This can perhaps be explained by the hardships that the local 
workforce had gone through in the decade prior to the war. 
Although many of the men who volunteered for service in the Home Guard 
were veterans of the First World War, the proportion of older volunteers was not as 
high as is popularly imagined. It has been estimated that the veterans made up 
approximately 35% of the original volunteers for the LDV. The command structure 
of the force was made up of a more significant number of veterans, many of whom 
$61 Rose, S 0, Which People's War, pp 178-196. 
5621bid, pp 179-180. 
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were ex-officers in the Regular Army. The veterans were joined by a large number of 
younger men who were waiting to be called up for service in the regular forces or who 
were working in reserved occupations. By 1940 the average age of the LDV/Home 
Guard was estimated to be approximately 35 years, much younger than the myth 
perpetuated by the images of `Dads' Army'. 
563 
Figure 8. Gosforth Home Guard unit, 21st April 1941. so' 
The pace of events sometimes led to a breakdown in communication with the 
result that the signing up of men did not go as smoothly as many of the volunteers, or 
the controlling authorities, would have wished. The greatest problem was that many 
of the local police stations had not been warned to expect the flood of volunteers that 
would soon arrive at their door. This led to various haphazard methods of the taking 
of particulars and caused some levels of confusion when it came to approaching men 
at a later date for the purposes of official enrolment. As the police fulfilled such a 
critical role in the enrolment of volunteers the failure to notify many stations of their 
role was a major oversight on the part of both central and local government. At North 
"" MacKenzie, S P, The Home Guard, pp 36-40. 
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Shields, where the situation was typical of many areas, the police had received no 
warning of their expected role in the matter and so names were listed on scraps of 
paper until a more efficient records system could be organised. The police seem to 
have adjusted to this role in a very speedy and efficient manner, at North Shields the 
scraps of paper were replaced with a very comprehensive alphabetical system within 
48 hours 565 The local police were said to have been "extremely helpful"566 at this 
stage in the formation of the LDV. Indeed they earned the praises of the LDV Group 
Commander for the role that they played in these early and disorganised days; 
Colonel Holmes stated that, "[The police] Played an invaluable part in building up the 
nucleus from which we were able to build the battalion. "567 
The country was divided into zones and each zone was then further sub- 
divided into different area groups. Each zone had an overall Zone Commander. In 
the case of Northumberland the Zone Commander was Lord Allendale. The holder of 
this position was responsible for the planning and organisation of the LDV within the 
entire purview of his command. This appointment of a local worthy was a common 
occurrence in the Home Guard and an issue that caused much controversy. The high 
command ranks of the force were dominated by the upper classes, thus giving rise to 
the popular belief of the Home Guard being led by Colonel Blimp type personalities. 
Looking at the issue purely in terms of social class it is true to say that the force was 
led by those who came from the upper echelons of society. This was for a variety of 
reasons, the role played by these men was largely administrative and as such they had 
the time for these tasks, the local commanders had to be well known and to an extent 
respected even if this was purely because of the respect for their social rank. 
Members of the aristocracy and gentry were also far more likely to have seen military 




service when they were younger. Whilst this command structure did lead to a degree 
of tactical stagnation and grasp of the military situation there were also positive 
results. As influential members of local society, and in some cases national society, 
the commanders were capable of getting quicker results from local and central 
authorities on behalf of their rank and file and the organisation as a whole. 568 Perhaps 
one of the greatest triumphs of the Home Guard was that it helped to break down 
traditional British class barriers. The Guardsmen came from all walks of life and 
generally co-operated well with each other when performing their duties. 
Although, on a national level, the Home Guard has been derided because of a 
perceived lack of organisation there is little evidence to suggest this in the case of the 
Northumberland Zone organisations. The police had coped adequately with the high 
demands placed upon them to take names and addresses of volunteers and these seem 
to have been passed on to the relevant LDV authorities in a short space of time. In 
Newcastle, a letter from Lord Allendale, the Zone Commander, requesting that the 
details of volunteers be submitted to the Newcastle Group Commander, Colonel EF 
Bell, was received by the Chief Constable on May 18th 1940, only four days after the 
initial request for volunteers had gone out. 569 Whilst at Tynemouth the Group 
Commander was appointed by the 17th of May and the first company of LDV were 
appointed by that weekend. 570 The formation of small company sized units of LDV 
took place at speed. By June 1940 there were four infantry companies, plus a separate 
headquarters company, in Newcastle. These companies were dispersed around the 
568 Ibid, pp 71-81. 
569 TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files: re Home Guard 1940-1945, 
letter from Lord Allendale to Chief Constable Crawley (ARP Controller), May 18`h 1940. 
570 The Shields Evening News, November 15th 1944. 
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city to give good levels of patrol coverage and were, like most LDV units, based in 
disused drill halls and schools. 571 
The most common criticism of the force was that it was not militarily viable. 
Critics argue that the organisation could not have fought off a German invasion if this 
had proven necessary. This is missing the point of the original formation of the LDV. 
The force was not intended to replace the Regular Army; it was an addition originally 
intended to act as a form of armed lookout. The only fighting role originally 
envisaged was that of a brief holding action whilst regular forces were transported to 
the area. The other most common duty associated with the LDV was that of 
patrolling and guarding sensitive locations. In this aspect of their duty the force 
served to relieve regular forces of this time consuming and inefficient duty. 
The reasons for the mockery of the Home Guard largely stem from 
circumstances that were beyond the control of the force's members -- the lack of 
equipment being the greatest criticism. Britain had already experienced a great defeat 
in the fall of France and its army had lost a large percentage of not only its heavy 
equipment but also of such fundamental items such as rifles, uniforms and so on. 
Hence, newly-produced items would be required merely to re-equip the regular forces 
and there was a severe shortage of any surplus that could be set aside for the use of 
the Home Guard. This led to the reports of units patrolling and mounting guard 
armed with cudgels, muskets and in some cases farming tools. Tynemouth LDV, 
upon its initial formation, was reported to have had only one shotgun between its one 
hundred members. 572 This lack of equipment did not only apply to firearms but also 
to uniforms, boots and other necessary military equipment. The Home Guard officers 
were speedily issued with an identification placard for display in their car windscreens 
s" TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files: re Home Guard 1940-1945, 
Secret document from LDV Group Commander (Newcastle) to Chief Constable, June 8th 1940. 
572 The Shields Evening News, November 15`h 1944. 
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in the event of an emergency however. 573 The initial volunteers received only an 
armband emblazoned with the initials LDV to be sewn onto a sleeve, so as to conform 
to the rules of war, 574 in lieu of the issue of a uniform. This, despite the risk of being 
shot as franc-tireurs (non-uniformed and illegal combatants) in the event of an 
invasion, did not deter the members of the LDV from continuing their activities in a 
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Figure 9. An early war LDV armlet, worn around the sleeve of a civilian jacket. 575 
The LDV command structure responded to this crisis in the admirable manner 
to which they responded to most crises during the war; they relied upon their own 
initiative. In the above case of Tynemouth LDV the Group Commander, Colonel 
Holmes, quickly ascertained that there was a small stock of First World War issue 
Mills Bombs (hand grenades) in a Newcastle drill hall. He then applied for and 
received permission from the Territorial Army to have approximately one gross of 
these delivered to the local police station for re-issue to his unit so that at least his 
57i TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files: re Home Guard 1940-1945, 
Memo from WR Wingfield (Regional Police Staff Officer) to Chief Constables, June II fh 1940. 
574 The Shields Evening News, November 15th 1944. 
s'S From the author's own collection. Original in the Military Vehicle Museum, Newcastle upon Tyne. 
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force would have some offensive power in the event of invasion. 57' In Newcastle the 
Group Commander petitioned the local police force for any spare revolvers or rifles 
that they had to be transferred to his own unit. 577 The government initially launched 
an appeal for the donation of any privately owned sporting rifles or shotguns for the 
use of the LDV units. These weapons, however, were not ideal for military use as 
there were problems finding adequate supplies of ammunition. Once again the police 
were to play a role as the weapons were to be handed in to local police stations in 
order that the police could organise the distribution of the weaponry to local LDV 
units. There is evidence suggesting that on Tyneside the police did not welcome the 
extra responsibility of storing weapons and that this led to an increase in tension 
between the police and the LDV. 578 
Whilst the police and, after some initial enthusiasm, the government, decided 
that the donated shotguns were not suitable, the LDV were enthusiastic about the 
possibility of gaining the use of any extra weaponry, thus showing once again the 
levels of individual initiative that was commonly displayed by members of the LDV. 
The example of Newcastle LDV shows that the volunteers of the civil defence 
organisations often disagreed with the opinions of the local authorities and the local 
police force, especially over the issue of the role and equipping of the LDV. 579 
The lack of suitable weaponry led to a loud and sustained campaign of protest 
from within the more influential ranks of the LDV. This willingness to protest at 
perceived unfair treatment was a feature of the organisation throughout the war. After 
the initial boost of mobilisation had begun to wear off the volunteers turned their 
576 Ibid. 
577 TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files: re Home Guard 1940-1945, 
Memo to the Chief Constable from LDV Group Commander (Newcastle), June 19'h 1940. 
579 Ibid. Memo and newspaper report regarding the storing of shotguns at West End Police Station, 
August 116' 1940. 
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attention towards the perceived lack of governmental action towards equipping the 
force in order to make it anything other than a token. The fact that the equipping of 
the LDV and Home Guard proceeded at a monotonously slow pace did nothing to 
alleviate some members' fears that the force was not widely regarded by the 
authorities. The government did order large numbers of pre-war weapons, Ross rifles 
from storage in Canada, and Springfield's from America, in order to provide 
armament for the LDV. The first batch of these weapons was delivered and issued in 
late June 1940 but despite this it was estimated that only one man in six had a 
firearm. 580 Patrols and roadblocks manned by LDV men armed with a variety of 
pistols, shotguns, outdated rifles, and even clubs, were a common site across Tyneside 
during this period. 
The challenge of securing armaments for the Home Guard only improved 
gradually throughout the course of the war. The organisation remained a test-bed for 
ad-hoc weapons systems, such as the Northover Projector and the Spigot Mortar 
(otherwise known as the Blacker Bombard), and a dumping ground for obsolescent or 
totally obsolete weaponry that was no longer required by the Regular Army. As this 
re-equipping coincided with the receding possibility. of any German invasion it was 
accepted by the rank and file of the Home Guard, despite some persistent grumbling 
from members who wished to be incorporated into the main body of the Regular 
Army. 
580 MacKenzie, S P, The Home Guard, p 40. 
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The Home Guard in Operation 
The training of Guardsmen was yet another factor that aroused derision 
amongst the more cynical members of the populace and amongst some historians. 
This is unfair. At the founding of the force there was indeed little planning or 
forethought put into the training programmes that would be necessary if the service 
was to fulfil its role in any meaningful way. Training centres, both locally and 
nationally, were established with commendable speed and efficiency. Even in the 
issue of training there was some confusion over the role that the service was to 
undertake in the event of an emergency. Some of the more left wing volunteers, 
influenced by the lessons of the Spanish Civil War, believed that the most effective 
method of fighting for the Home Guard was to practice guerrilla tactics. This led to 
the classes in "un-gentlemanly warfare" overseen by Tom Wintringham, former 
commander of the British Battalion of the International Brigade, at Osterley Park. 58' 
These early schools were later taken over by the authorities and the training 
programme became more staid but also more organised, involving the employment of 
instructors from the Regular Army. The Regular Army also assisted by its use of 
travelling "K" Wing units. These were instructors who travelled round Home Guard 
units giving lectures and organising small-scale exercises. 582 
Training at a more local level was left largely in the hands of the local 
command structure and consisted of regular target practice, annual and weekend 
training camps, as well as official informative displays and regular exercises. 583 The 
training procedure on Tyneside would appear to have been well organised and 
efficiently run. From November 1940 the platoon and section commanders of the 7th 
sal Ibid, pp 70-71. 
582 The Shields Eveningn News, December 21" 1944, p 3. 
38' Ibid, December 28 1944, p 6. 
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Battalion (Tynemouth) Northumberland Home Guard were required to attend 
weekend courses in Newcastle. S94 Rifle ranges were quickly organised, often in 
quarries or on farmland, and were extensively used by local units of Home Guard who 
were anxious to improve their standards of marksmanship. 585 Problems of testing 
some of the larger and more experimental weapons could still prove to be somewhat 
problematic and even dangerous. In the summer of 1941 the testing of a Northover 
Projector (a simple, and cheap, anti-tank weapon which fired a bottle containing a 
phosphorous solution. ) at Tynemouth Castle led to the ignition of some nearby gorse 
bushes and necessitated the calling out of the local fire brigade. 586 As more of the 
younger members of the force were called up for regular service it was reported that 
the training they had already received during their period of Home Guard service had 
proven useful. This is another example of the contribution the Home Guard made to 
the general war effort, often coincidentally -a contribution that was not envisaged 
upon the creation of the force. 587 
Ironically the Home Guard became more efficient as a military force as its 
original raison-d'etre became less necessary. - Access to equipment, especially 
ammunition, and better training methods led to a significant improvement in the 
performance of the force during the latter years of the war. It is probably correct to 
assume that the 1940 era LDV and Home Guard would not , 
have been sufficiently 
competent to have performed in any meaningful military role in the event of an 
invasion, or for that matter a minor raid. Yet by 1942-1943 the Home Guard was 
being used to replace regular units performing home duties and would most likely 
have been able to fight an effective containing action against quite large forces as well 





as performing roles such as manning anti-aircraft, and searchlight, batteries. The 
changing role and increased efficiency is best demonstrated by considering the 
example of the Tvnemouth battalion. On the 18`h of June 1940 a patrol fired five rifle 
rounds at a low flying enemy bomber that was strafing the area, the men were gently 
reprimanded that they had wasted nearly all of the ammunition allotted to the 
battalion. 5 By the time of the Home Guards stand down however the Tynemouth 
battalion had nearly 1,000,000 rounds of ammunition under its control and had access 
to artillery pieces that had been in use by the Regular Army until 1943. '8`' Whilst, by 
May 1942, men of the battalion were manning a `'Z" battery of anti-aircraft rocket 
projectors stationed beside the Park Hotel, Tynemouth, as well as more traditional 
anti-aircraft guns, the gunners succeeded in bringing down at least one enemy aircraft 
during this period. 590 
Figure 10. Searchlight, of the type manned by local Home Guard units. "" 
588 The Shields Evening News, November 28'x' 1944, p 3. 
589 The Shields Evening News, December 28th 1944, p 6. 
$90 The Shields Evening News, January I0th 1945, p 3. 
591 From the author's own collection. Original on display at the Military Vehicle Museum, Newcastle 
upon Tyne. 
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Despite this increasing level of operational efficiency there were some 
members of the Tyneside population who continued to look down on the organisation 
and to cast them in a comical light as bumbling incompetents. This had stemmed 
from the initial perception of the LDV - derisively called in some Tyneside localities 
the "look, duck and vanish Brigade"592 - as a disorganised group and the attitude 
continued to persist in some areas throughout the war. In other areas however the 
Home Guard quickly overcame the initial scepticism and "the scorn of some members 
of the general public, who eventually changed their opinion and looked upon the 
Home Guard with pride. "593 
Much of the controversy that arose from the actions of the Home Guard was a 
result of the unclear definition of their duties. Many of the men involved in the LDV 
saw themselves as the last line of defence against a German invasion of Britain; as 
such they saw the service as a fighting military organisation in which they would be 
expected to engage and destroy the enemy. The government had a different role in 
mind for the organisation. For them the primary function of the LDV was to act as 
observers and as a force to discourage and apprehend fifth columnists. In other words 
the LDV was to act as an "armed special constabulary rather than a front-line 
combatant force. "594 This was confirmed by the first training instructions that were 
issued by the War Office to the LDV. These instructions stated that the LDV were 
not adequately equipped or trained to offer sustained resistance to German regulars 
and that the role of observation, passing on of information and the confining of enemy 
activities were the roles to which the force should dedicate itself, along with the 
592 Interview NEW1/GY, August 2000. 
`93 The Shields Evening News, November 15th 1944, p 3. 
594 MacKenzie, S P, The Home Guard, p 41. Also, NA: WO 199/3243. History of the Formation and Organisation of the Home Guard. 
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standard duties of guarding locations of tactical and/or industrial importance to the 
war effort. 595 
The duties of the LDV/Home Guard increased, but with a different emphasis, 
during the war to take in local area defence, patrolling, manning anti-aircraft 
batteries, 596 coastal defences, ARP duties and, later in the war, traditional police 
duties such as traffic control. 597 These disparate, but important, duties took a great 
deal of pressure off the Regular Army and the ARP services by providing trained and 
committed manpower. This is one of the great successes of the Home Guard 
organisation yet is overlooked in more traditional accounts of the service and in the 
myths that have been built up since the end of the war. By 1944 the Home Guard was 
responsible for the majority of routine security operations within Britain. 598 The 
Tynemouth 7t' Battalion was even given a substantial role in the co-ordination of the 
local ARP effort. Due to the establishment of a Home Guard observation post on top 
of Billy Mill, a location that offered unparalleled views of the whole region. A 
special observation section of the Home Guard under the command of a Mr W 
Gallilee was commissioned and during a raid these men would relay messages to the 
local police and ARP services as well as the regional Commissioner. The Billy Mill 
post developed into the "eyes of the borough" and was to prove a significant aid to the 
ARP organisation. 599 The fact that the battalion was in the "unique position of closely 
co-operating with the Civil Defence authorities from its ideally sited observation 
post" was a key factor in improving the skills and abilities of the unit. 60° 
s9s Ibid. - 396 The Shields Evening News, December 30th 1944, January 10'' 1945, and January 12`h 1945. 597 TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files: re Home Guard 1940-1945, 
Official report on Home Guard traffic control training by Inspector JH Brown of Newcastle City 
Police, August 18th 1942. 
598 Yelton, D K, `British Public Opinion', p 475. 
599 The Shields Evening News, November 21't 1944, p 3. 
101bid, November 15 1944, p 3. 
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As the war progressed, the role of the Home Guard was more widely 
questioned, by some guardsmen as well as by the public, and this led to a general 
lowering of morale amongst the force. The government was so concerned by this 
perceived downturn in enthusiasm that it decided that from December 1941 service in 
the Home Guard was to be compulsory under the National Service (no. 2) Bill. This 
was not a particularly welcome move, as many men thought that the duties were by 
this time unnecessary and were viewed, by both the men themselves and in some 
cases their employers, 601 as a waste of potential leisure time. There were an 
increasing number of problems with compulsory Guardsmen failing to satisfactorily 
fulfil their appointed duties, a criminal offence. This took place in most Home Guard 
Battalions, including the 11th Battalion Home Guard (West Newcastle) where legal 
proceedings were initiated, under the Defence (Home Guard) Regulation Number 5, 
against two Guardsmen who had repeatedly failed to report for parade and guard 
duty. 602 This proves how rapidly the much vaunted blitz spirit could fade when 
people felt that they were no longer in any great danger and that attitudes towards 
voluntary service were vastly different from those of people who had been pressed 
into service at the loss of their perceived leisure time. 
By 1943, various industrial employers were complaining that the continuing 
service of their workers in the Home Guard, was beginning to affect productivity. 
They claimed that many men were leaving work, going on duty with the Home Guard 
and then, after minimal rest, going back to work again. Whilst it was undoubtedly 
true that this was having a negative effect on the workers the government, and 
Churchill in particular, realised that for many men their continuing service in the 
Home Guard was a boost to morale and that there would be much resentment if any 
601 NA: LAB 8/112-113. Home Guard - Compulsory enrolments, 1942. 602 TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files: re Home Guard 1940-1945, 
Memo from Adjutant of 11`" Btn. Home Guard to the Chief Constable, April 13t' 1942. 
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move was made to disband the force or to limit the voluntary service of workers. It 
was not only the Home Guardsmen who were tiring themselves outside of work. This 
applied to ARP workers, housewives, and even the Mayor of Jarrow who, according 
to the journalist, JL Hodson, got home at 8.30 am after a twelve hour shift in the 
shipyard and was digging in his allotment by 11 am. 603 
The relations between the Home Guard and the police have often been 
characterised by popular opinion as poor, there is little evidence to suggest that this 
was the case on Tyneside. Whilst the surviving evidence for Newcastle betrays a tone 
of weariness and pained tolerance in the correspondence between the City Police and 
the Home Guard authorities this is balanced by several documents that comment on 
the good relationship and the high level of co-ordination that existed between the two 
services as well as by the record of the Tynemouth Battalion in co-operating with 
ARP Services and the civil authorities as described previously. 
It is a widely held myth of the war that the LDV and Home Guard members 
thought of themselves as being above the law and as such could often take action that 
went a long way beyond their officially sanctioned powers. This myth would appear 
to be verified by some reports from Newcastle City Police. These hint at Home 
Guard units, especially the works' units, being somewhat nervous when guarding 
business properties and intolerant of police inspections after dark. 604 These reports 
are balanced by information from the local police regarding the success of joint 
exercises involving the Home Guard, especially the manning of road blocks and road 
closures. 605 Whilst undoubtedly there were incidences of Home Guard members 
603 Calder, A, The People's War, p 74. 
604 TWAS: PA/NC/5/35. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Wartime Files: re Home Guard 1940-1945. 
Official list of works with established Home Guard units and warning to police officers re: caution to 
be taken when inspecting these premises, September 1940. 
605 Ibid. Special Police Report by Sergeant JW Ingoe ("B" Division) on the Home Guard road closure 
exercise of April 6th 1941. 
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overstepping their authority it would seem that these were concentrated largely in the 
first year of the LDV/Home Guard's existence. As the expertise within the force 
improved, commensurate with the hysteria surrounding the threat of invasion 
receding, the frequency of incidents involving members of the force slowed. 
Relationships between the Home Guard and the Regular Army were also often 
strained. In the early days of the LDV the force was seen as a waste of time and 
indeed was often criticised for increasing problems due to its over-zealous 
prosecution of its duties. Perceived snubs by central government, especially over the 
issue of equipment, were fiercely criticised by members of the LDV/Home Guard and 
this led to a further straining of the relationship with the War Office. This lack of co- 
operation was highlighted by the editor of the `Army Quarterly' when, in turning 
down an article on the birth of the Home Guard by Brigadier William Carden Roe, he 
stated that, "It would not do, I think, to disclose that co-operation between Home 
Forces and the War Office was not quite as cordial as one would have liked. "606 
Inevitably the requirement for a force such as the Home Guard became 
untenable. By mid-1944 the useful service of the force had come to an end, and many 
of its founder members now wished to retire graciously. The threat of invasion or 
raiding was non-existent, whilst the Luftwaffe had long been subdued. Indeed, the 
only threat that still existed at this point in the war was from pilot-less rockets such as 
the VI and, later in the war, the more powerful V2. By this point in the war even 
Churchill had recognised that the force served very little real purpose. The Home 
Guard was officially stood down on the December 3rd 1944, amidst fanfare and both 
local and national parades. Although the organisation was allowed to contribute men 
to the victory parades the next year, even though officially disbanded. 
606 MacKenzie, S P, The Home Guard, pp 2-3. 
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Figure 11. Victory parade held at St . lames' Park, Newcastle, 12th May 1945.607 
The force was praised and then allowed to fade out of existence, but had it 
fulfilled its roles? At the stand-down parade in Tynemouth, the mayor related that 
Rear Admiral Sir Wellwood Maxwell had confided to him the opinion that the 
comparative immunity which the great shipyards on the Tyne enjoyed was in no small 
measure to the defences put up at the mouth of the river. -608 The effectiveness of the 
Home Guard is difficult to quantify: there was no invasion or land force raiding to test 
the organisation. Co-operation between the Home Guard and the ARP services 
continued to be effective and this no doubt helped to control the incidents that 
occurred on Tyneside. It is in the training of younger members who later went on to 
join the regular forces and in the function of relieving members of the Regular Army 
from some duties in order to allow them to be used on active fronts where the Home 
Guard, whether on a local or national basis, made its greatest contribution. On 
Tyneside the greatest tribute paid to the Home Guard was in the re-assurance and 
confidence that it gave to the local population. The thanks given to the members of 
(i07 Photograph © Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd. 
608 The Shields Evening News, December 4 `h 1944. 
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the force at the various stand-down parades seem to have concentrated on this aspect 
of the force's duties. 
609 
Other Civil Defence Services and Measures 
Whilst the Home Guard did contribute to the anti-aircraft defences of the area, the 
vast majority of these positions were occupied by members of the regular armed 
forces. The anti-aircraft gun operations room, responsible for co-ordinating the anti- 
aircraft defences of the region, was located at Low Gosforth House, which was on the 
southernmost perimeter of Gosforth Park (the site is currently the home of the 
Northumberland County Records Office, although a re-location is imminent). This 
site actually continued in a military role until the early 1950s and the house itself was 
finally demolished in the mid-1970s. 610 The Regional War Room, which was 
responsible for the overall co-ordination of the aerial defence of the Tyneside area, 
was sited in the Royal Grammar School at Jesmond, - on the outskirts of Newcastle 
upon Tyne. 
In order to fool enemy air crew, a number of decoy sites were created on 
Tyneside. These sites, utilising lighting effects, were designed to simulate factories, 
foundries, marshalling yards and airfields working under blackout conditions and 
were usually situated some way from the actual target in open fields. The sites also 
included areas where controlled fires and simulated bomb bursts could be created in 
order to add further realism and to lure enemy aircraft. Each site had a number of 
personnel attached and the construction, maintenance and control of these positions 
6" Ibid. 
610 The North-East Diary 1939-1945 website, [http: //www. b. pears. co. uk/NE-Diary/index. htmi]. 
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was complicated. On Tyneside sites were constructed to simulate everything from 
Low Fell Marshalling Yard (situated at Beamish) and the Tyneside Dockyards 
(Boldon Colliery) to the Tyne Naval Yards (Springwell). In addition to this there was 
a much more versatile and sophisticated site (known as a Starfish site) located in 
fields beside New York village. 611 Quite what the villagers and local colliery owners 
thought of this is, unfortunately, unrecorded. 
Acting in co-operation with the anti-aircraft sites were extensive searchlight 
batteries manned almost exclusively by men of the Royal Artillery, who were 
attached to the Northumberland Fusiliers and placed under the authority of Fighter 
Command, along with substantial numbers of female volunteers. 612 By 1944 these 
personnel had been moved to the south coast and were replaced with American 
soldiers from the 225th AAA Searchlight Battalion of the US Army. 613 There were 36 
such sites on Tyneside by 1944 providing a widespread coverage of the whole area. 
Anti-aircraft sites were common across the region and later in the war even included 
anti-aircraft rocket batteries. Unfortunately the effectiveness of the defences, 
especially early in the war, was not especially high with their main contribution being 
to the morale of the local populace, who at least had the satisfaction that they were 
being actively defended, and in providing boys with pieces of shrapnel for their 
collections. Barrage Balloon sites quickly came into operation at the outbreak of war 
as these were seen as an efficient way of deterring enemy bombing from low levels. 
The Tyneside barrage was especially concentrated around the banks of the Tyne but 
does not seem to have been very effective in deterring enemy aircraft. The balloons 
were crewed by both men and women and proved to be popular with local 
611 A full list of the sites situated in the North East of England can be found in ibid. 
612 For a fuller description of this subject see, De Groot, G J, `I Love the Smell of Cordite in Your Hair: 
Gender Dynamics in Mixed Anti-Aircraft Batteries during the Second World War', History, 82,265 
(January 1997), pp 73-92. 
613 Ibid. 
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schoolchildren. They had an unfortunate habit of breaking free from their tethers, 
especially in rough conditions, and caused a large amount of damage to the roofs of 
buildings by either landing on them or dragging heavy cabling across the rooftops 
knocking looses slates and chimneys. 
The Tyneside area was to play an important role if, as some military tacticians 
suspected, the enemy landed an invasion force in Northumberland; a plan of action 
and a line of defences known as the Tyne Stop Line was created. This plan entailed 
the immediate destruction of every bridge over the Tyne between the Rede valley and 
Scotswood (More than 100 bridges in total) and the cratering and mining of major 
roads. The bridges over the Tyne at Newcastle were to be prepared for demolition but 
were to be defended to the last man whilst the mouth of the Tyne was to be blocked 
by the sinking of two ships on the tidal bar. A substantial number of earthworks, 
pillboxes and other defences were built up in the area. These included a network of 
fortifications along the coastal beaches and alongside especially vulnerable points. 
Networks of pillboxes were built to cover possible coastal landing zones, ports and 
harbours, bridges, railway and road junctions,, as well as inland locations where 
enemy airborne landings were possible. Gun positions were established to cover vital 
areas, especially rivers, and included naval guns being positioned at Clifford's Fort in 
North Shields, the mounting of torpedo tubes on the Government Jetty at North 
Shields to deter enemy vessels from invading the, Tyne614, and the placing of 
obstructions on any open areas to prevent glider landings. Whilst these defensive 
fortifications were not needed they continued to play a partin the defences of the area 
throughout the war and there are still many signs of these defences existing today. 
614 Interview NS/RA1,2002. 
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Figure 12. Pill box at Seaton Sluice, North Tyneside. Part of a substantial defensive complex 
that was designed to protect the local harbour mouth. 
"'` 
The Police 
Whilst it was widely acknowledged that the outbreak of war would increase 
the burden facing the police in Britain, little action was taken within the separate 
forces to prepare for this eventuality and the numbers of police, in England, fell from 
60,028 officers in 1938 to just 43,644 in 1943, a decrease of 16,384 men. 616 New 
situations, however, did arise at the outbreak of hostilities. 
Due to the exigencies of the wartime situation the local police forces on 
Tyneside, in common with those serving other parts of the country, were compelled to 
undertake a large number of new duties. These ranged from providing guards for 
sensitive areas to checking and enforcing blackout precautions at private dwellings 
and industrial sites. Many of the extra duties were of a paramilitary nature and quite 
615 From the author's own collection. 
616 Thorpe, A, The Longman Companion, p 67. 
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outside the operational purview and experience of most regular police officers. These 
extra responsibilities were all to be performed under circumstances best described as 
trying, the situation being exacerbated by the numbers of serving police officers who 
were called up to the armed forces. Others were seconded to other duties in order to 
provide training to the inexperienced ARP Services as well as to the reserve police 
officers that would be serving alongside regular officers for the duration of the war, 
these events united to place a great strain on the officers of Tyneside. 
The police were also expected to play the role of local intelligence service 
throughout the war and their duties included keeping a close eye on meetings of the 
local communists and pacifist organisations as well as those foreign nationals who 
had not been interned or who had been subsequently released from internment. 617 
Several of the powers that were given to the police in this respect proved to be 
popular with higher ranking officers and there was some suggestion from the police 
that the scheme of registration of guests at boarding houses and hotels should be 
continued even after the war, despite the obvious impingement on civil liberties. 618 
Intelligence efforts also resulted in the local police gathering intelligence by listening 
in to private conversations and by using shopkeepers and paid observers to gauge 
local opinion. 
The previous lack of manpower affecting the police was partially solved 
during the course of the war when acting as a special constable or volunteer reserve 
officer counted as ARP service. The police could not have carried out their numerous 
duties without the assistance of a substantial number of these volunteers and in the 
Newcastle City force there were 540 special constables, 224 of them fully trained, by 
617 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Conditions in Newcastle upon Tyne, special reports of the Chief Constable of 
City Police, September 12t 1941. 
618 TWAS: PA/NC/5/24. Newcastle upon Tyne City Police Special Report on system of hotel 
registration scheme by Superintendent Donohoe of E Division, December 6`h 1940. 
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late summer of 1938 619 Inevitably some of the volunteers were found to be 
unsuitable for service and by April of 1939 the number of special constables in 
Newcastle stood at 509.620 
The question of arming the police was considered early in the war and whilst it 
was recommended there were important drawbacks voiced by those with experience 
of police service. The number of police officers trained to use firearms was relatively 
small and the likely public reaction to police officers patrolling with rifles was a 
major concern. Quite apart from this, the number of firearms available for police use 
was wholly inadequate if the intention was to arm even a small majority of officers. 
In 1940 there were only 1,000 rifles available for over 60,000 police officers and the 
majority of these weapons were allocated to those officers in seaside towns. The 
situation regarding handguns was little better. The police owned approximately 8,000 
handguns (both automatics and revolvers) but the majority of these were allocated to 
London, again the major problem was a lack of firearms training. 621 There seems to 
have been a great reluctance on the part of the police forces to become another armed 
military force. Indeed Sir Alexander Maxwell, the police representative to the Home 
Office, stated that the police could give only limited assistance and that, in the event 
of invasion, they, "cannot be turned into a combatant force because of their many 
duties in connection with Civil Defence"622 
The wartime powers that were given to the police and, by extension, the chief 
constables meant that many of these men became immensely powerful in their 
localities. At first, however, the chief constables were concerned that ARP measures 
619 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and reports of from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Watch Committee (ARP), September 16'h 1938. 
620 Minute of April 21" 1939, pp 233-236 in Ibid. 
621 NA: HO 45/18523. Minutes of meeting held at War Office to discuss formation of armed bodies to 
meet attacks by parachutists, May 11"' 1940, p 1. 
622jbid. 
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and the appointment of regional controllers would undermine their own authority 
despite the fact that the regional controllers would only be expected to take charge in 
the event of an invasion. This was not however the case and in Newcastle, along with 
other areas, the chief constable was appointed to an influential position in charge of 
the ARP Services and the co-ordination of the local ARP scheme. Chief Constable F. 
J. Crawley, on assuming his position as ARP Controller, was granted several far- 
reaching powers including the right to make "widespread executive decisions in the 
event of an emergency". 623 In many ways this was perfectly sensible as the police 
played a major role in both the creation and the activities of the ARP Services 
although the position was open to exploitation and, indeed, Mr Crawley was 
compelled to resign his position after a national scandal, discussed in more detail in 
chapter six, in 1944.624 
The early burden of the training of air raid wardens and other ARP workers 
fell upon the local police forces and local forces were compelled to contribute 
numbers of regular officers on attachment to ARP duties. 625 Included amongst the 
police training schedule were the techniques of anti-gas training although the 
standards varied considerably and in at least one case the pomposity of an officer, 
who told locals that poisonous gas had been released from an escaped barrage 
balloon, could have had serious repercussions. 26 In most cases however the police 
training proved to be of a competent and professional standard and the officers of 
Tyneside, both regular and volunteer, performed their duties with bravery and 
professionalism. The local police forces had a difficult job in that they, by necessity 
623 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and reports of from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Watch Committee (ARP), letter from Lord Privy Seal to the local authorities, March 31" 1939. 
624 The Times, March 30`x' 1944, p 2. 
623 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and reports of from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne 
Watch Committee (ARP), September 16`h 1938. 
626 North Shields Library website, [http: //www. libraryclub. co. uk/Memories/body_memory_11. html]. 
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of the wartime situation, became a quasi-military organisation whilst they had to 
retain the support of the general public to continue to fulfil their civic duties. 
A Worthwhile Service? 
The civil defence authorities on Tyneside would seem to have coped with the wartime 
situation in an efficient and calm manner. Whilst there were undoubtedly some 
tensions existent between the Home Guard and the civil authorities these are 
outweighed by the evidence suggesting that co-operation remained good and morale, 
in the two differing arms, steady. Whilst the initial formation of voluntary bodies 
such as the Home Guard was met with mixed amounts of both enthusiasm and 
derision the force went on to prove its usefulness and earned the respect and affection 
of the majority of Tyneside residents. 
Actions taken by the police on Tyneside during the war, at least relating to 
civil defence, are more difficult to evaluate. Undoubtedly the duties faced by the 
wartime police officer were multiplied by the war and the local forces had to cope 
with the challenging situation whilst also being faced with manpower shortages and 
the training of part time and/or volunteer officers. The reluctance on the part of the 
chief constables to become another quasi-military armed force remained throughout 
the war and possibly this was a vital contribution to the force retaining the trust of the 
general public. 
The fact that the area was never attacked by land forces means that the civil 
defences were not tested and this makes it difficult to judge the overall effectiveness 
of the measures taken. However, the evidence suggests that the structures in place 
were adaptable and that the organisational standard remained high throughout the war. 
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Certainly the efficiency of the local Home Guard units compares most favourably 
with those of other parts of the country. Indeed, it was stated that from June 1940 that 
Tynemouth borough was never left unguarded, being constantly patrolled by its Home 
Guard Battalion. 627 The existing evidence suggests that Tyneside benefited from an 
enthusiastic participation in voluntary civil defence duties, from well organised civil 
authority services, and from additional fortifications built and staffed by both regular 
and volunteer forces. Perhaps the greatest contribution that the civil defence 
organisations made to the regional war effort was in the boost to morale that they 
gave to the general public by giving reassurance that they were being actively 
protected and watched over. 
627 The Shields Evening News, November 21' 1944, p 3. 
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Chapter 5 
War Culture - `Wor' Culture 
Preparations for War 
The gathering clouds of war ensured that the people of Tyneside were made 
increasingly aware of the measures taken to protect them from enemy attack. The 
digging of trenches and the construction of air raid shelters, mentioned in chapter two, 
were the most visible signs of the coming dangers, but there were others. The issue of 
gas masks to all, the assigning of identity numbers, the preparations for the mass 
evacuation of all vulnerable people and the arrangements for establishing a total 
blackout, were all portents of what could be expected in the immediate future. 
Despite the fact that the expected aerial onslaught did not materialise, and during the 
subsequent lull known as the Phoney War, Tyneside rapidly shifted to a wartime 
footing. To some though the fact of being at war still caused shock, one woman, an 
eleven year old girl at the time, remembers listening to the declaration of war and 
bursting into tears, suddenly feeling older. 628 
As mentioned in chapter two, the population of Tyneside was protected by 
several different types of air raid shelter, as the war continued these played a larger 
part in the ordinary lives of the residents of the area. The shelters ranged from the 
deep, communal, shelters such as the Ouseburn Culvert, used mainly by residents of 
Byker and Sandyford, to the ubiquitous Anderson Shelter that was installed in many 
628 North Shields Library website [http: //www. libraryclub. co. uk/Memories/memory_139. htmi], April 
2004. 
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gardens. For many local residents the lack of a garden meant that they were not 
eligible for an Anderson Shelter and these people had to make do with the various 
public shelters that were erected in the area from 1938 or the few large communal 
shelters. The communal shelters were often very popular with locals and during raids 
they attracted large numbers. Most had, by 1940, organised their own forms of 
entertainment. Usually, this consisted of music in the form of individual 
instrumentalists or the ever-popular, morale boosting, sing-along. The standards of 
comfort in these shelters varied considerably, but almost all had, as a bare minimum, 
wooden bunks and areas where different groups could gather. Some of the deep 
shelters possessed even greater facilities. The Ouseburn Culvert, which could 
accommodate 3,000 people, contained, in addition to bunk beds, "seats, toilets and a 
shop selling soft drinks and snacks". 629 This well-equipped deep shelter also had a 
nurse permanently in attendance during air raid warnings. The protection offered by 
the shelter combined with the relative comfort when compared to many of the 
alternatives resulted in the Culvert being widely liked by local residents. 630 The 
Victoria Tunnel, stretching from Ouse Street to Spittal Tongues, was similar to the 
Ouseburn Culvert, although it was larger and had a 5,000 person capacity. It was also 
seen as one of the few comfortable shelters. 631 Ad-hoc shelters continued to be used, 
not only in Newcastle city centre but also ' in areas such as Percy Main where the 
railway tunnel under the station was utilised. With sandbagged entrances and the 
instalment of bunk-beds the tunnel became a reasonably comfortable place of shelter 
and local children remember that the atmosphere was akin to a large scale camping 
excursion 632 
629 Correspondence from Mr A Czupryna, 2001. 
630 Ibid. 
631 Correspondence from Mrs BM Stewart, 2001. 
632 Correspondence from Mr R Pearson, 2001. 
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The attraction of the communal shelters was primarily the result of the feeling 
of security in numbers and the need for many people who lived in tightly-knit 
communities to be together in order to share the wartime experiences. Even when no 
community shelter was available it was very common for "families and friends to 
gather ... in one or others house", as they 
felt safer when in familiar company. 633 
This propensity for fraternising in large groups was contrary to the original policy 
envisaged by Newcastle City Council, which initially advised that shelters should 
hold no more than 50 people. The propensity for gathering in larger groups continued 
to be a concern for the authorities 634 
The system of communal sheltering could, however, lead to disaster. This was 
clearly demonstrated on Tyneside during the night of May 3`d 1941 when Wilkinson's 
Shelter, located at the corner of George Street and King Street, in North Shields was 
destroyed by a direct hit. The shelter was in the basement of a local lemonäde factory 
and was very popular with local residents, who enjoyed the community feeling that 
was engendered by the entertainment that took place on a regular basis in the shelter. 
Unfortunately, as this was a Saturday night, the shelter was even busier than normal. 
It was later established that 195 people were in residence at the time of the incident. 
A total of 96 were killed inside the shelter, whilst a further seven people, who were 
rescued, died of their injuries in hospital. Only 92 survived the disaster. The incident 
showed up some of the severe weaknesses in the shelter system that existed on 
Tyneside. Many of the large shelters were in basements and had little or no 
reinforcement in the event of a direct hit. 635 In the case of Wilkinson's Shelter, the 
factory above contained large amounts of heavy machinery that had not been 
633 Correspondence from Mr KB Young, 2001. 
634 TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP), June 10`h 1938. 
635 The Shields Evening News, May 4d' 1941, p 1. 
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removed. It was later agreed that many of the fatalities were a direct result of crush 
injuries sustained when the mass of machinery fell through the basement ceiling onto 
those below. Others were injured or killed by the amount of acid that was stored on 
the site for the production of lemonade. Some local residents believed that this 
location should never have been utilised as a shelter in the first place and one local, a 
young child at the time, remembers her father, a member of the National Fire Service, 
forbidding her mother from going into the shelter because of the danger of collapsing 
636 
machinery. 
Figure 13. Rescue workers at the scene of Wilkinson's Shelter, North Shields, 1941. `"7 
`"`' Interview: NS/BA, 2004. 
`' Photograph © of North Tyneside Central Library, Local Studies Section. 
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Figure 14. Another view of the Wilkinson's Shelter incident. 638 
The smaller, brick-built, public shelters that were dotted around the area were 
the refuge of others who did not have access to a communal shelter or an Anderson. 
Despite the fact that many of these shelters had been poorly built, largely due to a 
shortage of cement or incompetence, and had a tendency to collapse under the strain 
of heavy raiding they were continually used throughout the war by the people of 
Tyneside. Indeed, many of these shelters were so poorly built that "they showed a 
disconcerting propensity to collapse ... when 
bombs fell nearby. "639 Some residents 
distrusted these shelters not because of fears over their protective value but because 
they feared that immoral activities were conducted inside. One local resident 
remembers sheltering in a neighbour's under-stair cupboard, next to the gas-main, in 
preference to the local public shelter because her mother believed that, in addition to 
the dirty condition of the shelter. "funny things went on in there. -640 Under-stair 
shelters were a fairly common occurrence although there capabilities fror saving lives 
`K Photograph©' of North Tyneside Central Library, Local Studies Section. 
9 Calder, A, The People's War, p 180. 
640 Correspondence from Mr K Christie, 2001. 
225 
remained dubious the attraction of remaining in a familiar property was strong. This 
concern would appear to have some basis in fact, as complaints regarding the poor 
conduct of several people in air raid shelters were being investigated during the winter 
of 1940.641 As a result of these failings the brick shelters proved to be universally 
unpopular but were often the only thing available in some working class districts. 
Of course, one of the most ubiquitous memories of the war in Britain is that of 
the Anderson Shelter. These were corrugated iron shelters that were designed to be 
buried in private gardens and provided protection to entire families. These shelters 
had an alarming propensity to flood, and were uncomfortable, especially in winter or 
in damp weather. This was especially true when many raids resulted in entire nights 
having to be spent inside the shelter. For a large number of Tyneside residents, 
however, they were a source, not only of valuable protection, but, also of pride as 
many families expended their powers of creativity to make their shelter more 
comfortable. Some even went so far as to utilise the covering of soil on top of the 
shelter for growing flowers or, more usually, vegetables. 
641 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, November 23rd 1940. 
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Figure 15. Flower bed over an Anderson Shelter, Condercum Gardens, 1939. `42 
Opinion on the Anderson Shelters continued to be divided on Tyneside with 
many detesting them as cold, damp and uncomfortable. Others, especially the young, 
felt a curious exhilaration at being in the Anderson Shelter as its tight confines 
increased the feeling of adventure during air raids. What cannot be doubted is the fact 
that these shelters saved many Tyneside lives, as they did all over the country, for 
they proved to be remarkably resilient to enemy bombing. 
For many of the children and parents of Tyneside, in common with those in 
other urban areas, the beginning of the war was marked by the turbulence of 
evacuation. Whilst the scheme in Newcastle upon Tyne attracted large numbers, as 
described in chapter 3, the experiences of the children and their families were mixed. 
Tyneside suffered some of the worst poverty in the country and many of the children 
had few possessions. Many had no change of clothing and the standards of footwear 
possessed by many received extensive criticism. Official propaganda, however. 
presents the evacuation as a relatively carefree experience, an adventure that the 
642 Reproduced with the kind permission of The Newcastle Evening Chronicle. Photograph C0 
Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd. 
227 
majority of children enjoyed. Official photographs, often of the rehearsal rather than 
the real thing. later published in the press show bands of brave faced youngsters 
clutching bags and parcels, or waving to parents as they cheerily embark on trains 
destined for the rural unknown. Even in these images, however, there is often a 
detectable apprehension clearly discernible in the faces of the children. 
Figure 16. Newcastle evacuation rehearsal, four days before the war. Their apprehension can 
clearly be seen. In the original it is discernible that all are wearing newly polished shoes. "' 
Many thousands of Tyneside residents were affected by the process of 
evacuation that was put into place to ensure that the most vulnerable were re-located 
to areas less likely to witness substantial attack. The original plan put forward by the 
ARP Controller was that all vulnerable people would be evacuated from the area. 
This was to include not only children but also the elderly and infirm. The estimated 
demands that such a large-scale evacuation would create were substantial. As a result 
it was suggested that a committee with its own dedicated secretary be set up to 
finalise arrangements with regard to "transport, accommodation, food, attention, 
64' Photograph © Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd. 
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sanitation", and to liaise with the local authorities to which the people of Tyneside 
were to be evacuated (these were later replaced by Billeting Tribunals). 644 Naturally, 
the key thought behind the evacuation of many Tyneside children was that they were 
being removed from physical danger but it was also thought that it would reassure the 
families of the evacuees as they could carry on with their duties knowing that their 
children were safe. The reality of course proved that this desired effect was not 
always the result of the evacuation policy. Whilst the plans were in place in advance, 
the reality of moving so many people proved to be more complicated than had been 
anticipated. In some cases, such as at Tynemouth and Walisend, children were not 
evacuated until several days after the war had begun. 645 
Although the evacuation scheme appears to have enjoyed popularity on 
Tyneside the numbers of parents willing to evacuate their offspring varied 
considerably even within the region. The middle-classes from the more well off areas 
of Newcastle, such as Jesmond and Gosforth, would appear to have been more willing 
to evacuate their children than their working-class neighbours, areas such as North 
Shields and Wallsend showing the lowest proportion of evacuees despite these areas 
often being more at risk from air attack than the middle-class suburbs. Of those 
mothers and children eligible for evacuation 57% were evacuated from Newcastle at 
the outbreak of war. This can be compared to the figures of 29% from Tynemouth, 
North Shields and Wallsend, 28% from Jarrow, and 26% from South Shields. 646 
Whilst it has recently become commonplace to think of evacuation as a 
dehumanising and random affair, characterised by unaccompanied children being sent 
6" TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and Reports of the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP). Report re: Trench and Bomb Proof Shelter System compiled by Chief Constable 
Crawley of Newcastle City Police, April 290' 1938, p 57. 
645 Brown, M, Evacuees. Evacuation in Wartime Britain 1939-1945 (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 2000), 
p 20. 
Titmuss, R M, Problems of Social Policy (London: HMSO, 1950), p 552. 
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to any destination and often being picked out by prospective adoptive families in 
scenes akin to a cattle auction, or a slave, market, the truth is that many of the children 
were evacuated in large, accompanied groups, often organised by schools. Equally, 
large numbers of people evacuated their homes by making private arrangements. 7 
The most common method of private arrangement was to send children to a friend or 
relative living in an unthreatened area. Another means was to seek to rent out suitable 
accommodation in a rural area, often a disused farmhouse or workers cottage. It has 
been argued that this policy was largely impossible for the urban poor and working 
classes, but there are some cases of working class Tyneside families following this 
method of evacuation. M School evacuations were often equally ad-hoc. With classes 
becoming separated and teachers being called up it was inevitable that the groups 
would lose some of their coherence. The long distances that were often travelled did 
not help in this process. For example, several school groups from Tyneside and 
Northumberland were evacuated to Ealing, in Middlesex. 9 
Of course, the urban poor of Tyneside (an area especially hard hit during the 
depression of the 1930s) did experience, often severe, problems during the process of 
evacuation. Many were poorly clothed and required assistance from either their own 
local authority or the authority in which they had been billeted; Tyneside evacuees 
were largely sent to Cumbria, rural Northumberland or North Yorkshire. Indeed, 
"The city of Newcastle admitted that of its thirty-one thousand children registered for 
evacuation, one-eighth were `deficient' in footwear and one-fifth in clothing, and its 
standards for measuring `deficiency' were likely to be lower than those of the villages 
which received them. " Some of the clothing that was worn by evacuees was in such 
abominable condition that it was burnt when the children arrived in their billeting 
647 Ibid, pp 24-29. 
6'8 Interview. NS/RA, 2002. 
649 Titmuss, R M, Social Policy, p 431. 
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area. 650 The official minutes of the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch 
Committee (ARP) expenditure analysis contradicts the number given by Titmuss and 
instead refers to 43,367 children being present in the city, spread over 75 registered 
schools. 651 It is possible that not all of these children had been registered for the 
evacuation scheme. If this is so then it would mean that the take-up rate of the official 
evacuation scheme in Newcastle stood at approximately 71%. An unknown number 
would, of course, have been evacuated through private arrangements. No figures 
indicate the total number of children in areas such as Tynemouth County Borough but 
the number of those evacuated is known. From Tynemouth Borough just 1,481 
children were evacuated unaccompanied by adults, whilst neighbouring South Shields 
returned a figure of 3,826.652 
The problems posed by the poverty of many local families were to prove a 
persistent dilemma which the local authorities could never completely resolve. As 
late as May 1941, Newcastle Council's Public Assistance Committee was reporting 
that it had supplied almost 382 children with clothing and/or footwear and several of 
these children had been supplied on more than one occasion. At the same time there 
were also a total of 838 applications for the supply of clothing from sources ranging 
from the Director of Education to the WVS 653 Comparing the one-eighth of those 
31,000 registered for evacuation with the number given as being supplied with 
clothing/footwear shows us that less than 10% of the estimated number requiring 
clothing had in fact been supplied. This figure would be even smaller if we knew 
650 Ibid, p 115. 
651 Calder, A, The People's War, p 44. Calder takes the figure of 3 1,000 children from Titmuss, R M, 
Problems, but this would appear to be contradicted by the figures given by Newcastle Council (TWAS: 
MD/NC/276/1. Minutes & Reports from the Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch Committee 
(ARP), Analysis of Expenditure, June 10th 1938) who place the figure at more than 45,000. 
652 Titmuss, R M, Social Policy, p 550. 
653 TWAS: 359/809(5) File 239. Newcastle Public Assistance Committee official letter, May 261h 
1941. 
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exactly the number of children that had been supplied on more than one occasion. 
Admittedly these figures are somewhat arbitrary and it is likely that clothing supplies 
were also acquired from other sources. This highlights merely one aspect in which 
the evacuation scheme on Tyneside was fraught with problems. 
Although the evacuation scheme seems to have enjoyed widespread popularity 
on Tyneside the events of the war had an impact that was shared by most other areas 
of the country. When mass bombing failed to occur in the first months of the war 
many of those families who had either been evacuated themselves or had sent children 
away were lulled into overconfidence and a false sense of security. This resulted in 
many of the evacuees returning to their urban homes. In Newcastle this was 
highlighted as a problem as early as October 1939 when it was said that substantial 
"numbers of evacuees [were] returning due to boredom, dislike of the countryside, 
concern for husbands and [a] false sense of security. , 654 By January 1940 it was 
estimated that over 40% of evacuated children had returned to the city and that the 
numbers were increasing daily. 655 Evacuees also returned according to wartime 
rhythms: in the aftermath of a particularly heavy raid the numbers of evacuees 
increased whilst, during periods of relative calm, the numbers of returning evacuees 
tended to intensify. 656 The occasional heavy raid saw increasing numbers of children 
being evacuated but these tended to be short term absences with the evacuees 
returning to the area once the immediate danger had decreased. 657 
The problem of evacuees failing to settle in their billet area was chronic and 
occasionally troublesome. Of course, many of these children were simply re-housed 
in other billets but, as the expected bombing failed to take place, renewed confidence 
654 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, October 15"- 29th 1939. 
655 Ibid, January 18`h 1940. 
6561bid, September 12th 1941. 
6571bid, September 26`h 1941. 
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led to the opinion that there would be no serious bombing in the area. This in turn 
reinforced the view that the vulnerable had been evacuated for no reason. When 
combined with the feelings of home-sickness and loss that the parting of families 
engendered it is perhaps unsurprising that so many parents demanded the return of 
their children from the billeting areas. In instances when wives were separated from 
their husbands who were still on Tyneside the concern was sometimes around the 
chances for indiscretions with members of the opposite sex. The pressure could also 
be exerted upon parents by their children and one young girl remembers persuading 
her parents to let her return from Wooler to North Shields "just in time for the 
bombing to start! "658 This would seem to have been a relatively common experience 
and led to several waves of evacuation. Even before the bombing of Tyneside, the 
collapse of French resistance had encouraged further evacuations from Tyneside. 659 
The pressure to return was not, of course, a one way exhortation. There were many 
people in the billeting areas that did not welcome these urban children and wanted 
them to return regardless of any danger. Other, private, concerns saw the shuttling of 
evacuees as a business opportunity. Evacuees were encouraged to return, either by 
their hosts or by the profiteering actions of at least one local bus company. This 
company saw the chance for profit and offered substantially reduced prices for 
returning evacuees during November 1939.660 Throughout the period there are 
frequent references to the numbers of returning evacuees and the disturbances that 
their return brought to the community. The children were often left to roam freely 
due to the reduced amount of schooling available, and, by February 1940, the main 
concern of the public was said to be the "return of unruly children. These [were] 
658 North Shields Library website [http: //www. libraryclub. co. uk/Memories/memory_l 16. html], April 
2004. 
659 Titmuss, R M, Social Policy, p 243. 
"0 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Police Duty Room Fortnightly Reports, October 29`h - November 12t' 1939. 
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mostly running wild". 661 The education of Tyneside children suffered further at the 
hands of bureaucracy. The government's attempt to recover money from parents for 
the upkeep of their evacuated children placed great demands on local authorities. 
Several, including Newcastle, were forced to transfer school officers and teachers 
from their normal duties and use them as assessing officials measuring the ability of 
parents to pay. 662 
The youths of the area were evacuated to several locations: Cumbria, North 
Yorkshire, 663 and Northumberland being the foremost areas to billet Tyneside 
children. Some were evacuated as entire classes along with their teacher. The teacher 
then often became responsible for overseeing the living conditions of their young 
charges. It is impossible to quantify the overall experience of those children who 
were evacuated. The events that were witnessed by these children could vary so 
much, even within the same village, that any, to attempt to establish an overall 
`evacuation experience' is doomed to failure. Undoubtedly, some had very positive 
experiences and enjoyed their time outside the urban sprawl of Tyneside, despite the 
ever-present feelings of home sickness. A woman from North Shields, then a young 
schoolgirl, remembers being evacuated to Otterbum and enjoying working on the 
farm, supplementing rations with regular shooting expeditions in which both the girl 
and her younger brother took part. 664 Others, however, experienced cruelty and were 
utilised as domestic servants or involuntary farm workers -- effectively, indentured 
labour. Some children were unfortunate enough to be billeted with people who had 
no inclination to care for them. Some were punished for minor offences, such as 
661 Ibid, February 291h 1940. 
662 Titmuss, R M, Problems, p 157. 
663 For a recent publication describing some of the experiences of north-east children see, Moore, G, 
Thirsk at War 1939-1945 (Unknown location: Mole End, 2004). 
664 North Shields Library website [http: //www. libraryclub. co. uk/Memories/memory_l 16. html], April 
2004. 
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being late home from school; others were forcibly starved or beaten. 665 One evacuee 
remembers how his brother was punished for arriving at his billet late from school. 
"He would get no tea and had to go home hungry ... His notes to home always asked 
if he could come home but nothing about what was happening to him. "666 It was not 
until the boy's father, a miner, visited him and "found him cowering under the big pot 
sink in the kitchen being punished" that he was relieved of his suffering and returned 
home. 667 For children, and the experience was far from uncommon, who were 
unfortunate enough to suffer such unhappiness there was very little recourse. Many 
failed to alert their parents to what was happening as they felt that they would simply 
be adding to their burden and this was still a time when many children automatically 
obeyed adults. These unfortunates eventually returned home, often as a result of their 
parents discovering their maltreatment or simply because their parents missed them. 
The evacuation was, undoubtedly, a formative event for some Tyneside children but 
for many it was a short disruption to their lives and they returned to their familiar 
surroundings very quickly. 
Despite the willingness of the people of Tyneside to rally behind the nation in 
war and the awareness of possible air attack the greatest criticism was aimed at the 
blackout regulations that came into force immediately on the declaration of war. The 
necessity for maintaining an effective blackout of the country at night was widely 
recognised but the inconveniences, as well as the very real dangers, that this caused 
ensured that there were those who resented the precaution. The lack of bombing early 
in the war lent credence to those who doubted the necessity of the levels of precaution 
being taken but by 1940 the preparations of the area were being tested as the 
Luftwaffe stepped up its bombing campaign. 





After war was declared at 11 o'clock on the morning of Sunday the 3rd of September 
1939 Constable Arthur Furness of Newcastle City Police was ordered to sound the air 
raid sirens for the first alert of the war. 668 Sirens were sounded and people took to 
shelters. The noise sounded a false alarm, the first of many, and the alert was quickly 
cancelled. 669 Conditions in the area continued to be unexpectedly quiet, in line with 
conditions nationwide, but then in June 1940 came a rash of alerts and warnings. The 
first bombs to fall on Newcastle came in the early evening of Tuesday, July the 2nd, 
when a single German raider dropped high explosive bombs on The Close and Forth 
Street. One bomb hit Spillers Flour Warehouse killing the 28 year old gateman, Mr 
John Kelly, who became the first civilian casualty of enemy action over Tyneside. 670 
668 Ingleton, R, The Gentlemen at War. Policing Britain 1939-45 (Maidstone: Cranborne, 1994), p S. 
669 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Reports of Whitley Bay Urban District Council ARP Committee. 
670 Details and numbers of casualties are constructed from several sources, including: North East Diary 
1939-1945 website [httpl/www. bpears. org. uk/NE-Diary/], 2003; various post-raid reports in TWAS: 
MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Post-war report of Whitley Bay Municipal Council, ARP; TWAS: 
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Figure 17. The remnants of Spiller's mill and factory. 671 
Other bombs impacted on the Hawthorn Leslie engineering works in Forth Street and 
a couple narrowly missed the Tyne Bridge, which was thought to be the main target of 
the raid. 672 The protection of the city was shown to be somewhat lacking by this raid 
as the German bomber "had virtually the freedom of Newcastle for about 20 
minutes". There are also unsubstantiated rumours that the Luftwaffe was using 
captured British aircraft to avoid detection, although this has never been proven and is 
highly unlikely. 673 In addition to the death of Mr Kelly, a further fourteen people, six 
of them children. were killed in Jarrow when the same aircraft dropped three high 
explosive bombs in the area of Princess Street. This attack Occurred some 41 minutes 
after the attack on N'ewvcastle. Eleven properties were destroyed, including a school, 
and a further 36 houses were damaged. Several air raid shelters were also damaged or 
destroyed, and teams of firemen and ARP Rescue teams worked in relays throughout 
671 Photograph CO Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle Libraries & Arts, Leisure Services Department, 
1992. 
672 North East Diary 1939-1945 website [http: //www. bpears. org. uk/NE-Diary/J, 2004. 
67' Correspondence from Mr S Hogarth, 2001. 
237 
the night to rescue those who had been trapped in the debris 
674 These were the first 
of 39 fatalities to occur in Jarrow due to enemy bombing. 
As an industrial area and a port Tyneside was a prime target for enemy air 
raids whilst its location strung along the banks of a major river made it easily 
identifiable from the air. All of this led to the local authorities on Tyneside treating 
the threat from enemy air attack very seriously indeed. Little has been written on the 
attacks that hit Tyneside and this has led some to believe that the area had escaped 
serious bombing. The truth is that whilst Tyneside was not as heavily bombed as was 
expected at the outbreak of war the area did suffer some serious attacks and in places 
heavy casualties were inflicted. 
The aims of the Luftwaffe, in attacking Tyneside, were obvious. As an area 
producing material vital for the war effort the area was given a high priority by Hitler 
and the Luftwaffe had detailed aerial plans of the area which marked designated 
industrial and civil targets. 75 The majority of raids during the first few years of the 
war were launched with the intent of destroying and degrading the area's industrial 
capabilities. To this end most of the raids targeted shipyards, known factories, goods 
stations and communication networks. Unfortunately, the inaccuracy of the German 
bombing meant that civilian areas were often hit. This meant that the majority of the 
casualties suffered on Tyneside occurred along the river banks where the industrial 
sites were most common. Areas such as Tynemouth, Wallsend, Jarrow and South 
Shields suffered proportionately much greater casualties than areas further upstream, 
like Newcastle. 
674 North East Diary 1939-1945 website [http: //www. bpears. org. uk/NE-Diary/], 2004. 
675 See Map 4, overleaf. 
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67' TWAS: DX I11. German plan of military targets adapted from 6" Ordnance Survey Map. 
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Map 4: Stadtplan (Target Plan) of North Shields, Tvnemouth, and South Shields. 673 
The first police casualty to be suffered in the area came in particularly tragic 
circumstances at South Shields on February 16th 1941. A Heinkel He III bomber had 
been shot down over the town during a raid which claimed the lives of three civilians. 
The aircraft crashed into the town after being hit by anti-aircraft fire and subsequent 
collision with a barrage balloon cable. The crew were killed in the crash (there are 
reports that one managed to bail out but was electrocuted when his parachute hit 
power lines) and, to maintain security, a guard was mounted on the wreckage. A 
parachute mine that was still on board the aircraft exploded 25 minutes later. Police 
Constable Leslie Lamb was killed, alongside an Auxiliary Fireman. Two other 
Auxiliaries died of their injuries shortly afterwards (the three dead firemen were 
George Renwick, Albert Purvis, and John Whalton). A further seventeen members of 
the police or fire services were injured, in many cases seriously. 677 
The reaction to the first fatalities in the area seems to have been muted; it 
seems that whilst there was obvious sadness the prevalent opinion was one of 
determination to carry on with normal -life as much as possible. Despite this 
determination the morale of the population was undermined when measures designed 
to protect them failed. This happened during the next raid on Newcastle just after 
midnight on the morning of July 29`h. Air raid sirens failed to sound and bombs, 
dropped in the space of just three minutes, -killed four people including a popular 
member of the local community, Mary Mackay, who was fatally injured at Heaton 
Secondary Girls' School whilst attempting to warn others of the danger. Anger was 
directed towards the local authorities and the military for the failure of the air raid 
sirens and this was a common re-occurrence on Tyneside whenever measures were 
deemed to have been inadequate. Possibly the best example of this anger could be 
677 Ibid. 
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seen in the reaction to an attack carried out on the Walker Naval Yard on the 27th of 
January 1941 when a lone raider managed to get inland undetected. It dropped 
several bombs inside the yard, narrowly missing an aircraft carrier that was under 
construction and injuring several of the workmen. At no point did the sirens sound. 
There were also strenuous protests that there was no return anti-aircraft fire directed at 
the raider. Workers went on to demand better protection in letters to the local press 
and the authorities capitulated when they admitted that measures would seem to have 
been lax. 678 It would seem that the residents of Tyneside tolerated the threat of enemy 
air raids and were not unduly demoralised by casualties, but they quickly became 
indignant if they believed that more could be done to protect them, their property or 
their livelihoods. 
Many of those who disliked the shelters were prepared to stay in their houses 
during raids despite the obviously increased risk. Some even elected to watch the 
raids from outside their abodes, with one resident remembering the Anderson as being 
"at best ... damp and cold, we seldom used ours, preferring to stay outside and watch 
the search lights [sic] in action". 679 Obviously this tendency to expose oneself to 
danger could, and often did, lead to tragic consequences in the form of unnecessary, 
avoidable, casualties. Another local resident remembers seeing several people 
watching a raid on Newcastle, on September , 1St . 
1941, from the balcony of a flat. A 
direct hit on the flat, at 57a City Road, killed all five spectators, wiping out two 
families. 680 Despite this the use of private dwellings as shelters continued to be 
popular and, for many residents of Tyneside; the air raid was the signal to take refuge 
in a cupboard under the stairs. The ruling that anyone who earned more than five 
pounds per week was not entitled to a free Anderson Shelter resulted in some people 
678 TWAS: MD/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, February 1" 1941. 67 Correspondence from Mrs E Carter, 2001. 
680 Correspondence from Mr G Bond, 2001. 
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refusing to purchase a shelter and instead rely on the structural integrity of their 
dwelling. 681 
As part of the continuing learning process that the nation was going through in 
response to aerial bombardment the experiences of separate areas around the country 
were shared. The results of some of the earlier bombing in other parts of the country, 
most notably London and Coventry, had revealed a weakness in the ARP system. If 
serious fires were started then it often proved impossible for the National Fire Service 
and the Auxiliary Fire Service to cope, especially when it came to fires in, less 
strategically important, purely residential areas. A partial solution was found in the 
recruitment and training of volunteer Fire Guards and Fire Watchers. This solution 
resolved two issue sin that not only did it provide some increased level of safety for 
people living in the suburbs but it also provided an activity which almost everyone 
could take part in and so increased the morale of the citizens by enhancing their 
feelings of importance. Local teams of Fire Guards were set up and, showing the 
organisational skills of the middle classes to which many of them belonged, the units 
were quickly organised and trained in rudimentary methods of fire fighting, using 
equipment such as sand bags and stirrup pumps. 682 
One of the most heavily bombed areas of Tyneside, Tynemouth Borough, 
suffered 253 air raid alerts up to October 1944 and had been bombed on 31 separate 
occasions. 683 Over 300 high explosive bombs, nineteen parachute mines and more 
than 18,000 incendiary bombs were dropped within the boundaries of the borough 
from the first incident on June 22 "d 1940 to the last on March 25th 1943. The borough 
suffered 225 fatalities with a further 475 persons being injured, 150 of them 
691 Correspondence from Mrs P Blaylock, 2001. 
682 TWAS: DX385/1/2-13. Newcastle Home Guard and Civil Defence files re: Fire Guards, 1941. 683 The Shields Evening News, October 13th 1944, p 5. - 
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severely. 84 Individual tragedies, where many were killed, such as in North Shields in 
May 1941, shocked the entire area and sapped morale in the immediate locality for 
the short term. 
The people of the area were required make many adjustments catering to 
specific wartime occurrences, but, the most memorable experience remains that of the 
bombing raids that affected the area. Whilst the area was not as heavily bombed as 
many other parts of Britain, it did suffer substantial raiding, especially in the winter of 
1940 and throughout 1941. The pattern of bombing on Tyneside was one that gave 
rise to concern amongst those responsible for the upkeep of morale. There were 
extended periods of little or no enemy activity with these lulls being broken by heavy 
raids or, especially in 1941, a series of raids spread over several days. It was thought 
that it was this pattern of attack that had the greatest effect on morale, because people 
had little opportunity to adjust to any particular pattern of attack, and were thus prone 
to becoming more shaken. Although other areas, such as Merseyside, suffered more 
substantial attacks, the sixteen large raids on Tyneside made it the second most 
heavily raided area in the country during this period. 685 This was a configuration of 
attacks that, at least as far as the first three years of the war were concerned, was not 
to be found in the south of the country. The people of Tyneside, by and large, appear 
to have successfully made this adjustment to their lives. 
Throughout the spring of 1941 there was a protracted series of heavy raids that 
affected the areas alongside the River Tyne. The residents of this area rapidly became 
accustomed to spending entire nights in their air raid shelters, listening to the 
deafening sounds of anti-aircraft fire, the shriek of falling bombs and the explosions 
as land mines levelled entire streets. This was the wartime experience that many had 
684 Ibid. 
695 Harrisson, T, Living through the Blitz (London: Penguin, 1990), pp 234-242. 
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expected before the war had begun but as it became obvious that casualties were not 
as great as pre-war estimates had predicted the people of Tyneside showed that they 
were just as resilient as those in other parts of the country. For those who lived in the 
most heavily bombed areas this was the key formative experience of their wartime 
lives. 
A most severe air raid took place during the night of April 9t' and the early 
hours of April 10th 1941. This attack saw heavy bombing aimed primarily at the 
docks and industrial areas stretching from Newcastle upon Tyne, although there was 
also reports of bombs falling as far west as Wylam, downstream to the mouth of the 
river at Tynemouth and along the coast as far north as Whitley Bay. The Tyneside 
public was given warning of the approaching raid by the usual public warning system 
at 11.25 pm and the beginning of the raid itself was marked by the dropping of 
incendiaries and a small number of high explosive bombs on Tynemouth and North 
Shields. This was a substantial and sustained attack which lasted some five and a half 
hours. The after-raid report determined that approximately 35 high explosive bombs 
were dropped in the Tynemouth/North Shields vicinity along with thousands of 
incendiary devices, a large proportion of them containing explosive charges. 686 The 
majority of high explosive bombs that were dropped were of a very large capacity and 
many of them created craters averaging 70 to 80 feet in diameter and 25 foot in depth. 
Blast damage was, unsurprisingly, extensive. Five bombs, in fact probably parachute 
mines, were even more powerful and left craters 120 feet in diameter and over 30 feet 
deep. Across the river in South Shields the raid killed 13 people and left another 73 
injured. Three unexploded bombs in the vicinity of the Dean Estate resulted in the 
evacuation of 300 people. The Stanhope Road Rest Centre was opened and the 
686 TWAS: T15. Report by T Blackburn, Chief Constable and ARP Controller, to the Emergency 
Committee of Tynemouth Borough Council regarding the air raid of April 9th / 10`h 1941, April 17" 
1941. - 
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decision was made to "keep this centre open for four or five days until the bombs had 
been dealt with. "687 
The main targets of the attack in this area were the wood-yards, and oil tanks, 
on the north bank of the river. 688 These were substantially damaged and, at one point, 
a fire over a mile in length developed. The Tynemouth and North Shields area that 
had suffered bombing already suffered casualties again this night with 35 fatalities 
and over 100 injuries. The ARP and Civil Defence Services paid a heavy price in the 
area on this night, largely because they were actively carrying out their duties 
throughout the raid. Two police officers were killed in Front Street, Tynemouth when 
a police box was hit and nine other police officers were injured to varying degrees. In 
addition to this there were eighteen Civil Defence personnel injured and two First Aid 
workers, who were based in Whitley Bay but were responding to a call for assistance, 
were killed when their ambulance received a direct hit. The female ambulance driver, 
Miss Doris Ewbank, was a school teacher at the nearby Backworth Infants School and 
the news of her death was never widely reported in case it sparked a withdrawal of 
female volunteers from the Voluntary Aid Detachment. 689 Miss Ewbank is however 
remembered on the Whitley Bay war memorial, the only civilian thereupon, and on 
plaques at Panama Gardens and in St Mary's Church, both in her home town. 
687 TWAS: T179/338. South Shields County Borough Council, Clerks Department (ARP minutes 
book), May 50'1939 -November 25`h 1941, ARP Emergency Committee meeting, April 10th 1941, p 
175. 
688 Seen clearly marked at the right side of map i, bordering the river. 
689 Whitley Bay News Guardian, June 13th 2002, p 1. 
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Figure 18. Plaque to Doris Ewbank, Panama Gardens, Whitley Bay. 690 
Aside from the substantial numbers of casualties, the blast and fire damage 
done to the area's property was also considerable. 63 buildings were demolished with 
a further 612 being damaged, many of them seriously. The medical facilities of the 
vicinity were seriously affected as, in addition to the destroyed ambulance, Preston 
Hospital was also hit and partially demolished, three members of staff and one patient 
were killed, and the area's First Aid Headquarters, at Holmlands (near the school and 
church just off Albion Road), was severely damaged and rendered inoperable by a 
high explosive bomb which detonated very close to the building. Other serious 
incidents occurring this night included the direct hit on the Royal National Lifeboat 
Station, which was destroyed, and the destruction of an Anderson Shelter killing all 
four occupants. The conflagration that developed in the timber yards resulted in 
outside assistance being called in from Newburn, Gosforth, Whitley Bay and Blyth. 
Soldiers were also drafted in to help in the effort. The fire was of such ferocity that it 
690 From the author's own collection. 
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was not controlled until 2 pm the next day and was not fully extinguished for another 
four hours after that. 
691 
The latter part of the raid, which consisted purely of incendiary bombs, spread 
upriver to Newcastle upon Tyne and at approximately four o'clock in the morning 
more than 50 aircraft attacked the north and west of the city, causing widespread 
damage. 68 separate fires developed and 300 troops were called out to assist the fire 
services. As a result of their attempts to fight the fires 19 fire-fighters were injured. 
This attack was aimed primarily at the Scotswood factory of Vickers-Armstrongs but, 
despite several fires being started, surprisingly little damage was done. Across the 
river, at South Shields, the attack was equally ferocious with severe fires threatening 
several important shipyards, docks, and engineering companies. The risk was so great 
that fire-fighting teams arrived to assist from as far away as Middlesbrough. Despite 
these efforts a great deal of damage was sustained at the Redhead's Shipyard. 
Civilian casualties were, once again, severe with 25 killed and 76 injured. Numbered 
amongst these casualties again were several ARP and Civil Defence workers. 692 An 
auxiliary fireman, Matthew Priestley, was killed at Redhead's and ten of his 
colleagues injured, whilst two wardens and a policemen were also injured. A further 
two AFS men, this time including one of those who were offering assistance from 
Sunderland, were overcome by fumes and died. Other areas on Tyneside also 
suffered heavily during this raid with a further 24 being killed in Jarrow. 
This was followed up by further heavy raids, and smaller scale nuisance 
attacks, throughout the month. Five nights later an attack on the same areas killed 
eighteen civilians in the Whitley Bay and Tynemouth area. Extensive damage was 
691 TWAS: T15. Report by T Blackburn, Chief Constable and ARP Controller, to the Emergency 
Committee of Tynemouth Borough Council regarding the air raid of April 9th /10 th 1941, April 17th 
1941. 
692 North East Diary 1939-1945 website [http: //www. bpears. org. uk/NE-Diary/], 2004. 
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caused to property as a result of the large numbers of parachute mines that were used 
in this attack and the clearing up process took a considerable amount of time. The 
official report claimed that hundreds of houses and shops were damaged and several 
hundred local residents rendered homeless. The heaviest casualties of the night were 
Ocean View, Whitley Bay, where sixteen people were killed, including four members 
of the same family. A further 90 people were injured in Whitley Bay and one of the 
dead was not discovered until a week later and remained unidentified. 693 In North 
Shields, a warden post at the Rex Cinema was demolished when a parachute mine 
impacted at Billy Mill Lane. A Firewatcher and a Warden were killed at this latter 
site and the army had to be called in to direct traffic whilst the clean up and rescue 
effort continued. 
This ghastly month for the people of Tyneside was to continue with a further 
heavy raid on the night of the 25th that resulted in 79 further civilian fatalities. Almost 
half of these were as a result of one incident when a parachute mine destroyed much 
of Guildford Place, Heaton, killing 35 people with a further nine being killed in the 
neighbouring street, Cheltenham Terrace. Several families were decimated in this 
incident and the search for bodies continued for nearly a week. Several bodies could 
not be identified and, as a result, were buried in a mass grave at Heaton Cemetery. 694 
693 TWAS: MB/WB/27/1 (T135/45). Reports of Whitley Bay Urban District Council (ARP 
Committee), April 18th 1941. 
694 Newcastle City Library, Newcastle at War (Newcastle upon Tyne: City Libraries and Arts, 1992), p 20. 
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Figure 19. The clearing up process in Guildford Place after the raid of April 2 5`h 1941.695 
Despite the severity of this raid the events that had occurred were to become a 
relatively common occurrence for the people of Tyneside. The disruption that was 
caused was at times substantial but for most the response to the air raids was simply to 
try to get on with as normal a life as possible. Some lessons were learned from this 
raid however. A report submitted to Newcastle's Public Assistance Officer analysed 
the functioning of the rest centres in South Shields and found several faults. Foremost 
amongst these was the fact that details of people who entered the centres were not 
taken efficiently and there was little or no provision for adequate lavatory facilities . 
696 
It was through learning processes such as these that the people of Tyneside gradually 
adapted themselves more fully to wartime conditions. 
Over the course of the war South Shields received approximately half the 
number of bombs which fell on Tynemouth and suffered some 156 fatalities, 564 
695 Photograph 0 Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd. 
696 TWAS: 359/794(5). Emergency Shelters/Feeding Centres. Report to the Public Assistance Officer 
of Newcastle Council detailing the lessons to be learned from the raid on South Shields on the night of 
April 9`h / 10th 1941, April 16 `h 1941. 
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injuries and over 3,000 homeless 697 These communities, despite being shocked at the 
enormity of their losses on several occasions, seemed to develop a sense of pride 
commensurate with those of other blitzed areas of the country such as the East End of 
London and Coventry. It would seem that the powerful imagery worked around the 
ability to `take' enemy bombing by the MoI had an effect on some areas of Tyneside 
comparable to other parts of the country. 
In total, the Tyneside area would appear to have suffered at least 719 civilian 
fatalities due to enemy action and many more people were injured or rendered 
homeless. 698 The raids on Tyneside were characterised by long periods of inaction 
followed by short but savage bursts of attacks that were often sustained over several 
days. The types of raids experienced by Tyneside meant that casualties when they 
came tended to be in fairly large numbers and this resulted in momentary, and highly 
regionalised, drops in morale but these were quickly abated by the prompt reactions of 
those organisation whose duty it was to aid those affected by raiding. Personalised 
accounts of air raids are becoming harder to obtain but from those reports that are 
available it would appear that the vast majority of the people of Tyneside did `pull 
together' in an effort reinforcing the belief in a community spirit. 
Owing to the randomness that characterised much of the Luftwaffe bombing it 
could be expected that casualties would be from a broad representation of society as a 
whole and an analysis of the available civilian casualty figures for Tyneside would 
appear, at first glance, to reinforce this view. There are, however, some points that 
need to be explained. More males were killed by enemy action than females, 402 
(56%) compared to 317 (44%). This would at first appear to be somewhat surprising 
given that it could reasonably be expected that many males would have been serving 
697 The Shields Evening News, October 13`h 1944, p 5. 698 Information culled from Index to the "Civilian War Dead Roll of Honour" for Northumberland, 
Durham and Yorkshire website [http: //www. genuki. org. uk/big/eng/Indexes/NE_WarDeaM, 2004. 
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abroad and that those who were left would more often be at work where shelter 
facilities tended to be more adequate than in the home. Conversely, the proportion of 
men in the ARP services and the Home Guard was, of course, considerably greater 
than female. This placed these men in greater danger as they were expected to be on 
duty and active during air raids. 
The danger that was faced by the ARP workers, various fire services and 
others, who were expected to be on duty during alerts, can be seen by the fact that 
some 130 (or 18% of the total casualties) were killed on Tyneside during the course of 
the war. It would appear that the ARP workers, Firemen and the Home Guard, faced 
the greatest dangers. People from these services accounted for 78% of those civilians 
who were killed in the line of duty on Tyneside. 
In other aspects the randomness of the bombing is proven. The range of ages 
of those killed on Tyneside stretches from babies under one-year of age to several 
people who were 87 at the time of their deaths. 699 By far the greatest concentration of 
deaths occurred in the 36-65 age bracket (42%), followed by those in the range 16-35 
(30%). Older persons made up a surprisingly small percentage of the total casualties 
(just 9%) in the area. This is somewhat surprising given that, it would appear, it was 
these people who were both more vulnerable to the effects of shock and to 
demonstrate a reluctance to move from their homes to the air raid shelters. Looking at 
the combinations of age and gender it can be seen that proportionately more males in 
the 36-65 age bracket were killed than females. Males in this bracket formed 44% of 
the total male casualties compared to just 39% of female casualties being in this 
bracket. Conversely, more females between the ages of 16 and 35 died than did 
similarly aged men. Men aged 16-35 represented 28% of the total male casualties. 
699 See Appendix C, Table viii. 
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This can be explained by the fact that many more men of this younger age group 
became members of the armed forces and were thus not present in their native area. 
The older men tended not to be called up until much later in the war, if at all, and a 
greater proportion of this age group consisted of men who were employed in reserved 
occupations, of which there were many on Tyneside. This goes part of the way to 
explain why this older age group of men suffered disproportionate casualties. 
Tyneside, and indeed Newcastle upon Tyne itself, whilst not as heavily 
bombed as some other areas, was damaged and, contrary to the opinion of Calder, 700 
suffered, at times, extensive damage. The area was bombed on numerous occasions 
and suffered many more false alerts which, nonetheless, forced the area's inhabitants 
into their shelters and increased anxiety. In addition to the human casualties the 
damage that was, at times, inflicted on the area's infrastructure especially in the 
coastal locations alongside the river was severe. Tynemouth, for example, had lost 
five percent of its total rateable value due solely to enemy bombing and the area was 
allocated emergency supplies of steel for reconstruction purposes. 701 The damage 
sustained by the major industrial concerns was fairly light, although buildings needed 
to be replaced, however, at no time was the industrial productivity of the area 
seriously affected. Damage to infrastructure was more lasting and the estimated 
repair bill for damage to schools and catering facilities in Tynemouth Borough alone 
came to £18,636.11s. 1d. (£745,462 today)702 The abilities of the local authorities to 
repair war damage varied and whilst all efforts were made to repair damage to 
housing and public facilities there were often shortfalls due to the limited amount of 
labour and funds that was available. When work had to be carried out it is clear that 
700 Calder, A, The People's War, p 220. 
701 TWAS: T15/1494A. Tynemouth Borough Council ARP Files 1938-1951, Re: reconstruction. 702 Ibid. 
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local authorities were actively considering the future. 703 Indeed, they appointed a 
reconstruction committee to ascertain the requirements of the local community and to 
act accordingly. 704 It is clear however that central government was increasingly 
reluctant to fund repair work and procedures for obtaining funding very often became 
bogged down in red tape; the funding for repairs to damage at North Shields fish 
quay, for example, had still not been settled in October 1947.705 Once again the local 
authorities on Tyneside were falling victim to the lack of understanding in central 
government. 
Adjusting to War - the Austere Road to Victory 
During the First World War the issue of food consumption and supply had remained a 
minor issue until the impact of unrestricted submarine warfare began to have a major 
effect on supplies during 1916. The remaining two years of the conflict were 
characterised in Britain by rising food prices, shortages, and queuing. Indeed, by 
1918 food prices (bread had doubled in price between 1913 and 1917) and shortages 
had become the foremost motivator of industrial unrest whilst workers were taking 
time off to relieve their wives who were queuing for food. However, the crisis that 706 
brought about rationing was not caused by war related shortages, indeed the harvest of 
1917 was a good one, but as a result of the irrational panic buying that emptied the 
703 For a more complete discussion of rebuilding policy see Woodbury, C, `Britain Begins to Rebuild 
Her Cities', The American Political Science Review, 41,5 (1947), pp 901-920. 704 TWAS: T15/1494A. Tynemouth Borough Council ARP Files 1938-1951, Minutes from interview 
with Regional Manager, War Damage Committee, September 19th 1941. 
los Ibid, Tynemouth Borough Council ARP Files 1938-1951, Re: reconstruction. 706 Marwick, A, The Deluge, p 208. 
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shops. 707 By June 1917 the government had assumed total control of all imports and 
was also supervising home-based production. Rationing, of sugar, fats, and meat, was 
not imposed until the final year of the war, although the system did continue until 
1920. The rationing system of the First World War was based on a `fair shares for all' 
proposal that was driven by an individual flat rate ration. It also required that 
customers register with a local supplier for each rationed good. These retailers then 
received supplies of goods according to the numbers that they had on their registers. 
The scheme was a success and served to improve the working-class diet and to reduce 
the wastage of food. 708 
After the First World War the Committee of Imperial Defence was given the 
role of investigating food controls in the event of a future war. The Committee 
recognised that valuable lessons had been learned during the First World War and that 
a policy of `business as usual', as had been in place for the first years of the First 
World War, was completely unworkable in relation to a modern total war situation. 
Policies concerning food controls during the Second World War were heavily 
influenced by the British experiences of the First World War. The successes of the 
food control scheme of the First World War remained fresh in the memories of many 
of those who were now confronted by an outwardly appearing similar situation. 
Foremost' amongst those influenced by previous policy was Sir William Beveridge 
who chaired the highly influential 1936 Sub-Committee on Food Supply in Time of 
War and was also the first permanent secretary, to the Ministry of Food. The final 
report of Beveridge's Sub-Committee emphasised that any future policy of rationing 
would only succeed if "each consumer was assured his or her share. "709 
707 Taylor, AJP, English History 1914-1945, p 95. 
708 DeGroot, G, Blighty, p 91. 
709 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I, Austerity in Britain. Rationing, Controls, and Consumption 1939-1955 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p 13. 
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The proposed scheme of rationing and controls in the event of a future war 
was so complex that it was imperative that plans were made in advance. In order to 
facilitate this planning the Board of Trade Food (Defence Plans) Department was 
formed. This department organised the planning of both a scheme of supply control 
and methods of regulating consumer demand. As part of the plan the country was 
separated into regions and the Local Authorities were asked to establish local food 
control committees whilst Divisional Food Officers were appointed to administer the 
system during war. 
In order to successfully adjust the national economy onto a total war footing it 
was imperative that civilian consumption be substantially slowed. It was strategically 
vital to reduce the expenditure of vital materials such as food, petrol, cloth and metal. 
This was because a reduction in the amounts of such materials being imported would 
be inevitable in wartime. Alongside this was the fact that shipping and manufacturing 
space previously taking up in the import or production of such goods would be 
required for the import or production of vital wartime materials. The government 
quickly came to the conclusion that the curtailment of personal consumption was vital 
if the economy of the country was to be maintained on a wartime basis. Rationing 
and other controls were utilised primarily to facilitate control over the consumption 
rates of the general public and, therefore, the national economy. In this respect the 
system was certainly effective in that, by 1942, "consumer spending had fallen by 
about 15 per cent". 710 Rationing seen as necessary in order to remedy, or prevent, 
shortages, it was also seen as being pivotal in the prevention of food queues, the 
restriction of unfair price inflation, and in ensuring fair distribution of available 
goods. 
710 Ibid, p 10. 
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There were, of course, other reasons behind the policy of rationing. Central 
government sought to avoid past mistakes and to avert possibly invidious emotions 
caused by the perception of an unequal sharing of the wartime burden. The public 
were encouraged through several speeches and propaganda campaigns to believe that 
the policy was concerned primarily with ensuring fair shares for all. "The fair shares 
policy was critical in maintaining morale on the home front". 711 There was 
widespread support for the notion of fair shares for all amongst the general public. 
Public responses to rationing, however, are multifaceted and influenced by factors 
such as gender, class, or regional perceptions. Many remained suspicious of the 
rationing and controls policies and were unconvinced by the supposed equality of the 
system. "Fair shares was a compelling slogan but at times there were widespread 
doubts whether sacrifice was in fact equally shared". 712 
The restrictions imposed by maintaining a flat rate of ration resulted in several 
anomalies. For example, the system "ignored the diverse needs of heavy workers", 
who comprised a substantial proportion of the Tyneside public. Criticisms of this 
nature were turned aside by the belief that in the event of war it would be necessary to 
ration only a very small number of items. The grumbles of many Tyneside industrial 
workers regarding the meagreness of their allotted ration would, no doubt, have been 
magnified if they had been aware that pre-war plans had included "differential 
rationing and supplementary ration books were prepared for ... heavy workers who 
were to receive additional bacon and meat. i713 These proposals were, however, to 
remain unused throughout the war. The widespread discontent over the fairness of the 
ration that was to repeatedly surface on Tyneside could surely have been, to some 
extent, alleviated by schemes such as the proposed differential ration. 
711 Ibid. 
712 Ibid, p 2. 
713 Ibid, p 14. 
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Registration with a specific retailer for a specified product resulted in the 
reduction of consumer freedom but was necessary if one wanted to be assured of 
receiving his or her allotted ration. Unfortunately the scheme did not take into 
account the migration of population that wartime conditions forced upon many 
people. Even movements within the Tyneside area could result in people having to 
change their supplier and re-register. This was a process that occupied valuable time 
and could cause organisational chaos. 
Figure 20. Householders applying to change their designated retailers at Newcastle Food Control 
Office, 1941. "" 
Rationing began, after governmental indecision had delayed it, in January 
1940 with the imposition of butter and sugar restrictions. These were followed in 
quick succession by the rationing of meat and sugar and, by July 1941, the ration had 
extended to cover tea, margarine, and cooking fats. Preserves and cheeses were added 
to the rationed goods list in 1941. The importance of rationing in the wartime 
experience cannot be overestimated, on Tyneside, as throughout Britain, in "contrast 
74 Photograph © Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd. 
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with air raids or evacuation, rationing and shortages affected everybody". 715 The 
austerity measures that were a direct result of rationing were accepted by the vast 
majority of the Tyneside public and were viewed as a necessity of war. This view 
was reinforced by the favour that was shown to the theory of fair shares for all and 
dissatisfaction was most often the result of perceived inequalities within the system. 
The extensive propaganda campaign, exhorting the public to be stoically self 
sacrificing appears to have been largely successful. 
Growing shortages throughout 1940 and 1941 resulted in an increasing public 
discontent over what was seen as uneven distribution of those foodstuffs that had 
remained un-rationed. The public maintained their faith in the rationing system's 
ability to deliver fair shares for all. This was demonstrated by the increasingly 
vociferous calls for items such as canned and processed foods, dried fruit, and other 
commodities to be added to the rationing system. Shortages of eggs on Tyneside 
were a constant complaint and the situation was only eased when eggs were later 
added to the rationed goods list. 716 The Tyneside public were comparable with the 
national situation in that, throughout the early years of the war, they wanted more 
goods placed on the ration list in order to ensure fair shares. This was largely because 
of a perception in the area that restaurants and hotels were "cornering supplies of un- 
rationed commodities. 017 
On Tyneside the shortages were beginning to be felt as early as April 1940 
when the local police force noticed increasing concerns over the shortages of both 
eggs, which were not rationed, and beef, which had been rationed only the previous 
month . 
718 As the war intensified the Tyneside public appear to have been more 
715 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I, Austerity, p 60. 716 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, June 20`h 1941. 717 Ibid, July 15th 1941. 
719 Ibid, April 25th 1940. 
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willing to accept scarcities and rationing. So that, by September 1940, it was said that 
the majority of the public accepted the shortages of eggs and the meagreness of the 
butter ration as "a fact of the wartime economy. 019 
It is clear from the records on Tyneside that the public grew increasingly 
irritable if shortages of a particular commodity continued for several consecutive 
weeks. This is reflected in that after shortages of eggs continued into October 
complaints about both this and, once again, the meagre butter ration surface with 
renewed vigour. 720 Grievances regarding shortages of meat, eggs, and onions, 
continued on into the first few months of 1941.721 In common with national norms 
the meagre supply of onions was a longstanding complaint on Tyneside. 722 Although 
this was the worst period of the war it would seem that the shortages were still not 
fully accepted by the Tyneside public despite the earlier optimism of the police 
intelligence reports. Indeed, the situation on Tyneside was worsening with an 
"increasing level of dissatisfaction [being voiced] over the uneven distribution of 
food. "723 
It would appear that the shortages had reached such a level that the Tyneside 
public were beginning to lose faith in the entire system of `fair shares for all' 
rationing. More worryingly for the authorities, this was further demonstrated by the 
founding in March 1941 of the, BCP supported, Newcastle Housewives Guild. This 
organisation began to campaign for greater supplies of foodstuffs. Complaints were, 
however, in proportion and seldom approached levels of concern. In common with 
national surveys the main focus of complaints on Tyneside were based on the 
719 Ibid, September 276' 1940. 
no Ibid, October 25h 1940. 
721 Ibid, January 4`h 1941 - March 1$` 1941. 722 Longmate, N, How We Lived Then. A history of everyday life during the Second World War 
(London: Arrow, 1973), pp 144-145. 
723 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, March 1" 1941. 
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inequalities and profiteering that the system permitted. Complaints also arose over 
the quality of meat that was being made available for human consumption and by 
May 1940 these complaints had reached such a level that the matter was being 
discussed by the Newcastle, Gateshead and District Butchers' Association. 724. 
This situation was not greatly relieved until the `Dig for Victory' campaign 
started to partially alleviate the supply situation, with increasing numbers of people 
growing their own foodstuffs. After this crisis period it would appear that the food 
supply situation was largely resolved, with only minor complaints over shortages of 
fish and fruit being mentioned in later intelligence reports. The families of fishermen 
were in a privileged position as they invariably obtained enough fish not only to feed 
themselves but to barter with friends and neighbours for other goods. 725 The rising 
price of fish, a stone of haddock had more than quadrupled in price by 1941,726 
combined with this, led to ill feeling in Tyneside fishing ports, such as North Shields, 
where many of the trawler men had been members of the Royal Navy Reserve and 
were called up at the outbreak of war whilst others, who were perhaps not so patriotic, 
made huge profits. 727 In North Shields, boats that in pre-war years would return with 
catches worth perhaps £100 (£4,000 today) were instead earning up to £1,700 
(£68,000 today) per trip. 728 The increases in the price of fish were down to the simple 
fact that there fewer boats were putting out to sea. At North Shields the number 
dropped from 84 in July 1939 to just seventeen by December 1941, a decrease of 
80%. 729 Equitable distribution of fish was to prove a major problem throughout the 
724 TWAS: TUBA/1/1. Newcastle, Gateshead and District Butchers' Association, minutes, May 27th 
1940, p 399. 
725 Interview, NS/RA2,2001. 
n6 Calder, A, The People's War, p 416. 
727 Interview, NS/RA 1,2001. 
728 Calder, A, The People's War, pp 415-416. 
729 Robinson, R, Trawling. The Rise and Fall of the British Trawl Fishery (Exeter: University of 
Exeter Press, 1996), p 176. 
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war with no decent solution being discovered. 730 Of course, despite the hugely 
increased profits they made, the life of the deep-sea fisherman during war was also 
massively dangerous and at least "1,243 British fishermen lost their lives whilst 
following their livelihood during the war. 9031 The trawler crews also performed acts 
of great bravery in saving the crews of stricken vessels and RAF aircrew. In March 
1941 the Grimsby trawler Pelican limped into the Tyne having carried out a daring 
rescue of crew from the 6,809 ton SS Somali which had been attacked by German 
aircraft and was left blazing off the Fame Islands. 732 
It was not only the deep-sea fishing industry that was affected by the war. The 
increasing prices of fish affected the luxury end of the market, such as salmon and 
sea-trout. In 1939, which was described as a "fairly satisfactory season", 733 the price 
of salmon at North Shields Fish Market stood at 1 s. 9d. per pound whilst that of sea- 
trout was I s. 6d. per pound. 734 Five years later the price of salmon was 3s. 5d. per 
pound and that of sea-trout 3s. 3d. per pound. To make matters worse there were 
fewer amounts of fish being landed by the shore nets due to combinations of poor 
weather and the reduction in the number of men who applied for net licenses. In 1939 
there were 47 licenses granted but by 1944 this total had decreased to just eighteen. 735 
Pollution, although improving, was also said to be a major factor in the paucity of 
catches; on more than half the days that water quality was monitored there was no 
detectable oxygen in the sample. 736 
The most serious complaint of the later war period would appear to have 
arisen around March 1942 when there were complaints that green vegetables were 
730 Longmate, N, How We Lived Then, pp 142-143. 731 Robinson, R, Trawling, p 185. 
732 Ibid, pp 178-179. 
733 TWAS: G/TFB/1/1. Tyne Fishery Board: annual reports and yearbooks, 1939-1944, p 15. 734 Ibid, p 14. 
7351bid, pp 14-15. 
736 Ibid, pp 20-21. 
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only available to those who could "afford them". 737 It is perhaps significant that a 
memo from the Ministry of Food was sent to Newcastle Corporation at this time 
saying that a door to door survey into food supplies would be carried out in May. 738 
Further problems arose when previously self-sufficient allotment holders, attempting 
to purchase food, were forced to complain that local greengrocers were refusing to 
serve them as they had not been registered as customers with them during previous 
years. However, by September 1944 the region's food stocks were sufficient to 
provide adequate food for its own population but also for large numbers of evacuees 
from the south of the country. 
739 
As has been previously stated, one of the key aims of the rationing system was 
to ensure that there would be no unfair and restrictive price increases. On Tyneside 
this aspect of the policy would appear to have failed as one of the most consistent 
complaints throughout the war regarding rationing concerns the perceived profiteering 
of some retailers when goods were scarce.. The price of rabbit meat in Newcastle 
upon Tyne was described, in 1941, as being widely affected by "profiteering". 740 As 
well as this there was no guarantee that the meat was fit for consumption due to the 
unethical practices of some shopkeepers. One young woman queued for over four 
hours just to purchase a rabbit and some biscuits. Despite her determination, when 
she returned home, she discovered that the rabbit was rotten and inedible 741 Some 
retailers demonstrated favouritism towards certain customers and sale of under the 
counter goods was commonplace. A young boy at the time recalled a greengrocer 
declaring to his mother that he had no fruit and then later giving a large bag of fruit to 
737 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, March 27th 1942. 738 Ministry of Food memorandum, April 30th 1942, in ibid. 
739Ibid, September 19`h 1944. 
Tao Ibid, January 18`h 1941. 
741 Correspondence from Mrs M Playle, 2001. 
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a woman who had no children. "' Such unfairness and cheating of the system would 
appear to have been relatively commonplace, despite the fact that it was illegal. 
Another key aim of the policy was to ensure that there would be no need for 
food queues. The authorities viewed food queues as anathema, and in 1941 the 
phenomenon of queuing was described as being "a bigger menace to public morale 
than several serious German air raids". 743 Yet, on Tyneside, the policy would appear 
to have failed in its aim of preventing queuing from taking hold. Queues, not only for 
food but for commodities such as stockings, were being described as commonplace in 
the area from the first months of 1941.44 Queues were most prevalent in the working 
class areas of Tyneside as people attempted to obtain meagre supplies and attempted 
to "make the coupons stretch as far as [they] could. " It was common for people to 
travel from places such as Wallsend to Newcastle queue for hours at a time to obtain 
some commodities. 745 For the authorities queues were a bad sign, it was believed that 
they encouraged the spreading of rumours and gossip and generally lowered morale. 
Despite some people having positive memories of queuing (indeed it can be argued 
that queues were simply an extension of the `community spirit' of the time), there 
were examples of queues leading to negative, sometimes even violent, behaviour. 
One man, then a young boy living in Hebburn Colliery, remembers a "traumatic 
experience" when queuing for cakes and pies at a local bakery shop when the delivery 
van held insufficient supplies for all. After queuing for four hours the scene turned 
threatening, with anger being directed towards the manageress of the bakery, who was 
forced to lock herself inside the shop, until a fair solution was worked out. 746 The fact 
that there were such protests serves to qualify "the myth of the home front 
742 Anonymous correspondence, 2001. 
743 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I, Austerity, p 66. 
744 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, March 29th 1941. las Correspondence from Mrs M Playle, 2001. 
746 Correspondence from Mr N Wilson, 2001. 
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characterized by universal sacrifice, egalitarianism, and common purpose". 747 
Queuing became so prevalent in working class areas of Tyneside that people were 
compelled to wait for several hours to obtain commodities such as fat for cooking and 
stockings always drew large crowds of women. In North Shields people even queued 
outside a tripe factory to obtain cooking fat. 748 
Rationing had a large impact on the children of Tyneside during the war. 
With the rationing of sugar came a rationing of sweets and cakes, whilst lack of fresh 
fruit meant that many Tyneside children growing up during the war had little 
recollection of what an orange looked like. This was a national norm, one doctor in 
Westmoreland was called out to a suspected appendicitis only to discover that the 
child had eaten her first orange and, never having seen one before, had eaten it peel 
and all. 749 Obtaining extra sweet coupons from a relative or friend became the 
highlight of many children's war. Children with spare pocket money clubbed 
together to share sweets whilst the first day of the new butter ration was anticipated 
for the thicker than usual layers of butter on the bread, the greyish-brown national loaf 
which was much disliked, at breakfast. 750 Some children supplemented their ration 
through theft and local farmers were plagued by the pilfering of turnips and apples. 
One man, a young boy in North Shields at the time, recalls frequent hunger motivated 
trips to the farm at Preston Village to steal turnips. 751 
Worries over the deterioration of children's diet due to rationing were one of 
the foremost concerns shared by both the general public and by the government. By 
1941 eggs and milk, whilst not officially rationed, had become controlled goods. 
747 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I, Austerity, p 61. 748 North Shields Library website [http: //www. libraryclub. co. uk/Memories/memory-l. htmi], April 
2004. 
749 Longmate, N, How We Lived Then, p 145. 750 Ibid. 
751 Interview, NS/RA2,2001. 
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Eighteen per cent of the country's milk supply was set aside for priority goods. 
752 
This was a measure largely designed to ensure an adequately balanced diet for the 
most vulnerable groups in society. This vulnerable group included expectant mothers, 
recent mothers, adolescents, and invalids but, it was primarily aimed at young 
children. The result of increased supplies for children did result in the government 
being unable to guarantee items for ordinary people, due to seasonal and regional 
fluctuation. Despite these efforts the effect of rationing on children continued to be a 
cause for anxiety and resulted in some vulnerable groups, including children, being 
offered free cod-liver oil or vitamin supplements. Conditions in wartime Britain also 
resulted in a great increase in those children who partook of school dinners. The 
overall percentage of children regularly eating school meals had increased tenfold 
over the course of the war, 40% of children in 1945 were regular consumers of school 
meals. 753 Milk consumption amongst schoolchildren was simultaneously increasing. 
In pre-war England only 50% of children regularly drank milk whilst, by 1944, this 
had risen to 76%. So drastic was the increase in milk consumption that children from 
industrial areas of the country were, by the end of the war, consuming milk at a rate 
that, by pre-war standards, were the sole preserve of children from "high income 
groups". 754 The benefits of increased milk consumption benefited Tyneside to a 
greater extent than any other area. By 1944 the consumption of milk in Gateshead, 
Jarrow, Newcastle, and South Shields, had increased by up to 400% when compared 
to the figures for 1935. This contrasts with the meagre rise of five to twenty percent 
experienced by towns in southern England. 755 
752 Titmuss, R M, Social Policy, p 513. 
'S' Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I, Austerity, p 148. 
7541bid, p 135. 
755 Titmuss, R M, Social Policy, p 513. 
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Despite the anxieties expressed by both government and many parents, the 
system of wartime rationing would seem to have been largely beneficial for children's 
health, especially those who came from working class homes. The British Medical 
Association (B. M. A. ) reported that, when compared to the pre-war data, children in 
1944 were both taller and heavier; a sign of better overall health standards. However, 
rates of death from tuberculosis had increased when compared to pre-war figures and . 
this remained a major concern for the B. M. A. Despite this one, albeit large concern, 
anthropometric survey clearly indicated that there were significant improvements in 
the general health of children during the war and that, as well as the increase in mean 
heights and weights, there was a "substantial improvement in child health ... as well 
as the virtual elimination of many of the extreme forms of physical disability". 756 
Of course, it was not only foodstuffs that were rationed and the rationing of 
household goods and other commodities adversely affected the people of Tyneside. 
Foremost amongst these concerns was the issue of clothing. Clothing coupons were 
issued and people were advised to `make do and mend' in order to preserve their 
clothing for longer. Almost immediately, several groups, including parents and 
industrial workers, began to voice their complaints over the issue. The government 
agreed to provide extra clothing coupons to industrial workers. At first this applied 
only to coal miners which resulted in another wave of protests from workers in other 
heavy industrial capacities. The subsequent increase in tensions was only resolved 
when the government agreed to give more coupons to all manual workers. 757 Parents, 
meanwhile, were complaining that the allocation of coupons for children was 
insufficient. The provision of children's footwear remained a constant source of 
grievance for parents on Tyneside. 
756 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I, Austerity, p 139. 
7571bid, p 89. 
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Whilst this was a common difficulty, even during peacetime, for many 
working-class Tyneside families the shortages of wartime brought the problem firmly 
into the middle-classes. The middle-class was often the hardest hit by the rationing 
system. Many Tyneside working-class families were better off due to increased 
wages and available work alongside a guaranteed healthy diet. For the middle-class, 
however, the shortages resulted in the removal of peacetime norms. For example, the 
shortages of new prams affected the middle-class to a much greater extent than it did 
the working-class, who were used to making do with second hand prams or 
improvised solutions. Likewise, the severe restrictions imposed on toy production 
resulted in middle-class families suffering during Christmas, whilst those from the 
working-class had not been used to receiving toys in the first place. 758 
For the people of Tyneside, in common with other areas, wartime Christmases 
were to prove a particular tense time. The gathering of sufficient supplies for the 
holiday period was acutely problematic. No other period provided so many 
inconveniences, or provoked so much determination to maintain a cheerful 
atmosphere. The majority of Tyneside people were determined to have as ordinary a 
Christmas as normal. Nationally, the period before Christmas was one of great 
tension as last minute efforts ensued to acquire the necessary foodstuffs, decorations, 
and presents. Grumbling over "high prices and scarcity of goods" was commonplace 
but the first few Christmases of the war appeared to be a success. On Tyneside the 
festivities were described as being as normal as possible despite the public being 
upset at shortages of meat, eggs and onions and the prices of Christmas fowl being 
described as "exorbitant". 759 By 1942 the period prior to Christmas was marked by 
widespread discontent centred on the frequent shortages and the Ministry of 
758 Ibid, pp 146-149. 
759 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, January 4`h 1941. 
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Information registered complaints from eleven regions regarding the shortages and the 
prices of toys. In some areas there were allegations of "extreme profiteering" in the 
toy-making and retail industry. 760 Tyneside was not one of these regions. The 
Christmas of 1942 appears to have passed quietly in the area with little mention of 
any major dissatisfaction aside from the shortages of alcohol that were provoking 
strong criticism at the time. 761 In a national sense the two final Christmases of the 
war continued this established pattern of pre-holiday grumbling followed by a 
reasonably successful celebration. Tyneside would appear to have followed this 
pattern with the most serious complaints being over the scarcity of poultry and 
alcoholic beverages. 
The shortages and the experiences associated with extensive rationing remain 
a fundamental wartime experience for many on Tyneside and demonstrate the 
willingness of the majority to accept hardship in the cause of the war effort. The 
grumbling and the complaints that did surface were always kept in perspective but 
demonstrate the fact that when the Tyneside public perceived a inequality, or when 
they felt too much was being asked of them, they were more than willing to take 
action to counter this. 
Rest and Recreation 
Growing weariness, as the war moved beyond the initial crisis period up to 1941, was 
evinced by the increasing number of petty grumbles being reported and by factors 
such as the worsening industrial relations. It rapidly became an imperative to provide 
people with entertainment despite the hardships that were enforced by the wartime 
760 Zweiniger-Bargielowska, I, Austerity, p 148. 
761 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, January 166' 1942. 
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conditions. On industrial Tyneside this was an even more important consideration 
due to the importance of the dominant industries. The industrial workers of the area 
were forced, by wartime necessity, to work greatly increased hours under stressful, 
often dangerous, conditions. Travel to and from work was made more difficult due to 
the restrictions on public transport; the blackout added to these difficulties for those 
beginning or ending their shifts during periods of darkness, especially in winter. 
Rationing, air raid warnings, and the restriction of public house opening hours further 
limited the opportunities for entertainment and recreation. All of these factors 
combined to erode morale and, perhaps more worryingly, caused a lessening 
effectiveness in the workplace with detrimental effects on the war effort and the 
regional economy. 
Some of the problems, such as the blackout, could not be ameliorated. 
However, efforts were made to lift the spirits in other ways. For example, the local 
authorities on Tyneside enacted several schemes under prompting from central 
government. These ranged from small dances to month long events that, as well as 
entertaining the public, served to raise money for wartime organisations (the 
Merchant Navy was an unsurprisingly popular organisation that benefited from such 
events). Themed periods were popular, the main intention being to raise funds for the 
armed forces. Targets for these fundraising campaigns were often ambitious. 
Tynemouth Borough Council intended to raise £500,000 (£20,000,000 today) with its 
Salute the Soldier campaign, enough to equip an entire brigade of the 50th 
Northumbrian Division. Locals were encouraged to donate money by an extensive 
poster campaign. 762 In 1944, Merchant Navy week events in Newcastle raised a total 
762 See illustrations, overleaf. 
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of £591.16s. 9d (over £23,000 today) from a variety of events ranging from concerts 
and dances, to a very popular rabbit show and a sheepdog trial. 763 
'°' TWAS: MD/NC/94/18. Holidays at Home Special Committee minutes, June 30th 1944. 
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Schemes aiming to provide entertainment came to be collectively known as 
`Holidays at Home'. They were actually the result of a joint requirement to limit 
unnecessary civilian travel and to "improve `morale', by providing healthy relaxation 
for factory workers °'767 The first Holidays at Home period had been introduced in 
1941 during which, "Newcastle upon Tyne had organized an apparently successful 
Games Week. "768 Indeed, the local authorities of the North East of England in 
general seem to have been keen supporters of the initiative. They organised a number 
of schemes from the outset despite a lack of interest demonstrated by central 
government. One intelligence report demonstrated the lack of faith in the scheme 
when it stated that "Holidays at Home have developed into a broad farce". 769 Despite 
the obvious benefits of these events it would seem that central government was slow 
in recognising the boost provided to local morale and the regional importance of the 
Holidays at Home schemes to the people of Tyneside. Funding for events was often 
needed and the 1944 events were hit by a refusal by the Ministry of Supply to allow 
the printing of a 24 page programme of events on the grounds that paper was scarce. 
The Ministry did offer to consider printing two twelve-page programmes however: 
one for the first four weeks and one for the second. The local authority committee 
eventually decided to simply produce a more limited twelve-page brochure for the 
whole period. 770 
Newcastle Corporation appears to have made a significantly greater effort in 
establishing the scheme than most other authorities in Britain. The events organised 
in the city tended to be of a larger scale than most comparable measures in other 
767 Sladen, C, `Holidays at Home in the Second World War', Journal of Contemporary History, 37,1 
(2002), p 69. 
768 Ibid, p 71. 
769 Ibid, p 72. 
no TWAS: MD/NC/94/18. Minutes of the Holidays at Home Executive Committee, chaired by 
Councillor Waller, May 12`h 1944. 
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localities. `' In 1944 the main Holiday at Home period was spread over eight weeks 
with events ranging from displays by the ARP services, armed forces, singing 
competitions, dances, games, displays of models, produce, and livestock shows. 772 
By the late years of the war these activities had become an important part of life on 
Tyneside for many. By 1944 the events were so popular that the Newcastle poultry 
show included 30 classes of entrant. The policy of rationing and the encouragement 
to 'Dig for Victory' had resulted in many of the people of Tyneside growing their 
own vegetables. Others went further and reared their own livestock as an additional 
source of wartime meat. Animals, most often pigs, were reared in back yards, 
allotments and on any remaining waste ground, with neighbours or work colleagues 
forming pig clubs. Not only was this useful in solving wartime shortages but the 
forming of clubs centred on these activities strengthened the sense of community 
purpose and togetherness. 
Figure 23. Heaton Pig Club members. '' 
Ti! For a comparison see Wheeler, H, Huddersfield at War (Bath: Alan Sutton, 1992), p 136. 
772 TWAS: MD/NC/94/l8. Holidays at Home Executive Committee (Chaired by Councillor Waller) 
minutes, May 12`h 1944. 
"' Photograph U' City of Newcastle upon Tyne, Newcastle Libraries & Arts, Leisure Services 
Department. 
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Other activities were organised to foster and develop the strength of the local 
community and to reinforce togetherness with foreign allies. These included sporting 
competitions involving foreign servicemen who were based in the area. In the case of 
Newcastle upon Tyne these events often took the form of baseball matches involving 
American servicemen, 774 many of whom were based in nearby Heaton and Byker. 775 
The participation of American servicemen in the Holidays at Home schemes would 
appear to have been relatively commonplace. 776 This is contrary to an assertion that 
leisure pursuits were a part of a defence of national identity against not only "Nazi 
tyranny but also (and increasingly as the war continued) against Americanism. "777 
The servicemen of nearby Polish RAF, who were often billeted in Byker, 779 squadrons 
also took part, playing in friendly football `international' matches against English and 
Scottish service teams. 
The role of continuing education, as provided by the Workers Educational 
Association, also benefited from the Holidays at Home activities. Several of the 
scheduled events, such as the Brain's Trust that was organised by Canon Pelly on 
behalf of the Council of United Christian Action, were intended to stimulate their 
audiences and to encourage educational pursuits. 779 Many of these academic 
activities were actively encouraged, at both a local and national level, by the Ministry 
of Labour. 
The operation of the events that made up the annual Holidays at Home period 
required considerable funding and a high degree of organisation. The granting of late 
774 TWAS: MD/NC/94/18. Holidays at Home Executive Committee minutes, May 12th 1944. 775 Correspondence from Mr R Miley, 2001. 
776 Sladen, C, `Holidays at Home', p 78. Hill, J, "When Work Is Over': Labour, Leisure and Culture in Wartime Britain', in Hayes, N and 
Hill, J (eds), 'Millions Like Us? ' British Culture in the Second World War (Liverpool: Liverpool 
University Press, 1999), p 259. 
778 Correspondence from Mr R Miley, 2001. 
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276 
licences, organising sufficient public transport, booking dance bands, the erection of a 
fairground covering twenty acres of the Town Moor, renting of marquees, these were 
just some of the necessary measures. It can be seen that this required a considerable 
effort on the part of the local authority whilst it also involved the local community in 
a way designed to strengthen morale and foster community spirit. 
A large proportion of the staff necessary to operate stalls and to provide 
stewarding were local volunteers. They came from either the civil defence services or 
were civilians and council workers who volunteered their time regardless of working 
commitments. Although many took part from a sense of civic duty, they were paid 
the sum of 1 s. 9d per hour for their services. There is evidence to suggest that the civil 
defence workers were sometimes unwilling to take up such duties if they would 
interfere with their official tasks. 780 This occasional lack of communal spirit affected 
not only civil defence workers but also dignitaries. For example, the Duchess of 
Northumberland who, having previously agreed to open the Holidays at Home period 
and the Merchant Navy week, withdrew from her commitment just days before the 
event was to commence. 781 
Whilst Newcastle could afford a relatively expansive Holidays at Home 
scheme other local authorities on Tyneside went for a more low key approach. The 
1943 Holidays at Home month organised by Tynemouth Borough Council 
emphasised musical amusements. Open 'air dances, variety concerts, band 
performances, and an amusement fair were the big attractions although there were 
also some small sporting competitions. 782 
780 Ibid 
781 Ibid, June 2"d 1944. 
782 Christenson, N, The People's History. North Shields. Plodgin'through the Claris (Seaham: The 
People's History, 1999), p 84. 
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The activities co-ordinated by the local authorities experienced competition 
and enjoyed assistance from individually organised events under the banner of 
organisations, such as the Miners' Welfare Commission. This organisation in 
particular had garnered experience in organising such activities and could make an 
often significant contribution. 783 This reflected the level of necessity that recreational 
events had in the attitudes of the general population and the spirit of co-operation that 
existed in some of the area's most tightly knit communities. 784 
Holidays at Home experienced a positive reaction from the people of Tyneside 
and many relate how they looked forward to the activities as a welcome break from 
the austerity and growing drudgery of the later war years. The reaction of the 
residents of Tyneside to these events can thus be explained as a want to escape from 
the war weariness that became prevalent in the middle and latter years of the conflict. 
As evidenced by the fact that catering profits during the Holidays at Home period rose 
by 24% from 1943 to 1944.785 The popularity of the events was obviously increasing, 
people were more enthusiastic, and willing to give backing to forms of relaxation. 
This was reflected in the summing up by the local council which stated that "due to 
the success of the year's endeavours the Council should attempt to fund and organise 
a similar series of events during the coming year. "786 The general success of the 
scheme led to some calls for it to be extended into peacetime as well. Notes of 
caution, however, were sounded by several major unions and by the Ministry of 
Health. These claimed that despite the popularity of Holidays at Home it should on 
no account have been assumed that the events were a direct, or appropriate, substitute 
for peacetime holidays. Of course this assessment failed to take into account the fact 
783 Sladen, C, `Holidays at Home', p 88. 784 For a fuller debate on this see Griffin, C, `Not Just a Case of Baths, Canteens and Rehabilitation 
Centres' in, Hayes, N& Hill, J, 'Million's Like Us? ', pp 261-295. 785 TWAS: MD/NC/94/18. Holidays at Home Special Committee, minutes, October 61° 1944. 786 Ibid, December 22°d 1944. 
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that for many working-class residents of Tyneside they had never experienced a 
peacetime holiday, being unable to afford the cost and not having the necessary 
transportation, and it was this group that received the greatest benefit from the 
wartime scheme. 
Aside from official schemes the people of Tyneside proved that they were 
quite capable of arranging their own entertainment. Although denied the ever-popular 
football matches due to wartime restrictions on crowds they still enjoyed attending 
local cinemas and public houses. Cinemas remained a popular form of entertainment 
on Tyneside throughout the war and, as well as providing relaxation, were, along with 
the radio, the main source of news delivery to the masses. Amongst the fans of 
Tyneside cinema was the Austrian philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was based 
at the Royal Victoria Infirmary in Newcastle carrying out studies into traumatic 
injury, and was resident in the city from 1943 to 1944.797 
Attendances at public houses remained high on Tyneside despite the 
restrictions of short supplies of beer, earlier closing times, and problems of public 
transport. The trend did exhibit seasonal patterns with the numbers declining during 
the winter months, especially early in the war. With wartime wages and adequate 
employment levels a large number of people found that they had more money to 
spend and, with the rationing system and the shortages of luxury goods, less to spend 
it on. This applied especially to young adults who, before the war, had seldom had 
significant amounts of spending money available to them. It was this age group that 
showed the most marked shift in behaviour with large numbers of them frequenting 
dance halls and public houses. 788 Despite the shortages and austerity of wartime 
787 Kilnen, L, `Wittgenstein in Newcastle', Northern Review, 13 (2003-2004), p 25. 788 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, November 7th 1941. 
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Tyneside it appears that the vast majority attempted to maintain as normal a life as 
possible. 
Pulling Together? 
One of the greatest perceived threats to the stability of the nation at the outbreak of 
war was the existence of thousands of foreign national who resided in Britain. 
German and Austrian citizens who were perceived to be Nazi sympathisers were 
immediately interned in a converted holiday camp at the outbreak of war. By October 
1939 the remainder were appearing before hastily organised tribunal boards and were 
classified in three groups according to their perceived threat level. Those deemed a 
threat were classified `A' and were immediately interned. A person judged to be 
classification `B' fell into the middle ground and whilst they were not immediately 
interned their movements were harshly restricted and the threat of immediate 
internment hung over them. Those graded `C' were judged to be no threat and they 
were allowed complete freedom, 789 although they were later forced to re-locate from 
important coastal areas, including much of Tyneside. In fact the initial internment 
was very small: only 600 enemy aliens were interned whilst 64,200 were classified in 
band `C', some 87% of the total number who went before the tribunals. 
The fall of Norway, the reported extensive use of a Fifth Column, and the 
establishment of the Quisling government, caused widespread alarm and despondency 
amongst all sections of British society and boosted the campaign of those who wished 
789 Mackay, R, The Test of War. Inside Britain 1939-45 (London: University College London, 1999), 
pp 96-97 
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to see greater internment of foreign nationals. This campaign had been started by the 
national press, supported by the armed forces and some in government. One of the 
foremost media campaigners for complete internment was the Daily Mail, which had 
supported appeasement (admittedly along with many other members of the press, 
general public, and government), and Mosley's Black Shirts, before the war. Over the 
four month period from April to July 1940 the paper, backed by others such as the 
Sunday Chronicle ran numerous articles that berated the lax official attitude towards 
the threat of an alien Fifth Column, urged the internment of all aliens, and insinuated 
that many European refugees were in fact agents on the payroll of the Nazis. 790 This 
view was balanced by the more sympathetic coverage given by several other national 
newspapers. The Times, for example, was inundated with readers' letters criticising 
the policy of internment, many of them opposing an editorial which claimed that it 
was wise not to take any chances with aliens. 791 Letters had, however, appeared as 
early as April 1940 criticising the calls for mass internment as a tactic of fascism. 792 
Others criticised the restrictions placed on those aliens whom had been recognised by 
tribunals as representing no threat to the national security. 793 The vast majority of 
letters that were sent to The Times on the subject agreed that some internment was 
necessary. But, that there were many cases of aliens friendly to Britain, and with 
important skills, being prevented from contributing to the war effort. The editor 
referred to these people as "useful aliens", presumably there were also anglophile 
aliens who lacking skills would have been termed useless? 794 It would appear that 
aliens were still not being thought of as human beings but were only of use to the 
nation if they were skilled. 
790 See Lafitte, F, The Internment ofAliens (London: Libris, 1988), pp 169-173. 
791 The Times, May 13`h 1940, p 7. 
7921bid, April 27th 1940, p 4. 
793 Ibid, June 15th 1940, p 4. 
794 Ibid, July 11`" 1940, p 5. 
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Despite claims that the "impetus for the round up came not from the public but 
from the Army, a handful of MPs and the press", 795 it would appear that on Tyneside 
the negative media campaign found some considerable favour and had influenced 
large numbers of people, enjoying widespread support on Tyneside, with a police 
report before the collapse of Norway stating that, "There was widespread support for 
greater degrees of internment and restrictions placed on enemy aliens. "796 Indeed, it 
was noted by Mass Observation that the internment policies intended for enemy aliens 
were widely welcomed due to the increase of the general publics "latent antagonism 
to the alien and foreigner". 797 It has been argued that the entire policy of internment 
was itself a product of the enduring enmity towards exhibited aliens by the majority of 
the country and that this hostility was exacerbated by the wartime situation. 798 
Mounting pressure over the issue of enemy aliens resulted in the government 
capitulating on May 12th. When the Minister of Home Security, Sir John Anderson, 
ordered the immediate internment of all enemy aliens living in coastal areas: the 
warning order was actually sent out to police forces on May 11th, under the orders of 
the Secretary of State. Later that week, all class `B' aliens were interned. The initial 
order states clearly that the internment was to be temporary and that consideration 
should be shown to the persons concerned. This is reinforced throughout the official 
warning which even states, "It must be remembered that the majority are well 
disposed to this country and their temporary internment is merely a precautionary 
measure". 799 This would appear to show that the authorities were reluctantly ordering 
795 MacKay, R, Half the Battle. Civilian morale in Britain during the Second World War (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2002), p 64. 
796 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Conditions in Newcastle upon Tyne - Special Reports of the Chief Constable 
of City Police, April 25'h 1940. 
797 Rose, S 0, Which People's War, p 94. 
798 See: Holmes, C, John Bull's Island: Immigration and British Society, 1871-1971 (London: 
Macmillan, 1988), pp 191-193. 
799 TWAS: PA/NC/5/24. Newcastle City Police Files re: aliens. Post Office Telegram to Chief 
Constables on behalf of the Secretary of State, May 11th 1940. 
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this measure and that they viewed it as purely temporary. The rapidity of events that 
followed, culminating with the entry of Italy into the war, led to an almost nationwide 
panic and the abandonment of what had been an attempt at an understanding policy 
towards aliens. This was replaced by the internment of nearly all enemy aliens, 
including those classified as being no threat and in many cases refugees and 
opponents of the Axis leaderships. 
One of the results of this policy was that individual industrial concerns could 
be deprived of several of their key workers; a situation that had a major impact on the 
Team Valley Industrial Estate in Gateshead. 800 Some aliens were arrested and 
interned before the May announcement. At Reyrolles factory a specialist engineer, 
Mr Alfred Gunther Nathorff, working on a new type of airbrake switching gear, was 
interned. It was claimed that this had caused the company "a great deal of 
inconvenience". 801 Major Brock of the Intelligence Service replied that, despite the 
protestations that Mr Nathorff had no means of obtaining sensitive information, he 
presumed Reyrolles' management were "not surprised at what has happened. 99802 
Those scheduled for internment on Sunday, May 12th, were rounded up at 8 
am, in a highly organised operation, by local police officers. They were escorted to 
the nearest infantry unit to be handed over to military control and then transferred to 
one of the training centres that were acting as collection and processing stations. 03 
They were allowed no communication with members of their family. In Newcastle 
there were a total of 52 persons taken into custody and handed over to the 
B0° Lafitte, F, The Internment ofAliens, pp 151-152. 
801 TWAS: DS/REY/35. Reyrolles correspondence, letter from Mr Towns to Major Brock, January 1& 
1940. 
802 Ibid, letter from Major Brock to Mr Towns, January 21a 1940. 
803 TWAS: PA/NC/5/24. Newcastle City Police Files re: aliens. City Police telephone report form 
detailing Home Office instructions for dealing with enemy aliens, May 12'h 1940. 
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commanding officer of Fenham Barracks. 804 Four more men were arrested the next 
day and handed over to the same destination. 805 
Despite the increasing harshness of the treatment of enemy aliens and the 
worsening attitudes towards them both on Tyneside and nationally there were still 
efforts to ensure that other aliens were cared for and received good treatment. The 
Civil Defence Northern regional office attempted to put in place an educational 
programme for merchant seamen and refugees. The plans showed a considerable 
degree of co-ordination, as the appointment of Professor T. S. Simey, from the 
University of Liverpool, Department of Social Science, to the position of regional 
officer, would appear to confirm. 806 
Tyneside had a considerable number of ethnic or national minorities as is 
common to those areas that are reliant on sea trade. Many of these aliens had lived in 
the Tyneside area for years and were a naturalised and valued part of the community. 
The area and its population had previously shown sympathy for, and an understanding 
of, minorities, even going so far as to welcome Basque refugees during the Spanish 
Civil War. 807 The impact of the war on this portion of the Tyneside community meant 
a loss of their civil rights and substantial amounts of their freedom. As part of the 
preparations for the coming war all aliens, not only those judged as enemy aliens, 
were required to register with their local police force and had restrictions placed upon 
their movements and their rights to own items such as radios, motor vehicles and 
maps. Several of the alien communities of the North East were unhappy at the 
treatment afforded them by the dictates of the alien order. Those who were officially 
$04 Letter from FJ Crawley, Chief Constable, to the Under Secretary of State, May 12`h 1940, in ibid. 805 Letters from Chief Constable Crawley to Officer Commanding Fenham Barracks, May 13th 1940, in 
ibid. 
806 Letter from Inspector of Constabulary to Chief Constable Crawley requesting information, 
November 29t' 1940, in ibid. 
807 Watson, D, & Corcoran, J, An Inspiring Example. The North East of England and the Spanish Civil 
War1936-1939 (Unknown: McGuffin Press, 1996), pp 73-84. 
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residents of British protectorates from around the world found themselves classified 
as aliens and were bound by curfews and other restrictions. In South Shields, the 
members of the British Somalian community, already struggling to find sufficient 
work due to the requirements of registration and the strictures of the 1935 British 
Shipping (Assistance) Act, 808 particularly resented being treated as aliens and found 
that such treatment made it more difficult for them to secure work. This resentment 
culminated in an angry letter being sent by Mr YH Sulliman, on behalf of the 
Somalis, to the Home Office on May 15th 1940.809 The Home Office proved to be 
receptive to this complaint and sent out instructions to local Chief Constables that 
they were to be allowed considerable lee-way when classifying British Somalis as 
aliens and that the enforcement of the restrictions on this group should be relaxed 
wherever possible. 810 
The task of registering and monitoring all aliens was one to which 
considerable police resources were dedicated, especially after the fall of Norway and 
the Low Countries and the tales of the effectiveness of the Nazis' use of Fifth 
Columnists. In Newcastle upon Tyne alone there were 1025 aliens resident within the 
city boundaries. 811 Of this total there were representatives of 29 separate nationalities 
and one person stated to be "stateless". 812 These are the numbers only for those 
within Newcastle upon Tyne and there were significant numbers living in other parts 
of Tyneside: notably the large population of Arab nationals that were an established 
part of the community in South Shields, despite the antipathy that was often 
808 Lawless, R I, From Ta'Izz to Tyneside. An Arab Community in the North-East of England During 
the Early Twentieth Century (Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1995), p 167. 809 NA: CO 535/135. Letter from Mr Sulliman, on behalf of British Somalis on Tyneside, to the Home 
Office, May 15`h 1940. 
8'0 Ibid, Home Office internal memo, May 25th 1940. 
81 TWAS: PA/NC/5/24. Newcastle City Police Files re: aliens. List of aliens resident in Newcastle 
upon Tyne, 1940. 
82 Ibid. See Appendix C, Table i. 
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demonstrated towards them. 813 In addition there was also a significant Scandinavian 
population of fishermen in and around North Shields. 
Aliens were categorised in three groups: `old residents' were those who had 
lived in the city prior to the war. `Conditional landings' were those who had made 
their way to Tyneside after war had commenced and largely consisted of refugees but 
could also include students who had been granted government endorsements allowing 
them to enter the country. The final group consisted of the `alien seamen' who were 
naturally common to the area due to Newcastle's importance as a port. 814 
The largest proportion of aliens in the city at this time consisted of 457 foreign 
seamen. This group was largely composed of Scandinavians and Russians as 
Newcastle had been designated as the pool city for these men; all seamen of these 
nationalities were to remain in Newcastle upon Tyne whilst ashore and could leave 
only for the purpose of a job at sea. 815 The general attitude of the populace of 
Tyneside towards the Scandinavian seamen appears to have been one of warm 
solidarity and understanding with the men being seen as "valuable citizens" and 
efforts being made to ensure that they were "embraced in our fold". 816 A committee 
chaired by Lord Eustace Percy and including the Lord Mayor of Newcastle, as well as 
Mr Dalgliesh, was created to arrange facilities for these men including the 
establishment of a meeting place with provision for newspapers and refreshments; a 
$" For a detailed history of the South Shields Arab community see, Lawless, R I, From Ta'izz to 
Tyneside. An Arab Community in the North-East of England during the Early Twentieth Century 
(Exeter: University of Exeter, 1995). 
814 TWAS: PA/NC/5/24. Newcastle City Police Files re: aliens. Letter from Deputy Chief Constable 
Bell of Newcastle City Police to the Civil Defence Northern Regional office, December 2"d 1940. 
815 See Appendix B, Table iv. 
816 TWAS: PA/NC/5/24. Newcastle City Police Files re: aliens. Letter from Mr RS Dalgliesh JP (Of 
Dalgliesh Coal Exporters, Ship Owners and Brokers) regarding attitudes towards Scandinavian seamen, 
October 18t' 1940. 
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civic welcome for those who arrived in the area and the supervision of lodgings to 
ensure that the seamen did not associate with less salubrious elements. 
817 
The people of Tyneside appear to have reacted with kindness and tolerance 
towards the foreign military personnel that they came into close contact with. For the 
first few years of the war these largely consisted of Polish, Canadian and Australian 
airmen and soldiers. The interaction was not marred by any major incidents and the 
relationship between the locals and these interlopers was consistently described as 
excellent. 818 When numbers of American troops began arriving in the area there were 
several minor incidents but nothing to disrupt the status quo. The area did not have as 
many American visitors as other areas of the country, although there were, a large 
number billeted in Byker and Heaton; however, there were no "coloured troops in this 
locality". 819 British reactions towards racial differences, not only Black Americans 
but also colonial troops, can best be described as ambivalent. Although many were 
strongly opposed to any form of official segregation that the American forces 
attempted to impose, others were suspicious of Black Americans and colonial 
troops. 820 Relations with the Americans on Tyneside were rapidly established and 
they became active participants in the social and recreational activities of the area. 
The activities of various political and religious organisations also caused some 
concern to both local and central government. Amongst these organisations were the 
British Communist Party, the British Union of Fascist, the Peace Pledge Union and 
other, less widely recognised, groups such as the Quakers and the Jehovah's 
Witnesses. Very tight restrictions were placed on many of these groups and on 
Tyneside known members were closely observed by the local police forces. The 
B" Ibid, Letter to Alderman Dalgliesh from Lord Eustace Percy, October 11`h 1940. 
818 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1941-1945. 
619 Ibid, March 25`h 1944. 
820 For a fuller analysis of the issues of race and the Home Front see: Rose, S 0, Which People's War?, 
pp 239-284. 
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distrust reached such levels that when the BCP set up an advice centre in Newcastle, 
in the aftermath of a particularly heavy raid, the local police assigned units to 
maintain surveillance on the building. 821 
The activities of both the PPU and the Jehovah's Witnesses were met with 
both concern and stem disciplinary measures. Both of these organisations continued 
throughout the war to advocate conscientious objection, not only to active military 
service but also to undertaking roles in the ARP Services. It would appear that the 
authorities on Tyneside were particularly harsh when it came to dealing with 
conscientious objectors. Newcastle magistrates turned down every exemption from 
service appeal made by members of either organisation, it was claimed. During at 
least one hearing a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses was said to have been refused 
exemption from military service and held up to ridicule for his stance. 822 
Despite initial reports of "infinitesimal" amounts of subversive and pacifist 
activities in the area, the anti-war campaign championed by the Jehovah's Witnesses 
(largely consisting of the distribution of pacifist leaflets encouraging people to object 
to wartime service), 823 was an ongoing source of comment in local police intelligence 
reports. 824 This suggests that the anti-war feeling, whilst limited in nature, was 
greater than infinitesimal. By the early winter of 1940, there were concerns that 
pacifist activity in the area was expanding and this continued into the next year as 
many pacifists refused to attend medical examinations. 825 Throughout 1941 and 1942 
the authorities continued to take a hard line against conscientious objection from 
Jehovah's Witnesses. On at least seven separate occasions numbers of people 
belonging to the organisation were either fined substantial sums or, more commonly, 
821 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1941-1945, September 12th 1941. 822 The Times, February 23"d 1940, p 3. 
823 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, March 29th 1941. 824 Ibid. October 17th 1939. 
825 Ibid, October 25`" 1940. 
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imprisoned. 826 The members of this organisation would appear to have been 
undaunted by the disciplinary measures taken against them as they were able to hold a 
conference in the summer of 1942 that attracted some 500 outside visitors. 827 
Ideological movements such as the Peace Pledge Union, 828 claiming that it had 
seen war and would not tolerate it again, had proven to be immensely popular in the 
years after the ending of the First World War. A spirit of pacifism had overtaken a 
large number of the British populace - culminating in the 1930s vote by the Oxford 
Union that they would refuse to fight for King and Country in any future war, and by 
the way in which the Munich `peace' agreement was welcomed by the majority of the 
British public. 
Whilst this was an important social movement it had begun to show signs of 
fading by the mid-1930s and was to dissolve altogether under the impact of the threat 
of Nazism. The pacifist organisations did enjoy some support on Tyneside, but with a 
large proportion of the population depending for their livelihoods on the manufacture 
of weaponry and ammunitions it is perhaps explainable that support was probably on 
a lesser scale than in other parts of the country. Despite this, the PPU did actively 
campaign on Tyneside during the war but its campaigns never gained much publicity 
or garnered public support; the reaction of the local populace being repeatedly 
described as "negative". 829 Indeed there appears to have been a large consensus 
favouring the banning of pacifist organisation meetings for the duration of the war. 830 
226 Ibid, October 10`h 1941-December 5`h 1942. 
827Ibid, September 11th 1942. 
228 One of the founders of the PPU was the First World War padre, Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy (known 
as Woodbine Willie). For accounts of this remarkable man, see Purcell, W, Woodbine Willie: Study of 
Geoffrey Studdert Kennedy (Oxford: Mowbray, 1983), also Grundy, M, A Fiery Glow in the Darkness: 
Woodbine Willie -Padre and Poet (London: Osborne, 1997). 929 Jbid, October 27`h 1939. 
2" ibid, May 9`h 1940. 
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The PPU continued, along with its allies in the Jehovah's Witnesses, in some 
small way by chalking peace slogans onto walls; several of these slogans seem to 
have been intended to stir up class feelings including one which read "England - the 
land of the freemason". 831 The party was also attempting to hold meetings but these 
failed to capture any public support and the organisation struggled to make any 
headway on Tyneside; by 1941 the local police were commenting on PPU meetings as 
being "very poorly attended". 832 After this initial failure the local PPU restricted itself 
to more targeted activities such as running campaigns to free conscientious objectors, 
such as John Morley, 833 who had been imprisoned under the Defence Regulations, and 
complaining about the treatment of conscientious objectors in general, despite 
overwhelming public opinion. 834 This was to be the mainstay of the party's Tyneside 
activities for the remainder of the war. Several of its members were themselves 
imprisoned for breaches of the defence Regulations pertaining to military or ARP 
service, along with the aforementioned Jehovah's Witnesses who were not recognised 
as having any legitimate reason for refusing to serve. 835 
The PPU continued to misjudge the mood of the Tyneside public and when a 
meeting was held on the Quayside in Newcastle objections to several speakers 
became so strenuous that the police intervened to close down the meeting. This was 
the only time such a gathering was closed down due to unrest on Tyneside during the 
war. 836 The political misjudgement of the party continued with its last noticeable 
wartime act on Tyneside when several of its leading local members stood surety for 
$31 Ibid, March 29`h 1941. 
832Ibid, March 140' 1941. 
933 Morley was imprisoned for non-payment of a fine after being prosecuted under the Defence 
Regulations (Fire Watching) Act. He had been a conscientious objector in World War I. 834 For a detailed discussion on attitudes towards conscientious objectors in World War II see Rose, S 
0, Which People's War, pp 170-178. 
835 For a more detailed discussion of this see Rose, S 0, Which People's War, pp 171-172. 836 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, December 3rd 1943. 
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the Trotskyites charged with organising the unpopular shipyard apprentice's strike of 
1944.837 
Perhaps the foremost political organisation to fall under suspicion was the 
British Communist Party. 838 This was a particular concern to the authorities on 
Tyneside as the BCP had proven to have some limited influence, especially amongst 
the local shipyard workers and mining communities. Although far more shipyard 
workers continued to vote Conservative the BCP had infiltrated the shop stewards 
movement and had a toe-hold in several unions. This continued throughout the war as 
the party continued, despite making increased production a priority, to champion the 
rights of the workers by calling for compensation for workers whose labours were 
disrupted by raids and alerts and by setting up advice centres after heavy raids. 839 
Support increased greatly after the change of party policy brought about by the 
invasion of the USSR. Up until this point the BCP's anti-war stance had found little 
favour on Tyneside. The propensity for the party to hold lunchtime meetings outside 
the major industrial employers caused some concern to the authorities as it was 
thought that these could encourage militancy amongst the workforce but this was a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the ambivalence in which the BCP viewed the war 
and its effect on the workers. Because of the imperilment of Russia the party became 
obsessed with the need for increasing production and urged dedication towards the 
war effort. Indeed the party even went as far as strike breaking during the latter years 
of the war when industrial militancy became more commonplace. 840 The assertions of 
A. J. P. Taylor that the BCP was wholeheartedly committed to the war effort, and that 
837 Ibid, April 2l `t 1944. 
838 For a detailed study of government attitudes towards British Communists in the inter-war years see, 
Ewing, K D, and Gearty, C A, The Struggle for Civil Liberties. Political Freedom and the Rule of Law 
in Britain, 1914-1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), pp 94-154. 839 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, September 12`h 1941. 
940 Ibid, October 90' 1942 - November 7th 1942. 
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when the `Daily Worker' was banned there was no protest would seem to 
be 
reinforced by the evidence of Tyneside. 
841 Only the local party campaigned, albeit 
vociferously, for the re-instatement of the newspaper. 
842 At the same time the party 
was continuing to rally support for workers' issues and attempting to gain control of 
the Shop Stewards Movement. This ambivalent attitude was to ensure that whilst the 
party accomplished much on Tyneside; enabling a substantial rise in membership, it 
was never trusted by the authorities and as a result close attention was paid to its 
activities. 
Early in the war the existence of the Nazi-Soviet pact had led many in 
authority to call for the arrest and internment of members and the banning of the party 
as a whole. One of the few British citizens to be executed for treachery during the 
war was a member of the BCP. 843 Despite these calls the popularity of the party in 
championing the causes of the working class on Tyneside ensured that there were no 
such calls from this region, despite the fact that the local police would probably have 
backed this policy. This was reinforced in the police reports from early in the war and 
there was a period during the height of the invasion scare when a large minority 
thought that B. C. P. meetings should be banned. It is however doubtful that there was 
ever such a clear consensus on this matter as some within the police force 
suggested. 844 
94' Taylor, AJP, English History 1914-1945, p 503. 
aal TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, February 1" 1941. 
843 This was George John Armstrong, who was arrested whilst attempting to pass secrets to the German 
consul in Boston (USA). He was later tried and hanged for treason. Armstrong was a crewman aboard 
a merchant ship and a member of the B. C. P. who had been encouraged in his activities by the party 
only to be later abandoned after the German invasion of Russia just 17 days before his execution. For a 
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After the German invasion of Russia there was widespread support for both 
the Russian people and the BCP, as Russia suddenly became an ally. This could be 
seen on Tyneside by the party's generally high levels of activity. Many working-class 
Tyneside residents felt a closer affinity with the Russian people than they did with the 
country's American allies. The BCP focussed primarily on the issues that captured 
popular imagination and exploited concerns over the management of the war. These 
campaigns became more effective as the war progressed and it is impossible to 
overestimate the importance that sympathy for the Russian people played in this 
increase in popularity. 
Whilst its initial meetings were poorly attended, 845 the party attracted 
followers by manipulating common concerns such as the demand for more effective 
deep air raid shelters, 846 and by the sympathy engendered by the suffering of the 
Russian people and by November 1940 the party was holding large meetings and 
raising substantial amounts of money through collections. 847 Two of these meetings 
within the space of 2 months were attended by 1,300 people and raised the total sum 
of £125. The importance of the local area to the party was reflected in the importance 
of the speakers who addressed these meetings; a gathering in January 1941 was 
addressed by Harry Pollitt. 848 Later meetings attracted ever larger crowds including 
several of over 1,000 persons. These large attendances were often because of the 
appearance of well known speakers or were combined with the activities of the 
various Anglo-Soviet Committees that were organised by the BCP. 849 The creation of 
subsidiary organisations was a common party strategy. These subordinate groups 
were usually designed to appeal to popular sentiment of the time. So, after the 
845 Ibid, October 27`' 1939 -April 25'h 1940. 946 Ibid, September 27`h 1940. 
8471bid, November 23rd 1940 and January 4'h 1941. 
8481bid, January 4t' 1941. 
849 Ibid. October 10`h 1941. 
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invasion of Russia, the Anglo-Soviet Committees were created and proved very 
popular. Most worryingly for the authorities this was especially the case with "people 
of a better type" , 
850 whilst in order to exploit the food shortages of 1941 the party 
organised the Newcastle Housewives Guild. 85' 
Despite the increasing success of the party's activities there is considerable 
evidence of a mellowing of official attitudes towards the party. When Willie 
Gallagher, M. P. addressed a large meeting at Newcastle City Hall his speech was 
described by an undercover police observer as being "moderate and [it] stressed the 
necessity for unity between peoples of this country and the USSR. v)852 This softening 
of attitudes can perhaps be partially explained by the fact that the key demands of the 
party largely squared with official government policy; at the time the BCP was 
demanding greater industrial production, the opening of a second front and an 
increase in the amount of aid being given to Russia. 853 
Other political organisations, such as the BUF (rebuffed on Tyneside during 
the 1930s), were less active on Tyneside. 854 It is difficult to analyse levels of support 
for the BUF as most supporters would not admit to their allegiance during the war. 
The organisation had tried to make Tyneside a key stronghold in the 1930's but had 
faced a great deal of, often violent, opposition and had failed to make considerable 
progress. 855 Tyneside had long enjoyed a reputation for racial tolerance. Orthodox 
Jews had a seminary located in Gateshead because of the area's reputation for open- 
mindedness. 856 Indeed, the Gateshead seminary was a nationally important centre for 
850 Ibid, November Vh 1941. 
851 Ibid, March 14th 1941. 
852. Ibid, July 18th 1941. 
853 Ibid, 7'h November 1941. Also, see Pelling, H, Britain and the Second World War, p 250. 854 Again, for a detailed view of concerns surrounding the BUF see Ewing, K D, and Gearty, C A, The Struggle for Civil Liberties, pp 275-330. 
85$ For a detailed consideration of the BUF and anti-fascist activities on Tyneside, see Todd, N, In Excited Times: People against the Blackshirts (Whitley Bay: Bewick Press, 1994). 856 See: Copsey, N, Anti-Fascism in Britain (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1999). 
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the study of the Torah. 857 Newcastle, and Tyneside in general, had a reputation 
spanning a century or more of accepting exiles. This can be partially ascribed to the 
"City's long liberal tradition. "858 This was to continue to be the case throughout the 
war. The hostility of the majority of the Tyneside population towards the Fascists 
increased markedly after the declaration of war and demands for all members of this 
group to be interned were commonplace. Early attempts by the organisation to hold 
meetings suffered from very poor attendances and plans for later meetings were very 
quickly abandoned. 859 The antipathy with which this political party was still faced 
with on Tyneside was seen by the reaction to the release of Mosley from internment 
in 1943. The North East branch of the Communist Party very quickly, and 
unsurprisingly, released a broadsheet which demanded that the leader of the BUF be 
re-arrested and kept in custody for the duration of the war. 860 As part of this 
campaign petitions were circulated in the major industrial works of Tyneside and the 
sentiment proved to be popular amongst the workforces. However, once the release 
had been discussed and explained in the Houses of Parliament public anger quickly 
subsided on Tyneside. 861 
In recent years some historians have attempted to demonstrate that the 
existence of a blitz spirit was a myth through descriptions of crimes that occurred 
during the war. 862 They argue that the existence of these crimes must mean that the 
population of Britain was not in fact `pulling together' and was rather looking after its 
own needs first and foremost; often at the expense of the overall war effort. However, 
... For further discussion of the North-East's Jewish community see: Olsover, L, Jewish Communities 
oaf North-East England 1755-1980 (Gateshead: Ashley Mark, 1980). 
88 Todd, N, `Ambition and Harsh Reality', in Ayris, I, et al, Water under the Bridges, pp 93-94. 859 SAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, May 91h 1940. 860 Broadsheet, `The People against Mosley', December 1943, in ibid. 
86' TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, December 3'd 1943. 862 For example see Hylton, S, Their Darkest Hour. The Hidden History of the Home Front 1939-1945 
(Stroud: Sutton, 2003), pp 186-202 or Thomas, D, An Underworld at War. Spivs, Deserters, 
Racketeers and Civilians in the Second World War (London: John Murray, 2003). 
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it would appear from the evidence of the police report files, and from the monthly 
intelligence reports, 863 that crime, apart from black market activities which are 
impossible to gauge, did not play a significant role on wartime Tyneside. Despite the 
increasing number of offences for which otherwise law abiding citizens could see 
their actions criminalised, the rate of crime in the area remained steady. 
Unfortunately, the nature of wartime crime makes the subject a difficult one to 
evaluate. Offences that went undiscovered obviously very rarely come to light and do 
not, of course, appear in any official documents whilst there is also the possibility that 
the police, eager to foster the sense of togetherness and community spirit, failed to 
report less serious infractions. This would appear to have been especially common in 
the rural areas. 8" Combined with the loss of good young officers and their 
replacement with older and/or less experienced volunteers these factors ensured that 
laxity could hide a multitude of sins. 
There were two distinct varieties of crime during the period. The first was that 
which had taken place during peacetime, principally perpetrated by career criminals, 
and was to continue throughout the conflict. The other type was that which was 
specifically related to the wartime situation and included black market activities, 
breaches of lighting regulations, profiteering, and acting contrary to the new 
regulations that were brought in relating to security. Many of these crimes were 
carried out by otherwise law abiding citizens and some became accepted by Tyneside 
society. One incident of this type, although there could be a more serious 
explanation, involved two South Shields women on, what they claimed was, an 
innocent excursion to the coast. The mother and daughter were seen recording details 
of passing shipping in a notebook and a Police Constable confiscated the book and 
863 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1939-1945. 164 Ingleton, R, The Gentlemen at War, pp 286-287. 
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arrested them. They were later fined £5 apiece (£200 today) and were cautioned that 
if it had been thought that there was any traitorous intent they would have been sent to 
prison. 865 
Crimes that did show substantial increases on Tyneside were almost all minor 
infractions of the lighting restrictions, 866 or those relating to rationing. Whilst those 
relating to lighting were often a sign of no more than carelessness on behalf of the 
accused, offences against rationing regulations were more serious. Because the 
rationing system was created in part to ensure a fair share for all, and to protect the 
meagre stocks of the country, it could be argued that infractions of the rules were a 
clear indication of a lack of community spirit. There was most probably an extensive 
black market for foodstuffs on Tyneside, with much of this being controlled by career 
criminals who used theft to obtain food stocks. Many black market goods were sold 
`under the counter' to regular customers. 867 One*Newcastle family, however, found 
themselves black marketeers through circumstance. The father was employed as a 
cook at a nearby military post where a clerical error had resulted in ten times the 
amount of food being supplied as was required. This food should have been either 
returned or destroyed but instead the cook collected the surplus and sold this on the 
black market around Newcastle. The family sold meat, eggs, butter, cheese, and other 
scarce foodstuffs to local businesses and private individuals, in the process making a 
comfortable living. 868 The culprits were never caught and the scheme only came to an 
end when their father was posted away. 
865 The Times, June 1`t 1940, p 3. 
866 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, November 23`d 1940, and again 
January 16`h 1942. 
667 For a detailed discussion of the black market, nationally, see, Thomas, D, An Underworld at War. 
Spivs, Deserters, Racketeers and Civilians in the Second World War (London: John Murray, 2003), pp 
131-159. 
868 Anonymous correspondence, 2001. 
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Herein is one of the difficulties with assessing crime of this type on Tyneside. 
Although such activities appear to have been relatively rare on wartime Tyneside it is 
clear that there was a thriving black market. Undoubtedly such activities were more 
common than the official records reflect. For, unless those involved were caught in 
the act of purloining or selling the black market goods, it remained very difficult to 
obtain evidence sufficient for subsequent conviction. The very fact that this group of 
part time inexperienced criminals could operate their scheme undetected implies that, 
for many Tyneside residents, the black market was not seen as a great offence. 
Certainly, it would appear that shortage of customers was never a problem. Herein is 
one of the perplexities of wartime society. Whilst the majority, if asked, would have 
declared themselves against all forms of black market activity, the illegal trade could 
only prosper, as indeed it did, if there were sufficient numbers of people willing to 
obtain black market goods. 
The war introduced increased opportunities for crime. Not only did the 
blackout provide a cover of darkness for criminals but many houses on Tyneside were 
left unoccupied for substantial periods, whether due to war damage, evacuation, or 
other circumstances. In order to enable ease of access to ARP workers in the case of 
fire it was made illegal to lock internal doors and to board up windows. All of these 
circumstances combined to facilitate criminal activities, especially housebreaking. 
The damage suffered by houses during air. raid resulted in broken windows and the 
exposure of private property meaning that there was greater temptation to criminal 
elements. These elements, already emboldened by the above factors, had to contend 
with police forces that were struggling to maintain their standards. The police were 
drained of available manpower and, despite the efforts of the war reserve and the 
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special constabulary, those who were left were often less suited to law enforcement 
than the men that they had replaced. 
Under the above circumstances it is unsurprising that petty theft also seems to 
have increased slightly on Tyneside during the war. Most of these thefts were of 
minor items such as bicycles. In 1941 there was a spate of thefts from allotments and 
gardens, presumably because demand for these items was at the time high. 869 Whilst 
these crimes were irksome to the local population they are insufficient in scale to 
suggest that a significant proportion of the population of Tyneside were lacking in 
community spirit or dedication to the national effort. To some degree they simply 
represent the usual, peacetime, levels of crime, except that the targets of the theft were 
changing according to the wartime situation. There were even allegations that the 
police themselves were adding to this rise in petty theft, usually these allegations were 
un-witnessed suspicions of the looting of bomb damaged properties. 970 Although 
most of these allegations were unsubstantiated, or merely rumours, a recovered 
bicycle became the core of a more concrete allegation of theft against a 
Superintendent of Newcastle City Police in 1944. The bicycle in question was 
recovered unattended from an air raid shelter in Heaton and taken to East End Police 
Station where it was entered into the lost property log book. The bike later vanished 
from the station and a forged claim that the owner had reclaimed it was found in the 
log book. The property book itself was then lost. A Sergeant based at the station 
accused his new Superintendent who denied the allegations and claimed that the 
Sergeant had previously threatened him, the case was never proven. 871 
Looting from bomb damaged sites was a more serious charge and there were 
several occasions when residents of the area were faced with such behaviour. Two 
869 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, September 12th 1941. 870 Interview NS/RA, 2002. 
871 TWAS: MD/NC/274/20. Watch Committee minute book, May 12'" 1944, pp 397-398. 
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men were convicted at Newcastle of looting from bomb damaged property in 
September 1940.872 Their case was one of just 426 similar charges dealt with 
nationally that year. The definition of looting was problematic and, as the possible 
penalty for the crime was death, many borderline cases were instead downgraded to 
charges of larceny. 873 On Tyneside it would appear that looting was a rare crime, 
although, at Tynemouth a twelve year old boy was arrested and charged with the 
offence during the heavy raids on the 90` and 10th of April 1941.74 
Attitudes towards alcohol provide one of the greatest contrasts of the two 
world wars. Whilst consumption of alcohol during the First World War was looked 
on as sinful, 975 the latter conflict saw little or no censure, despite some concerns that it 
would lead to an eroding of the moral standards of the country. Incidents of arrests 
for drunken behaviour increased throughout the war. Prosecutions on Tyneside, by 
January 1942, were up 28% on the figures for 1940 and eleven percent on the 1939 
figures. 876 There were concerns voiced later in the war about an increase in the 
numbers of juveniles who were being served alcohol and a "tightening up" of police 
enforcement was initiated to combat this, apparently effectively. 877 Greater alcohol 
consumption also led to more numerous levels of minor violent crimes such as drunk 
and disorderly and minor assaults. One more serious case occurred at Newcastle on 
the of March 10th 1944. A night-time dance at the ever-popular Oxford Galleries 
dance hall had attracted a large crowd who did not have tickets. Three Police 
Constables, who were on duty at the scene, requested that the crowd disperse. Three 
872 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, September 27`h 1940. 
873 For a more detailed discussion of the problems posed by looting see, Ingleton, R, The Gentlemen at 
War, pp 265-273. 
974 North East Diary website [http: //www. bpears. org. uk/NE-Diary/Inc/lSeq_l5. html], 2004 875 For a discussion of the Temperance movement of World War One Britain see, DeGroot, G J, 
Blighty, pp 230-250. 
876 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, January 30th 1942. 977 Ibid, November 5`h 1943 - December 3rd 1943. 
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drunken youths refused and became violent whereupon one of the officers removed a 
suspect from the premises. Outside the dance hall the officer, a PC Peart, was 
attacked by the three men and was kicked and punched to the ground suffering a lost 
tooth, abrasions, and severe bruising. The three men were detained and convicted of 
the attack. The two ringleaders, who were brothers, were each fined the sum of two 
pounds (£80 today) and sentenced to three months hard labour. The third attacker 
was given the choice of either a twenty pound fine (£800 today) or two months hard 
labour. Their accusation that PC Peart had attacked them was disproved and the 
officers concerned were exonerated. 978 Cases like this were, however, rare on 
wartime Tyneside and the levels of violent crime do not appear to have risen beyond 
the peacetime norms. The majority of offences appear to have been committed by 
career criminals, given greater opportunities by the war. One such example being an 
Ipswich man who was convicted on several accounts of house breaking and larceny 
committed in several different cities across the country, including Newcastle upon 
Tyne, where he was arrested in March 1944.879 
Fraudulent crimes were also made more possible, and more profitable, due to 
the sheer volume of government contracts that were available, combined with the 
levels of power that were given to local officials. The numbers of such crimes did 
increase and, in one case, discussed in chapter two, led to the public shaming of 
several Newcastle councillors. Several other prominent local businessmen were also 
accused of conspiracy to defraud during the war. Sir Arthur Munro Sutherland, the 
High Sherrif of Northumberland, was accused, alongside Robert Stanley Dalgliesh, 
managing director of Blyth Dry Docks and Shipbuilding Company, with bribing 
878 TWAS: MD/NC/274/20. Watch Committee minute book, April 120' 1944, p 388. 879 The Times, June 5t' 1945, p 6. 
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admiralty officials in order to secure tenders for work. 880 Overall, however, major 
crime did not play a significant part in the story of wartime Tyneside with levels 
remaining normal whilst the vast majority of Tyneside residents maintained a law 
abiding and co-operative manner apart from their willingness to accept certain black 
market activities. 
Throughout the last two years of the war thoughts on Tyneside were already 
turning to post-war reconstruction and a determination that the sacrifices of the last 
few years must not be discarded and proven to be in vain. In Newcastle, the major 
topic of complaint was that there was a lack of suitable housing and that basic rights 
put forward in the Beveridge report should be enacted as soon as was possible. 881 At 
the end of the war in Europe the capitulation of Germany was greeted in a restrained 
but happy manner whilst the commonly remembered VE Day celebrations were 
described as having passed in a comparatively quiet manner with church attendance 
being significantly up on previous weeks. 882 Perhaps this restrained acceptance of the 
end of the war in Europe was again influenced by local factors: a large number of 
Tyneside men were still fighting in Burma against the Japanese at the time. 
880 The Times, May 26th 1943, p 2. 
881 TWAS: MD/NC/274/20. Watch Committee minute book, February 22nd 1945. 982 Ibid. May 18th 1945. 
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Chapter 6 
'Tyneside Can Take It? ' 
Myths, Morale, and Community 
The relationship between the Second World War and the British people has been 
marked by several long-living myths. The use of the word `myth' does not imply lies. 
Some historians have attempted to portray the myths of the Second World War as 
exactly that, and have, furthermore, attempted to debunk these myths in order to 
expose them as lies. 883 The historian, Malcolm Smith, correctly defines the myths of 
the war as being merely "a widely held view of the past which has helped to shape 
and to explain the present. , 884 It is also true that the greater `myth' of the Second 
World War is in fact a patchwork of several other myths, most of them concerned 
with events of 1940. It is an assumption, a confident estimate, that a cross section of 
the Tyneside public (or indeed anywhere in Britain), asked about the war, would 
mention Dunkirk, the Blitz, and, possibly, the Battle of Britain. The monolithic 
stature of the national myth, focusing largely on 1940, has come to be the 
predominant factor in national identification with regard to the war. Regional 
memories and experiences have been largely expurgated from the national conscious 
by the overarching national consensus of mythologized memory. This myth has been 
reshaped throughout the decades since the end of the war but has retained its power 
over the majority of the British public. The `myth' of the war does indeed "offer a 
$83 See Ponting, C, 1940: Myth and Reality (London: Cardinal, 1990). 
$" Smith, M, Britain and 1940, p 2. 
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popular memory [to the British people] which explains the past and the present ... A 
social group or a nation becomes a social group or nation only when it has a common 
mythology, and a common sense of the past is a very significant element in the 
collective identity of any interpretive community. "885 
Thanks to their longevity and complexity, these myths have become an 
accepted feature of the British national character. The myths concern the pressures 
faced while being on the losing side in the early stages of the war: pressed back in the 
field, ill-prepared in military or civilian terms, and facing, for the first time, the full- 
scale extension of the conflict into the home front. A collective feeling emerged of 
Britain standing alone as the sole hope of the free world. The sentiment soon 
penetrated the psyche of the British people very deeply. Moreover, the psychological 
imprint of this sense of heroic and stoic isolation lived on long after hostilities 
subsided. These sentiments also connected with another emotion -a shared bravery 
associated with the idea of being attacked without being cowed. People in Britain felt 
they were demonstrating an ability `to take it'. This bullish, and often competitive, 
pride was behind what coalesced as the myth of the `blitz spirit'. This itself combined 
with the myth that everyone `pulled together' throughout the war; that the British 
people were united firmly behind the war effort as one unified whole. 
Of course, for the British, the first year of the war was characterised by a 
series of reversals on the field of battle. The fall of France and the Low Countries, 
and the resultant evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk in 1940, 
gave rise to yet another myth: the `Dunkirk spirit'. The idea that the Dunkirk 
evacuation was the epitome of pluck in the face of overwhelming odds, a victory of 




remains there. It came to characterise the supposed pugnacious determination of the 
British people, and it continues to do so. Dunkirk also sparked a sharp rise in 
nationalistic pride, as the evacuation, by a flotilla of ordinary boat-owners, of a 
bedraggled, defeated army became a triumph of British spirit and of amateur ability to 
muddle through. Although, in fact, the majority of men were brought out by the 
Royal Navy and many of the `small boats' were also manned, at least partially, by 
regular servicemen, Royal Naval Reserve (RNR) personnel, or by members of the 
Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR). 886 Operation Dynamo (the operational 
codename given to the attempt to extricate the British Expeditionary Force) was 
plagued with a shortage of the small vessels that could get directly into the Dunkirk 
beaches, especially fishing boats. For example, the port of Deal sent only two 
volunteers from approximately 200 local fishermen. 887 
The subsequent characterisation of Britain's World War as `the People's War', 
was predicated upon this series of overlapping ideas and events. This then introduced 
several sacrosanct views into the British people's popular view of their forebears' 
war. In this formulation, the war was felt to have suspended and then broken down the 
class barriers that characterised pre-war society. A Canadian diplomat based in 
London during 1940 noted that one result of the war was that "English men and 
women of different classes, localities, sets and tastes are for the first time talking to 
each other. "888 The war was a time when the British were said to unite behind their 
political leaders, particularly after the demise of Chamberlain, and when many of 
those most closely associated with the policy of appeasement had been forced from 
office. 
886 Harman, N, Dunkirk The Necessary Myth (London: Coronet, 1981), pp 141-255. 887 Ibid, p 164. . 888 Calder, A, The Myth of the Blitz (London: Pimlico, 2002), p 34. 
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The idea that the `People's War' disrupted the traditional class system of 
Britain, and that class resentment faded during the war, as everyone pulled together in 
a common cause, can be disputed from an analysis of the situation on Tyneside. It 
was, of course, inevitable that, despite the working-class identity of Tyneside, many 
of the people given responsibility for local leadership during the war would be from 
local authorities, the police, or the services, and not be representative of the working 
class. The preponderance of local dignitaries in positions of power thus proves little. 
The distinctive class snobbery that existed on Tyneside, as it did throughout the 
nation, could be seen throughout the war in the police intelligence reports. 889 These 
expressed worries that it was the children of the lower classes from the "poorer areas" 
who returned from their evacuation billets and caused chaos by running wild, 
increasing juvenile crime. Although it is a sad fact that children from the poorer areas 
were more likely to turn to crime. It was also reflected in the worry that was 
expressed over the growth in popularity of the Anglo-Soviet Committees. It was 
claimed that the meetings were regularly being frequented by "people of a better 
type. "890 Local trade associations also continued to reflect a distinct class bias 
through their continued resistance to increased workers rights and wages. The 
Licensed Trade Employer's Association, complaining regarding a committee that had 
proposed increased wages for workers in the catering industry, went so far as to allege 
that "Mr Bevin appeared to be taking advantage of his position to inflict Socialist 
ideas upon the country. "891 Such examples of continuing class friction, taken along 
with the complaints over unfair rationing, do not mesh with the belief that class 
889 For a discussion of the class structure that existed on Tyneside during the period, see Goodfellow, D 
M, Tyneside: the social facts 2"d ed. (Co-operative Printing Society, 1941). 
890 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, November 7th 1941. 891 TWAS: EM/LT/1/1: Licensed Trade Employer's Association, minute book, annual meeting, 
October 14th 1942. 
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barriers had been broken down by the war and would seem to show that the class 
structure was still deeply entrenched on Tyneside. 
The popular view of the blitz was that the British people exhibited great 
fortitude and moral rectitude, as well as a considerable amount of cheerfulness and 
stoic endurance. This ideal very quickly coalesced into the myth of a `blitz spirit'. 
This has persisted in the British consciousness and is still a powerful factor in the 
popular memory of the war. There is compelling evidence to suggest that this was 
indeed the case and that "the final achievement of so many Britons was enormous 
enough. Maybe monumental is not putting it too high. 93,892 Examples exist from all 
over the country of people continuing with their daily routine of work despite 
suffering aerial bombardment. In Coventry, after the massive attack on the night of 
November 14th, into the early hours of the 15`", 1940, the majority of people 
attempted to go back to work normally despite the difficulties that they faced and the 
harrowing trials of the previous few hours. 893 
This would appear to be comparable to the response to air raids on much of 
Tyneside as well. After a heavy raid on the area during April 24th /25 th 1941, in 
which a total of 75 civilians were killed, morale was described as being good and a 
month later it was being reported that there was little shortfall in productivity and that, 
"Air raids have not weakened the morale of the public. "894 A sharp raid, lasting only 
an hour, on the night of September 1st 1941 led to the deaths of 69 people in the area 
and the strategically important New Bridge Street Goods Station was destroyed by 
fire. This raid came at a time of industrial unrest on Tyneside but, as was shown in 
some other areas, it would appear that the raid completely failed to significantly dent 
morale. There was no sign of panic, either during the raid or in its aftermath. 
892 Harrisson, T, Living through the Blitz (London: Penguin, 1990), p 278. 893 Longmate, N, Air Raid The Bombing of Coventry, 1940 (London: Hutchinson, 1976), p 160. 894 TWAS: PA/NC/5/S5. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, May 10th - 26th 1941. 
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However, a large number of evacuees, many of them from the suburbs of the city, did 
leave the city shortly following this attack. Most had returned a fortnight later 
suggesting that this was a reaction of the middle-classes of the city who could afford 
to send their children out of the city at short notice and then return once danger had 
appeared to have passed. 895 As such this represented a negative, although sensible, 
reaction to a severe incident, one which had been relatively rare in Newcastle upon 
Tyne. Other areas of Tyneside, especially along the banks of the Tyne, had 
experienced such incidents on more regular occasions. Raids on April lO _ 25th 
1941, led to 182 civilian deaths, with the majority concentrated along the banks of the 
river, although 47 were killed in Newcastle. 996 
Figure 24. Firemen working in the ruins of the New Bridge Street Goods Station. 897 
895 Ibid, September 12'h 1941. 
896 Of the 182 casualties from these raids seventeen were in Wallsend, 36 in Tvnemouth and North 
Shields, fifteen in Whitley Bay, two in Shiremoor, four in Seghill, two in Blyth, 47 in Newcastle upon 
Tyne, and 59 in either Jarrow or South Shields. 
897 Photograph © Newcastle Chronicle and Journal Ltd. 
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Figure 25. Firemen fight to contain the blaze inside the Goods Station 898 
With the increasing frequency of air raids becoming more problematic 
throughout 1940 and especially 1941 it was imperative that the ARP Organisations 
functioned efficiently. The requirements for the rapid creation of a comprehensive 
system of Air Raid Precautions and Civil Defence organisations placed undoubted 
strain on the local authorities of Tyneside. The efforts required of local authorities 
could occasionally prove to be too great, as was exposed by the crisis that enveloped 
Newcastle City Council in 1944, as discussed in chapter six. There were also a series 
of lesser problems that aroused complaints from the general public. This was not a 
situation that was unique to the area and similar difficulties can be traced in the 
majority of regions of Britain throughout the war. Indeed, the Tyneside authorities 
seem to have, with the exception of certain aspects of Newcastle's organisation, 
succeeded in creating a relatively efficient system. Although these systems were not 
tested by bombing raids to the extent that some other areas were it would appear that 
when bombing raids did affect the area the local organisations generally coped in a 
898 Photograph 0 of the Newcastle Chronicle and Journal. 
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professional and efficient manner. Standards of behaviour within the Air Raid 
Precautions Services at ground level would also appear to back up the `blitz spirit' 
argument. Despite these amateurs, often responding to serious incidents for the first 
time, lack of experience they would appear to have dealt with harrowing and 
disturbing scenes with calm professionalism, something which in turn spread 
confidence and reassurance amongst the general populace. 
The local population adjusted to the air raids in a remarkably quick time. The 
lull of the `Phoney War' had created a breathing space which acted as a suitable 
period of mental adjustment, allowing the majority to prepare themselves for the 
coming tests. Confidence in the ability of the local community to `take it' rose and by 
February 1941 this new found confidence was being exhibited by the very small 
numbers of those who were still carrying their gas masks. 899 
Much of the rationale behind the myths of a `blitz spirit' and of the entire 
country `pulling together', as of a `Dunkirk spirit', stemmed from the strong sense of 
national identity that was fostered by official propaganda and by the exigencies of life 
in wartime Britain. In a total war situation the development of a firm national identity 
is a common and powerful factor. The majority of British people during the Second 
World War were no exception and, thanks largely to common perceptions of a 
national identity aided by official propaganda efforts, realised that, because Britain 
was at war, they were "in it together. s900 Whilst this is true to an extent, it would 
appear that the feeling of solidarity and commitment, weak throughout the phoney 
war, was reinforced even further by the events in France which meant that an invasion 
of Britain was itself a distinct possibility. It was this direct threat to the `British' way 
of life that was the key in the unification of patriotic feeling and defiant 
899 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, February 14`h 1941. 900 Rose, S 0, Which People's War, p 286. 
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determination. The physical threat to the country appears to have united disparate 
groups under a national identity. This is unsurprising, the sense of nationality is an 
important factor in the formation of identity and the sense of national belonging is 
often heightened at times of national crisis. This sense of belonging, of being "a 
member of an organic community" is one which can be "incredibly emotionally 
compelling", especially when the organic community is under threat from an external 
source 901 It was recognised by the second year of the war that, "One component of 
high morale is obviously a feeling of national unity. "902 
National identity, in common with other collective identities can, however, be 
fragile and is open to multiple interpretations. It is also an ever-changing perception 
and once the common phrase "we are all in this together" is analysed and exactly who 
the "we" refers to, and what "together" means is specified then "the singularity of that 
identity is exposed as being false. 003 Examples of this breakdown can be seen in the 
frequent complaints of the people of Tyneside, on a wide range of locally specific 
subjects including: shortages; unfair rationing systems; lack of publicity; the blackout; 
and other general inconveniences. It is also shown in the continuation of the workers' 
struggle against the perceived unfair systems of management during the period. 
Despite the popular conception of the `British people' as a united whole 
during the war it is abundantly clear that regional identities were not completely 
subsumed. This was visibly recognised at all levels from industrial disputes, which 
often continued to be centred on locally specific agreements and conditions, to 
governmental reports on the area. It can be argued that Tyneside had developed a 
strong regional identity from as early as the late Sixteenth Century. This was largely 
901 Ibid. 
902 Ruch, F L, `The Problem of Measuring Morale', Journal of Educational Sociology, 15,4 (December 
1941), p 226. 
9031bid, p 285. 
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based on the region's growing dependence upon the rapidly expanding, and nationally 
vital, carboniferous economy. Since the industrial revolution the workers of Tyneside 
had proven to be the most singularly important part of the regional community. 
Developing a nationwide, if not worldwide, reputation and establishing a strong, and 
unique, sense of community. It has even been suggested that, in Newcastle (and the 
concept can be extended to cover much of Tyneside), "the dominant ethos, the 
`establishment' if you like, is - rarity! - working class" 904 Despite this culture, 
Newcastle did have a significant middle class population. Indeed, it had the largest 
middle class in the North East. Policy makers on wartime Tyneside continued to be 
comprised of the upper echelons of local society but the wartime conditions ensured 
that they were compelled to reflect the views and wishes of the majority. 
Whilst this is undoubtedly true, there were, and indeed still are, separate 
identities that were apparent within the region. 905 Differences, however slight, existed 
between those who lived in the coalfield area, in the north and east of the region, and 
those who lived in the armaments and shipbuilding areas along the Tyne. Even these 
identities were different when compared with those who lived in the suburbs of 
Newcastle upon Tyne, the coastal area around Whitley Bay, and the more rural 
western parts of the Tyne valley. Despite this, it was still believed that "Industrially, 
commercially and to a large extent socially, Tyneside is a unit. 006 This was largely a 
result of the "daily movement up and down and across the river. "907 Every town on 
Tyneside, with the sole exception of Newcastle, upon Tyne itself, experienced a 
significant daily movement of people to work in other parts of the area. In Gateshead 
904 Lancaster, B, `Sociability and the City', in Coils, R, and Lancaster, B (eds), Newcastle upon Tyne. A Modern History (Chichester: Phillimore, 2001), p 340. 905 See Goodfellow, D M, Tyneside: the social facts. 
906 PRO: BT 64/3260. Report on Tyneside compiled by Professor Allen, September 1943, p 1. 907 Ibid. 
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this proportion was said to be as high as 60%. 908 This was an undoubted factor in the 
development, and evolution, of a vibrant and strong Twentieth Century regional 
identity on Tyneside. 
The sense of belonging to a community at war bonded sometimes disparate 
groups together under a common banner. Some believed that "morale is 
fundamentally a conception of oneself as a member of a group. "909 An awareness of 
being on trial was prevalent, not just on Tyneside, but in most regions, although, at 
the commencement of hostilities, this awareness was dominated by an almost 
irrational fear of the apocalyptic results of bombing. This awareness was altered after 
the first bombs had fell and was rapidly assimilated into the overall myth of the `blitz 
spirit' in that community pride dictated that when it was Tyneside's turn to experience 
bombing a mould of expected behaviour had already been cast by the reactions, and 
indeed the media portrayals of, those who had gone before. The communities of 
London's East End being the focal example held up at this early point in the war. The 
moral pressure that the community itself exerted on individual members cannot be 
underestimated and it would appear that, "the primitive instincts of self-preservation 
and self interest - themselves heightened in times of danger and disorder - frequently 
[were] overridden by the group norms of the tribe at war. "910 The sense of belonging 
to a community can result in the aspirations and the impact of shared group 
experiences exercising a control over the individual's conception of self. 911 It was 
this sense of `community spirit' that influenced so many Tyneside residents to behave 
in such a steadfast manner throughout the war. By acknowledging that they belonged 
to the community they gained a sense of acceptance, of belonging, at the cost of 
908 Ibid. 
909 Zorbaugh, H, `The Morale Needs of Youth', Journal of Educational Sociology, 16,4 (December 
1942), p 242. 
91° MacKay, R, Half the Battle, p 259. 
911 Zorbaugh, H, 'The Morale Needs of Youth', p 243. 
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taking on the goals and values of the community identity. The value of belonging to a 
community in wartime was recognised in the aftermath of the blitz, where, "a cursory 
survey.. . would indicate that morale was highest in persons whose lives were best 
integrated with that of the community... that morale was facilitated as persons were 
drawn-into closer relationship with one another" 912 
The competitive spirit of communities also acted to ensure that the majority of 
Tyneside residents wanted to be seen to be equally capable of standing up to bombing 
as other British communities had. Furthermore, this competitiveness was found 
inside Tyneside itself with the residents of, for example, North Shields becoming 
quite proud of being one of the most heavily bombed parts of the area, despite the 
casualties. This can be evinced in the tone of the summary of air raids published in 
the local newspaper before the war had ended. 913 Whilst the evidence of a unifying, 
self sacrificing and egalitarian `blitz spirit' is apparent it must also be said that there 
were periods and incidents that would seem to contradict this spirit, such as the two 
men who were imprisoned for looting bomb damaged Newcastle properties during the 
height of the blitz period of summer 1940.9 14 Such activity is putatively incongruent 
with the myth of the blitz but it must be stated that this type of behaviour was an 
exception to that of the vast majority of the citizens of Tyneside who embodied a 
spirit of stoic determination despite their fears., This was not the case in every area 
that experienced bombing. For example, the people of Manchester appear to have 
reacted in a much less sanguine manner. By early January of 1941 morale in the city 
was very poor with "an atmosphere of barely restrained depression" apparent to 
visitors. 915 This was at a time when Newcastle was reporting that "morale remains 
912 ]bid, p 244. 
913 The Shields Evening News, October 13t' 1944, p 1. 914 TWAS: MD/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, September 27`h 1940. 915 Harrisson, T, Living through the Blitz, p 244. 
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excellent", despite rumours of an upcoming heavy enemy attack on the city. 
916 Mass 
Observation members came to the conclusion that the comparatively poor morale in 
Manchester, as compared to Liverpool or Newcastle, was partially a result of a lack of 
communal identity, combined with poor leadership from the local authority. 917 
Community, and class, links on Tyneside were particularly strong. This was 
especially true of those places that suffered the heaviest concentration of bombing, 
predominantly working class areas where many families had lived in close proximity 
for generations. This was to prove to be a mixed blessing during bombing. Whilst it 
resulted in people being willing to help their neighbours, going so far as to work as 
voluntary rescue squads in the aftermath of air raids in some cases, it also meant that 
heavy casualties cast an even greater pall over the entire community. The deep-seated 
bonds in such areas often resulted in residents displaying intense emotional reactions, 
both positive and negative, to shared wartime experiences. 
The existence and strength of a so-called community spirit has become a 
widely accepted `fact' of our national recollection of wartime Britain. A definition of 
community, however, has proven to be problematic 918 In accordance with the 
definitions of those who assessed morale at the time, the perception of community 
during the war can be said to have consisted of a variety of cascading cultural 
networks. These could be interconnected or stand-alone networks, ranging in scale 
from the basic family unit, to the street of residence, to entire neighbourhoods, to the 
region as a whole. There were also a variety of different community networks that 
applied to individuals separately of each other. These often included relationship 
networks formed within the workplace or within the voluntary services that were 
916 TWAS: MD/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, December 20th 1940. 917 Harrisson, T, Living through the Blitz, pp 244-247. 
918 Indeed, many sociologists prefer the term `social network system' which was coined during the 
1960s sociological debate on the subject of community, but wartime studies used the word 
`community'. 
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created as a response to the wartime situation. For example, the often strong sense of 
comradeship that was exhibited by many members of local Home Guard units. 
The feeling of being a part of a local community, whether the term is being 
used to describe a family unit, a street, or a whole neighbourhood, played an 
important role in sustaining morale. Accounts of those who experienced the war on 
Tyneside are littered with references describing how strong a `community spirit' 
existed at the time and the way in which, "everybody helped one another. "919 A 
wartime resident of heavily bombed Wallsend remembered how, "good neighbourly 
relations prevailed in those days. "920 These were all indicative of the strong 
neighbourhood identity that permeated much of Tyneside. 921 One former ARP 
messenger remembers that the overarching feeling on Tyneside was one of 
determination and cheerful optimism, with people genuinely believing that, despite 
setbacks, the war would eventually be won. 22 Whilst another, a young mother in 
1941, had sad recollections of the war, but also wistful memories of how everyone 
helped one another. 923 This would appear to tally with the official assessment of 
feeling on Tyneside, even during 1940. It was reported that there was a spirit of 
confidence regarding, "the official outcome of the war and that most people expect it 
will be a long one"924 It would appear from these examples that the majority of 
Tyneside residents had made an assessment, -sober or bullishly optimistic, of the 
situation, were united behind the war effort and believed in its eventual success; a 
defining aspect of `good morale'. This contradicts some recent opinions expressed on 
919 Correspondence from Mrs M Playle, 2001. 
920 North Shields Library website [http: //www. libraryclub. co. uk/Memories/memory32. html], April 
2004. 
921 This is largely true, despite the peculiar class distribution that did exist on Tyneside. For example, 
many of the middle classes lived in Gosforth, and did not consider themselves to be either Geordies or 
part of Tyneside culture. 
22 Correspondence from Mr T Smith, 2001. 
923 Correspondence from Mrs M Playle, 2001. 
924 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, April 25`h 1940. 
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the state of the optimism of the British public. 25 Despite the experiences of Mollie 
Panter-Downe of workers redoubling their efforts after the victory at El-Alamein it 
would appear that, on Tyneside, both victory and defeat could serve to inspire the 
workforce. This was reflected by the increase in the productivity of Tyneside 
shipyard workers upon hearing the news of heavy naval losses. Initial consternation 
rapidly gave way to renewed determination. 
It is noticeable that in all the accounts which I received, through interviews, 
private correspondence, or via the world-wide web, not one expressed any doubt that 
the war would eventually be won. Yes, some contributors expressed the fact that they 
were fearful during the war, or that some terrible events occurred, but there is no trace 
of defeatism. Of course, this may be simply that such emotions were not expressed at 
the time and that since Britain was victorious such admissions now would seem out of 
keeping with the national myth of stoic determination and the will to win. However, 
it does seem remarkable that there should be such consistency and this does imply, 
although it is impossible to guarantee, that morale and confidence in victory remained 
high throughout Tyneside. The prevailing attitude seems to be summed up as though 
the situation was at times bleak confidence in eventual victory remained strong. 
Many of the community networks described above had existed, to greater or 
lesser degrees, on Tyneside before the war. However, the confusion of war 
introduced complicating factors into established community networks. The billeting 
of members of the regular armed forces, foreign military personnel, and others all had 
an impact on the established community, whilst the process of mass evacuation at the 
beginning of the war and the local billeting of children from London during the period 
of the V1 and V2 attacks, as well as the exigencies of wartime work or service, often 
925 MacKay, R, Half the Battle, p 258. 
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led to the dislocation of that most basic communal network, the family unit. The 
willingness of families in allowing their children to return home from evacuation 
billets despite the risk of aerial attack reflects the depth of these communal links, even 
when placed under wartime stresses. 
The bombing of Tyneside, however, led to a shift in some definitions of 
community. It would appear that the people of Tyneside, in common with other 
areas, withdrew into smaller, more isolated, groups after they had undergone the 
experience of aerial bombardment. Rather than feeling themselves to be part of the 
community of Tyneside the victims often narrowed their definition of belonging and 
instead became concerned only with their own town, street, or family. This can be 
seen from the reaction to the worst incident to occur on wartime Tyneside, the 
destruction of Wilkinson's air raid shelter in North Shields 926 On the night of May 
3 `d 1941 a bomb destroyed the communal shelter that was in the basement of 
Wilkinson's lemonade factory. The shelter was, "extremely popular among the 
residents of a working class district", and, on this Saturday night, the shelter was 
crowded 927 Unfortunately the machinery and ingredients in the factory above 
collapsed into the shelter and 105 people were killed. This was a devastating blow to 
the town. Morale plummeted and took some time to recover. However, the report for 
this period from Newcastle fails even to mention the incident and describes the state 
of morale as "good" 928 This would appear to show that the people of Newcastle upon 
Tyne, probably in common with others, were not affected adversely by a tragedy in a 
neighbouring town. Experiences during . the war often led to communities 
withdrawing into ever-smaller units in order to adjust to the situation. 
926 Described in Chapter 5. 
927 The Shields Evening News, May 5th 1941, p 1. 929 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, May 10`h 1941. 
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The level of comprehension of how localised, community, experiences fit into 
the more general wartime situation was demonstrated to varying degrees on Tyneside. 
However, it would appear that individuals found it easier to adjust to a traumatic 
experience by localising it, and thus, placing it within an established community 
network, whereupon it could become a shared experience. This would appear to back 
up the Home Intelligence interpretation that very few connections were made between 
"the bomb at the corner of our street" and the wartime position in genera1929 In this 
case the community location has become narrowed down to the level of people living 
in the same street. It appears that it was this localisation of experience that enabled 
the majority of the wartime public, both on Tyneside and across Great Britain, to 
adjust so readily to the, often testing, wartime situations that they were faced with. 
The localisation of experiences also helped to strengthen and to develop the 
community network bonds that had became vital, during the war. 930 
Reactions to air raids varied considerably across the nation. On Tyneside 
there are no accurately documented cases of air raid related behaviour which could be 
termed panic. There are anecdotal references to mental casualties caused by bombing. 
The day after the raid which destroyed the New Bridge Street Goods Station one local 
resident gave birth to twins. Several days later it was noted that the babies were 
twitching and a doctor was sent for, he concluded that the babies were suffering from 
shell shock. 931 Some local residents, especially children, were perhaps unaware of the 
seriousness of the situation and thought that the air raids represented the chance for 
adventure. This can be seen in the morale boosting pastime of shrapnel collecting that 
was all pervasive amongst the young boys of Tyneside. A young girl on Tyneside 
929 NA: INF 1/264. Home Intelligence Daily Report, September 21`t 1940. 930 This concurs with the geographical `scales theory'.. This theory is an attempt to explain 
communities in terms of identity hierarchies. 
931 North Shields Library website [http: //www. libraryclub. co. uk/Memories/memory_l01. html], April 
2004. 
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throughout the war remembered thinking of the raids as, "an adventure", and 
declared 
that she was never frightened during the war. 
932 Another, a boy who was eleven when 
the air raids began, remembered being scared at first but coming to actually enjoy 
them. He did however ascribe this emotion to youthful ignorance. 
33 The resilience, 
encouraged by ignorance, of youth often meant that it was the young who were 
least 
affected by the bombing. 34 Instead a relatively common consensus appears to have 
been that "the war was a source of excitement for us. At our age we did not realise 
the danger" 935 Although the young tended to shrug off the dangers there were some 
exceptions. One such case, a fifteen-year old boy at the time, remembers being sent 
to the doctor because he was behaving in an irrational manner. He had recently 
narrowly escaped serious injury in a bombing raid and was diagnosed as suffering 
from shock. 936 
Analysis of the morale of youths and children was an aspect often overlooked, 
especially early in the war, but was vitally important to the emotional state of the 
community. For a youth or child it is the basic family unit that represents the most 
important community network in their lives. "It is within the family that the first of 
the series of group identifications out of which morale is built takes place. s937 It was 
not uncommon for an individual's standard of morale to rest solely on his conception 
of belonging to a family community. In wartime many Tyneside youths found 
themselves belonging to the community that grew around the ARP services through 
participation with the Messenger Service. This was one of the few areas in which 
youth community could interact with adult community on an equal footing and proved 
932 Anonymous correspondence, 2001. 
933 Correspondence from Mr D Charlton, 2001. 
934 For Robert Westall, his experiences of growing up on wartime Tyneside influenced his children's 
books. See Westall, R, The Machine-Gunners (London: Macmillan, 1975). 
935 Correspondence from Mr E Walker, 2001. 
936 Correspondence from MR J Jefferson, 2001. 
937 Zorbaugh, H, `The Morale Needs of Youth', p 247. 
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to be important in the upkeep of youth morale as they allowed a process of 
"integration and identification of youth with the community" 938 This was vital as it 
was important that for youths, as well as adults, "war increases both the need and the 
opportunity for youth to feel it is part of the community, with a role to play in its life 
and defense. "939 The evacuation of so many Tyneside children away from -the 
threatened areas resulted in a great degree of social dislocation to the family units that 
were essential to their development. The importance of the shared experience was 
undermined by the evacuation. The, usually, supportive family unit was disrupted 
with the result that many of the affected children, youths, and adults showed signs of 
decreased morale. Such disruption can at least be partially blamed for the rise in 
juvenile crime that accompanied the return of evacuees to Tyneside 940 It has been 
shown that "family disruption ... seems to be as strong a predictor of self-reported 
and official delinquency as other major risk factors". 41 Not only were children 
separated from their families for varying amounts of time but, when they returned, 
they often found that their parents were working longer hours and there was no 
system of schooling in place for them. Separation from the family environment was 
the key factor in the expressions of homesickness or loneliness voiced by both 
evacuees and by their parents on Tyneside, and resulted in the majority of evacuees 
returning to their families within weeks or months of leaving. On occasions when 
entire schools were evacuated together with their teachers the bond between classes 
and teachers became even stronger and acted as a surrogate family unit. Despite this, 
many children were still returned to Tyneside at the request of their parents. 
9381bid, p 246. 
939 Ibid. 
Sao . WAS: PA/NC/5/55. Police intelligence report on conditions in Newcastle upon Tyne, February 
29`h 1940. 
941 Haas, H, Farrington, D P, Killias, M, and Sattar, G, `The Impact of Different Family Configurations 
on Delinquency', British Journal of Criminology, 44,4 (April 2004), p 520. 
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In order to understand some of the attitudes that prevailed on wartime 
Tyneside we must recognise the type of war that was being experienced. The 
bombing of civilians was not a battle in the conventional sense of the word. The 
affected civilian population could not, in any effective manner, fight back directly 
against the enemy overhead. They were vulnerable, battling not to win but to survive. 
The only victories to be had were those won by not giving in to panic and in 
continuing to function as normally as possible, thus contributing to both the local 
community and to the national war effort. This was why morale was seen as key and 
why this imprecise, nebulous, subject was so rigorously and continually monitored. 
The government placed great importance on the assessment of morale during the war, 
allocating substantial resources to this task. In order to recognise the significance of 
the morale question we must first consider the reasons behind the government's 
obsession with morale and, indeed, the official definition of morale itself. In the wake 
of the allied victory in the First World War, the -belief, perpetuated 
by the German 
military, that the victory was largely attributable to the collapse of civilian morale 
inside Germany, and consequent revolution, became widely acknowledged. This was 
supported by the collapse of Russia in 1917 and the subsequent revolution. As a 
result it was recognised by every major European government that, in the event of 
another major war occurring, the question of maintaining civilian morale on the home 
front would be as fundamentally important as the strength of armed forces and the 
tactical ability of commanders. The lessons of 1917 and 1918 were a salutary 
reminder to the governments of the late 1930's of the "political consequences of 
"942 failure to sustain the spirit and commitment of the people. 
942 Mackay, R, The Test of War, p137. 
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The question of determining morale on Tyneside, and indeed nationally, 
proved to be one of perplexing complexity throughout the war. Morale is an elusive 
concept, one which both historians and governments have struggled to define and 
assess. Even the definition of what exactly represents morale is one that troubled the 
government of the time and, indeed, it has continued to trouble historians seeking to 
explore the topic. Arthur Marwick described two distinct forms of morale: active and 
passive. Active morale was characterised by exuberant behaviour, laughing at the 
dangers of the war and by the extensive use of defiant gestures, whether in speech or 
in action. The original reaction to Dunkirk was characterised by this sort of 
pugnacious defiance and it can be argued that the myth of the `Dunkirk spirit' stems 
from this reaction. Passive morale however evinced a quieter sort of determination, 
or even a grimly stoical acceptance of the situation. 943 The Mass Observation 
organisation, which was contracted by the government to aid the assessment of 
morale, came up with a more analytical definition of the subject. By 1940 the 
organisation offered the following definition for the term `morale': "determination to 
carry on ... determination to carry on with the utmost energy, a determination based 
on realization of the facts of life and with it a readiness for many minor and some 
major sacrifices ... Good morale means hard and persistent work, means optimum 
production, maximum unity, reasonable awareness of the true situation, and absence 
of complacency and confidence which are not based on fact. , 944 
As the war continued the theory of what morale actually was continued to 
evolve; by 1943 it was more fully developed. The definition of morale from 1943 can 
still be used by historians today as it is an effective and well defined tool and has been 
943 Marwick, A, The Home Front (London: Thames and Hudson, 1976). 944 MacKay, R, Half the Battle, p 2. 
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further developed by historians, such as Robert MacKay. 45 Morale is split into two 
separate factors: attitudes and behaviour. These defining factors are further split into 
features indicative of either high or low standards of morale. In the case of attitudes 
the indicators of low morale include: panic, hysteria, depression, apathy, pessimism 
and defeatism. Attitudes indicative of high morale are largely the opposites of those 
for low morale such as: calm and cheerfulness, support for leaders and leadership 
structures, both military and civil, the belief that the country would ultimately be 
victorious and a steady commitment to any tasks or duties. The types of behaviour 
indicative of low morale are as follows: flight to safer areas (trekking); a build up of 
the shelter mentality; general grumbling and the unfair apportioning of blame; 
absenteeism and other forms of industrial action. Once again the positive indicators 
are, unsurprisingly, the opposites of the negative: cooperativeness and neighbourly 
feeling; high productivity and low levels of. absenteeism; and a large proportion of 
volunteers 946 
In purely psychological terms acute demoralisation can be split into three 
separate reactions: overwhelming terror which results in random activity; terror with 
the result that a person becomes obsessed with escape from the situation; and terror 
resulting in a psychoneurotic episode. 947 As. there were very few instances of 
members of the Tyneside public requiring - professional psychological assistance 
(although available help was limited and the prevailing spirit of the time, reinforcing 
the need to remain outwardly confident, could have prevented some from seeking aid, 
it is certainly true that instances of severe mental problems were remarkably few) this 
would seem to imply that the Tyneside public was at no point seriously demoralised. 
9451bid, p 3. 
946 Ibid. 
947 Sullivan, H S, `Psychiatric Aspects of Morale', The American Journal of Sociology, 47,3 
(November 1941), p 280. 
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Demoralisation is characterised by the inability to think straight and the propensity to 
look for any simple solution, however impractical. In the case of Britain during the 
war this would surely have resulted in people demanding peace with Germany at any 
cost, this did not happen on any large scale and, on Tyneside, the only activity of this 
nature was from the PPU and the Jehovah's Witnesses, although this did continue 
throughout the war. 948 There were those who wanted to find a peaceful solution to the 
war, especially after the defeat of France and the Low Countries. Several leading 
politicians advocated this course throughout 1939 and early 1940.949 On Tyneside 
there does not appear to have been widespread support for peace overtures but there 
were some individuals who still maintained faith in pacifism and the policy of 
appeasement, including the President of the North of England Shipowners' 
Association and former governmental peace envoy, Lord Runciman. 95° 
Some of these indicators, however, are rather vague and are easily open to 
misinterpretation. To take grumbling as a sign of low morale could be a mistake as, 
so long as it does not lead to other forms of negative behaviour, it can, and often was, 
merely a form of `letting off steam' rather than a reflection of declining or poor 
morale. Even the incidences of flight to safer areas away from bombing have to be 
treated with caution. In many cases the people who were behind this behaviour, often 
but not always members of the middle classes, left only for the night and returned to 
their places of work the next day despite the increased difficulties of travel. The 
majority "did not go berserk ... They required neither priest nor psychiatrist. "951 It 
would seem that they were willing to carry on with their duties but took action to 
withdraw themselves from danger, and thus removed a further burden from the ARP 
948 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, 1939-1945. 
949 Ponting, C, 1940. Myth and Reality (London: Cardinal 1990), pp 96-119. 
950 TWAS: 1070/21. North of England Shipowners' Association, annual report, 1939, pp 21-23. 951 Harrisson, T, Living through the Blitz, p 279. 
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Services. They would seem to have shown attitudes and behaviour that, when seen in 
the light of the above morale formula, was contradictory but the lack of true panic and 
hysteria would seem to imply that their morale remained, if not good, then at least 
steady. It would seem that the definition of morale will continue to be troublesome 
but the definition given above remains as a good general indicator. 
The government body with the responsibility for the assessment of morale was 
the Ministry of Information and, on Tyneside, a substantial intelligence gathering 
network was fashioned. This network was composed of widely differing groups of 
people or organisations, spearheaded by the Ministry of Information's own Regional 
Officer, who was based in Newcastle along with a team of civil servants seconded 
from their duties to monitor morale and to ensure the relaying of positive news 
stories. The Regional Information Officer's were assisted by the system of Local 
Information Committees that were formed prior to any bombing. These aided the 
Regional Officer by maintaining, and utilising, contacts with local political parties, 
business leaders, union officials, and the press. The Local Information Committees 
were solely concerned with the monitoring, and improvement, of local morale. The 
system, however, was not operational, despite extensive planning, until March 1940, 
largely due to the concerns of the Labour Party. 952 
The Regional Officer was assisted by the following groups: local police force 
duty rooms which collated reports and Chief Constable's who sent these reports on to 
London; the employees of firms such as WH Smith; the censors employed by the 
Royal Mail; and the BBC Listeners Research Department. Mass Observation was 
also contracted by the Ministry to undertake' inquiries into the state of morale in 
952 McLaine, I, The Ministry of Morale (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp 46-47. 
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different regions and to, "survey the development and variations in morale. "953 
This 
organisation used volunteers to gather information on local feeling and, with 
its 
distrust of officialdom, provided a counterbalance to the official intelligence reports 
provided by the Ministry. 954 Later in the war part time observers were also employed 
to gather information through informal conversation with members of the public and 
this also played a contributory part in the assessment of morale in both a regional and 
in a more general, national, manner. 955 
One factor that definitely did affect local morale was the inadequate, or 
inaccurate, dissemination of news, especially in the first two years of the war. This 
was of increasing concern to several groups: The newspaper owners who felt that 
their industry was being emasculated by censorship, the local officials responsible for 
the interpretation and reporting of regional morale, and the Ministry of Information 
itself. In Newcastle upon Tyne, by late 1940, the summary of intelligence reports 
collated by the duty room of the local police and authorised by the Chief Constable 
was claiming that the Ministry of Information - was the subject of strong local 
complaint and that it was being claimed that it was the reticence of this Ministry in 
reporting the war news that "gave scope for rumours to spread. "956 It is important to 
grasp just how limited the means were-of obtaining news at this time. People relied 
95' Beaven, B, and Griffiths, J, Mass Observation and Civilian Morale: Working Class Communities 
during the Blit; 1940-1941 (Mass fteryation Occasional Paper, number 8) (Brighton; Univcr5ily of 
Sussex, 1998), p 4. 
954 Mass Observation, founded by Tom Harrisson, carried out extensive social surveys during the war, 
not only in London but in the industrial northern towns and in Scotland. However, the information 
provided on Tyneside is more limited and it is often the case that the few observers who were present 
in the area were from outside the region and misunderstood the character of the Tyneside public. This 
is a common problem with Mass Observation observers of the period. Being drawn from, mainly, the 
middle class their observations tend to be somewhat prejudiced. As such, Mass Observation, whilst 
otherwise an eminently useful source of information, must be utilised with great caution. 
955 MacKay, R, The Test of War, pp 142-143. 
956 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle City Police, October 11`h 1940. 
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on newspapers, newsreels in cinemas, and on the radio for news coverage. 
957 In 1942 
there were over 9 million radio licenses issued and it was estimated that more than 
68% of the population could regularly listen to a radio broadcast. 958 The most popular 
daily newspaper the Daily Express, in 1937, enjoyed a daily circulation of almost 2.25 
million 959 Cinema audiences increased by 507 million from 1938 to 1942 and by the 
middle of the war the yearly cinema attendance was almost 1,500 million people. 960 
The effect on morale from a lack of faith in the reliability of British news can be seen 
in the increasing numbers who were believed to be listening to enemy propaganda 
broadcasts and, more worryingly, were willing to believe them over the official, 
British, news broadcasts. This also enabled the spread of rumours such as the anxiety 
that was experienced in the wake of an enemy broadcast which declared Newcastle to 
be the next target of a Coventry style aerial attack. 961 Complaints regarding the 
scarcity of war news continued to be voiced on Tyneside and, by January 1941, it was 
stated that the enemy broadcasts were more up to date than their British counterparts 
and that this was "the main [cause of] complaint" in the area. 62 Obviously this 
demonstrates a factor that had an undermining effect on the morale of Tyneside 
residents. As late as May 1941 it was reported that, on Tyneside, the "General feeling 
is that no news is bad news", and that the scarcity of war news was, once again, being 
heavily criticised by the general public 963 This could and did lead to displays of 
pessimism, grumbling, and the spread of rumours; all signs of decaying active and 
passive morale. It is clear that the people of Tyneside wished to know what was 
957 For a discussion of radio broadcasting during the war, see Briggs, A, The History of Broadcasting in 
the United Kingdom Volume 111. The War of Words (London: Oxford University Press, 1970). 
958 Thorpe, A, The Longman Companion, p 72. 
9591bid, p 71. 
960 Browning, H E, and Sorrell, A A, `Cinemas and Cinema-Going in Great Britain', Journal of the 
Royal Statistical Society, 111 (1954), p 134. 
961 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle City Police, December 6'h _ 20th 1940. 962 Ibid, January 18`h 1941. 
963 Ibid, May 26d' 1941. f 
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happening in the prosecution of the war and why and that this was vital if the morale 
of the area was to be sustained through a long and drawn out conflict. 
The restriction of information was official policy, largely at the behest of the 
heads of the armed forces, but after the autumn of 1940 a perceptible change 
occurred. Some dissenting voices inside the Ministry of Information had already been 
campaigning for much greater honesty in news releases but it was the appointment of 
Brendan Bracken as Minister of Information in the summer of 1941 that saw the 
impetus gathering behind this new policy. Bracken saw that in order to maintain good 
morale it was necessary for the general public to feel that they were kept abreast of 
the situation and that they received a good supply of honest war news. He reiterated 
his beliefs when he said, "the people must be told the news about the war because 
without them and their spirit, we cannot achieve victory. "964 The view that accurate 
and timely news broadcasts were important to the sustenance of morale would seem 
to have been backed up by the experiences of the people of Tyneside who remained, 
throughout the war, finely attuned to overly optimistic propaganda in news 
broadcasts. Throughout early 1942 there were complaints over what was being 
perceived as the deliberately overly optimistic misrepresentation of news from the 
Russian front. 965 
Some influential students of morale thought that other factors should also have 
been taken into account during the assessment process. Stephen Taylor, the Head of 
Home Intelligence at the Ministry of Information, believed that the determinants of 
morale could be separated into material and mental factors. Included amongst the 
material factors were such things as food supplies, work, and adequate leisure time. 
He stated that mental factors that could affect morale included: beliefs in eventual 
964 MacKay, R, Half the Battle, pp 145-146. 
965 TWAS: PAINC/5155. Summary of Reports, Newcastle City Police, February 27th 1942, 
329 
victory, in the equality of sacrifice being asked, and that the war was just and 
unavoidable. All of these factors can be seen to have affected morale on Tyneside at 
one time or another during the course of the war but they were often combined with 
other, previously discussed, factors. Obviously the subject of morale continues to be 
complex and an overall definition, elusive. American psychologists were faced with a 
similar need to define and gauge morale after that country entered the war and they 
appear to have come up with more democratic methods of attempting to measure 
public confidence. The favoured methodology was to use the opinion poll with which 
all Americans were already familiar along with simplified psychiatric interview 
techniques. 966 The efficacy of these measures was equally debatable when compared 
to the British system of estimating morale which, after the initial problems of 1939- 
1942, worked extremely efficiently. 
One of the tactics employed to boost morale on Tyneside was to arrange for 
visits from members of the royal family or government in order to praise the workers 
of the area and to heighten the feeling of national inclusiveness. The policy of 
holding public meetings involving Cabinet Ministers was initially launched to oppose 
the Pacifist and Communist elements which had been campaigning since 1939. There 
were also concerns that the Labour Party was exploiting the wartime situation by 
supporting the war and by claiming the plaudits when it was seen to stand up for the 
rights of the people, a policy that was also employed on Tyneside later in the war by 
the British Communist Party. By February 1940 the meetings were more concerned 
with raising morale than with party politics 967 Gauging the importance of these 
measures in terms of morale is problematic; it is obvious that, as a result of their 
localised nature, these visits had a limited scope and impact. References to the visits 
966 Ruch, F L, `The Problem of Measuring Morale', Journal of Educational Sociology, 15,4 (December 
1941), pp 221-228. 
967 McLaine, 1, The Ministry, pp 47-48. 
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are made in the police reports on morale although the reports are often ambiguous. 
The earlier report of the visit of the Secretary of State for War, the Right Honourable 
Oliver Stanley, MP, in February 1940, is a good example of this. A speech given to a 
large audience at the City Hall in Newcastle was said to have been warmly received 
despite minor incidents of heckling interrupting the speech. Without knowing who 
was present at the meeting we cannot make any informed judgements of the degree of 
opposition to the Secretary's speech or whether the interruption were from some 
pacifist group such as the PPU. 
As can be seen by the events in London, the visit by a dignitary or well-known 
figure could be a very effective boost to active morale, although only in a localised 
area and only for a short period. The tactic of using visiting dignitaries to boost 
morale was not confined to Tyneside, with most areas of the country benefiting from 
this. The tactic was not always successful, but it would seem that accounts of the 
King and Churchill being booed by crowds in London have been exaggerated and that 
the reception in London, as on Tyneside, was generally warm. 968 The royal family 
toured the provinces extensively during the war, with the industrial powerhouse areas, 
such as Tyneside and Glasgow, seeing frequent visits. These visits, such as the tour 
by the King and Queen to Glasgow in June 1942, included inspections of key wartime 
industries, especially shipbuilding, and often lasted several days. 69 
Tyneside, in common with the rest of the country, suffered from rationing and 
wartime shortages. This was also recognised as a possible threat to the morale of the 
area and the occurrences of queuing came in for especial criticism. Queuing for food 
was reported to be prevalent on Tyneside throughout the spring of 1941 and it was felt 
'68 Ziegler, P, London at War 1939-1945 (London: Pimlico, 2002), pp 164-165. 
969 Osborn, B, and ArmWvong, R. Glasgow, A City at War (Edinburgh. Dirlinn. 2003), p 95, 
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that the queues occurred most often in the "poorer areas". 970 It was felt that queuing 
could lead to grumbling and the subsequent spreading of rumours detrimental to the 
maintenance of local morale and that, where possible, queuing should have been 
actively discouraged. This proved to be impossible and by 1943 Newcastle City 
Police were growing increasingly concerned about the queues of upwards of 200 
women attempting to purchase commodities such -as stockings. 71 The majority of 
those who formed the queues were of "the poorer classes". 72 However, the official 
views of the possible pitfalls attached to queuing are not borne out by the testimony of 
those who formed the queues on Tyneside. - Once again this reflects the reality that 
grumbling and gossiping was not, necessarily, an indication of worsening, or poor, 
morale as was believed by the Ministry of Information and that it could actually serve 
to improve the situation by strengthening the bonds of community. One young girl of 
six who lived in western Newcastle remembers the gossip that occurred in the food 
queues, to which she was frequently sent by her mother, as a positive experience. She 
"used to love to listen to the older women chatting ... I used to run home to main to 
tell her all the chat. 073 Swapping items that had been queued for amongst neighbours 
would appear to have been common practice, as was sending children out to queue for 
commodities. 974 It would appear that the queues were, for many of those forced to 
endure them, a factor which could provide. important bonds to their local community 
and, indeed, the queues themselves appear to have been . another link 
in the 
community networks discussed earlier. 
970 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, May 10`h 1941. 
971 Ibid, May 21" 1943. 
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The relationship between morale and the rationing of goods are both 
reciprocal and complicated. Levels of shortages and the efficiency of the system are 
both key to the correlation between morale and rationing. If the system of rationing is 
seen to be fair and well managed it provides an added sense of security and communal 
togetherness. When there was a perceived flaw in the system the residents of 
Tyneside were not slow to complain. They were prepared to sacrifice goods if it was 
clear that all were suffering equally, although their ability to detect unfairness 
remained keen throughout the war. Tyneside was particularly plagued by shortages of 
fresh fruit, it was claimed that the area had been almost deprived of this delicacy for 
almost three years. 75 Complaints made to the national press regarding this issue were 
only exacerbated when a consignment of bitter Seville Oranges, only good for making 
marmalade, for which little sugar was available, were delivered 976 Indeed, 
throughout the war the rationing system would appear to have been perceived as 
unfair by many on Tyneside. Shortages of meat, fish, and vegetables all solicited 
complaints from the Tyneside public, from time to time. The duality of the 
relationship between rationing and morale also meant that when morale was high and 
support for the national effort high then the system of rationing was accepted with 
good grace. 77 Rationing was not, however, always accepted with good grace. Many 
residents of Tyneside resented perceived unfairness in the system and this could 
reinforce the sense of injustice that had. been brewing, since the 1930s. Such 
discontent was not necessarily an indicator of diminishing support for the war effort. 
Although more usually seen as being detrimental to morale, rationing could 
provide a boost to the well-being of some. These were usually the better off with a 
973 The Times, March 9`h 1944, p 5. 
976 Ibid. 
977 Anderson, C A, `Food Rationing and Morale', American Sociological Review, 8,1 (February 1943), 
p25. 
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social conscience or a developed sense of patriotism. For such individuals rationing 
was one way in which they could achieve a sense of sacrifice, participation, and 
shared communal experience. 978 The policy of developing factory canteens stemmed 
solely from the policy of ensuring that workers had access to nutritious meals, it also 
created a boost in production by ensuring that workers took shorter breaks and 
remained on site during these meal breaks. This was a morale boosting development 
for workers in that it allowed them to maintain their morale whilst engaged in 
important war work. Alongside this, the wartime shortages also led to the 
establishment of pig clubs whilst the `dig for victory' campaign resulted in gardens 
and allotments being cultivated with vigour. These simple measures allowed the 
people of Tyneside to supplement their wartime ration and served to lift morale by 
involving them in a social, communal, activity. 
Activity was vital if the morale of Tyneside was to be kept at a high level as 
inactivity or activity solely concerned with the war effort could lead to boredom. 
Several schemes were introduced or, improved to enhance the social activity of the 
British people during wartime. A key way of getting people involved in social 
activities was through the use of educational - classes. The Workers Educational 
Association (North East Division) continued its pre-war work with a panoramic 
selection of classes that could be taken by anyone. These classes ranged from 
Economics and Social Policy to Music and Art. Obviously, the number of those who 
could regularly attend declined as the wartime situation worsened but even in 1941, 
the worst year of the war, on Tyneside, some 3,508 people were involved in the 
project. 979 The improvement of educational standards also led to a further 
97slbid, p 24. 
979 TWAS: E/WEA1/7/6-9, Workers Educational Trade Union Committee: North Eastern Divisional 
Committee minutes, June 1" 1941 - May 31" 1942. 
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engagement with the possibilities of post-war reconstruction and thus also helped to 
sustain high morale. 
The lack of an outlet for hitting back at the enemy bombers proved to be a 
major frustration for many and it was this emotion that provided the bedrock of the 
support for an extensive bombing campaign against Germany. RAF Bomber 
Command provided one of the few consistent boosts to morale over the course of the 
majority of the war. Its bombing of Germany, once it had been acknowledged by the 
military strategists that crews could not solely confine their aim to military 
installations, provided timely boosts to morale and assured the public that British 
forces were striking back and that the German public was on the receiving end of 
similar punishment to that which the British were suffering. In fact for the early years 
of the war the bombing campaign was marked by incompetent command, inadequate 
equipment, minimal results, and heavy losses. Throughout the winter of 1941 and the 
first months of 1942 concerns regarding the effectiveness of the bombing campaign 
were being expressed. The Butt Report of August 1941 backed up this pessimistic 
view and related that only 25% of crews claiming to have bombed a target were 
within five miles of it. 980 Despite the failure of this campaign the morale effect that it 
had on the public was immeasurable. Bomber command raids are mentioned 
sporadically throughout wartime intelligence reports measuring the morale of 
Tyneside and their impact is always positive. Attacks of a special nature, such as the 
raid on the Ruhr Dams or raids on Berlin, were said to have a particularly "stimulating 
effect on the public"981 
980 Middlebrook, M and Everitt, C, The Bomber Command War Diaries. An operational reference 
book 1939-1945 (Leicester. Midland, 1996), pp 220-222. 
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The first months of the war, after the fall of Poland in 1939, were marked by 
confusion amongst the British population as the government refused to state exactly 
what the aims of the war were. The Ministry of Information became increasingly 
concerned with the growing scepticism and complacency of the public. The 
criticisms aimed at the wartime measures that were in place, including the black-out 
and the Civil Defence and ARP Organisations, were seen as signifying a developing 
complacency. No action had occurred and, as a result, apprehension quickly gave 
way to apathy. At Newcastle upon Tyne the main target for public dissatisfaction was 
the lighting restrictions 982 The number of road deaths caused by the blackout had 
increased tenfold in Newcastle upon Tyne 983 This was of course reinforced by the 
paucity of war news that was being released, this resulted in an emergent belief that 
nothing was happening and encouraged apathy and boredom with the war effort984 
Nationally, the first months of the war, from September 1939 to the early 
spring of 1940, when the impact was slight, was the period when the lowest morale 
was registered. This is not, however, reflected in the assessments of morale on 
Tyneside. Throughout 1939 the morale of the public was consistently described as 
being very high with only minor complaints being mentioned. Despite this there are 
indications that, under the surface, the confusion that the Ministry suspected to be 
common still existed, one report mentions "extensive reports of grumbling amongst 
the public" . 
985 A further example of one of the behavioural indicators of bad morale 
as recognised by the Ministry of Information. By the end of April 1940 there was a 
discernible upturn in assessed morale, with the reaction towards the Norwegian 
922 Ibid. December 9'h 1939. 
9E3 The Times, October 19th 1939, p 8. 
9" McLaine, I, The Ministry, pp 34-39. 
9" TWAS: PA/NGS/SS. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, December 9d 1939. 
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campaign being described as particularly positive 986 This optimism was short-lived 
as the ignominious end of the aforementioned campaign led to extensive criticism of 
the number of losses and to the muddled leadership of British forces that had been 
demonstrated throughout. 927 This criticism of leadership represented one of the 
indicators of low morale but at no point did this spill over into more general defeatism 
and, indeed, the majority of Tyneside residents appear to have retained their belief 
that victory, though not without significant cost, would be attained. 
1941 was to prove difficult for Tyneside. This was the year that saw the 
heaviest bombing of the region (82% of the civilian fatalities suffered in the area 
occurred in this year), and this was at times reflected in official estimates of the state 
of morale in the area. Concerns were raised throughout the year regarding food 
shortages and allegations of profiteering were made against some shopkeepers. The 
"increasing dissatisfaction over the uneven distribution of food" was beginning to 
adversely affect the morale of the area. This was a major concern as it was felt by the 
Ministry of Information that one of the non-material factors key to the maintenance of 
high morale was that people were "convinced that all sections and classes of the 
community were suffering and enduring equally. i988 Uneven distribution of food, and 
the bombing of predominantly working-class fed feelings of class and regional 
distinction. The emotions engendered were detrimental to the state of morale. As a 
result of the shortages queuing was starting to become a more regular occurrence in 
the area, yet another threat as perceived by the Ministry. 
The shortage of food and goods was not the only threat to the morale of 
Tyneside during this period as local defences also came in for criticism during the 
year and there were protests that important installations, especially shipyards, were 
"6 Ibid, April 25th 1940. 
'a' Ibid, May 9" 1940. 
921 McLaine, I, The Ministry, p 113. 
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not being adequately protected from air attack whilst, throughout the first half of the 
year, the Peace Pledge Union and the Jehovah's Witnesses were more active than they 
had been over the previous 12 months. Several incidents of peace slogans being 
chalked on walls were noted, a sure sign that morale was at a low ebb amongst some 
sections of the community. Worryingly, industrial unrest was also on the increase 
after the relative peace of the previous year; yet another sign of declining morale and 
commitment. The war news, which -. %-as almost unrelentingly bad until the victory at 
El Alamein was announced in November 1942, also began to affect local morale and 
a calming speech made by Churchill as described as having been "needed to 
reassure some sections of the community? '989 Towards the end of the year that old 
bugbear, complaints regarding the blackout, appeared once more, with a small 
campaign to relax lighting restrictions . 
990 Feeling regarding this matter had never 
really gone away with one man even suing Newcastle Corporation for injuries and 
damages sustained when he crashed his motorcycles into an unlit air raid shelter. 991 
All of these factors would appear to represent a serious diminishment of morale on 
Tyneside. Grumbling, the apportioning of blame, and industrial action are all 
behavioural indicators of bad morale whilst depression and pessimism, which it would 
appear were present, are both attitudinal indicators of poor morale. 
Despite all of these factors, however, the general assessment claimed that the 
state of morale on Tyneside remained high throughout 1941; but, as can be seen by 
the examples given above, the situation was becoming increasingly volatile. In 
contradiction to the poor indicators already mentioned, however, there were also signs 
of positive morale throughout the year. Despite the heavy bombing that occurred, it 
appears that the people of Tyneside reacted well under pressure and were not unduly 
989 TWAS: PA/NC/5155. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, May 10`h 1941. 
990 Ibid, October 10th 194 1. 
"' The Times, June 16d' 1941, p 2. 
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panicked by the aerial onslaught. At the start of the year there are indications of 
complacency amongst the populace as very few were carrying gas-masks and the 
majority expressed the view that the threat of enemy gas attack was not to be taken 
seriously. 992 The shelter mentality that was seen as one of the behavioural indicators 
of low morale was not to be seen in the area. Sometimes the unwillingness of some 
residents of Tyneside to take to the shelters proved a tragic decision. Of the 50 
civilians killed in Newcastle upon Tyne during the air raid of April 25th it was said 
that many could have been saved if they had been in their shelters. 3 Towards the 
end of the year morale would seem to have been showing signs of improving and by 
the end of August was said to be very high. Even the heavy air raids of September 
failed to dent this assessment and, "despite severe attack morale remained excellent 
and there was no sign of panic"w4 
Even the heavy air attacks on the ports and provincial cities lasting from the 
latter half of 1940 until May 1941, there were 352 civilians killed on Tyneside 
between June 1940 and May 1941 whilst heavy attacks on the area over a period of 
five months from August 1941 left a further 272 casualties, failed to cause the 
universal panic that had been predicted before the war. Doctors were surprised by the 
rugged ability of the British people to adapt to aerial bombing. The frequency of 
"genuine psychiatric air-raid casualties [had] been much lower than might have been 
expected". 95 
1942 has been presented as the turning point of the war, even though the 
positive news of victory at El Alamein did not come until November. At the time 
there were increasing worries that war weariness would serve to erode morale and 
92 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, February 14" 1941. "3 Ibid, May 10ie 1941. 
"4 Ibid, September 121° 1941. 
"s McLaine, I, The Alinistry, p 108. 
339 
that, as people adjusted to the wartime routine, slackness and apathy could become 
larger concerns. There was some evidence of carelessness creeping into the area as 
reflected by the laxity of the blackout, with the local police organising a crackdown 
on offences of this type 9`'6 Shortages of beer were still causing problems with a 
subsequent negative effect on local morale. The propensity for bad war news to have 
a negative effect on morale continued with the assumed ease of German fleet 
movements resulting in criticism alongside that of the situation in Singapore. 
997 
Indeed, concerns over the naval war continued to dominate and the loss of many 
merchant seamen from the area was responsible for further lowering of morale. 8 
The faults within the rationing system continued to erode local morale with green 
vegetables only being available to "those who can afford them". 999 Continued strikes, 
including that of the several hundred dockers described in chapter two, also reflected 
signs of worsening morale in the area. Once again grumbling would appear to be the 
most common indicator of worsening morale and, as described above, this could be 
seen as simply an emotional release valve. 
Although the number, and frequency, of strikes was increasing it is clear that 
the majority of these actions did not win public support and that many were seen as 
being unpatriotic. Positive war news also gave a boost to morale later in the year with 
the news of the successes of local regiments in Egypt being particularly welcomed, '°°° 
a feature that was to re-appear in 1943.1001 It is clear that, despite some evidence of 
poor spirits, the majority of people continued to exhibit indicators of good morale 
with local places of entertainment proving popular and experiencing "phenomenal 
996 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, January 16`h - 30`' 1942. "97 Ibid, February13th - 27`h 1942. 9" Ibid, June 17'h 1942. 
99' Ibid, March 27"1942. 
10°° Ibid, November 7`4 1942. 
1001 The Times, June 25th 1943, p 2. 
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patronage". Over the Christmas period pantomimes also proved popular in the 
locality, with extra performances having to be organised, and helped to raise 
morale. 1002 All of these are reflections of cheerfulness and optimism and, as such, 
reflect positive morale. 
From 1943 onwards, the worries regarding increasing war weariness played a 
larger role. These latter years of the war were characterised by minor, and then major, 
victories but proved to be a long and drawn out slog for those on the home front. The 
people of Tyneside were still expected to provide support for the war effort but were 
now entering their fourth year of rationing, shortages and blackout. It was thought to 
be inevitable that morale would suffer. The text of the official intelligence reports 
deals with this period more scantily than previous years but the overall impression is 
one of weary stoicism highlighted by military victories which provided timely boosts 
to local morale. Food and commodity shortages continued to be the greatest morale 
concern with queuing becoming commonplace, although, as described above, some 
aspects of queuing could provide a positive morale boost. It was 1943 that saw the 
only breaking up of a political gathering on Tyneside during the war. This was during 
a large outside meeting of the peace Pledge Union held on Newcastle Quayside. 
Although a large crowd was present several people objected to one of the main 
speakers and the police were called upon to close down the gathering. 10°3 Obviously 
the mere fact that the PPU could organise and hold such a large meeting indicates that 
there was some demand for settlement even at this late stage of the war. However, the 
strenuous objection of many local people to the meeting is also evidence of patriotism 
and exhibits the `will to win' that was seen as a positive sign of morale by the 
authorities. 
10°2 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, January 5tb 1943. 
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Throughout 1944 and 1945 the overall morale of the area remained high 
despite the increasing weariness of the population. The greatest example of poor 
morale was to be found in the increasing industrial unrest that persisted on Tyneside 
throughout the year. There arc indications, primarily the lack of public support being 
expressed, that this unrest was still viewed by the majority of the population as 
unpatriotic behaviour. When the four organisers of the Apprentices Strike of 1944, 
described in chapter two, were charged with encouraging and providing support for an 
illegal strike, and tried, there was very little public reaction. This indicates that many 
people agreed with the action taken by the government in this matter and were still 
united behind the war effort. 1004 It was during this year that many on Tyneside began 
to see the `beginning of the end' of the war and this gave a renewed boost to the state 
of morale in the area. The relaxation of ARP duties, the standing-down of the Home 
Guard, D-Day, and the lifting of some lighting restrictions, all promised a quick return 
to normality, and held out hope for a quick and decisive victory. There were still 
knocks to morale however. The catastrophic outcome of the Arnhem operation and 
the loss of 96 bombers on a disastrous raid to Nuremburg at the end of March were 
indications that the war could well continue for some time yet. The Arnhem 
operation in particular, coming as it did, late in the year amidst many successes, 
seems to have had a salutary effect on the morale of Tyneside. 10°5 Despite this the 
community remained optimistic and cheerful, as is shown by the fine record 
established in relations between the area and the many American troops who were 
billeted on Tyneside. 1006 
Throughout this period, when victory was all but inevitable, many were 
turning their thoughts to the future. The recommendations of the Beveridge Report, 
1004 Ibid, August 13th 1944. 
1005 Ibid, 5th October 5th 1943. 
J0061bid, April 21"-May 18th 1944. 
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combined with the greater political and social awareness engendered by the war, were 
being actively supported in the face of governmental dithering. The people of 
Tyneside remembered the agonies of the inter-war depressions and wanted no repeat. 
However, the war had given a reprieve to the heavy industries that were failing during 
the 1930s and many correctly assumed that this boom time would not last much 
longer than the war itself. For example, plans were drawn up for change at Vickers- 
Armstrongs Naval Yard, but were hampered by the available machinery and, perhaps 
more tellingly, by the skills deficit of the workforce. The yard prided itself on 
building large ships, the battleships and aircraft carriers of the early part of the 
century, but there was now little demand for such units. It was thought that there 
might be a market for large shipping liners after the war and initial plans were laid to 
cater for this trade. 10°7 During 1945, although industrial unrest continued, it would 
appear that morale was maintained and the VE Day celebrations were described as 
being thankful and "comparatively quiet". 1008 In view of this, can it be said that 
Tyneside, along with many other areas of the country, had `taken it'? 
From the official reports the answer would appear to be in the affirmative. In 
terms of morale it is fair to say that the area seems to have sustained a relative 
buoyancy throughout the war. Unlike the national norm it would appear that morale 
was high in the area from the very outset. This could be explained by the fact that the 
war had brought fuller employment to the region and this cast a positive light after the 
shadows of the depression. The most difficult year in terms of morale was almost 
certainly 1941 -*Nith heavy and sustained attacks damaging many part of the area and 
causing substantial casualties. Despite this there were positives that persisted 
throughout this most difficult year. There was little or no panic, no-one took to the 
10°7 Scott, J D, Vickers, pp 301-312. 
'001 TWAS: PA/NC/S/55. Summary of reports. Newcastle upon Tyne, May 18'h 1945. 
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shelters and stayed there, and trekking was never a great problem on Tyneside. 
Calmness; cheerfulness; support for leaders; neighbourly feeling; continuing high- 
productivity; large numbers of willing voluntary workers; and the belief in ultimate 
victory - these things, which were seen as key indicators of good morale, were all 
displayed throughout the war on Tyneside. Alongside these positive virtues, however, 
were examples of grumbling; willingness to unfairly apportion blame; high levels of 
absenteeism; steadily worsening industrial relations; apathy; and pessimism, all 
indicative of low morale. The greatest threat, from the above list, was the industrial 
unrest that persisted. However, the majority of these actions were not well supported 
by the public, were of short duration, and of limited impact. 
How do we unite these opposite ends of the morale spectrum? The official 
determination of morale on Tyneside was unstintingly praising in its descriptions of 
the population and its resolve. It would seem that, despite the negatives, the people of 
Tyneside maintained a high standard of morale for much of the war with occasional 
troughs. Usually these low points were a result of bad war news or of particularly bad 
air raids on the area and the standards quickly recovered. Tyneside, and its people, 
had `taken it, now they awaited the rewards for which they had struggled. 
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Conclusion 
Areas of Further Interest 
Research undertaken in the preparation of this thesis has pointed up several interesting 
conclusions. The first is that the importance of the region to the national war effort 
has never been thoroughly highlighted. Tyneside contributed huge numbers of men, 
material, and expertise to the war effort. This regional research is useful in that it 
demonstrates how the trajectory of wartime experience can vary according to local 
factors. As such, whilst this research could be considered a microhistory, it also 
makes a significant contribution to our developing knowledge of how Total War can 
affect an entire nation. 
Despite the completion of research for this thesis there are many areas 
within this field that would benefit from further academic study. The industrial 
importance of the area cannot be overstated and there are several important topics that 
would benefit from deep, scholarly study. The continuing popularity of service in the 
Merchant Navy remains a little researched topic, one which is of prime importance to 
the social and industrial make-up of the region. The heavy casualties suffered by 
Tyneside residents in this service are indicative of the substantial numbers of 
Geordies who sailed undefthe red ensign during the war (indeed the service proved to 
be just as popular during peacetime). The merchant service played a large role in 
many Tyneside families, especially those from the communities along the banks of 
the River Tyne. This went hand-in-hand with the importance of the deep-sea fishing 
fleet to the mouth of the Tyne, and northwards, along the coast. Again, very little 
research has been undertaken in this area. 
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The effect of the war on women is a topic which has been researched 
comprehensively at a national level but there has been relatively little work on the 
specific effect of the war on Geordie women-1m In a traditionally masculine 
dominated area, such as Tyneside, the, so-called, emancipatory effect of the war on 
womenfolk would appear to have been considerably lessened. What is more, much of 
the existing research concentrates to a large degree on the gains made by women in 
the workplace as a result of wartime demands. Remarkably little attention has been 
paid to the social ramifications of the war on Tyneside women with regard to their 
domestic duties. 10'° Rationing, long hours, the absence of loved-ones, all combined to 
make the war, for many women, a wearisome and worrying time. There has also been 
little research into those Tyneside women who found themselves part of the armed 
forces during the war. 
As this research has discovered, the social impact of the war on Tyneside was 
immense. Many of the fields, which have been the subject of past research, have 
considered subjects only at a national level. The importance of regional studies in the 
fields of evacuation (particularly with relation to the wholesale evacuation of local 
schools), relations with foreigners, wartime fundraising, and the impact on civil 
liberties, has often been overlooked. 1011 Indeed, so far as research into evacuation on 
Tyneside is concerned, there is huge scope for a detailed survey involving the 
techniques of the oral historian, as many of the participants are still capable of 
contributing their own experiences. Tyneside, and indeed the north-east region in 
X0°9 For one such example, see: Knox, E, `Women, Work and Culture on Tyneside, 1900-1980', 
unpublished PhD thesis, University of Lancaster, 1996. Also Knox, E, `Keep Your Feet Still Geordie 
Hinnie', in Colls, R. and Lancaster, B (eds), Geordies (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1992), 
pp 92-112. 
010 Although dealing with the topic in a national sense, see Parker, K 1., 'Women MP's, Feminism and 
Domestic Policy in the Second World War', unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford University, 1995. 
101 For some local examples of school evacuation policy and experiences, see TWAS: 1634. Church 
high Girl's School, evacuation correspondence, 1939-1942. Also TWAS: E/NC19. Todds Nook 
County Primary School, papers re: evacuation to Arnside and admissions and billeting registers, 1940- 
1942. 
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general, is an excellent location for the research of such topics due to the unique 
characteristics found in the area, and due to the plethora of locally available primary 
material that can be found in the local archives. 
Although this research has remained solely within the borders of Tyneside, the 
neighbouring areas of Northumberland, Teeside (with its chemical and steel 
industries), and \Vcarsidc (another shipbuilding and repairing centre), would all 
benefit from similar research, as relatively little work has currently been completed in 
these locations. Indeed, the study of the war with regard to Northumberland throws 
up some interesting possibilities in the field of rural history. The war had significant 
effects on the rural economy of Britain and, as a large agrarian county, 
Northumberland would represent an exceptional case study. 1012 Whilst, for those 
interested in military history, the defence plan for the Northern Region, including 
Tyneside, would be a long-term research project. Incorporating the regular Army, 
Royal Navy, Home Guard, Auxiliary Units, other volunteers, and the building of 
defensive fortifications, this is another area in which little research has been 
performed. 
Rebuilding would be a priority for any post-war government and this, when 
combined with the political pressures brought to bear by the people themselves, is 
also an under-researched aspect of Tyneside culture, another aspect that would benefit 
from thorough research. Such a study, combining the resurgent political idealism of 
the period with the history of the local economy, and the enthusiasm for planning that 
developed during the war, would represent an important contribution to the area's 
history. 
1012 See Wilt, A F, Food for War. Agriculture and Rearmament in Britain before the Second World 
War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp 223-232. 
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Tyneside at the End of the War 
As the war cnded, Tyneside found itself in a somewhat ambiguous position. 
Whilst the heavy industries were still experiencing great success it was increasingly 
clear that this would not last and that in order to prosper in the times of peace changes 
were necessary. The greatest need was for diversification of the industrial make-up of 
the area. The Tyneside %vorkforce continued to be dominated by the heavy industries. 
In 1944 these industries accounted for more than 57% of all employed males on 
Tyneside. \Vhen added to the distributive trades and local government figures of I S% 
it becomes apparent that the area had only 27°ßö of its male workforce available for the 
developing small manufacturing industries. 1013 New industries had been founded to a 
limited extent and more women were employed in the area than had been the case 
before the war, it was estimated that new developments at the Team Valley Industrial 
Estate accounted for approximately 10,000 new jobs, 50% of them taken by 
women. 1014 Despite some gains being made in this field by Tyneside women the area 
still lagged behind other parts of the country. A post war survey of the area stated that 
there was "no substantial women's factory industry on Tyneside and there has been 
even less opportunity for work in such factories in the neighbouring countryside. "' 015 
More than half of the women who were employed in the area worked in the 
distributive, catering, or laundry industries. 1016 
The post-war report on Tyneside by the Board of Trade is damning in its 
indictment of the areas over-dependence upon the heavy industries of the past. It is 
1013 NA: BT 64/3260. Post-War Survey of Tyneside, 1944, p 3. 
1014 Jbid, Report on Tyneside, General Characteristics of the Area, 1943, p 6. 'ois Ibid, Post-War Survey of Tyneside, 1944, p 3. 
iota Ibid. 
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clear that the 'wartime situation of increased demand for the goods produced by these 
concerns achieved little and, indeed, served to worsen Tyneside's post-war prospects 
by stifling development in other areas of industry. Despite growing employment in 
the engineering fields the Board of Trade inspectors concluded that "The war has not 
brought any new industry to Tyneside. "1017 If the area was to prosper in peacetime it 
would require both substantial government investment and good local management of 
resources. NVhilst it has been claimed that the war served to level class differences, 
there was no guarantee that such levelling, especially when it was related to wartime 
wage structures, would last beyond the conflict. It is true that many manual workers, 
especially those in fields such as engineering, were financially better off during the 
war. This was largely due to increased wages, a lack of consumer goods, and the 
demand for overtime work. However, such benefits were often balanced by the 
numbers of working class families who had members in the forces, and who, as a 
result, received relatively little income. One historian has argued that by examining 
the ownership of property a more pessimistic overview is discernible: there was "very 
little movement out of the working class via accumulation, and it [the war] may even 
have encouraged the widening of property differentials". 1018 
Governmental resources were, however, stretched and Tyneside was only one 
area demanding increased funding. With an estimated 500,000 houses destroyed or 
damaged beyond repair, demand, across the nation for materials and funding was 
high. 1019 The area had not experienced destruction on the scale of many others and 
the need for physical rebuilding, as a result of war damage, was slight. Only in 
specific areas of the region, such as Tynemouth Borough, which lost 5% of it rateable 
101 lbid, p 18. 
10 11 Summerfield, P, 'The 'levelling of class", in Smith, H 1., War and Social Change, pp 201-202. 1019 Woodbury, C, 'Britain Begins to Rebuild Her Cities', The American Political Science Review, 41,5 
(1947), pp 901-920. 
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property and %%here sixteen schools had been seriously damaged or destroyed, 
'°2° was 
there property damage comparable to areas like Bristol (which lost 4.1% of its 
rateable value) or even Coventry (which lost only 3.5% of its rateable value). 
1021 
Whilst central government was determined that damaged city centres should be re- 
developed it concentrated its main efforts on three test areas: Bristol, Coventry, and 
Southampton. 1° This meant that, for Tyneside, much of the onus for re-development 
and planning fell on the sorely tried local authorities with the result that claims for 
funds to make good war damage could face significant impediments due to 
government procrastination. 10 
In addition to the questions surrounding the industrial future and restructuring 
of the area there were mounting pressures in other areas too. There were, perhaps, 
two dominant ideals amongst the public, on Tyneside as across much of the country. 
The first was that foreign relations should never again reach such a state where `Total 
War' was again necessary. The second was that in the post-war Britain such things as 
hunger, poor medical treatment, unemployment, and class prejudice, should never 
again overshadow sections of society. Increased social and political awareness, 
combined with a swing to the left of the political spectrum, had led many Tyneside 
residents, during 1941-1943, to embrace membership of the BCP. This was reflected 
in the increased financial circumstances of the local party and in the increasing 
frequency, and popularity, of meetings being held in the area. 1024 This had faded 
away by the end of the war but many Tyneside residents had retained a belief in the 
1020 TWAS: T15/1494A. Tynemouth County Borough Council ARP Files, January 1949. 
1021 Hasegawa, J, Re-planning the Blited City Centre: A Comparative Study of Bristol. Coventry and 
Southampton, 1941-50 (Oxford: Open University Press, 1992), pp 28-29. 
1022 Hasegawa, J, Re-planning, p 3. 
ý° TWAS: T15/1494A. Tynemouth County Borough Council ARP Files, report on repairs to 
damaged fish quay at North Shields, October 1947. 
t02` TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of Reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, November 2 1# 1941. 
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efficacy of more socially beneficial policies such as those advised by Beveridge and 
voiced this belief in the large Labour vote during the post-war election. 
Contrary to popular perception Tyneside was not an area traditionally 
dominated by the Labour Party. The area, especially Newcastle itself, had an 
established Liberal reputation through much of its history. In the aftermath of the 
First World War the Labour Party made significant gains in the number of local 
councillors it possessed in Newcastle. By 1921 the party had seventeen councillors, 
compared to just nine in 1915. In a reaction to this threat the Liberals and 
Conservative, long-time enemies, had allied themselves against the local Labour 
Party. This split in political loyalties tended to develop around class lines. Labour 
supporters were often workers from the traditional heavy industries whilst their 
opponents were largely composed of business and professional men. 1025 The anti- 
socialist forces, named the Progressives, managed to keep the Labour Party in 
opposition from the mid-1930s. 
In common with the general election the council elections of 1945 saw the 
Labour Party make big gains. For the first time the party won control of Newcastle 
Town Hall. "James Clydesdale, who had been blind since the age of eight, led the 
victorious Labour councillors. Elected to the Council in 1922, he now became 
Labour's first Lord Mayor. "' 026 In addition to the impressive gains made in the 
council chambers, the party also managed to win three of the constituencies in 
Newcastle. 1027 This change in the political sway of the area can be partially explained 
by the gro%ving interest in government intervention and the determination to build a 
new society laid out in the 1941 idea of `A Plan for Britain', as published by the 
1025 Todd, N, 'Ambition and Harsh Reality - Local Politics ... Local Politicians', in Ayris, 1, et al, Water under the Bridges, p 96. 
1026 Ibid, p 97. 
1027 Ibid. 
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Picture Post-l°'' Although the definition of working-class areas of Tyneside as a 
Labour stronghold has now been midely accepted, it was not always so. Many of 
those employed in the traditional industries were of a conservative outlook and some 
voted accordingly. ' 0-'9 This changed disproportionately during the war with the result 
that the region rapidly acquired a reputation as a Labour area. In the 1945 election the 
"working classes of the declining areas of heavy industry [such as Tyneside] joined 
forces through the ballot-box with much of the more prosperous working class in the 
Midlands and South-East, and a substantial section of the urban middle classes. "'030 
Ironically the only Conservative gain in the election came at Berwick, the Liberal who 
was defeated was Beveridge. 
A later factor that helped to maintain strong socialist feeling in the region was 
the reorganisation of the area's local government. The social cleavage of Tyneside, 
caused by the existence of numerous small and independent local authorities had long 
been criticised. 1031 It was believed that only a large, and well-resourced, system of 
local government could overcome the difficulties faced by the area. As a result of this 
policy Newcastle upon Tyne absorbed several smaller municipal areas. 1032 These 
areas were often reliant on heavy industry and contained a large proportion of 
working-class, labour-inclined, voters. Despite this factor the Progressives managed 
to fight back and succeeded in ousting Labour from control of Newcastle Council in 
1949, when there was evenly balanced support for both the Progressives and 
Labour. 
102: Stevenson, ], 'Planner's Moon? The Second World War and the planning movement', in Smith, H 
L, War and Social Change, p 58. 
1029 For a discussion of working-class conservatives, see Nordlinger, E A, The Working Class Tories 
(Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1967). . 1030 Addison, P, The Road to 1945 (London: Quartet, 1982), p 268. 
103 NA: 110 187/163. Report of the Royal Commission on Local Government in the Tyneside Area, 
1937.1938. 
1032 Todd, N, 'Ambition and Harsh Reality', p 95. 
1033 Ibid, p 97. 
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The necessities of wartime had coerced the government to run the economy in 
a much more direct manner than had hitherto been the case. The enthusiasm for 
planning that developed as a result of the war continued into the period of peace that 
followed. Indeed, it has been said that the "idea of `planning' was an important 
component of ... immediate post-war radical political consciousness. 
"1034 Increased 
state intervention and a "more collectivist solution to the nation's pre-war problems 
has been properly identified as part of the legacy of the `people's wars. s91035 This 
filtered down to the immediate post-war reactions of regional governmental bodies. 
On Tyneside, the local authorities reacted by enlarging their planning departments and 
forming planning committees. In Newcastle a pamphlet was created during 1945 
which declared the city's planning aims as being to produce a controlled and efficient 
environment that would benefit industry and recreation. 1036 This willingness to 
manage the city was more incredible in that it had previously demonstrated marked 
unwillingness to interfere, even going so far as to refuse to open cinemas on Sundays 
for locally billeted troops. 1037 
The Reactions of the People of Tyneside 
Undoubtedly, the people of Tyneside proved resilient throughout the war. 
They showed determination to continue with their lives as normally as was possible 
under the circumstances. Dances and other places of entertainment received 
"phenomenal patronage", even throughout the worst phases, when war weariness was 
1034 Byrne, D, `The Reconstruction of Newcastle', in Colls, R, and Lancaster, B, Newcastle upon Tyne, 
p 42. 
s Stevenson, J, `Planner's Moon? The Second World War and the planning movement', in Smith, H 
L, War and Social Change, p 59. 
10361bid, pp 341-343. 
1037 Todd, N, `Ambition and Harsh Reality', in Ayris, I, et al, Water under the Bridges, pp 91-92. 
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described as a morale-sapping factor in other parts of the country. 
1038 Whilst 
industrial unrest and weariness did show signs of eroding morale during the final 
period of the war the relaxation of restrictions by the authorities proved to be a 
popular move that enabled people to recapture some of the normality that had been 
missing from their everyday lives for more than five years. 1039 Despite experiencing 
sometimes heavy raiding and loss of life on an unevenly distributed but considerable 
scale, the attitude of the majority of those on Tyneside remained one of grim 
determination. Morale was described as excellent at the commencement of hostilities, 
despite the fear of an all-out bombing attack, and remained steady despite the military 
blows that affected the country during the first few years of the conflict. It would 
appear that although confidence dipped considerably at times (especially with the 
failure of the Norway campaign and the Battle of France) the people of Tyneside were 
quick to recover their spirits. Local factors again seemed to play a more important 
role in the morale of the people, as news involving substantial numbers of men from 
the region, such as the actions of the 50th Division, was treated with much greater 
seriousness than that which did not affect the area specifically. 1040 The losses 
experienced by groups with a large proportion of local men, such as the Merchant 
Navy, 1041 could and did cause consternation on Tyneside with a subsequent harmful 
effect on the confidence of the residents. Events which highlighted the importance of 
their own contribution were also motivational factors to the people of Tyneside and 
when the loss of HMS Repulse and HMS Prince of Wales was announced it was 
greeted on Tyneside with "consternation especially as residents of Tyneside 
10'8 TWAS: PA/NC/5/55. Summary of reports, Newcastle upon Tyne, January 5`h 1943. 
10'91bid, December 29`h 1944. 
1040Ibid July 17`x` 1942. 
1041 Ibid. 
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recognised the value of such ships. " 1042 The loss apparently encouraged the workers 
in the shipyards to redouble their efforts and made them feel that they were making a 
vital contribution to the war effort. 
1043 
Thus it would appear that, although the majority of Tyneside was steadfastly 
committed to the national war effort, regional factors could assume a disproportionate 
importance. The actions of the local authorities and the central government 
initiatives, designed to maintain public spirits, appear by and large to have been 
successful. Post-raid services functioned relatively smoothly on Tyneside and this, 
allied with the determination of the people themselves to play a proactive role in 
wartime society, enabled the majority of residents to maintain a high standard of 
confidence, despite the, at times, hard knocks that were suffered. The prevailing 
attitude was one of stoic acceptance, coupled with a determination to be seen to be 
`not letting the side down'. Despite the suffering "people just got on with life as best 
they could. "1044 The determination to appear outwardly confident meant that it was 
"not `done' to show grief in public". 1045 Confidence was exhibited to such a degree 
that, despite the setbacks one young man recalled that throughout the war "we all 
knew we were going to win it. It never occurred to us that we could lose. " 1046 
1042 lbid, December 19'h 1941. 
1043 For a discussion of the importance that naval ships played in the mentality of the British public see: 
Harrington, IZ, `The Mighty Hood: Navy, Empire, War at Sea and the British National Imagination 
1920-1960', Journal of Contemporary History, 38,2 (2003), pp 171-185. 
10" Correspondence from Mrs Doreen Barton, 2001. 
1045 Correspondence from Mrs E Carter, 2001. 




List i. Details of Vessels Lost by Moor Line. 
SS Alnmoor: Left Halifax bound for Glasgow, presumed lost in mid-Atlantic on 
February 15th 1941. No survivors from a crew of 41. 
SS Blythmoor: Sunk while berthed by torpedo fire on April 10th 1940 during Battle 
Of Narvik. Fourteen men rescued, 27 interned in Sweden. 
SS Castlemoor: Left Halifax bound for Middlesbrough. Last reported sighting on 
February 25th 1940, lost with no survivors from 42 man crew. 
SS Dalemoor: Bombed and set afire by enemy aircraft on June 13th 1941 when 
five miles off Aberdeen. Damaged but successfully repaired. Eight 
killed. Later struck a mine off the Humber and sank. 
SS Eastmoor: Torpedoed and sunk on March 31st 1942 off Norfolk, Virginia. 35 
Men rescued but sixteen killed. 
MV Glenmoor: Torpedoed and sunk in Atlantic on November 27th 1940 whilst 230 
miles off the west coast of Ireland. Two survivors, 31 killed. 
1047 All details from TWAS: DX 1054/1. Book of Remembrance for the firms Walter Runciman and 
Moor Line, 1939-1945. 
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MV Jedmoor: Torpedoed and sunk in Atlantic on September 16th 1941 approximately 
110 miles off Outer Hebrides. Six rescued, 31 killed. 
MV Northmoor: Torpedoed and sunk off South African coast on May 17th 1943. The 
ship sank in two minutes with the loss of twelve lives, 26 men were 
saved. 
SS Orangemoor: Torpedoed and sunk in Channel on May 3 1St 1940 (en-route to 
Tyne). Eighteen killed. 
SS Pearlmoor: Torpedoed and sunk in Atlantic on July 19th 1940. Ship sank in under 
two minutes. 26 crewmen saved, thirteen killed. 
MV Vinemoor: Sunk in Atlantic on July 26th 1940. No loss of life. 
SS Yorkmoor: Sunk off US Atlantic coast by gunfire after running battle with an 
enemy submarine on May 27th 1942. All of the crew were saved. 
SS Zurichmoor: Left Halifax on May 21511942 bound for St Thomas. Believed lost 
to enemy action on May 24"' 1942. Entire crew, 45 men, perished. 
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List ii. Vessels lost whilst being managed by Walter Runciman & Co. on behalf of the Ministry of 
Transport. 
SS Empire Adventure: Lost on September 20t' 1940,21 killed. 
SS Empire Beaumont: Lost on September 13th 1942,5 killed. 
SS Empire Blessing: Lost on March 19th 1945, no loss of life. 
MV Empire Dawn: Lost on September 12th 1942,27 killed and 19 were held as 
prisoners of war by the Japanese. 
SS Empire Haven: Lost on August 9t' 1943,1 killed. 
MV Empire Statesman: Lost on December 5th 1940,32 killed. 
SS Ocean Vagabond: Lost on January 10`h 1943,1 killed. 
SS Samselbu: Lost on March 19`h 1945, no loss of life. 
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Appendix BI°48 
Table i. Newcastle Council Spending on ARP. 
£ S D Years 
55 7 9 1936-1937 
522 19 6 1937-1938 
345 19 11 1938-1939 
924 7 2 Total 
Table ii. Breakdown of Newcastle Council Spending on ARP. 
1936-1937 1937-1938 1938-1939 
£ s d £ s d £ s d 
40 5 0 69 1 5 17 19 5 ARP Courses & Demonstrations 
13 2 5 Deputation expended 
28 19 8 Hiring of grounds etc 
14 1 8 160 6 7 22 11 4 Printing / Stationery / Postage 
49 6 0 Clothing 
1 1 1 35 3 0 1 9 0 Wood / Steel etc 
30 9 10 Maps and Plans 
10 10 1 1 14 10 Refreshments 
1 4 9 Chemical Requisites 
65 0 2 41 9 10 Alterations 
158 17 5 Furnishings 
55 13 10 Insurance 
4 1 9 22 3 5 Miscellaneous Costs 
36 19 7 Typists / Caretakers wages 
28 10 0 Typewriters 
14 5 1 AFS Medical Exams 
55 7 9 522 19 6 345 19 11 
1048 All figures in this appendix are from TWAS: MD/NC/276/1. Minutes and Reports from the 
Corporation of Newcastle upon Tyne Watch Committee (ARP). 
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Table iii. WVSAir Raids Welfare Committee Organisational Chart. 
WVS Admin. for Air Raids Welfare 
General Administration 









" General Communal 
Information Feeding 
Office 
Indoor II Outdoor 
Stores Stores 
Official II Voluntary 
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Annendix C1049 

































1049 All figures in tables i-vi are taken from TWAS: PA/NC/5/24. Newcastle City Police files re: 
Aliens. 
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Table ii. List of Resident Aliens in Newcastle upon Tyne, 1939-1940. 
Nationality Male Female Total 
American 16 4 20 
Armenian 1 1 
Austrian 2 1 3 
Belgian 10 5 15 
Chilean 3 3 
Chinese 4 1 5 
Czechoslovakian 1 1 
Danish 20 6 26 
Dutch 6 5 11 
French 7 10 17 
German 11 16 27 
Greek 3 3 
Italian 31 41 72 
Latvian 1 1 2 
Norwegian 16 7 23 
Polish 4 2 4 
Romanian 4 3 7 
Russian 73 73 146 
Spanish 1 2 3 
Swedish 6 3 9 
Swiss 15 15 
Siamese 1 1 
Turkish 2 2 
Total 236 180 416 
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Table iii. Conditional Landings Residing in Newcastle upon Tyne, 1939-1940. 
Nationality Male Female Total 
American 2 2 4 
Austrian 2 1 3 
Chinese 2 2 
Czechoslovakian 11 12 23 
Danish 12 4 16 
German 13 13 26 
Greek 5 5 
Hungarian 1 1 
Egyptian 2 2 
Italian 2 2 
Lithuanian 1 1 
Norwegian 3 1 4 
Polish 27 31 58 
Portuguese 1 1 
Spanish 1 1 
Stateless 1 1 
Swedish 1 1 
Turkish 1 1 
82 70 152 
Table iv. Alien Seamen Resident in Newcastle upon Tyne, 1939-1940. 













Table V. Aliens aged 16 to 18 residing in Newcastle upon Tyne, 1939-1940. 
Nationality Male Female Total 
Austrian 1 1 
Belgian 1 1 
Czechoslovakian 1 2 3 
Italian 1 1 
Polish 2 2 
4I4I8 
Table vi. Summary ofAliens Resident in Newcastle upon Tyne, 1939-1940. 
Category Aale Female Total 
Old Resident 236 180 416 
Conditional Landing 82 70 152 
Alien Seamen 457 457 
775 250 1025 
Table vii. Civilian Casualties by Gender. '°5° 
Gender Casualties Percentage 
Male 402 56% 
Female 317 44% 
1050 Information given in table vii-x is culled from the Index to the "Civilian War Dead Roll of Honour" 
for Northumberland, Durham and Yorkshire website 
[http: //www. genuki. org. uk/big/eng/Indexes/NE_WarDeaM, 2004. 
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Table viii. Civilian Casualties by Age. 
Age Range I Number Percentage 
0-15 136 19% 
16-35 212 30% 
36-65 300 42% 
66+ 68 9% 
Table ix. Female Casualties by Age. 
Age Range Number Percentage 
0-15 62 20% 
16-35 102 32% 
36-65 123 39% 
66+ 30 9% 
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Table x. Male Casualties by Age. 
Age Range Number Percentage 
0-15 74 19% 
16-35 110 28% 
36-65 177 44% 
66+ 38 9% 
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